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**A HISTORICAL STUDY OF THE NORTH  
ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION**

**BY**

**MARLIN EDWARD PETERSON**

**A research report submitted  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree Master of Education with a major in  
Social Science, South Dakota State  
College of Agriculture and  
Mechanic Arts**

**March, 1961**



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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The objectives of making a study of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are threefold. These objectives are to show the background, development, structure, operation, problems and accomplishments of NATO; to determine whether NATO has fulfilled the general objectives of the treaty; and to furnish a bibliography and source materials useful as teaching aids for further study of the organization.

We are living in a period when people of the West are turning to world organizations, such as NATO, as the hope of the world. A knowledge of what they have accomplished seems necessary if there is to be confidence in such organizations. A knowledge of their failures also seems necessary in this evaluation.

The average American on the street is not familiar with the history of NATO. He probably knows something of its recent activities, but little about its background, issues and struggles. This is largely due to the fact that he shows little interest in the politics, dates and details that are associated with this organization. Even so, however, more people are expressing a greater interest in world affairs because of such crises as Berlin, Germany, the Middle East, the Orient and the threat posed by Russian development of intercontinental missiles.

A personal interest in this study was prompted by a feeling of inadequacy while teaching current historical topics in an Iowa public school system. Due to insufficient time, the history courses taken in

this writer's undergraduate study could not adequately cover all the important events since World War II. A heavy teaching load prevented sufficient private study of this time period. The interest of this writer in this topic was also aroused by several references to NATO while doing research for a term paper in American Foreign Policy. It is hoped that this study will provide knowledge of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as well as knowledge of the major world events since World War II.

It is the plan of this study to trace the development of NATO in chronological order from its conception to its present status, which, because of the changing conditions must be incomplete. The early chapters deal with NATO's background, including the reasons for NATO, the leaders and countries responsible, early negotiations and provisions and purposes. The second part traces the changes that have come about since the treaty began functioning in 1949, and the structure, with explanations of the various civilian and military officials, committees, organizations and commands. The study closes with a summary of the accomplishments made by NATO in its eleven years of existence and of the problems NATO has faced, is facing, and will face in the future.

Information for this study was taken from an encyclopedia, books, pamphlets, newspapers and magazines. The books were used to provide the general background, while the other sources were used to make the study more current and detailed. The writer found the material from the Department of State and the United States Government Printing Office, especially the reports, documents and speeches, very helpful. An especially

helpful organization was the American Council on NATO, Inc., an independent information center located in New York City, which supplied much current literature.

The writer realized from the onset the tremendous scope of the topic. He is fully aware that a complete paper of this type could be written on several of the subdivisions of this subject. This paper was delimited, therefore, to a study of the historical aspects of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. For this reason one should expect the areas dealing with the political, social and economic aspects to be of shorter length. It was also necessary to be selective in the information chosen and no claim is made to have exhausted the material on this topic. Anyone so inclined can find ample information to make a more thorough study of this topic than does this research problem report. This author believes the character of the study he has undertaken will best serve his interests and future teaching needs.

## CHAPTER II

## BACKGROUND

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization formally came into existence on April 4, 1949, in Washington, D.C.<sup>1</sup> At this time, ten nations of Western Europe, plus Canada and the United States, signed a document that was to form a new group of states. These European nations were Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal, Iceland, Denmark and Norway. Later in February, 1952, Greece and Turkey signed the treaty, and in May, 1955, West Germany joined to make a total of fifteen nations in the new organization.

For the United States, it meant a departure from traditional policies because never before in peacetime had this nation committed itself to go to the aid of a country outside the Western Hemisphere. Never before had the United States agreed to join other nations in an active peacetime effort to build up mutual defensive strength.<sup>2</sup>

Previous to this time the United States could afford to remain aloof from Europe, but now the problems of Europe and America had become closely intertwined. The serious threat of the Soviet Union to the free world meant the United States could not evade its responsibilities in

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<sup>1</sup>The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Information Service: Palais De Chaillot, Paris, 1959, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup>NATO: Its Development and Significance, Department of State Publication 6467, U. S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., March, 1957, p. 2.



this area. The United States had twice become involved in wars in this area of the world and now realized that freedom and security in this area were essential to its own freedom and security. For the other nations, it meant American military assistance and psychological security against an armed attack.

The reasons for this new departure in American foreign policy are numerous. They are of a political, economic, cultural and social nature. An understanding of the historical period is also necessary if one is to grasp the full significance of the change.

To many others, the Atlantic Pact is not a new departure but a natural outgrowth of the ties we have with Western Europe.

The Atlantic Pact does not mark a sudden or novel change in our basic foreign relations. It does not newly entangle us with Europe. We have always been entangled with that continent. Whether or not we were fully conscious of it, we have always belonged to an Atlantic community embracing Western Europe together with America. Indeed, the pending Pact only gives name and substance to this very community which has existed ever since the discovery and settlement of America by Europeans over 450 years ago.<sup>3</sup>

The controversy does not alter the factors that make Europe so important to American safety. Western Europe is strategically located in relation to the heart of Soviet power. Air bases and seaports there would help the United States and its allies resist Soviet aggression and enable them to make a devastating retaliatory attack. In communist hands, these same bases and ports would imperil Atlantic commerce and bring North Atlantic cities within Soviet striking distance.

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<sup>3</sup>Carleton J.H. Hayes, "The Atlantic Pact," Think, vol. 21, May, 1949, p. 3.



The industrial potential of Western Europe is also of great importance to the United States as well as to the Soviet Union. If Russia obtained this area and combined it with her own, it would overbalance the United States and give the communists a 5 to 4 lead over North America in manufacturing output; the same area would give North America and Western Europe a 7 to 2 lead over the Soviets.<sup>4</sup> An examination of the 1953 steel production figures perhaps makes the point more meaningful.

American production . . . . .	101 million tons
Soviet Bloc . . . . .	47 million tons
Western Europe . . . . .	58 million tons <sup>5</sup>

Another factor to be considered is the large population of Western Europe which in 1959 was 561,300,000 people.<sup>6</sup> These people mean skilled workers, trained soldiers, businessmen and scientific and technical experts to aid the cause of freedom and defend Europe against aggression. Under the control of the Soviets, they would become slaves and enlarge the Soviet capacity for aggression.

In the economic field, the United States also has a great interest in this area. Western Europe provides the United States with great quantities of raw materials which are greatly needed by American industry. Some products, such as tin, rubber and platinum, must be entirely imported

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<sup>4</sup>NATO: Its Development and Significance, op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>5</sup>Lennox A. Mills and Charles H. McLaughlin, World Politics in Transition, Henry Holt and Company: New York, 1957, p. 397.

<sup>6</sup>"Europe," World Book Encyclopedia, Vol. 5, 1959 Edition, p. 2403.

from Western Europe or its colonies. The United States could not build a single tank, airplane or ship without certain imported materials.<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, these raw materials and trade would bolster the Soviet economy and make the communists an even greater threat to world peace.

Not only is Western Europe important to the United States with its location, industry, population and trade, but we are tied to this area culturally. Most of our people came from this part of the world and we, therefore, are extremely interested in it because of the similarity of our backgrounds and common heritage of political ideals, art, religion, literature, social customs and economic practices. The old adage, "blood flows thicker than water," explains the deep bonds that exist between the two areas. This was ably expressed by Foreign Minister Bjarni Benediktsson of Iceland in a speech during the signing of the treaty:

It is not only this threat to world peace and human well-being which unites us . . . There are stronger bonds which bind us together. We all belong to the same culture . . . .<sup>8</sup>

These factors alone did not produce the great change in American foreign policy. A brief glance at history is also necessary. History had long witnessed the politics of balance of power prevent many struggles on the continent. This had depended upon a powerful England and countervailing powers on the continent. Then World War II had reduced Europe, including England, to a continent of relatively weak powers none

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<sup>7</sup>NATO: Its Development and Significance, op. cit., p. 2.

<sup>8</sup>The Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, Department of State Publication 3497, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., April 4, 1949, p. 18.

of which alone could become the basis for an anti-communist influence.<sup>9</sup>  
 The war had left the European nations in a state of political chaos and economic devastation. In the words of one author:

Among the problems which confronted the Allies were the problems of forging a peace out of weariness, cynicism, inertia, and disunion, of coping with hunger, misery, and disease, of rehabilitating the economic life of both victors and vanquished -- in short of rebuilding a shattered world order . . . .<sup>10</sup>

The communists wasted little time in taking advantage of the above conditions and encouraged subversion, sabotage and unrest. While the Western democracies disarmed and maintained faith in the ability of the United Nations to maintain world peace, the Soviet Union continued to maintain its large standing army and to harass the efforts of the United Nations.

The earlier meetings with Russia at Yalta and Potsdam seemed to indicate that although a postwar pattern was mapped out, the leaders spoke in different tongues and with different aims. It was determined at Yalta that the people in the lands overrun by the Germans should have the right to choose the form of government under which they would live, to have representative provisional governments and free elections. These provisions were not carried out in the lands occupied by the Russian Army. The story of Yalta was repeated by Russia in its treatment of the Potsdam agreements. Here Russia refused to cooperate on the questions of the type

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<sup>9</sup>Saul K. Padover, Europe's Quest for Unity, No. 97, Foreign Policy Association, Inc.: New York, January-February, 1953, p. 14.

<sup>10</sup>Robert Ergang, Europe in Our Times, D. C. Heath and Company: Boston, 1953, p. 611.

of government, economic unity and on reparations to be levied on the defeated powers. Whatever unity had existed during the war had quickly evaporated in its aftermath. In its place was wrangling over strategic areas, colonial possessions and spheres of political influence.

Even after the fighting ended, the Russians refused to withdraw their troops from Iran and the countries of Eastern Europe. In several of these areas occupied by Soviet troops, puppet governments were established and united with the communist bloc. Among the first states to be made communist were those of Bulgaria and Rumania. This caused one writer to say:

By the end of the summer, it was clear that the Yalta agreements on the Balkans would not work and that neither the United Kingdom nor the United States had the power to make them work.<sup>11</sup>

Finland, Poland and Hungary remained in Russian control thus placing Czechoslovakia in grave danger.

Soon the Soviet menace was expanding in the direction of Western Europe and the remaining democracies needed protection against communist subversion and possible military aggression. If Western Europe fell to communism, the defense of Asia and Africa would become even more difficult. The Russian troops in Iran were withdrawn in the spring of 1946, but only after repeated requests from the United Nations.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Marina Salvin, The North Atlantic Pact, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: New York, May, 1949, p. 379.

<sup>12</sup>James Burnham, The Struggle for the World, John Day and Company, Inc.: New York, 1947, p. 2.

Pressure was also put on Turkey and Greece in 1946 to obtain for Russia the control of the Straits. This was merely a continuation of the Russian desire since the days of Peter the Great to obtain a warm water outlet to the Mediterranean Sea. Territorial demands were made on Turkey, including claims to bases in the Straits. Moscow insisted on a revision of the Montreux Convention of 1936 which would give Russia a privileged position in the strategic waters.<sup>13</sup> She also demanded frontier changes along her common frontier with Turkey. Agents, trained within the Soviet Union, swarmed into Turkey and Soviet professors and journalists worked overtime to prove that Turks are the root of all evil.<sup>14</sup>

Guerrilla warfare was encouraged in Greece and aid was given to communists attempting to take over the Greek government. When England announced its intention to withdraw from the Balkans, the United States decided to take action to preserve these two nations from communism. President Truman asked Congress for, and received, aid for Greece and Turkey. The President said, "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities, or by outside pressures."<sup>15</sup> This financial and moral assistance was intended as a stopgap measure, but it soon

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<sup>13</sup>Charles O. Lerche, Jr., Foreign Policy of the American People, Prentice-Hall, Inc.: Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1958, p. 266.

<sup>14</sup>James Burnham, op. cit., p. 174.

<sup>15</sup>Marina Salvin, op. cit., p. 385.

became clear that a more comprehensive program would be needed.

The United States had hopes of finding honest and peaceful settlements to postwar problems with Russia and planned to work through the United Nations to create economic and social conditions for world peace and prosperity. Underlying this faith was the belief that the major powers could act in harmony to solve the postwar problems. The Russians, however, persistently defied the United Nations with the abuse of the veto power in the Security Council. Cooperation could be achieved only at the price of concession and this the United States was unwilling to do. The concessions previously given by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes in December, 1946, on his trip to Moscow were summarized by the words, "He came, he saw, he concurred."<sup>16</sup> Americans had decided there would be no more of that. They were slowly grasping the implications of the Russian policy.

After much discussion and debate the European Recovery Program, better known as the Marshall Plan, was passed by Congress and went into effect on April 13, 1948. Its purpose was to provide economic aid to all the nations of Europe, including Russia, to help rebuild the shattered economies. The Russians refused any aid that was to be sent to Europe.

But the Soviet Union rejected the Marshall Plan and forced its satellites to do likewise. Through economic pressure, strikes, and sabotage, it sought to prevent the economic recovery of Western Europe.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup>Robert Ergang, op. cit., p. 618.

<sup>17</sup>NATO: Its Development and Significance, August, 1952, p. 7.



Russia was convinced that an exhausted Europe would mean final victory for communism. In the meantime, Russia had executed the coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia which again showed her intentions and caused many who were opposed to the European Recovery Program to reverse their stand.<sup>18</sup> Russia attacked the Marshall Plan as a scheme of American capitalists to gain economic and political control over Europe. She made every effort to cause failure of the Plan by refusing to participate, by re-establishing the Cominform and organizing her own Council of Economic Mutual Aid, informally known as the Molotov Plan. These aid programs, however good, could not contain Russia, and the free world began to feel a need for unity and coordination of policy and defense. Only by joint effort could communist expansion be halted.

Earlier in a speech at Fulton, Missouri, on March 1, 1946, Winston Churchill had suggested some sort of military alliance between England and the United States, but it brought no action. People still placed more faith in the United Nations than in power alliances. Now such men as Bernard Baruch, John Foster Dulles and Senator Saltonstall suggested plans for military aid or joint defense to prevent further aggression by the Soviet Union. These and many others believed that unless such a program were established the recipient nations would be forced to divert a large share of their Marshall Plan aid into armaments which would deter their economic development.

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<sup>18</sup> Joseph C. Harsh, "American Policy in Eastern Europe," Eastern Europe Today, No. 77, Foreign Policy Association, Inc.: New York, September 20, 1949, p. 56.

The trend of thought in the United States was beginning to change in favor of such an alliance. It became convincingly clear that to restore the balance of power, Western Europe must be united with Great Britain. This would produce the "third force" in the United States-Soviet dominated world, and by being associated with one or the other, would swing the balance of power to its advantage. As the United States became fully aware of this concept, she made haste to prevent the development of a neutral bloc and to bring as many European nations as possible into a security system to swing the power balance in its favor. An event on March 4, 1947, at Dunkirk was the beginning. At this time, Great Britain and France signed a fifty year treaty of alliance.<sup>19</sup> From this came the Brussels Pact followed by the North Atlantic Treaty. The centuries-old fear of a unified Europe dominating the world was dead.

The Soviets, meanwhile, continued their policy of expansion and threatening world peace. They continued to violate the terms of the Potsdam Agreement, blocked peace treaties with former enemy countries, continued the maintenance of large Soviet forces throughout Eastern Europe and the building up of satellite forces. Perhaps the greatest of these threats to world peace was the Berlin Blockade. It was the purpose of this act to cut off the allies' supply line into Berlin, which lay in the Soviet occupation zone of Germany. By means of an airlift the city was saved and the Russian plan to force surrender of the city failed.

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<sup>19</sup>Halford Lancaster Hoskins, The Atlantic Pact, Public Affairs Bulletin Number 69, Library of Congress: Washington, D.C., April, 1949, p. 16.



There was no retaliation by the Russians. Moscow, faced by equal pressure, had shown it would stop; it seemed reasonable to conclude that the Kremlin would recoil if faced by superior power.<sup>20</sup> A unified organization of nations could present this necessary power.

The movement leading to the Atlantic Pact was gaining momentum. In the closing days of 1947 when the sixth meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers had drawn to a close, Ernest Bevin, England's Foreign Minister, realized that the great wartime alliance had come to an end. Mr. Molotov had shown no cooperation and had gone home. Mr. Bevin had an idea:

He had become convinced that at no time in the future could anybody look forward to a day when the Russians would deal in any other terms but force. He was convinced that there was only one way for the West to survive. The Western Powers had to work out some sort of union that would put Western Europe together and then back it with the military strength of the United States and Canada.<sup>21</sup>

He passed on his idea to Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, who in turn talked to Senator Vandenberg who thought it very good.

As work toward this end progressed in the United States, Bevin organized an association of France, England and the Benelux powers. This pact was signed in Brussels, Belgium, on March 17, 1948 and was to remain in force for 50 years.<sup>22</sup> In doing this, England departed from her traditional policy of neutralism and, further, placed the blame for the state of affairs directly on Russia. This pact seemed necessary in that the

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<sup>20</sup>Charles O. Lerche, Jr., op. cit., p. 350.

<sup>21</sup>Theodore H. White, Fire in the Ashes, William Sloane Associates: New York, 1953, p. 287.

<sup>22</sup>Sidney B. Fay, "Union for Western Europe," Current History, vol. 16, March, 1949, p. 158.

threat of Soviet military aggression steadily increased as Western Europe grew in economic recovery and political stability with the Marshall Plan aid.

The Brussels Pact was set up to meet aggression. It was primarily a military alliance, although it also included economic, social and cultural provisions. For this reason, it has been claimed that this pact anticipated the North Atlantic Treaty by resolving "to associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims with other States inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination."<sup>23</sup>

It provided for a Consultative Council made up of Five Foreign Ministers and a permanent Military Committee in London. Their joint permanent organization for common defense was known as UNIFORCE. The chief commander was Field Marshall Montgomery of England and its headquarters was located at Fontainbleau, France. The results of the meeting of the Five Foreign Ministers, with the United States and Canada observing, was to create a defense pattern for Western Europe. To make the defense effective they needed war materials from the United States. Because the latter had already departed from her traditional isolationist attitude by joining the United Nations, the possibility of United States membership was great.

What would be the reaction in the United States? Although President Truman welcomed the Brussels Pact and declared the United States would match the determination of the free peoples of Europe to protect

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<sup>23</sup>The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, op. cit., p. 8.

themselves, many problems remained. Public opinion needed to be swayed in favor of a treaty with these nations; military problems required clearing through the Pentagon; and it had to conform to the Constitution of the United States.

It was also a presidential election year and practical politics had to be contended with. From the spring of 1948 to the early part of 1949, talks continued between the Ambassadors of the United States, Canada and those of the Brussels Pact states. In addition, a State Department team, representatives of the armed forces and Senate committees, studied the problem and submitted their findings and proposals. The result of these efforts produced the basic formula that:

an armed attack against one or more of them . . . shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agreed that each of them . . . will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith . . . such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.<sup>24</sup>

Earlier, President Truman had been encouraged by the Vandenberg Resolution that had passed the Senate on June 11, 1948, by a vote of 64 to 4.<sup>25</sup> It stated that it was the duty of the Senate to work toward international peace and security through the United Nations with emphasis on the development of regional and collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

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<sup>24</sup>Theodore H. White, op. cit., p. 290.

<sup>25</sup>Halford Lancaster Hoskins, op. cit., p. 22.

Negotiations of the pact began immediately with representatives of the United States, Canada and the Brussels Treaty Powers meeting in Washington, D.C., throughout the summer.

The meetings were delayed while the United States and Canada sent observers to the permanent military organization set up under the Brussels Treaty. In December, 1948, the Washington discussions were resumed among the same nations. They were soon joined by representatives from Norway, Iceland, Italy and Portugal, all of which had vital geographical positions. Sweden showed signs of interest, but she was in a particularly difficult spot because her joining might have provoked Russia into occupying Finland. The Soviets attempted unsuccessfully to intimidate Norway by claiming that the sponsors of the Pact wanted to establish military and air bases in Norway for an attack on the Soviet Union.

Two more months of negotiation were required before all nations were in agreement. The talks were conducted in private and in confidence so all representatives could speak frankly and fully on matters of utmost importance to their countries. The major nations did not care to have too many countries in the Pact because the arsenal nations would not be able to supply everyone. Yet they did not want it to be too exclusive so as to weaken the alliance. The final draft of the treaty was signed in Washington on April 4, 1949, by the Foreign Ministers of the 12 nations.

It had been quite common for European nations to use a peacetime alliance against armed attack but, as we have noted, this was an uncommon venture for the United States. In its entire history, the United States had entered into only one defensive alliance with a European power, that

in 1778 with France. That America signed the pact showed the American problems and those of the remainder of the world to be inseparable and such a pact was inevitable.

Two questions still remained to be answered: Would the people of the signing nations accept the pact? Would the United States Senate ratify the treaty? There was mixed reaction among European nations to joining such an organization. What kind of aid would come from the United States? Had efforts been exhausted in a compromise with Russia? Would it provoke Russia to war?

Even in Western Europe where American leadership was strongest, there was resentment and resistance.<sup>26</sup> Many Europeans felt they were being pushed too rapidly and too far in hostility toward the Soviets. They also feared the effects of rearmament and militarization on their shaky economies and unstable governments. A final complaint was their belief that the United States was closing the door to peaceful negotiations and overlooking the danger of nonmilitary expansion.

Russia voiced criticism of the alliance. She charged the making of such a pact was an instrument for world domination by England and the United States. During a debate in the United Nations General Assembly, Andrei Gromyko said:

To undermine the United Nations and to build up a military and political bloc for use in the new war which they are hatching is the general policy of the United States and the United Kingdom.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup>Charles O. Lerche, Jr., op. cit., p. 357.

<sup>27</sup>Walter M. Daniels, Defense of Western Europe, The H. W. Wilson Company: New York, 1950, p. 20.

Finland was immediately sent a sharp warning against aligning itself with the Western Powers. Juliusz Kata-Sucky of Poland said, "The North Atlantic Alliance is the chief instrument of an aggressive policy on both sides of the Atlantic."<sup>28</sup> Communists in the legislatures of France, led by Thorez, and in Italy, led by Togliatti, debated at great lengths against such an organization.

Discussions also took place in the United States Senate. After lengthy public hearings, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted (unanimously) to recommend that the Senate approve the treaty. This the Senate did on July 21, 1949, by a vote of 82 to 13.<sup>29</sup> The effect of the inaugural address of Harry Truman in January, and the Department of State circular, "Collective Security in the North Atlantic Area," of January 23 on the vote can only be speculated.

The ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty has been called "about as bipartisan as a foreign policy can be."<sup>30</sup> This new spirit of the Senate appeared to be a realization that if the United States were to play an effective role in world affairs, more cooperation would be required between the two major political parties and the executive and legislative branches. This new spirit was shown in the acceptance of the

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<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>29</sup>Vera Miles Dean, "Europe's Efforts to Unite," Can Europe Unite? No. 80, Foreign Policy Association, Inc.: New York, March, 1950, p. 25.

<sup>30</sup>Blair Bolles and Francis O. Wilcox, The Armed Road to Peace, An Analysis of NATO, Foreign Policy Association, Inc.: New York, March-April, 1952, p. 57.



following: the United Nations membership by a vote of 89 to 2; the Rio Pact, 72 to 1; and the Italian Peace Treaty, 79 to 10.<sup>31</sup>

So great was the unity in the Senate that a proposed amendment to the Vandenberg Resolution by Senator Claude Pepper of Florida to omit reference to future American military aid was voted down by a vote of 61 to 6.<sup>32</sup> Concerning his resolution of future American membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Senator Vandenberg said, "It is the most practical deterrent to war which the wit of mankind has yet devised."<sup>33</sup>

Among those heard in opposition was Henry A. Wallace who said:

The peaceful alternative rests on agreeing to live in the same world with Russia. Far from fearing Russian aggression, we must welcome every possible move for Russia's peace. . . We must come to the Russians with a plan for cooperation within the framework of the United Nations, not unilateral proposals that lead to the suspicion of world domination.<sup>34</sup>

The President signed the Treaty on July 25, 1949, and it became effective on August 24, 1949.<sup>35</sup> The prophetic advice given by General George C. Marshall in 1945 had been realized:

We must if we are to realize the hopes we may dare have for lasting peace, enforce our will for peace with strength. We must make it clear to the potential gangsters of the world that if they dare break our peace, they do so at their great peril.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 56.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 58.

<sup>33</sup>NATO: Its Development and Significance, March, 1957, p. 8.

<sup>34</sup>Walter M. Daniels, op. cit., p. 29.

<sup>35</sup>NATO: Its Development and Significance, March, 1957, p. 7.

<sup>36</sup>Elair Bolles, and Francis O. Wilcox, op. cit., p. 12.

NATO is composed of soldiers, airfields, diplomats, etc., but it is more than these---it is an idea. It had taken years to develop, and the basic idea is that in the Atlantic area the individual man and liberty are the measures of political value. It was not until the Russian threat that the people of the Atlantic area realized that their interdependence, economically and militarily, along with their common traditions, customs and religion could be used to develop an embryonic Atlantic community.

Not until now, when desperately challenged by other counter-attacking civilizations, have the men who live around the Atlantic realized that they must band themselves together to defend, each people with its lives and substance, the lives and substance of every other member. It is an alliance like no other in history, for at its base lie no objectives of spoil or conquest. All the rest of the globe may be bargained over, but NATO itself was not erected for bargaining. It was erected for defense of the heartland of freedom and a heritage which only too late was realized to be common property.<sup>37</sup>

Is the North Atlantic community a step toward peace? President Truman, in his message transmitting the North Atlantic Treaty, said:

This treaty is only one step---although a long one on the road to peace. No single action, no matter how significant, will achieve peace. We must continue to work patiently and carefully, advancing with practical realistic steps in the light of circumstance and events as they occur, building the structure of peace soundly and solidly.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>37</sup>Theodore H. White, op. cit., p. 286.

<sup>38</sup>Walter M. Daniels, op. cit., p. 16.



## CHAPTER III

## PROVISIONS AND PURPOSES OF NATO

This chapter will present a somewhat detailed discussion of the provisions and purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. An understanding of these must come from frequent reference to the treaty itself, which is one of the shortest and clearest of international documents.<sup>1</sup> The more important clauses will be briefly explained, as will the military strategy which has been planned to fulfill the defensive purpose of the Treaty. Its relationship to the United Nations is also explained in this chapter.

Following the Preamble, the Treaty contains 14 articles, of which the most important, from the political, economical and military standpoints, are Articles 3, 4 and 5. Article 3 pledges the parties "to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid."<sup>2</sup> In other words, one country cannot rely on others alone, but must do its utmost to defend itself and help the general defense. There is no specific amount of aid one country must give to defense; they give what they can in such areas as manpower, arms or strategic locations for bases.

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<sup>1</sup>The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Information Service: Palais De Chaillot, Paris, 1959, p. 11.

<sup>2</sup>The North Atlantic Treaty, Department of State Publication 3464, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., March, 1949, p. 2.

Article 4 provides: "The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened."<sup>3</sup> Consultation can result from any threat in the world, and this can include threats from internal sources, such as a revolution within a country, which could also be engineered from without.

Article 5 provides: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all."<sup>4</sup> This is an important statement by itself---it helps to discourage aggression. If one country should attack a member, the Treaty makes it clear that such an aggressor as appeared in World War II would meet the combined power of all the NATO countries.

The Pact has changed the situation from that which existed before World War II when Hitler could drive against a divided Europe. Such an invasion today would bring in not only the NATO nations, but also the 21 American Republics of the Rio Pact, whose purpose is to defend the Western Hemisphere. Many people believe such a Pact could have prevented World War II.

These three articles are the heart of the Treaty---Article 3 provides for work before any threat has developed; Article 4 provides for consultation should trouble develop; and Article 5 provides for action should the need occur. A very important point should be mentioned at this

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

time. All measures taken by the organization as a result of an armed attack will be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations and will be ended when that body has taken sufficient measures to restore and maintain world peace.

Article 6 clarifies the meaning of "armed attack" as held by the framers of the Treaty. This provision would seem to show that NATO nations wish to avoid war by describing in detail the area covered by the Treaty. On the other hand, it leaves no doubt as to how a nation wishing to do so might begin a war.

Article 9 establishes a council and sets up the basis for representation. It was intended for this council to set the machinery of NATO in motion and establish other bodies as it finds necessary. This council will be discussed in a later chapter on the development of NATO.

Article 10 sets forth the conditions under which new members may be added. The framers of the treaty could foresee the desire of other nations to join and the possibility of disagreement of which to admit.

Membership in NATO is based on the principle of equality. This means that the vote of the smallest nation counts as much as a vote of the largest nation. Because a unanimous vote is required to admit a new member, no nation can be forced to accept the entrance of an unwelcome member. There are other standards of membership besides those of strength or strategic location. A nation making application for membership must be acceptable to the other members and it must be willing to accept the principles of the Treaty. The unanimity requirement protects each member from an unwelcome country. For example, France cannot be

forced to accept the membership of Franco Spain; the United States can veto any nation's application which she feels would add unduly to her military and strategic problems. The United States would like to have Spain in NATO, but many members are reluctant to accept undemocratic Spain despite her strategic location. Thus Spain remains outside the NATO alliance. Whether an applying nation is able and willing to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area as required for admission is left to individual nations to decide.

The other articles deal with such provisions as previous obligations, further development of international relations, procedure of ratification, tenure of the treaty, withdrawal, and safekeeping of the Treaty. The reader is encouraged to consult the appendix for a more detailed study of the Treaty.

One of the objections of the communist bloc and others opposed to the Treaty was that it violated the United Nations Charter. One of the most notable persons who expressed a viewpoint on this opposition was Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio. In a speech before the Senate on July 11, 1949, the senator said:

. . . in the United Nations Charter we accepted the principle that we could go to war in association with other nations against a nation found by the Security Council to be the aggressor . . . the treaty as drawn is certainly no improvement over the United Nations . . . from the point of an international organization it is a step backward . . . and . . . will do far more to bring about a third world war than it will ever maintain the peace of the world . . . it is a step backward in the progress toward international peace and justice . . . .<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Vital Speeches, "The North Atlantic Pact," vol. 15, City News Publishing Company: New York, November 15, 1949, p. 611.

Those who favored the Treaty said it does not violate the United Nations Charter. On the contrary, they argue it is recognized by the "right of individual or collective self-defense" expressed in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.<sup>6</sup> It has not weakened the United Nations, but has recognized that the United Nations has some definite weaknesses. The NATO Treaty recognizes that it is wise to have your plans secret from a body in which your potential aggressor sits. Mr. Ernest Bevin said, "This Treaty does not affect in any way, the rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations of the parties which are members of the United Nations."<sup>7</sup> This view was also expressed by President Truman at the signing of the Treaty in 1949:

Through this treaty, we undertake to conduct our international affairs in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. We undertake to exercise our right of collective or individual self-defense against armed attack, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, and subject to such measures as the Security Council may take to maintain and restore international peace and security.<sup>8</sup>

Senator Robert A. Taft, in the speech already mentioned, takes issue with this point:

. . . I would conclude that member nations can enter into an agreement binding themselves to exercise this inherent right of collective self-defense if and when an armed attack occurs. There is nothing said about an agreement. There is no reference to regional undertakings . . . It seems clear to me, however, that the right is to be exercised only "if an armed attack occurs." I do

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<sup>6</sup>See appendix p. 85.

<sup>7</sup>Debate in the House of Commons, British Information Services, Reference Division: New York, 1949, p. 127.

<sup>8</sup>The Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, Department of State Publication 3497, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., April 4, 1949, p. 34.



not think Article 51 extends the actual exercise of this right to the arming of other nations prior to the occurrence of such an attack. An undertaking by the most powerful nation in the world to arm half the world against the other half goes far beyond any "right of collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs." It violates the whole spirit of the United Nations Charter. That Charter looks to the reduction of armaments by agreement between individual nations. I do not claim that there is any direct violation of the Charter, but the Atlantic Pact moves in exactly the opposite direction from the purposes of the Charter and makes a farce of further efforts to secure international peace through law and justice . . . .<sup>9</sup>

Other individuals opposed to the compatibility of the Treaty and the United Nations Charter state similar views. One such view states:

. . . any honest person reading the Charter and the pact side by side will reject the State Department claim that the pact "implements the Charter." The contrary is true. Article 51 of the Charter recognizes the right of member states to defend themselves against armed attack, individually or collectively, until the Security Council has taken measures to deal with the emergency. But Article 53 provides that no enforcement action shall be taken by any regional agency "without the authorization of the Security Council," and Article 54 says that the council shall be "kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements . . ." The text of the pact ignores these detailed provisions; instead it states that the signatories will act "forthwith" in case of armed attack upon a fellow member and will then report their action to the Security Council.<sup>10</sup>

Two protocols have been added to NATO since its beginning. The first of these was signed by the Council Deputies in London on October 22, 1951. This protocol made provision for the admittance of Greece and Turkey, and they formally became members on February 18, 1952.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>Vital Speeches, op. cit., p. 615.

<sup>10</sup>Freda Kirchwey, "Signed but not Sealed," The Nation, vol. 168, April 9, 1949, p. 404.

<sup>11</sup>The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, op. cit., p. 16.

To further strengthen the defenses of Western Europe, the NATO nations turned to West Germany. The United States was eager to enlist German manpower and resources, especially the Ruhr, the industrial heart of Europe. However, France and other Western European nations, mindful of past German actions, were fearful of rearming Germany. In the face of the communist menace steps were taken, however, to rearm Germany but with safeguards.

The first plan for rearmament of West Germany was the European Defense Community drawn up in 1952. This plan never came into existence. After more than two-years delay, the French National Assembly rejected the European Defense Plan because it failed to include England as a member---to help counterbalance German power---and it merged defense budgets, arms production and military commands that limited France's control over her own defense.<sup>12</sup>

When EDC was defeated, Western statesmen moved to find an alternative plan for rearming West Germany but with safeguards to win French approval. A new series of agreements called the Paris Agreements were drawn up and signed in Paris in October, 1954.<sup>13</sup> These agreements provided for West Germany sovereignty, the end of the Allied occupation, West Germany was to regain complete control over her domestic and foreign affairs (except for negotiations regarding German reunification), and allied troops were to be retained in West Germany and West Berlin.

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<sup>12</sup>"European Unity: Now to Make it Stick," Newsweek, vol. 44, November 1, 1954, pp. 34-35.

<sup>13</sup>Sidney B. Fay, "The United States and Western Europe," Current History, vol. 28, January, 1955, p. 40.

Secondly, the Paris Agreements called for West German rearmament and she was to be admitted to the Western European Union. England was not to withdraw her forces from Europe without the consent of her WEU allies. WEU also set upper limits on the armed forces and armaments its members could contribute to NATO. In addition, other provisions included the prohibition of West German manufacture of atomic, biological or chemical weapons, guided missiles, submarines, large warships or bomber aircraft. The most important provision of all allowed West Germany to join NATO.

The Paris Agreements met with quick acceptance. On May 5, 1955, the second protocol was ratified by all member nations and the Federal Republic of Germany became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization two days later.<sup>14</sup>

The basic statements of NATO's purposes are found in the preamble which states:

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of the law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and preservation of peace and security. They, therefore, agree to this North Atlantic Treaty.<sup>15</sup>

The major aim of NATO is collective action for defense against aggression and has been briefly stated by one student of world politics as follows:

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<sup>14</sup>Elie Abel, "Bonn is Admitted to Atlantic Pact; Dulles Hails Step," New York Times, May 7, 1955, pp. 1-2.

<sup>15</sup>The North Atlantic Treaty, op. cit., p. 1.



"Its purpose is peace, not war—peace through unity, strength, and preparedness."<sup>16</sup> Dean Acheson, in his letter transmitting NATO to the President, said:

The essential purpose of the treaty is to fortify and preserve this common way of life. It is designed to contribute to the maintenance of peace by making clear in advance the determination of the parties resolutely and collectively to resist armed attack on any of them. It is further designed to contribute to the stability and well-being of the member nations by removing the haunting sense of insecurity, and enabling them to plan and work with confidence in the future. Finally, it is designed to provide the basis for effective collective action to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area, if an armed attack should occur.<sup>17</sup>

The crux of the NATO concept is the establishment of a single unified defensive force for Western Europe under the general direction of a civilian body representing all the treaty members. The member nations plan their military strategy jointly; they have combined their forces into an international army; they have placed themselves under regional rather than national commanders and they have agreed to work out their economic problems to the benefit of all.

To accomplish the collective action for defense against aggression, a military strategy has been planned in the event of an armed attack. In such an emergency, the forces immediately available to SACEUR would be expected to make the maximum possible use of defensive obstacles to slow the Soviet advance. Meanwhile, additional reserve units would be mobilized and prepare a stand behind such natural barriers

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<sup>16</sup>Herbert L. Marx, Jr., Defense and National Security, The H. W. Wilson Company: New York, 1955, p. 124.

<sup>17</sup>Marina Salvin, The North Atlantic Pact, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: New York, May, 1949, p. 435.

as rivers, mountains, etc. While this fighting was taking place, the Strategic Air Command of the United States Air Force would make atomic bombing raids upon the Soviet Union. The naval units of NATO would keep open the sea lanes between Europe and Canada and the United States. Through these lanes would pour reinforcements of men and materiel which would insure an eventual victory. Thus NATO would serve as a shield to prevent a rapid Soviet conquest of Europe.<sup>18</sup>

This original strategy changed when Russia also developed the atomic bomb. On September 23, 1949, President Truman made the announcement to the American people, " . . . We have evidence that within recent weeks an atomic explosion occurred in the U.S.S.R. . . . ."<sup>19</sup> This made a change necessary because the Soviets would now be able to devastate both Europe and America before the three phases of the original strategy could be accomplished. Of course, the original strategy will remain should Russia decide to forsake the atomic bomb to gain control of Europe's industrial plants and population.

To counter for an atomic blow to Europe, warning and defense systems have been established in Canada and the United States. Because of the distance involved, the Soviets would be required to launch their attack against North America first to prevent a retaliatory attack. This warning system can provide the alert of an attack on America. It would

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<sup>18</sup>J. Lawton Collins, "NATO: Still Vital For Peace," Foreign Affairs, vol. 34, April, 1956, p. 373.

<sup>19</sup>"U.S. Detects Atomic Blast in Russia," Life, vol. 27, October 3, 1949, p. 17.

give the NATO forces time to prepare and launch an atomic attack against the Soviet Union. In either case, the Soviets could not avoid a retaliatory attack upon their own cities and territory.

While the original strategy of NATO has changed, its over-all military purpose has not changed. This is to provide a deterrent force which will convince Russia that she cannot escape a retaliatory atomic attack. It is hoped this will prevent another war.

## CHAPTER IV

## THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization as we know it today had no actual organizational structure in the beginning. Article 9 merely provided for the establishment of a Council to implement the treaty and left it up to the Council to set up whatever organizational machinery might be necessary.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, the North Atlantic Council held its first session in Washington on September 17, 1949. It was responsible for setting up subsidiary bodies, in particular, a defense committee for the implementation of Articles 3 and 4. The Council made it clear that any such bodies were to be subordinate to the Council, and they recognized that any organization established must be flexible and subject to periodic review.

At its first meeting, it was decided that the Foreign Ministers of the member countries would be members of the Council; annual meetings were to be held with provisions for extraordinary sessions at times when it seemed necessary. Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson of the United States became the first chairman of the Council, thereafter the chairmanship was to be rotated.<sup>2</sup>

The Council then established a Defense Committee composed of Defense Ministers. They had the task of drawing up defense plans for the

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<sup>1</sup>NATO: Its Development and Significance, March, 1957, p. 14.

<sup>2</sup>See appendix p. 86.

North Atlantic area. The military part of the organization included a Military Committee and Regional Planning Groups. The Military Committee was to consist of the Chiefs-of-Staff of all signatory nations and this committee was to establish an executive subcommittee known as the Standing Group.<sup>3</sup> It was to be composed of one representative from the three major powers---France, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Military Committee was to provide policy guidance of a military nature to the Standing Group and to advise the Defense Committee on defensive measures for the North Atlantic area.

Five Regional Planning Groups were set up: the Northern European Group; the Western European Group; the Southern European-Western Mediterranean Group; the Canadian-United States Group and the North Atlantic Ocean Group. The Planning Groups were to recommend to the Military Committee, through the Standing Group, plans for the defense of the region.<sup>4</sup>

At the second session, held in November, 1949, the Council recognized the question of military production and supply and economic and financial problems. To deal with these problems, a Defense Financial and Economic Committee was formed and given the following tasks: to develop over-all financial and economic guides to, and limits of, future defense programs which North Atlantic Treaty nations should undertake; to appraise the financial and economic impact on member nations of major individual defense projects; to recommend financial arrangements for executing military

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<sup>3</sup>NATO: Its Significance and Development, op. cit., p. 19.

<sup>4</sup>The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, op. cit., p. 20.

defense plans; to measure and recommend steps to meet the foreign exchange costs on imports of materials from nonmember countries and to consider plans for the mobilization of economic and financial resources in time of emergency. Also at the second session, the Defense Committee established a Military Production and Supply Board to review the military supply situation, recommend ways to increase supplies and promote more efficient production of military equipment.

At the fourth session in London, the Council agreed it was time to create a civilian body which would supervise the activities of all parts of the Organization. Accordingly, the Council established the Council Deputies, meaning Deputies representing their Foreign Ministers, to sit in permanent session in London. The Deputies were to study defense plans, co-ordinate the work of Council agencies and exchange political views and public information.

In the fall of 1950 and spring of 1951, there developed a fuller integration of military forces and the strengthening of the financial and economic structure of NATO.

It was decided at the fifth Council meeting on September 15-17, 1950, that in order to obtain military security, it would be necessary to create an integrated military force in the shortest possible time. This action was precipitated by the communist attack on South Korea in June of that year. It was realized that a tighter military organization would be required in NATO if similar communist attacks were to be prevented in



NATO Europe.<sup>5</sup>

This force would be under the command of a Supreme Commander supported by an international staff and given strategic direction by the Standing Group. It was also decided to allow West Germany to contribute to the defense of Western Europe. At the sixth session of the Council held at Brussels in December, 1950, the President of the United States was asked to appoint the Supreme Commander and President Truman chose General Dwight D. Eisenhower for the post.<sup>6</sup>

After making a preliminary tour of NATO capitals, General Eisenhower proceeded to set up SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe), and selected officers for his command. Then he and his staff immediately set to work creating field commands in northern, southern and central Europe; to lay out the essential supply lines; to establish vital communications and to integrate the defensive plans for employment of the growing army, navy and air forces committed to NATO.<sup>7</sup>

The fifth Council meeting also announced that the Defense Committee had established a Defense Production Board with greater powers than those of the Military Production and Supply Board which it replaced. The Council also agreed to invite the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States to discuss the possibility of Germany's participating in the NATO organization.

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<sup>5</sup>J. Lawton Collins, "NATO: Still Vital For Peace," Foreign Affairs, vol. 34, April, 1956, p. 370.

<sup>6</sup>"Allied Council Communique," Current History, vol. 20, February, 1951, p. 109.

<sup>7</sup>J. Lawton Collins, op. cit., p. 370.

Further changes went on in organizing NATO. In May, 1951, the Council Deputies announced that the North Atlantic Council absorbed the Defense Committee and the Defense Financial and Economic Committee, so it became the sole ministerial body in the organization. They also announced the creation of a Financial and Economic Board. Its chief function was to make recommendations on financial and economic problems arising from the defense program.

As a result of this reorganization, at the next meeting of the Council in Ottawa in September, 1951, all the governments were represented for the first time by Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers or finance Ministers. At the Ottawa meeting a number of important decisions were made. First of all, the member states agreed that Greece and Turkey should be invited to join NATO. Secondly, a Temporary Council Committee, or "T.C.C.," would be established to survey the requirements of external security and recommend a military plan acceptable for the defense of Western Europe. Thirdly, the Council received a report on the progress of discussions on the relationship of NATO with the German Federal Republic. Fourthly, the Council noted agreement had been reached on the first intra-structure program in which member nations were to share the costs of military installations. Lastly, the Council decided to create an Atlantic Community Committee to make recommendations on co-ordination of foreign policy and closer economic, financial and social cooperation.<sup>8</sup>

Later in 1951, in Rome, the Council heard for the first time the

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<sup>8</sup>The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, op. cit., p. 25.

progress of military planning. General Eisenhower reported there was increased combat effectiveness of European forces because of better organization and training. Longer periods of military service were being required to aid this.

About this time the Temporary Council Committee made its report. It was a substantial document, the core of which was the detailed study of the defense programs of the individual countries in proportion to their economic capabilities.<sup>9</sup> Early in 1952, another major NATO command was established. This was the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) which had its headquarters at Norfolk, Virginia.

One of NATO's most important meetings was held in Lisbon, Portugal, from February 20-25, 1952. Here the Council approved the principles of the creation of the European Defense Community. It also adopted the plan for the organization of NATO as suggested by the T.C.C. The meeting also recorded the acceptance of Greece and Turkey to the Treaty.<sup>10</sup>

Perhaps the Council's most significant decision was to reorganize the civilian institutions serving the Alliance. The Council itself would remain in permanent session and member states were to appoint permanent representatives to the Council which was to have its headquarters in Paris. The meetings of the Permanent Council were to be presided over by a permanent Vice-Chairman, who also became the Secretary General of the

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<sup>9</sup>The U.S. in World Affairs 1952, Council on Foreign Affairs, Harper and Brothers: New York, 1953, p. 113.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 125.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization.<sup>11</sup> These decisions resulted in the abolition of the Council Deputies that had been established in 1950.

This change was stated by one author thus:

At Lisbon, finally the soldiers were forced to answer to a body of civilians why they wanted the troops they said they needed, and to yield to civilians the decision as to how quickly how much of their request could be met.<sup>12</sup>

In 1952, continued strength was built by the establishment of naval and maritime air commands for the English Channel and southern North Sea area. The Commanders-in-Chief of these two forces were made responsible to a body called the Channel Committee. This body was composed of the Naval Chiefs-of-Staff of Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

From 1952 to 1955 NATO was greatly strengthened and the reorganization of the civilian institutions for the Alliance was accomplished. Lord Ismay of the United Kingdom was appointed Vice-Chairman of the Council and Secretary General of NATO. During the month of April, 1952, the Permanent Council was established at Paris. One of its first tasks was to appoint Matthew B. Ridgeway as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe to replace General Eisenhower who had been called back to the United States to be a presidential candidate. Ridgeway retired in June, 1953, and was replaced by General Alfred M. Gruenther.<sup>13</sup> It is interesting to note

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 131.

<sup>12</sup>White, op. cit., pp. 308-309.

<sup>13</sup>The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, op. cit., p. 28.

that while it was reported at various times that NATO forces were so effective and efficient, General Ridgeway said upon retiring:

I find the disparity between our available forces and those which the Soviet rulers could bring against us so great that a full-scale Soviet attack within the near future would find the Allied Command critically weak. Our progress is insufficient to give us acceptable prospect of success if attacked.<sup>14</sup>

Other factors in the development of NATO during these years were the establishment of long-term plans, the co-ordination of national plans for civil defense and the wartime control and distribution of supplies, transport, etc.

The death of Josef Stalin brought a great change in the development of NATO. Russian tactics underwent an abrupt change following the death of the premier in March, 1953. At the close of World War II, this man had adopted the use of threats, subversion and naked force to expand communism. This had paid off very well in the form of Eastern Europe and much of Asia.<sup>15</sup>

The reaction of the West to this was rearmament, the forming of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and resistance in Korea to "contain" the communist expansion. Therefore, NATO emphasized military preparedness during its first few years.

After the death of Stalin the Soviet rulers adopted new "soft" tactics to achieve their goal of world conquest. Colonial troubles in

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<sup>14</sup>"NATO-Critically Weak," Time, vol. 61, June 15, 1953, p. 29.

<sup>15</sup>John Fischer, "The Coming Change in American Foreign Policy," Harpers, vol. 207, September, 1953, p. 35.

Czechoslovakia and Germany and appearing signs of cynicism, weariness and apathy among the Russian people also brought this change.<sup>16</sup> The Kremlin decided it could expand communism only at the risk of war and this they wished to avoid. They decided to follow the Marxist dogma of waiting for the capitalist world to crumble from within. Their new objective was now to split the Western Alliance.

They waged psychological and economic warfare to create suspicion and disunity among the allies. Communist groups in the various nations were told to emphasize neutrality, distrust of other alliance members and the expense of the NATO. This, the Kremlin hoped, would lead to disarmament. It was also decided to bring the Korean Conflict to a close at this time. The results were seen in the rise of Bevanism in England, neutralism in Europe, anti-colonialism in Asia and isolation and economy in America.<sup>17</sup>

Congress threatened to lower foreign economic aid and decided to maintain the high tariff which halted much European trade. Meanwhile, Russia stood by ready to trade with Western Europe. The economies of the allies grew weaker, and suspicion and disunity appeared. NATO faced a different type of problem.

The last significant event of 1955 was the entrance of West Germany as the fifteenth member of NATO. This was a much needed strengthening of the line of defense against aggression. The attitude with which

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<sup>16</sup>Herbert L. Marx, Defense and National Security, The H. W. Wilson Company: New York, 1955, p. 11.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 12.



the West German people joined NATO is well illustrated in the words of Chancellor Adenauer:

As a member of NATO the Federal Republic has assumed the obligation to share in the defense of the Free World. We stand by our word . . . The Federal Republic does not by any means intend to evade those obligations it assumed upon entering NATO. Only through complete solidarity with the other members of NATO can we effectively protect the freedom without which life would be intolerable.<sup>18</sup>

In 1956, it was decided to place greater emphasis on nonmilitary matters. The Foreign Ministers agreed that the Atlantic Powers possessed, in the North Atlantic Council, an instrument of unity and a forum for consultation regarding policies of general interest. In order to enable the Council to perform these tasks they decided to appoint a committee of three Foreign Ministers, Dr. Gaetano Martino of Italy, Mr. Halvard Lange of Norway and Mr. Lester B. Pearson of Canada.<sup>19</sup> This committee would advise the Council on how to improve and extend NATO cooperation in nonmilitary fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community.

It was the desire of the Committee to implement Article 2 of the Treaty which states that "the Parties of the Treaty will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are

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<sup>18</sup>Konrad Adenauer, "Germany Today and Tomorrow," The Atlantic, vol. 199, March, 1957, p. 111.

<sup>19</sup>"NATO Unit Set Up To Chart Course of Western Policy," New York Times, May 6, 1956, p. 1

founded. It further desires to promote conditions of stability and well-being and seeks to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and encourage economic collaboration among any or all of them."<sup>20</sup>

The most important measures to promote unity proposed by the Committee of Three and approved by the Council were as follows: member governments are to inform the North Atlantic Council of any development which significantly affects the Alliance in order to have effective political consultation about the action to be taken; at every spring Ministerial Meeting the fifteen Foreign Ministers would make an appraisal of the political progress of the Alliance; and member states should submit any such disputes which have not proved capable of settlement directly to good offices procedures within the NATO framework before resorting to any other international agency. The Council was given the added role of co-ordinating foreign policy within the organization.<sup>21</sup>

Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium replaced Lord Ismay as Secretary General of NATO in May, 1957. Upon this promotion Mr. Spaak said:

A military alliance is no longer enough; political and ultimately, economic unity must be achieved. I don't think it's necessary to present a united front on everything, but I feel it would be useful for the NATO countries to discuss their respective troubles and try to present a common policy in other organizations.<sup>22</sup>

A further development of NATO took place in November, 1956, when General

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<sup>20</sup>See appendix p. 82.

<sup>21</sup>NATO: The First Ten Years, Department of State Publication 6783, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., March, 1959, pp. 19-20.

<sup>22</sup>"NATO--New Man," Newsweek, vol. 49, May 6, 1957, p. 56.

Lauris Norstad succeeded General Alfred Gruenther as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.<sup>23</sup>

The development of NATO continued during the period 1957-1960. Perhaps the most important development took place during the December, 1957, Council Meeting in Paris. At this meeting, clouded by the illness of President Eisenhower and ruffled feelings from the Suez Crisis, it was decided to establish stocks of nuclear weapons and put intermediate range ballistic missiles (I.R.B.M.) at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.<sup>24</sup> This decision resulted from Russia's refusal to discuss disarmament and her continued development of nuclear weapons.

The Council also decided to bring about a larger program of cooperation in scientific and technical matters. To accomplish this, a Science Committee was established and charged to make recommendations on how to bring about the best possible sharing of tasks and pooling of scientific facilities and information.<sup>25</sup> Greater economic cooperation was also to be sought with free nations outside the Alliance.

One can readily see that the development of NATO has evolved gradually during the eleven years of its existence. Beginning with only a skeletal outline, numerous committees and commands have been added from

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<sup>23</sup>"Norstad Takes Command of NATO," New York Times, November 21, 1956, pp. 1, 3.

<sup>24</sup>Meeting of Heads of Government of NATO Countries, Department of State Publication 6581, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., December, 1957, p. 14.

<sup>25</sup>Meeting of Heads of Government of NATO Countries, op. cit., p. 14.

time to time to make the structure what it is today. It has been necessary to abolish some committees, merge others and form new ones. Military commanders have changed for various reasons. Despite these changes, NATO has developed into a powerful regional organization to maintain world peace--that goal for which it was established.

## CHAPTER V

## THE STRUCTURE OF NATO

This chapter will present a very brief discussion of the present structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It will be recalled that the treaty, in Article 9, provided only for the establishment of a council and empowered it with the responsibility to establish the necessary subsidiary bodies. A summary was presented in Chapter IV of its development so this chapter will serve as an outline of its accomplishments.

"NATO is not a supranational body. It is an organization of fifteen sovereign nations, each retaining full independence of decision and action."<sup>1</sup> It is not a supergovernment, but in reality a loose military coalition. None of the groups has plenary powers. They can only recommend but demand nothing. As shall be noted in Chapter VI, this arrangement is the source of many troubles NATO has encountered.

Beginning at the top of the structure and working downward, the first bodies to be mentioned are the North Atlantic Council and the International Staff and Secretariat.<sup>2</sup> The North Atlantic Council is composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and, according to need, the Ministers of Finance and Defense of the member states. A unanimous vote

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<sup>1</sup>NATO: Its Development and Significance, March, 1957, p. 14.

<sup>2</sup>NATO: The First Ten Years, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

is required for approval of any policy.<sup>3</sup> Since 1952, the Council has been functioning in permanent session with the Secretary General of NATO as chairman. Each year a Foreign Minister of one of the member nations is elected President of the Council, with the present one being Mr. Joseph M.A.H. Luns of the Netherlands.<sup>4</sup> This position was new in 1957 and took the place of electing a Chairman of the Council. The chairman of all working sessions is the Secretary General, who in 1960 was M. Paul-Henri Spaak.

On the civilian side the Council has a number of committees whose job it is to examine problems submitted to them by the Council and make recommendations. Also on the civilian side is the International Staff/Secretariat. The Secretary General heads the International Staff and he is responsible to the Council for organizing its work and directing the International Staff/Secretariat, and as was mentioned is Chairman of the North Atlantic Council.<sup>5</sup> This official is also assisted by a Deputy Secretary General and three Assistant Secretaries General.

The higher military organization of NATO consists of the Military Committee, the Military Representatives Committee, an executive body called the Standing Group, the Supreme Commands, and a Regional Planning Group.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Blair Bolles, and Francis O. Wilcox, The Armed Road to Peace, An Analysis of NATO, Foreign Policy Association, Inc.: New York, March-April, 1952, p. 39.

<sup>4</sup>See appendix p. 86

<sup>5</sup>NATO: The First Ten Years, op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>6</sup>NATO: Its Development and Significance, op. cit., p. 16.



The supreme military authority is vested in the Military Committee which is composed of one of the Chiefs-of-Staff of each country. Because Iceland has no military forces a civilian represents that country. The chairmanship of this body rotates annually in the alphabetical order of countries. This committee meets at least once a year, or whenever important decisions must be made. Two agencies have been established in Washington, D.C. to insure continuity between meetings. These are the Military Representatives Committee and the Standing Group.

The Military Representatives Committee is made up of a national representative of each country of the Military Committee. It maintains close contact with the Standing Group and provides a means for presenting national views on military matters when the Military Committee is not in session.<sup>7</sup>

The Standing Group is composed of representatives of the Chiefs-of-Staff of France, Britain and the United States and is the full-time executive agency of the Military Committee. It is the superior body responsible for the highest guidance in areas in which Allied NATO forces operate. As such, it is the body to which the NATO Supreme Commanders are responsible.<sup>8</sup> The Standing Group is represented on the Atlantic Council by a general officer and a staff, thus insuring close cooperation between the NATO civilian branch and the military. This is known as the Standing Group Representative (SGREF).

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>8</sup>The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, op. cit., p. 46.

The area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty is divided into three Supreme Commands and a Regional Planning Group. They are the European Command, Atlantic Ocean Command, Channel Committee and Channel Command and the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group.<sup>9</sup> Each of these in turn is further subdivided into areas and commanders so as not to neglect any area. The three NATO Supreme Commanders are responsible for the development of defense plans for their respective areas, for determining force requirements and the exercise of the forces under their command. All their reports and recommendations are referred to the Standing Group.<sup>10</sup>

The organization of these Commands is flexible enough to allow for mutual support in the event of war and makes possible the rapid shifting of the land, sea and air forces to meet any threat in the North Atlantic Community.

The European Command is the best known of NATO's Commands. This area is under the Supreme Allied Command of Europe, called SACEUR, with headquarters near Paris known as SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe). As has already been noted the first man to hold the position of Supreme Commander was Dwight David Eisenhower. Since November 20, 1956, General Lauris Norstad of the United States has held this post. Under the Standing Group, the SACEUR Commander is responsible for the defense of the Allied countries under his command. He is also responsible for such peacetime functions as organizing, training and equipping the forces

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<sup>9</sup>NATO: Its Development and Significance, op. cit., p. 16.

<sup>10</sup>The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, op. cit., p. 47.

assigned to him as well as the preparation of defense plans and making recommendations as to instruction, training and equipping his forces. There is also a Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of Europe who at one time was Field Marshall Montgomery of the United Kingdom. The post is currently held by General Sir Richard Gale of the same nation.<sup>11</sup> There are four subordinate commands responsible to SACEUR: The Northern Europe Command, the Central Europe Command, The Southern Europe Command and the Mediterranean Command. Each of these in turn is further subdivided.<sup>12</sup>

The Atlantic Ocean Command covers the North Atlantic area. The Supreme Allied Commander (SACLANT) has his headquarters at Norfolk, Virginia. Admiral Jerault Wright of the United States has held this position since April 12, 1954.<sup>13</sup> SACLANT's duties are entirely operational since he has no forces permanently attached to his command during peacetime. His peacetime duties are to prepare defense plans, conduct training exercises and lay down training standards. During a war SACLANT would determine general forces policy, assign forces and direct over-all operations in its theater. The commands subordinate to SACLANT are the Western Atlantic Area, the Eastern Atlantic Area and the Striking Fleet Atlantic Command.

In addition to these commands, there are two special commands—The Channel Committee and the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group. The former covers the English Channel and the southern North Sea,

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<sup>11</sup>The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, op. cit., p. 82.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 90.

<sup>13</sup>NATO: The First Ten Years, op. cit., p. 12.

and the latter has responsibility for planning the defense of the North American Area.

There are also other military agencies within the NATO structure. These are the NATO Defence College, the Military Agency for Standardization, the Communications Agencies in Europe and the Advisory Group on Aeronautical Research and Development. The major purpose of the college is to train officers who will be needed in key capacities in NATO; the major purpose of the Military Agency for Standardization is to promote standardization of both procedures and materials among members. The Communications Agencies, subdivided into three agencies, has charge of matters relating to the transmission of information. The purpose of the Advisory Group is to bring together aeronautical experts to recommend ways to better utilize research and developmental personnel and facilities.

Such is the structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It can be compared with the structure of a pyramid with the final responsibility remaining with the top organs.

## CHAPTER VI

## ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND PROBLEMS OF NATO

Shortly after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, Secretary Acheson explained to the American people the meaning of the Treaty. One of the questions he attempted to answer was "what will it accomplish?"<sup>1</sup> This chapter is a summary of the answers to that question. It will also discuss some of the problems which have come before NATO for solution. To discuss both aspects it will be necessary to venture into the political, military, economic, scientific and cultural areas.

The basic purpose of NATO has been to erect a barrier against Russian aggression in Western and South-central Europe. The accomplishments in this area have been phenomenal. Although there have been hot and cold phases in our relations with Russia during this period, communism in Europe has been contained. There has been no aggressive move by Russia in Europe since NATO came into being.<sup>2</sup> As Andre Fontaine observed, "In the ten years since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, the demarcation line between the two blocs in Europe has not shifted by as much as a millimeter . . . ."<sup>3</sup> In achieving this, the NATO nations have shown the

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<sup>1</sup>"The Meaning of the North Atlantic Pact," Department of State Bulletin, No. 3489, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., April, 1949, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup>Herbert L. Marx, Defense and National Security, The H. W. Wilson Company: New York, 1955, p. 126.

<sup>3</sup>Pierre M. Gallois, "New Teeth for NATO," Foreign Affairs, vol. 39, October, 1960, p. 67.

superiority of joint defense over the efforts of single nations. This accomplishment remains tremendous even in the face of those who maintain that there is no tangible evidence that Russia ever planned a direct military assault on Western Europe.

Much has been accomplished in building up the armed forces of NATO. When General Eisenhower first took command on December 19, 1950, his forces totaled less than 20 divisions, fewer than 1,000 operational aircraft, less than 20 airfields and some 400 ships. During the first ten years of NATO's existence, that force has been increased to nearly 100 active and reserve divisions, over 1,000 combat vessels and nearly 5,000 modern aircraft.<sup>4</sup> There has also been much accomplished in building fixed installations, such as airfields, fuel pipelines and communications networks, without which modern armies cannot operate.

It must be remembered, however, that there is still a lack of NATO forces in Europe; they could give Russia pause but cannot remove entirely the threat of attack. In comparison to NATO's forces, Russia has 175 active divisions and an equivalent support of aircraft.<sup>5</sup> It is small wonder that the Information Division of NATO has publicly called the defensive strength of NATO "still inadequate."<sup>6</sup> The 20 divisions immediately available for phase one of the strategy would probably not be able to slow the Soviet advance into Western Europe.

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<sup>4</sup>NATO: The First Ten Years, op. cit., p. 14.

<sup>5</sup>The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, op. cit., p. 58.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 59.



One of the grave problems of NATO arises in maintaining an adequate number of troops in Western Europe. Because the troops are furnished on a national basis, they can be withdrawn from NATO at any time by that country. Such a crisis was precipitated in May, 1957, when England withdrew 13,000 troops from Western Europe. This had an unfortunate impact on such other nations as France, the Netherlands and Norway who saw in this move an increasing dependence of NATO upon atomic weapons. Even in England some observers felt they would also bear the brunt of an atomic attack. The Director of Far Eastern Studies of Oxford University in Oxford, England, G. F. Hudson, stated:

It is indeed extraordinary that it is the British Government which will be leading this route of the Garadene swine, for Britain is the last country which should invoke hydrogen strategy if it can possibly be avoided.<sup>7</sup>

Britain issued its "White Paper" in April, 1957, which stated she was trimming her armed forces by one-half before 1962. This would make the United States the only major military power in the Free World. Other questions arose: Would France and Italy follow suit? Would the United States make up for the loss?

Aware of a European fear of a chain reaction to Britain's troop reductions, Dulles brought assurances from President Eisenhower that the United States had no intention whatsoever of reducing the United States' strength in Europe.<sup>8</sup>

The admittance of West Germany into NATO meant additional armed forces, but the Germans were slow in raising the promised divisions. This was

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<sup>7</sup>G. F. Hudson, "Why Russia Likes the Idea of Arms Cut," U.S. News and World Report, vol. 43, July 19, 1957, p. 100.

<sup>8</sup>"NATO—Choice of Weapons," Time, vol. 79, May 13, 1957, p. 32.

the case despite the promise, "It is Germany's responsibility to raise twelve army divisions, a tactical air force of approximately 1,300 planes and a limited navy whose primary task is coastal defense."<sup>9</sup> Four years were required before this promise was adequately fulfilled. The continued withdrawal of French troops for duty in Algeria has also added to the military problems of the Supreme Commander. These differences of opinion over the military aspect have continued and have brought an added problem of disunity within NATO. The scientific accomplishments of the past decade have strengthened the defenses of NATO but have also brought new problems. This can be illustrated by the mixed reactions when NATO's military capability was strengthened in 1954 by the addition of Metador pilotless bomber squadrons and atomic artillery to United States armed forces in Europe.

The achievements of the Soviet Union prompted the heads of NATO governments to attend the mid-December Council meeting in 1957. England's Prime Minister, Macmillan, went to Washington, D.C. prior to this Council meeting to confer with President Eisenhower on the common problems concerning both nations. There was no doubt that the West had to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance. The meeting appeared to have been successful in that Eisenhower announced that he and Macmillan had reached preliminary agreement to pool Anglo-American scientific resources to overtake the achievements of Russia. It was a declaration of interdependence with its

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<sup>9</sup>Heinz L. Krekeler, "The German Defense Contribution," The Future of the Western Alliance, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science: Philadelphia, vol. 312, July, 1957, p. 85.

main theme that "the countries of the Free World are interdependent, and only in genuine partnerships, by combining their resources and sharing tasks in many fields, can progress and safety be found."<sup>10</sup>

To accomplish this partnership, Eisenhower and Macmillan set up committees to work on closer cooperation in atomic matters and military defense, especially missiles and rockets. It was necessary for Eisenhower to ask Congress to amend such acts as the McMahon Act that forbids the United States from supplying actual atomic weapons to non-U.S. forces. In referring to the proposed amendments to the McMahon Act, a Life magazine editorial stated:

They should be preceded by a shift in Pentagon strategic thinking, where NATO deserves a far more important and central place than it enjoys now. Against the ever present danger of an all-out Russian attack, NATO is America's first line of defense--in the present phase of the missile era, more so than ever.<sup>11</sup>

In spite of these efforts, the Russian success with earth satellites and the rapid deterioration of France's position in Algeria led to widespread speculation that the NATO system was crumbling and it would be up to the summit meeting scheduled for December, 1957, to repair the weakened alliance. Ideas for three different organizations to be under NATO's control were considered: A NATO Political Cabinet to smooth out, in advance, friction between member states and to analyze Soviet moves and decide on the scope and type of retaliation in case of actual attack;

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<sup>10</sup>Dana A. Schmidt, "U.S. Seeks Answers to New Soviet Challenges," New York Times, November 3, 1957, p. E-3.

<sup>11</sup>"The President and the Crisis," Life, vol. 43, November 4, 1957, p. 40.

a NATO Economic Operations Executive to co-ordinate Free World Trade and organize economic aid, and a NATO Scientific Organization to pool technical resources and brain power in the race to overtake Russia's scientific break-through. The original purpose of using NATO forces to slow the Russian attack while the United States could deliver a massive retaliatory attack "was still possible but the beep of Sputnik II and successful I.C.B.M. tests demanded a rallying of allies and a massive re-evaluation of NATO capabilities."<sup>12</sup>

When the United States attempted to enlarge its military program of atomic weapons of 1954, and provide NATO nations with the I.R.B.M. (intermediate range ballistic missile) in November, 1957, many smaller alliance members objected.<sup>13</sup> They believed their nations would be bases for retaliation by the Soviets. The Danes and Norwegians were not interested in having missile bases on their soil; the Dutch and Belgians wanted NATO to concentrate on conventional weapons to defend their land.

NATO partners also argued that Russia's recent successes in the field of science demonstrated the need for the Free World not only to share its weapons, but equally important, to pool its scientific resources. President Eisenhower recognized the existence of such sentiment and in announcing plans to attend the NATO summit meeting said:

There is much to be accomplished in awakening interest of all our people in common, in cooperative problems, by that kind of meeting. I sincerely want to do my part in keeping all our people,

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<sup>12</sup>"New Look for NATO," Newsweek, vol. 50, November 11, 1957, p. 58.

<sup>13</sup>"Missiles for NATO," Time, vol. 70, December 25, 1957, p. 25.

as well as government, interested in the NATO concept of collective security and defense.<sup>14</sup>

Such was the background for the crisis that led to the December meeting of the heads of government of the NATO nations. This was, without doubt, the most crucial meeting in NATO history. It launched the North Atlantic Treaty Organization into a new beginning involving new ways to end the cold war with Russia.

The most important tasks facing the summit conference were to overcome the fear and self-interests of the member nations and to give new vitality and strength to the NATO alliance. Much to the surprise of the American delegation to the conference, most of the other delegates were more interested in talking, not about missiles, but about the possibility of negotiating with the Russians. The differences of opinion between the members appears to have been reconciled in that the conference decided to negotiate with Russia whenever possible, and it also accepted American proposals for missiles and other new weapons on European soil.

One part of the communique of the conference stated that NATO had decided to establish stocks of nuclear weapons to be readily available for the defense of the alliance.

To this end NATO has decided to establish stocks of nuclear warheads, which will be readily available for the defense of the Alliance in case of need. In view of the present Soviet policies in the field of new weapons, the Council has also decided that intermediate range missiles will have to be put at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>"Eisenhower to go to Paris Meeting to aid NATO Unity," New York Times, October 31, 1957, p. 11.

<sup>15</sup>"North Atlantic Council," NATO Letter, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Information Service: Paris, France, January, 1958, p. 11.



This agreement to accept missiles was hedged somewhat because missiles cannot be distributed without first entering into military agreements with each NATO nation separately. It was decided that "the deployment of these stocks and missiles and arrangements for their use will be decided in conformity with NATO defense plans and in agreement with the states directly."<sup>16</sup>

Another part of the communique stated the conference's willingness to promote, preferably within the framework of the United Nations, any negotiations with the Soviet Union likely to lead to the implementation of disarmament proposals. Said the communique:

We are also prepared to examine any proposal, from whatever source, for general or partial disarmaments and any proposal enabling agreement to be reached on the controlled reduction of all types.<sup>17</sup>

In connection with negotiations with Russia on this matter, both Secretary Dulles and President Eisenhower said in their report to the nation on radio and television:

The NATO Council made clear its determination to continue probing to find some evidence that there is within the Soviet Union the good will to resume serious efforts to achieve nuclear peace and to put behind us the horrible prospect of nuclear war.<sup>18</sup>

While the disagreements over the defense of NATO territory appeared to have been reconciled, they will again appear at a later time.

It was previously stated that NATO's accomplishments can also be

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>18</sup>Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, "The NATO Conference in Paris," Department of State Publication, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., Dec. 23, 1957, p. 4.



found in such other areas as science, economics and culture. In addition to the agreement on missile bases and negotiations with the Soviet Union, the conference agreed to broaden the area of cooperation of the NATO countries. The previously referred to NATO Letter also said:

The strength of our Alliance, freely concluded between independent nations, lies in our fundamental unity in the face of danger which threatens us. Thanks to this fundamental unity, we can overcome our difficulties and bring into harmony our individual points of view.<sup>19</sup>

To accomplish better political consultation and greater cooperation, the nations of NATO promised to keep their representatives fully informed as to national policies which might have an impact upon other nations. As one magazine said:

The Secretary-General and the permanent representatives to NATO were instructed to insure effective consultation and, where necessary, to seek conciliation of policy disputes among members.<sup>20</sup>

The conference also decided to establish a NATO Science Committee to advise the Council. In the communique it was stated:

We have decided to establish forthwith a Science Committee in which all countries will be represented by men highly qualified to speak authoritatively on scientific policy.<sup>21</sup>

In addition, a science advisor was appointed to serve under the Secretary General of NATO. For those who wish a detailed account of the accomplishments of this committee, as well as those of other NATO committees, the writer strongly recommends they consult the monthly publication of

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<sup>19</sup>NATO Letter, op. cit., p. 11.

<sup>20</sup>"The Paris Conference," Time, vol. 70, December 30, 1957, p. 19.

<sup>21</sup>NATO Letter, op. cit., p. 12.

the NATO Letter.

In economic matters, the Council decided to cooperate with each other and other free governments to protect economic stability and growth, to expand international trade and reduce trade barriers. This is a realization that communism makes its greatest gains in areas of poverty, misery and fear. The Council reaffirmed the desirability of closer economic association between countries of Western Europe and recognized the interdependence of the economies of the members of NATO and the other countries of the Free World. Much has been done in recent years to achieve this integrated economic group. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation and the European Payments Union have done a great deal to reduce trade restrictions and simplify international financial transactions. More important is the Schuman Plan under which France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux nations have pooled their coal and steel industries.<sup>22</sup> Other such bodies are the International Monetary Fund, the International Financial Corporation, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Economic Commission for Europe. The reader is again reminded that the accomplishments of these individual bodies are often reported in the daily newspapers, magazines and the monthly NATO Letter.

In addition to these bodies, there is the Atlantic Common Market which is still in the transition stage. It is the ultimate purpose of this device to bring about freer trade throughout the world, especially

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<sup>22</sup>Saul K. Padover, Europe's Quest for Union, Foreign Policy Association, Inc.: New York, January 20, 1953, p. 50.

among the NATO nations. It would put all producers, whether in Europe or America, on the same level, with the same chances and the same duties.<sup>23</sup> Much remains to be done in this field, including bringing Canada and the United States into the organization.

NATO has also accomplished much in the field of scientific co-operation. In March, 1957, the six major nations of Western Europe signed a treaty providing for the integration of their efforts in the atomic energy field. This plan is called the European Atomic Community or Euratom. This integrated group will operate under the political direction of the European Defense Community. The establishment of a NATO Science Committee and appointment of a science advisor to the Secretary General have already been mentioned in another connection. In addition, a NATO scientific exchange fellowship programme has been established as well as a NATO fund to support advanced study institutes in science. The success of the latter program is told in the NATO Letter of June, 1960, which stated that:

There were 102 applicants for NATO Fellowships available for 1960-1961, and after a preliminary screening . . . eighteen candidates were chosen . . . .<sup>24</sup>

Much could also be discussed concerning the accomplishments of NATO in other areas. To mention just a few, there has been a co-ordination of air traffic, cooperation in civil emergency planning, and

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<sup>23</sup>Paul van Zeeland, "An Atlantic Common Market?" NATO Letter, vol. 8, February, 1960, p. 3.

<sup>24</sup>NATO Letter, "NATO Fellowship Programme," vol. 8, June, 1960, p. 15.

the exchange of information and cultural relations. Current literature will provide an account of these.

Despite these outstanding accomplishments, the goals sought by the planners of NATO have not been fully realized. An informed source, Henry A. Kissinger, has said:

None of the force levels of NATO which have been announced periodically with such fanfare has ever been achieved. Almost a decade after its creation, NATO is still without a force sufficient to prevent its members from being overrun by the Soviet Army.<sup>25</sup>

Many problems remain to be solved in the 1960's. One of these concerns the stubborn efforts of France to revise NATO's defense. Opposition to these attempts has been expressed by Chancellor Adenauer. To Charles De Gaulle's insistence of a veto on allied use of the nuclear bomb, Adenauer asked, ". . . If Krushchev unleashes his rocket on us, must the allies remain paralyzed until France makes its decision?"<sup>26</sup> Adenauer fears that this attitude of the French, with their withdrawal of troops from NATO, will cause the United States to leave Europe. The latter nation has specified a minimum number of troops that European nations must furnish if American troops are to remain in Europe.

Charles De Gaulle has also refused to incorporate completely the French Air Force into an integrated NATO air defense system. He desires to create a Western European confederation dominated by France. To

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<sup>25</sup>James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age, Harpers and Brothers: New York, 1953, p. 141.

<sup>26</sup>Time, "The Allies," vol. 70, October 24, 1960, p. 41.

accomplish this, he wants to keep England out of Europe and give the smaller Common Market nations less of a voice in NATO affairs. The United States has flatly stated its opposition to such plans.

Another factor bringing discord within the NATO organization is the dissatisfaction of other NATO members with the United States-British monopoly of the West's nuclear weapons. The British, however, are also dissatisfied because they want greater nuclear power which they believe will enhance their diplomatic prestige. To this end, France and England are spending billions of dollars to discover technical and scientific knowledge already possessed by the United States. To do this, they are cutting expenditures on conventional arms which is weakening NATO's collective security. If France is successful in acquiring full nuclear status, there is fear that Germany will also insist on an independent atomic force.

What has caused this recent discord? Europe has realized that American cities are vulnerable to attack---and that America is also aware of this fact.<sup>27</sup> The Western Europeans wonder if America will risk a war under these conditions just to protect Europe. As an American Secretary of State said:

I cannot conceive of any President involving us in an all-out war unless the facts show clearly that we are in danger of all-out devastation ourselves or that actual moves have been made toward devastating ourselves.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>Pierre M. Gallois, "New Teeth for NATO," Foreign Affairs, vol. 39, October, 1960, p. 68.

<sup>28</sup>Raymond Aron, Klaus Knorr and Alaster Buchan, "The Future of Western Deterrent Power," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 16, September, 1960, p. 267.

This has caused Western Europeans to emphasize the importance of their individual striking forces for self-protection. This feeling could grow stronger as Russia increases in nuclear-missile power. On the other hand, they fear a retaliatory attack by the United States would bring annihilation of Western Europe by Russia unless the Western Europeans have the means to prevent this.

What can be done to halt this movement and restore full unity and confidence among all member nations? It has been suggested that the United States should encourage this growth of national deterrent systems by diffusing atomic weapons and missiles among member nations as was first proposed in 1947. This would avoid the waste and duplication and relieve the feelings of suspicion. Under one plan, commonly called the Bowie Plan, atomic weapons would be sent to Europe but the power of control would remain in American hands. Thus, while individual nations would have the weapons, the control would remain in American hands. Individual nations could, however, be released from this control when their individual security were at stake. Another proposal would place the nuclear weapons under dual control of the United States and the host country. Here again the United States would suspend its control in a serious crisis affecting the host country.

Several benefits might result from action of this type. It is believed this will end the nuclear ambitions of France to go-it-alone. It might also relieve the French fear of nuclear weapons under the control of Germany and would serve to convince Europe that America would use atomic weapons in the event of a Soviet attack despite the



vulnerability of her cities. NATO parliamentarians have declared such a force as "urgent." At the present time, NATO is awaiting the State Department's detailed plan of its proposal.

This proposed plan has been criticized as putting "fifteen fingers on the trigger."<sup>30</sup> Many wonder how 15 nations could be consulted quickly enough to make this NATO deterrent effective in the event of attack. French spokesmen claim that De Gaulle would continue building his atomic weapons and the British fear that the West's nuclear strength is being brought too close to Russia. Yet as one top official explained, "We have to move toward something of this kind; you can't go on forever with an alliance of unequals."<sup>31</sup>

In accordance with this Bowie Plan, by April, 1960, some short-range missiles with nuclear warheads had been distributed throughout Western Europe. The "Honest John" is now in the hands of almost every NATO ally and West Germany is getting "Mace" missiles.<sup>32</sup> Despite this, the French recently exploded their fourth atomic bomb in the Sahara Desert. The disunity remains and many believe the central control of these smaller atomic weapons by the United States will not prove adequate over the long run. Whether or not the U.S. will make NATO the fourth atomic power remains to be seen as this paper is being written.

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<sup>30</sup>Time, "NATO, 15 Trigger Fingers," vol. 76, December 5, 1960, p. 27.

<sup>31</sup>Newsweek, "Western Defense: Fifteen Fingers," vol. 61, December 5, 1960, p. 38.

<sup>32</sup>Alastair Buchan, "Should NATO Become a Nuclear Power?" The Reporter, vol. 22, April 14, 1960, p. 23.

Another current problem facing NATO is the German desire for bases and training territory in Spain.<sup>33</sup> Because West Germany has been encouraged to rearm, she has need of land for these purposes in that America and England already occupy such sites within her own territory. This also tends to show the weakness of the structure of NATO in that other member nations frowned upon such negotiations with Spain but were powerless to prevent them.

It is certain that the problems of NATO will continue in the future. Three developments---the shift in British defensive policy, the emergence of France as a nuclear power and the confusion caused by the West German quest for bases---will continue to keep NATO in the international spotlight. Perhaps the future problems of NATO will be largely in the economic area as Paul-Henri Spaak believes.<sup>34</sup> This could result from both sides realizing there can be no winner in World War III. In any event, Russia will continue exerting pressure hoping for an eventual split. This was already made public in 1956 when 11 of the 12 speakers at the Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow cited NATO's dismemberment as the number one objective of Soviet foreign policy.<sup>35</sup>

The gravity of this problem facing NATO is expressed in the words of Konrad Adenauer:

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<sup>33</sup>The Reporter, "The Reversible Ally," vol. 22, March 17, 1960, p. 2.

<sup>34</sup>Paul-Henri Spaak, "How Many Worlds Do We Need?" Saturday Review, vol. 43, April 30, 1960, p. 39.

<sup>35</sup>Ross N. Berkes, "United States Policy in Europe," Current History, vol. 31, November, 1956, p. 296.

Europe is not as united as it should be. We can do Communism no greater favor than by allowing the political and military ties that bind us to be loosened. We must not allow nationalist feelings to arise against the background of a powerful Soviet Union and Red China. There is no great European power anymore. We can save ourselves only by standing firmly together with the U.S.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>36</sup>Time, "Western Europe, The Lonely Dreamer," vol. 76, October 3, 1960, p. 23.

## CHAPTER VII

### CONCLUSION

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization came into existence primarily because of the fear of Soviet aggression. As the nations of Western Europe became aware of the Soviet policy, they realized a form of collective security was necessary to preserve their independence and freedom. Out of this awareness came the Brussels Pact which was later enlarged into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The United States realized its own security and freedom depended upon these also existing in this area and diverted from its traditional isolationist tendency. This added military and economic strength sealed the future of the new organization. Soviet expansion in Europe came to a halt.

This does not mean that new dangers will not confront NATO. Even as this paper is being written, the radio and television are giving warnings of possible warfare and communist activity. Disunity from within has developed within the Alliance. It is the number one objective of Russian foreign policy to further this condition so communist expansion can continue. To restore unity to NATO, new efforts must be made to encourage member nations to recognize the problems common to all. The members must learn they cannot ignore each others' interests, engage in political or economic conflict or hold suspicions of each other. If NATO nations can achieve this full unity, backed by the strength of 500 million people, there is no limit to what it can achieve.

The United States is the backbone of NATO. For this reason the

United States must continue to support the Alliance with a consistent foreign policy and sound leadership. On occasion the United States has found its policies in conflict with other NATO nations.<sup>1</sup> If necessary to maintain unity, this nation must be willing to compromise its differences, while yet striving for those conditions which will bring lasting world peace and prosperity. Should the United States withdraw from NATO, a breakup of the Alliance might soon result and Communist expansion could again run rampage over defenseless nations.

The major purpose of NATO is the prevention of war in Europe. Now that the Alliance has been partially successful in achieving this goal, steps should be taken to strengthen the organization to bring complete world peace. A strong NATO will serve as a rallying point for political, economic and military efforts toward this goal. If peace can be achieved on a regional basis in Europe, there is hope that this can be extended to other regions until the scope of the world is encompassed.

NATO is becoming more important for its political advantages rather than its military. A few years ago the Cyprus question would have been regarded as a mortal blow to the Atlantic Alliance and an invitation to Soviet aggression. While the "ship of NATO did list", its structure and principles enabled the disputant parties to arrive at a satisfactory solution. The future may well see other serious political differences settled through the efforts of NATO. Among these might be the problems of off-shore fishing rights that involve Britain, Iceland, Norway, West Germany

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<sup>1</sup>e.g., The United States' opposition to England and France's intervention in the Suez; the U.S. insistence on placing military bases in Spain, and the North African crisis.

and Denmark. Although the age-old hostility between France and Germany is slowly diminishing, NATO could play a large role in completely banishing this suspicion at an earlier time than is thought possible. NATO's political potentiality could be extended to serve as a challenge to Russia's influence with such neutral nations as India and Syria. This could be done by maintaining and/or acquiring close ties with them.

One must not neglect the role NATO could play in the economic sphere. It is well known that economic inequalities are a major cause of war. While one must admit that NATO has done much to distribute economic advantages in Europe, such as forming the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and other fine agencies, much remains to be done in this area. This work could be expanded to aid the underdeveloped and backward states in Africa and Asia. Only when all nations have an adequate standard of living will swords be made into plowshares.

Improvement in morale can be added as an accomplishment of NATO. Before 1949, Europe had unstable governments and people were advocating a neutral Europe and wanted to "let the East fight the West." Today the morale of the European people is higher than it would have been without NATO.<sup>2</sup> These people have a hope in tomorrow that all human beings will eventually be free from the bonds of tyranny. This has given them a cause for which to pray, live and even fight.

Several improvements could be made in the structure of NATO. There are complaints that NATO is top-heavy in structure, too complicated,

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<sup>2</sup>NATO: Its Development and Significance, August, 1952, p. 25.



cumbersome and expensive. These criticisms are justified, in the opinion of this writer, and NATO could be streamlined so as to bring greater structural simplicity and swift decision---two essentials vital in any emergency. The President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, recently stated he would attempt to streamline the departments of the federal government, and there is a possibility he might extend this project to NATO.

The political and military structure of NATO could be overhauled. Staffs could be pruned and paperwork cut. Furthermore, the NATO Council is in Paris while its military advisors are in Washington, D.C., three thousand miles away. This arrangement makes cooperation between these two organizations difficult. Perhaps some arrangement could be made to have these two groups brought closer together. Costs could be cut by having collective balanced forces for NATO as a whole, rather than on a national basis. This system would not only save money, but would tend to bind the nations together since they would be dependent upon each other.

We must recognize that the Soviet Union has made great strides in scientific and technical advancements. Thirteen years ago the West faced strong Soviet armies while our forces remained weak, scattered and ill-prepared. The balance still remained in the favor of NATO forces, however, because the United States alone possessed the atomic bomb. President Truman's announcement in 1949 changed that and the balance of power has been lost with Russia's production of atomic and hydrogen bombs, a large bombing fleet, intermediate ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. This has resulted in two worlds facing each other with

Europe in the middle and all three facing total destruction should war develop. Upon the shoulders of NATO has been placed the hope of the world.

Because of this fact, it appears that NATO will be provided with more armaments, more planning, more co-ordination, more and better leaders and more money. The results achieved by NATO during its 11 years of existence seem to justify these. It must be remembered that NATO was a tremendous and constructive experiment in international relations. Today we can see the results of this experiment: peace has been preserved in Europe, Soviet expansion has been halted, the individual and collective ability of the Alliance to resist attack has increased, and despite the vast expense and effort put forth for defense, the economies of the member nations are stronger today than in 1949.

Is NATO worth the effort and will it succeed? Secretary of State Dean Acheson said at the Lisbon meeting:

The success of the NATO defense program and the development of the over-all strength of the Atlantic community offer a good chance that we and our children will be able to live our lives in peace and freedom. The members of NATO will succeed because we must succeed.<sup>3</sup>

We must also bear in mind another side of the picture. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is based on assumptions that have yet to be proved sound. One such assumption is that the arming of one part of the world will prevent aggression from other parts. History has recorded the

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<sup>3</sup>NATO: Its Development and Significance, op. cit., p. 34.

use of military strength by nations to guard the peace since the days of Sparta. Even today it is difficult to judge the success or failure of such a policy. One must wonder if the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente postponed war or aided in bringing the conflict they attempted to prevent.

Another such assumption is that an armed group of nations will be feared by others. A group must be willing to use the weapons in addition to possessing them. Many historians claim that France was stronger than Germany in 1940, yet the world knows the outcome of that struggle. A nation or group of nations may develop a feeling of anti-militarism because armaments dislocate their civilian economy and lower their standard of living. In this way armaments may discourage the will to resist and may encourage aggression---the very consequences they were intended to prevent.

The third and last assumption is that all nations in NATO will cooperate readily because they dislike, fear or distrust the Soviet Union. Time has a way of lessening and even healing such apprehensions, and even in a period of great peril nations tend to nurse these feelings each in its own way. This could bring reluctance to carry out NATO commitments for the common good of all. The Russian menace is not enough to give all nations the same outlook and nations will not cooperate just for the sheer joy of cooperating. Perhaps this helps to explain the disunity which appears again and again in the alliance.

That there will be repeated testing of NATO by its enemies is a foregone conclusion. If freedom is to live NATO must not die.

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**APPENDIX**

## NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

## PREAMBLE

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

## ARTICLE 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

## ARTICLE 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

## ARTICLE 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

## ARTICLE 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

## ARTICLE 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

## ARTICLE 6

For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer, or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.

## ARTICLE 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

## ARTICLE 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.



## ARTICLE 9

The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

## ARTICLE 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any state so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

## ARTICLE 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the states which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other states on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

## ARTICLE 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

## ARTICLE 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

## ARTICLE 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the signatories.

## ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way effect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

## CHAIRMEN OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

1949-1950	Mr. Dean G. Acheson	(United States)
1950-1951	M. Paul van Zeeland	(Belgium)
1951-1952	Mr. Lester B. Pearson	(Canada)
1952-1953	Mr. Ole Bjorn Kraft	(Denmark)
1953-1954	M. Georges Bidault	(France)
	M. Pierre Mendes-France	(France)
1954-1955	M. Stephanos Stephanopoulos	(Greece)
1955-1956	Mr. Kristinn Gudmundsson	(Iceland)
	Mr. Gudmundur I. Gudmundsson	(Iceland)
1956-	M. Gaetano Martino	(Italy)

PRESIDENTS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>

1957	M. Gaetano Martino	(Italy)
	M. Giuseppe Pelia	(Italy)
1957-1958	M. Joseph Bech	(Luxembourg)
1958-1959	Mr. Joseph M.A.H. Luns	(Netherlands)

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<sup>1</sup>In accordance with the recommendations of the Committee of Three, it was decided that each year a Foreign Minister of one of the member countries would become President of the North Atlantic Council, and that the Secretary General would be Chairman at all working sessions of the Council.