S.I. Hayakawa and the Use of Danger Indicators of General Semantics

Janine Rae Rudnick

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S. I. HAYAKAWA AND THE USE OF DANGER
INDICATORS OF GENERAL SEMANTICS

BY
JANINE RAE RUDNICK

A thesis submitted
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree Master of Arts
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This thesis is approved as a creditable and independent investigation by a candidate for the degree, Master of Arts, and is acceptable for meeting the thesis requirements for this degree. Acceptance of this thesis does not imply that the conclusions reached by the candidate are necessarily the conclusions of the major department.

---

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JRR
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement of Purpose</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Studies</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification for Study</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of Study</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. BACKGROUND OF STUDY</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Biography of S. I. Hayakawa and Explanation of Danger Indicators of General Semantics</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biography of S. I. Hayakawa</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danger Indicators of General Semantics</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. ANALYSIS OF SPEECHES</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Application of Danger Indicators to Discourses of S. I. Hayakawa</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Application of Danger Indicators to &quot;A Search for Relevance, 1968&quot;</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Application of Danger Indicators to &quot;After the Canal Treaties&quot;</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Application of Danger Indicators to a Speech to the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Application of Danger Indicators to &quot;Bilingual Education Improvement Act&quot;</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of the Analysis of the Four Discourses</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Methodology</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Hayakawa's Biography</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of General Semantics Danger Indicators</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Analysis</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions of Analysis of Discourses</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suggestions for Further Research</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX B</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX C</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX D</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Samuel Ichiyê Hayakawa has had three distinct careers in his lifetime, as a general semanticist, a college president, and a United States Senator.¹ With his book, Language in Action, Hayakawa established a reputation as a pioneer in the development of general semantics.² Writings in general semantics and his actions as a president of San Francisco State College and as United States Senator have made Hayakawa known throughout the country as a scholar, administrator and politician.

Statement of Purpose

The purpose of this study was to examine four discourses of general semanticist S. I. Hayakawa to determine if he used danger indicators as presented by J. Samuel Bois in the book, Explorations in Awareness.³ The discourses studied were "A Search for Relevance, 1968," given at the International Conference on General Semantics on August 5-9, 1969;⁴ "After the Canal Treaties," written in the New York Times on October 27, 1977;⁵ an address to the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company Convention in San Francisco on May 7, 1977;⁶ and "Bilingual Education Improvement Act," given to the Subcommittee on Education,
Arts and Humanities, Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Washington, D.C., on April 23, 1982. The four discourses of S. I. Hayakawa analyzed were selected because they present the general semanticist in a variety of situations. Hayakawa gives the discourses to a group of semanticists, the general public through a newspaper article, a group of insurance representatives, and a senate subcommittee. The discourses also avoid the period when Hayakawa was involved in conflict at San Francisco State College. The writer believes the "conflict discourses" are not representative of the majority of Hayakawa's discourses.

In these four discourses, answer to the following questions were sought:

1. Did S. I. Hayakawa use absolute terms, generalities, or words that imply "allness"?
2. Did S. I. Hayakawa use judgment terms; terms loaded with approval or disapproval?
3. Did S. I Hayakawa use "either-or" arguments or pass from one alternative to its extreme opposite, describing things in terms of black and white without any gray shading in between?
4. Did S. I. Hayakawa speak of the present situation as "just like" another one?
5. Did S. I. Hayakawa confuse facts with interpretations, opinions, and judgments that are exclusively his own?

6. Did S. I. Hayakawa ramble from one subject to another?

7. Did S. I. Hayakawa quote authorities to uphold his viewpoints?

These seven danger indicators from J. Samuel Bois deal with written discourse. Bois has presented six other danger indicators which deal with oral discourse. Because this study deals with written discourse, these six were excluded.

Previous Studies

The following publications have been examined to determine if any previous investigations have been undertaken regarding S. I. Hayakawa and the use of danger indicators:


In the publication, *Index to Journals in Communication Studies Through 1979*, an article, "The Confrontation Policies of S. I. Hayakawa: A Case Study in Coercive Semantics," by Lawrence B. Rosenfeld was found. Upon further investigation, it was discovered that this article covered Hayakawa's rhetoric during the confrontations at San Francisco State College and did not deal with discourse other than at that period of time. Some danger indicators were studied, but the extent was minimal. Another article, "On Rereading Language in Action," by Maxwell H. Goldberg, dealt with Hayakawa's book rather than actions.

An unpublished Master's thesis, "S. I. Hayakawa's Expressed Positions Regarding Campus Government and Control from November 26, 1968 to March 20, 1969," by Richard E. Pletcher, dealt with Hayakawa during his years as president at San Francisco State College. This thesis studied the rhetoric of Hayakawa during the specific
period of time only, and did not analyze danger indicators of that rhetoric.

**Justification for Study**

Many books and articles have been written about general semantics and specific phrases included in general semantics study. The books generally have a theme of the meaning of words. Very few books or articles, however, have stressed the importance of J. Samuel Bois' danger indicators as part of the meaning of words. "Ego statements"\(^1\) and "either-or"\(^2\) indicators have been touched upon in books and articles, but no one has dedicated significant study to the specific danger indicators as presented by Bois.

It is this writer's belief that the danger indicators of general semantics should be studied more thoroughly and analyzed in more applications. The danger indicators include aspects of discourse which many find as negative factors in the message. When the danger indicators are removed, the message may again have the positive effect that was originally anticipated.

Bois, in *Explorations in Awareness*, gave a brief explanation of danger indicators, but focused his attention mainly on the six indicators dealing with oral discourse—the "visible" indicators. Bois states, "If we learn to pay attention to them [indicators] we shall: (1) stop
wearing ourselves out or destroying ourselves by excessive bursts of energy; (2) keep functioning within an optimum range of efficiency; (3) adapt ourselves to shifting objectives and changing conditions.\textsuperscript{13}

Bois also gave reasons why these indicators should be studied. First, he said, "They reveal how things are going on inside of you."\textsuperscript{14} He continues the "inside" theory with the second reason, that these factors or indicators are "laws from inside."\textsuperscript{15} When we ignore the laws from inside ourselves, danger indicators occur.

Bois did not go into detail explaining the verbal danger indicators, nor did he provide an application of such indicators. This study applies the danger indicators to discourses of S. I. Hayakawa and explains why the indicators demonstrate danger in discourse.

\textbf{Organization of the Study}

This study provides a biography of S. I. Hayakawa and his work in the area of general semantics. It explains the writer's interpretation of the danger indicators, and application of them to the discourse of Hayakawa. The discourse was then analyzed and a conclusion given as to the use of danger indicators.
ENDNOTES


2Ibid.


8Bois, Explorations in Awareness, p. 189.


13Bois, Explorations in Awareness, p. 186.
14 Ibid., p. 189.
15 Ibid.
CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The Biography of S. I. Hayakawa and Explanation of Danger Indicators of General Semantics

This chapter provides a biography of S. I. Hayakawa to show his diverse careers which have included politics, education, and language study. The biography shows that S. I. Hayakawa is a general semanticist and has done study in that area.

An explanation of the danger indicators of general semantics used in this study is also given. An analysis of the use of danger indicators by general semanticists is presented. The author's criteria for the application of danger indicators to the discourses of S. I. Hayakawa is explained.

Biography of S. I. Hayakawa

Samuel Ichiye Hayakawa was born in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, on July 18, 1906. His parents were Ichiro and Tora (Isono) Hayakawa.¹

Hayakawa graduated from a Winnipeg, Manitoba high school in 1923. He obtained his B.A. degree at the University of Manitoba in 1927 and his M.A. degree in English literature at McGill University, Montreal in
1930. Hayakawa traveled to the United States to study at the University of Wisconsin, where he obtained a Ph.D. in 1935.

After graduation, Hayakawa taught at the University of Wisconsin as an English instructor. In 1939 he moved to Chicago where he was instructor in English at the Armour Institute of Technology. He stayed at the school until 1947. He lectured in semantics at the University College of the University of Chicago from 1950 to 1955. At that time, he accepted a position as professor in the language arts at San Francisco State College.

San Francisco State College experienced growing student unrest during the mid-60s. The college president resigned from his position in May of 1968. His successor resigned in November of 1968.

By the time of the second resignation, the campus was closed due to clashes between striking students and city police. Most faculty members were reluctant to act in defiance of militant students. S. I. Hayakawa was one of the few teachers to urge the reopening of San Francisco State College and the restoration of order by police force if necessary.

Hayakawa was named acting president in late November of 1968. According to Lawrence B. Rosenfeld in his article, "The Confrontation Policies of S. I.
Hayakawa: A Case Study in Coercive Semantics," Hayakawa used coercive semantics, the opposite of his stated philosophy of general semantics, in an attempt to return the campus to its previous peacefulness. This tough tactic was contrary to Hayakawa's statement in his book, Language in Thought and Action, which says, "The basic assumption of general semantics . . . is that cooperation is preferable to conflict." 

S. I. Hayakawa used conflict to bring San Francisco State College back to its original state of calmness. When he resigned from the presidency of that college in June of 1973, he noted that his major goals had been accomplished; the campus was again peaceful.

Hayakawa entered the California Republican Senatorial primary in early 1976. The advantage that he had over the three other candidates, such as Robert H. Finch, former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, was that he was without Washington connections in a post-Watergate year of dissatisfaction with the government. Hayakawa successfully gained the Republican nomination to oppose the Democratic incumbent, John V. Tunney, in the November election. Hayakawa's platform was based on reduced taxes, government decentralization, and easing of controls on business. He was victorious in the November election. While in the Senate, Hayakawa served on the
Hayakawa as a general semanticist

In 1941 S. I. Hayakawa wrote Language in Action, the first popular work in the area of general semantics. Hayakawa defined general semantics as "the comparative study of the kinds of responses people make to the symbols and signs around them." Hayakawa became interested in general semantics during the 1930s after observing how totalitarian rulers in Europe manipulated words and symbols to extend their political control.

S. I. Hayakawa has aroused interest in general semantics with his writings and study in that area. A revision of his first book, Language in Thought and Action, maintains a high annual sale. Hayakawa has also been the editor of ETC, A Review of General Semantics, the journal of the International Society for General Semantics, of which he was also president. Two books, Language, Meaning and Maturity, and Our Language and Our World, each containing articles from ETC, were edited by Hayakawa.

Through his careers of college president, senator from California, and general semanticist, S. I Hayakawa
has attained a career remarkable for the diversity of achievement.18

This study deals with S. I. Hayakawa as a practitioner of general semantics. Because he follows other aspects of general semantics, and has not written discourse opposing danger indicators, it is assumed that Hayakawa also agrees with the theory of danger indicators presented by J. Samuel Bois. This study applies the danger indicators to discourse of Hayakawa to determine if the discourse does indeed fall into Bois' danger indicators. The application is important because as Alfred Korzybski states, if "... language of wrong and unnatural structure (is used), our doctrines and institutions must reflect that linguistic structure and so become unnatural, and inevitably lead to disasters."19

Danger Indicators of General Semantics

J. Samuel Bois in Explorations in Awareness lists thirteen danger and safety indicators of general semantics. These danger indicators, along with the safety counterparts, are listed below.

1. We use absolute terms, generalities, abstractions of a high order, words that imply "allness," or we use descriptive terms and low order abstractions, statements as to who, what, where, when, and how much.

2. We use judgment terms, terms loaded with approval or disapproval, or we use neutral terms, terms that are as free as possible from bias or slant.
3. We use "either-or" arguments, pass from one alternative to its extreme opposite, describe things in terms of black and white without any gray shading in between, or we speak of more-or-less, give consideration to degrees and shades of meaning, avoid talking about opposites.

4. We speak of the present situation as "just like" another one, of this person "just like" So-and-so, of this problem as "just like" the one previously solved, or we differentiate carefully between people, situations, and problems.

5. We confuse facts that can be verified by anybody, and interpretations, opinions, and judgements that are exclusively our own, or we distinguish between what is going on and what we feel or understand is going on.

6. We ramble from one subject to another, or we keep to the subject under discussion.

7. We quote authorities to uphold our viewpoint, or we try to evaluate the situation on its own merits.

8. We quibble on the dictionary meaning of words, or we use words as mere tokens for what we wish to convey.

9. We talk fast and/or loud, or we talk with deliberation.

10. We interrupt, start talking before the other fellow is finished, we contradict with a quick yes/but, or we listen with genuine attention, wait for our turn to speak, begin with something like "If this is what you mean, then . . . ."

11. We keep muscles tense, move in jerks, fidget, twitch, or we relax, remain calm and quiet, and delay our reactions.

12. We ask rhetorical and tricky questions, or we ask matter-of-fact questions that invite more information.

13. We take ourselves very seriously, or we keep our sense of humor.

Because the last six danger-safety indicators deal with oral discourse rather than written discourse, they are not used in this analysis. The danger indicators are studied, since one assumes that if the danger indicators
do not appear in the discourse, the safety indicators will apply.

Some writers in general semantics have explained parts of the seven danger indicators being used in this analysis. An explanation of views given by general semanticists in each of the danger indicators will be given, followed by the writer's explanation of the application to discourse of S. I. Hayakawa.

Before looking at the views of general semanticists, however, an explanation of a commonly used term, "abstraction," is needed. Bois, in *The Art of Awareness*, states that when something is observed, only one or two very few elements are actually given attention. The entire picture is not perceived, only parts that are interesting or that suit a given purpose. The picking and choosing of elements is abstraction. Different levels or orders of abstraction are used in communication. The higher orders of abstraction are words which have a variety of general meanings. Words which are very specific are low-order words of abstraction. Bois explains a situation showing the orders of abstraction.

If I say, "I bought a new automobile last fall," I give very little information about the car I am now driving. *Automobile* is a very general term, a term of high order, not at all specific.
If I say, "It is a sedan," you begin to see a more definite picture; I have limited the field by eliminating sports cars, convertibles, and
station wagons. If I also say, "It's a Ford," I come one step lower on the abstraction ladder and I limit the field even more.

Abstraction of the word being used depends on the present situation in observation and a stock of prejudices, memories, and interpretations. From this combination, opinions are formed that are taken for facts, when they are actually extensions of imagination.  

First danger indicator as explained by general semanticists

In the first danger indicator, the use of absolute terms, generalities, or words that imply "allness," Bois explains that these implications are indeed a danger. He says that we use general, absolute, and sweeping terms to mean implicitly that we are speaking of all objects, people, or situations. Words that have connotative meaning applied to them, or words that we have abstracted, are used frequently in this indicator. Words of high order of abstraction lead to the specific label of "danger" if overused. Bois states that we are heading for trouble if 15 percent of our speech contains words of high order of abstraction.  

Alfred Korzybski, the founder of the Institute of General Semantics, says that once a lower level of abstraction has been achieved, the "allness" implied is
eliminated. For example, words should describe things precisely, rather than in generalities.

**Second danger indicator as explained by general semanticists**

The second danger indicator is the use of judgment terms or those terms loaded with approval or disapproval. Bois says that when this indicator is used, words actually describe much more how we feel about the situation rather than the situation itself. Phrases frequently used in this area are "you should," "you ought to," and "the only thing to do is." When these and other similar phrases are used, the attempt is being made to impose a specific set of beliefs on someone else. To counter this danger, neutral terms and ones without bias are substituted.

**Third danger indicator as explained by general semanticists**

The third indicator is the use of "either-or" arguments or passing from one alternative to its extreme opposite, describing things in terms of black and white without leaving any room for compromise in between. According to Korzybski, these two-valued, "either-or," inflexible, and dogmatic statements stem from old Aristotelian Orientations. The writers in general semantics leave the explanation of this danger indicator
relatively open; they have left this indicator in the hands of those who wish to apply it.

**Fourth danger indicator as explained by general semanticists**

The fourth indicator is the comparison of one situation to another "just like" this one. Wendell Johnson, a spokesman for the principles of general semantics, says that no event is exactly repeated. When this indicator is used, generalization is also used. A generalization is a statement that asserts that different things are somehow similar, or even identical, and so are to be reacted to or treated exactly alike, or nearly so. When this danger indicator is used, uniqueness of the situation is taken away. Judgment is pronounced without taking time to look at the differences between the previous situation and the present situation. To overcome this danger, differences, no matter how small, should be observed.

**Fifth danger indicator as explained by general semanticists**

The fifth danger indicator deals with the use of facts that can be confused with interpretations, opinions and judgments. Bois explains this as the confusion of first-order facts with the second-order inferences. This is a commonly seen danger, he says, since our newspapers
are full of biased statements presented as objective description of facts.\textsuperscript{33} The determination of a fact as compared to an opinion may not be as easily seen, however. Johnson says that a fact appears different depending on the point of view; your facts are not exactly like those of someone else. To further complicate matters, Johnson says that a fact is necessarily incomplete.

If you would recognize a fact when you see one and make the most of it, there are, then, four things about any fact that you must be clear about: It is necessarily incomplete, it changes, it is a personal affair, and its usefulness depends on the degree to which others agree with you concerning it.\textsuperscript{34}

So, even when facts are used, they may change upon statement of them. Bois says the only way to avoid the use of opinions in place of facts is to be trained to distinguish what is going on from feelings or understandings of what is going on.\textsuperscript{35}

**Sixth danger indicator as explained by general semanticists**

The sixth danger indicator is the rambling from one subject to another. When the subject at hand is avoided, or irrelevent material substituted for the subject, a danger is seen. When the discussion is kept to the subject, this danger is overcome. In the area of rambling, no studies by general smanticists were found.
It seems to be a self-explanatory danger and means exactly what it says.

**Seventh danger indicator as explained by general semanticists**

The last of the danger indicators being studied is concerned with the use of authorities to uphold given viewpoints. This also has had very little discussion by general semanticists. The situation should be evaluated on the basis of its own merit to deal with the danger. The authority quoted may not have been in the same situation, and, as shown by earlier danger indicators, the situation could not be exactly the same, anyway.

While studies have been made in regard to some of the danger indicators of general semantics, not all indicators have been studied thoroughly. With the use of the given explanations of the danger indicators, the writer will now explain the meanings being used in the application of them to discourse of S. I. Hayakawa.

**First danger indicator as explained by the writer**

In the first danger indicator, absolute terms, generalities, or words that imply "allness" will be discussed. The danger shown by this indicator is that generalities are used to "lump" different situations into one category. General terms and words of high-order of
abstraction are easily confused if individuals have differing meanings. Each word should be carefully selected to avoid the use of the "allness" concept as well as ambiguity. The discourse of S. I. Hayakawa is analyzed to see if general terms, or words of general nature are used. If so, danger will be seen in the discourse.

Second danger indicator as explained by the writer

The second danger indicator deals with the use of judgment terms. It applies to those situations when terms of approval or disapproval are used. The ideal discourse would put judgments in perspective to the audience by using the phrase, "If I were in that position . . . ." The judgment may still be given, but only as the opinion of the author of the discourse. In order to move away from being in a danger zone, Hayakawa must state opinions clearly and label them as such.

Third danger indicator as explained by the writer

The third indicator deals with the use of "either-or" statements. The author of the discourse should not block concepts, beliefs, or "facts" into rigid placement. There should be room for gray areas of discussion which
fall neither in the positive or negative viewpoints. Compromise is needed to achieve good discourse.

**Fourth danger indicator as explained by the writer**

The fourth indicator deals with "just like" situations. As argued by general semanticists, no situation is like another. Every situation has its individual characteristics. If the author does not recognize these differences, danger is definitely close by. Just as each person likes to be treated as an individual, each person also wants his/her situation treated individually. Hayakawa's discourse utilizes this danger indicator if he characterizes one situation exactly like one he has observed at another thime.

**Fifth danger indicator as explained by the writer**

The fifth danger indicator deals with facts and exclusive interpretations, opinions, and judgments. This is a difficult danger to discover in discourse, because the definition of a fact can be confused with that of an opinion in some circumstances. As a society used to seeing opinions presented as facts, this is an important area of study. A careful look at the facts presented by S. I. Hayakawa is needed to discover if opinions are actually given in place of genuine facts.
Sixth danger indicator as explained by the writer

The sixth danger indicator deals with the consistency of staying on one subject. It is discouraging as an audience member to find the speaker jumping from one subject to another. Rambling shows that the author is not organized and may not be prepared to present the discourse. If Hayakawa rambles from one topic to another, he falls into this danger indicator. It is the writer's belief that if Hayakawa does ramble, it will be in a spoken discourse rather than a written one, since the latter can be edited.

Seventh danger indicator as explained by the writer

The seventh danger indicator deals with the use of authorities. When relying on others' testimonies to uphold viewpoints, someone is then available to receive the blame if the discourse is questioned. When using someone else as a reference point, defense of beliefs is not given, rather backing by an authority. Relying on self-viewpoints shows commitment to the cause; belief is truly shown by the statements made without the necessity of reassurance from another individual.

The seven danger indicators as given by J. Samuel Bois have been somewhat discussed by general semanti-cists, but definite detail has not been provided. The
application of these indicators, then, is a relatively new area of general semantics.
ENDNOTES


3 Current Biography 1977, p. 194.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.


9 Current Biography 1977, p. 196.

10 Ibid.


12 Charles B. Brownson, 1980 Congressional Staff Directory (Mt. Vernon, Virginia: Congressional Staff Director, Limited), pp. 171, 189, 202, 206.

13 Current Biography 1977, p. 194.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.


21 Ibid., p. 281.

22 Ibid., p. 78.

23 Ibid., p. 86.

24 Ibid., p. 87.

25 Ibid., p. 280.

26 Korzybski, Science and Sanity, p. 404.


28 Ibid.

29 Korzybski, Science and Sanity, p. v.


31 Ibid.


33 Ibid.

34 Johnson, People in Quandries, p. 94.

CHAPTER III

ANALYSIS OF SPEECHES

The Application of Danger Indicators to Discourses of S. I. Hayakawa

This chapter is an application of the danger indicators of general semantics to four discourses of S. I. Hayakawa. These four discourses are "A Search for Relevance, 1968;" "After the Canal Treaties;" an address to the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company Convention in San Francisco; and "Bilingual Education Improvement Act." The application attempts to determine if S. I. Hayakawa violates general semantics principles by using danger indicators. (Copies of the four speeches are found in the Appendixes.)

The Application of Danger Indicators to "A Search for Relevance, 1968"

The first discourse of S. I. Hayakawa analyzed was "A Search for Relevance, 1968." This speech was given at the Eleventh International Conference on General Semantics held in Denver, Colorado, August 5-9, 1968.¹ It was included in the collection of speeches in Communication: General Semantics Perspectives in the chapter on application. Lee Thayer, editor of the book, says Hayakawa's paper "should be taken (together) in the
context of the conference and its theme." The paper is from an edited tape-script of the actual speech.

In the discourse, the indexing factor of "1968" is used. The indexing factor is used to show that the content of the discourse applies to the year 1968 only. The message, therefore, is in the here-and-now when given.

This discourse is used in this analysis because it was given by a man known in the field of general semantics, S. I. Hayakawa, to a group of general semanticists in response to a theme of "... a Search for Relevance, 1968." Being recognized as a speaker at this conference shows that S. I. Hayakawa is accepted as one of the group--a general semanticist. In the discourse, Hayakawa looks at television and the semantic environment it has created. Commercialized television has created a belief that happiness, significance, and values are purchasable consumer goods. Poor blacks and whites whose entire outlook of the outside world has been through a television screen want the advertised luxuries so they can be accepted by higher social and economic classes. This discourse also discusses the connotations of the words, "white" and "black." Hayakawa says, "White had connotations of purity, loveliness, elegance, truth, brightness, clarity, and so on." He says, "... black [has] a connotation of dark, black, evil, Satanic, sinister, and
Hayakawa then applies the bad connotation of "black" to groups such as the Black Panthers. People have a bad attitude towards groups such as this simply because of the name. Hayakawa suggests that the name be substituted by "Soul Brothers Mutual Assistance Society." He says a name-change that replaces the evil connotation will also change the attitudes.

In this discourse, "A Search for Relevance, 1968," it is hypothesized that S. I. Hayakawa will rarely use the danger indicators because the discourse was presented by a general semanticist to a group of general semanticists. It is assumed that extreme care would be taken when giving a speech in front of colleagues, to insure that all of the principles of general semantics were followed. It is also assumed that Hayakawa will use qualifiers when giving facts that are actually opinions. An example of a qualifier is "In my opinion." Using a qualifier, the statement has clear authorship, and is not presented as a fact.

In the discourse, S. I. Hayakawa used four of the seven danger indicators. Danger indicator three, the use of "either-or" statements, passing from one alternative to another opposite alternative, was not used by Hayakawa, nor were danger indicators four, the use of
"just-like" situations and experiences; and six, rambling from one subject to another.

Application of danger indicator number one

Three statements using absolute terms, generalities, and "allness" terms, danger indicator number one, were included in the discourse. The first statement is, "All happiness and all significance and all values that human beings might strive for are transformed by advertising into purchasable commodities." The word "all" gives a clear indication that the sentence is using an "allness" term. Hayakawa could have avoided the violation of the first danger indicator here by rephrasing the sentence eliminating the word "all." Writing the statement as, "Some of the happiness, significance, and values that human beings might strive for seem to be transformed by advertising into purchasable commodities."

The second statement in which Hayakawa falls into the first danger indicator is, "For the culturally unsophisticated, there are very few messages from other sources." Hayakawa uses a generality when he assumes those lower-class citizens who watch television are "culturally unsophisticated." He does not take into consideration the fact that there may be some culturally sophisticated people who watch television quite a bit. The sentence includes another violation of general
semantics principles when the "culturally unsophisticated" have very few outlets of information other than television. This is an assumption on Hayakawa's part, and a generality. He does not show with statistics or testimony that lower-class citizens do not read the newspaper or listen to the radio news. It is an assumption that appears as a danger indicator.

The third statement that shows itself as a danger indicator by the use of generalities, absolute terms, or terms that imply "allness," is, "So the black people and the white policeman are all role-playing around the words black-white, black-white--both of them trapped by the English language." Hayakawa uses many danger indicators within this one sentence. First, he generalizes by labeling the two groups as "black people" and "white policemen." While it is safe to assume that the group other than the police may have been made up of blacks, it cannot be assumed that all of the policemen were white. There is a generality made in this statement, since Hayakawa does not give the racial background of the police force. A second generality is made when Hayakawa labels the police force as "policemen." Although it may have been a generic norm in 1968 to use "man" to mean "humanity," it is a generality when taken literally. All police
officers are not men, and the group should not be labeled as such.

A third violation of the first danger indicator is seen in this statement when it is said that "all [are] role-playing." It cannot be assumed that the entire groups of both blacks and whites are role-playing. From an example, it cannot be determined what is motivating the individual to act the way he/she does. This is an allness statement, and should be changed to avoid the danger indicator. A fourth misuse of generalities or absolute terms is seen in the last portion of the sentence, "... both of them trapped by the English language." This phrasing assumes that each person in the group is motivated to act according to the boundaries of the English language. This may put both groups into an absolute situation.

A restatement of the sentence to "So the Black Panthers and the Oakland Police force have a strong possibility of role-playing around the words black-white, black-white--perhaps trapped by the English language." This would absolve the danger indicator in the use of generalities, absolute terms, and terms that imply "allness."
Application of danger indicator number two

Hayakawa falls into the second danger indicator when he presents judgment terms of approval or disapproval. He does this when suggesting the name change of the Black Panthers to "Soul Brothers Mutual Assistance Society." Three comments are made by Hayakawa about the name. First he says, "It's a beautiful name." The phrase "That's fine," is used twice in the paragraph, once behind the statement of "Soul Brothers," and once behind the statement of "Mutual Assistance." Although these infractions of general semantics principles are not serious, they do, however, give a judgment of approval to the titles Hayakawa presents. To solve this problem, Hayakawa could have either eliminated the phrases entirely, or explained why the name change would be beneficial to the police force and the group.

Application of danger indicator number five

The fifth danger indicator is used quite extensively by S. I. Hayakawa. He many times states "facts" which are instead his own opinions, interpretations, and judgments. The first notice of the use of opinions, interpretations, and judgments as facts is in the following paragraph:
The basic message of commercial television is "Want this product. Want this convenience. Want this luxury. Buy. Buy. Buy. If you have enough things, all your problems will be solved. This hairdressing, this headache remedy, this broiler, this luxurious carpeting, this new automobile will bring you charm, personality, sexual fulfillment, domestic bliss, and the envy and respect of your neighbors." All happiness and all significance and all values that human beings might strive for are transformed by advertising into purchasable commodities.

This entire paragraph is presented as a group of facts. The paragraph is divided into two separate thoughts. The first gives the basic message of commercialized television. Although many might agree with the principle presented by Hayakawa, it cannot be considered a "fact." Advertising executives or station managers may see television as an information medium rather than a persuasive medium. Hayakawa suggests that commercialized television has only one purpose--to sell, sell, sell. He presents this as a fact, not an opinion. A qualifier, such as "It seems to me . . ." or "In my opinion . . ." would insure that the statement was an opinion. The second part of the paragraph describing the transformation of happiness, significance, and values can be changed as shown under the first danger indicator, "Some of the happiness, significance, and values that human beings might strive for seem to be transformed by advertising into purchasable commodities." This solves both the first danger indicator and the fifth, where the fact is made
permeable because of the word "seem." If this qualifier was used, the "fact" would appear to be an opinion as it should.

A similar "fact" of television is stated later in the discourse. "At the heart of all this, the central fact is that the message of television is: 'Don't wait. Buy today. Don't postpone gratification.'"\(^\text{11}\) As in the earlier "fact," Hayakawa could have avoided the danger indicator by saying, "In my opinion . . . ."

After giving opinions on commercialized television, Hayakawa moves to the lower-class Negro. He states, "One of the real problems of the lower-class Negro . . . is the inability to postpone gratification."\(^\text{12}\) He also states, "Many underprivileged Negroes, as we all know, have inherited from slavery days the habits of irresponsibility and living from moment to moment."\(^\text{13}\) These "facts" are clearly opinions of S. I. Hayakawa, and ones that could be labeled as discriminatory. Statements such as these need to be put in perspective as opinions and not as facts that are accepted by the entire society. The second statement falls into a strong violation when the phrase "as we all know" is included. If the statement was unquestionable, the use of the phrase would be justified, but it does not belong in an opinion statement. Hayakawa could get out of the danger indicator arena in
two ways. First, and probably the best solution, would be to leave out these statements entirely. They are not facts, and do not contribute to the credibility of the speaker due to the bias of the statements. The second solution is to include a specific phrase showing authorship of the statements. An example of one such phrase is, "I believe that . . . ." If "as we all know" was replaced by "in my opinion," the statement about lower-class Negro irresponsibility would be attributed to Hayakawa and not stated as a fact known by everyone.

Application of danger indicator
number seven

The seventh danger indicator presented by Bois is the use of authorities to support the author's viewpoints. The application of the seventh danger indicator is not an extensive analysis, since Hayakawa does not fall into this danger very easily. Hayakawa uses Marshall McLuhan as an authority to support his viewpoint in the statement, "And like Marshall McLuhan, I agree that no medium of mass communication is as powerful in its effect on people." Because Hayakawa is giving his viewpoint on television, he falls into a general semantics danger indicator by using Marshall McLuhan as an authority to support his beliefs. Hayakawa could have avoided this
danger indicator by leaving out McLuhan's name and standing on his own opinions—presenting them, of course, as opinions.

As a transitional statement, Hayakawa says, "As Wendell Johnson said, 'Every speaker is his own most interested and affected listener.'" Because Johnson's quote is used purely to introduce the next topic area, danger indicator number seven does not appear.

**Summary of application of danger indicators to Hayakawa's first discourse**

In this first discourse, Hayakawa uses four of the seven danger indicators of general semantics. His main infraction of the principles is in danger indicator number five, when he presents opinions as facts. He needs to use qualifiers to show that the statements are, indeed, his own views, and not society's established facts. Although three other danger indicators were used, they are not as serious as the fifth indicator. Because the discourse was taken from an edited tape-script, the mistakes could have been edited from the original speech. As shown in the analysis, however, the dangers still remain in the discourse.
The Application of Danger Indicators to "After the Canal Treaties"

The second discourse of S. I. Hayakawa to be analyzed is "After the Canal Treaties." The discourse was published in the New York Times on October 25, 1977. Senator Jacob Javits of New York, when submitting the article to the Congressional Record said that Hayakawa discusses "neglected and often overlooked issues which bear upon the Senate's consideration of the two Panama Canal treaties which are now before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee."17

The Panama Canal Treaties were important issues of the 95th Congress. The treaties dealt with the proposal of the United States to transfer the Panama Canal and Canal Zone to Panama. According to Encyclopedia Britannica 1977 Book of the Year,

The settlement consisted of two agreements, a lengthy general treaty and a neutrality pact. On October 14 (1977) Carter and Torrijos announced an agreement interpreting the United States right to defend the canal as not extending to intervention in the internal affairs of Panama and construing the right of U.S. war vessels to expeditions transit as priority of passage through the canal.19

Hayakawa's discourse, "After the Canal Treaties," came before the agreement settled on between Carter and Torrijos. It discusses two misconceptions many people had about the ratification of the treaties. The first is that the Senate can only reject or consent to the treaties.
Hayakawa says this is not true; other options are available. The second misconception is that when a decision is made, the Canal matter will be solved. Hayakawa says the problems will have only begun. The rest of the discourse examines those problems.

It is hypothesized that Hayakawa will not violate the fifth danger indicator, presenting opinions and interpretations as facts. This is hypothesized as such because of the knowledge gained by being in the Senate. Senator Hayakawa, therefore, should be knowledgeable in this topic area and able to present reliable information to the public. An incorrect or biased statement would reflect on the entire Senate.

In "After the Canal Treaties," S. I Hayakawa uses three of the danger indicators. The first indicator, the use of generalities, absolute terms, and words that imply "allness," was not used in this article. Danger indicator number three, "either-or" statements, was also not seen. S. I. Hayakawa does not present a situation that is "just like" another situation, danger indicator number four.

Application of danger indicator number two

As shown in the previous chapter, J. Samuel Bois states that a phrase such as "you ought to . . . " shows a set of beliefs, or approval or disapproval, danger
indicator number two. S. I. Hayakawa used this danger indicator twice in the discourse. The first use is in the sentence, "We therefore ought to be prepared for new pressures to abandon Guantanamo, Cuba, and to evacuate Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay in the Philippines." The use of "we (therefore) ought" shows the approval as explained by Bois. Substitution of "we therefore may need to be . . ." for the phrase would eliminate the danger. A similar phrase was used in the phrase "... it would seem wise to authorize simultaneously a substantial increase in security and our military presence in the Canal Zone." The statement gives approval to the idea presented. Because danger is shown, the statement could be changed to "I believe the possibility of authorizing simultaneously a substantial increase in security and our military presence in the Canal Zone should be investigated." This revision changes the danger sentence to a non-threatening one. A suggestion is made, but the approval is not as definite.

Application of danger indicator number five

Although it was hypothesized that S. I. Hayakawa would not use opinions, interpretations, and judgments relayed as facts, violation of the fifth danger indicator is indeed seen in the discourse. The infractions are
more difficult to determine, however, because they are written as factual information. The first violation occurs in the statement, "The detailed and complex provisions of the treaty . . . are bound to produce all kinds of controversies." The offending indicator is in the last half of the statement. It sounds factual, but gives no rationale for the belief that controversies will occur. To avoid falling into a danger indicator, a qualifier showing clear authorship should be included in the statement. The statement would then say, "The detailed and complex provisions of the treaty . . . are bound, I believe, to produce all kinds of controversies." The addition of an authorship qualifier will remove the statement as a danger indicator.

The second use of an opinion stated as a fact is similar to the prior example. In this statement, Hayakawa says, "A refusal by the Senate to consent to ratification is bound to have equally detrimental consequences." As in the prior statement using "bound," the addition of a qualifier would clear Hayakawa from falling into a danger indicator. The statement, then, would read, "In my opinion, a refusal by the Senate to consent to ratification is bound to have equally detrimental consequences."

Near the end of the Canal Treaties discourse, Hayakawa falls into a series of violations of the fifth
danger indicator. The following sentence is the first infraction in the series: "An important by-product of such action would be the warning to the rest of the world that the United States not only is unwilling to give up the Canal, but also is prepared to defend its rights regardless of consequences." In discussing the defense treaty, Hayakawa uses a definite opinion, and a strong one at that. If indeed, this is a fact, a quotation from the source would be in order. If authorship is not shown, changes in the statement showing a possibility rather than a definite action would eliminate the danger indicator. The substitution of words would make the sentence say, "An important by-product of such action may be the warning to . . . but may also be prepared to defend its rights regardless of consequences."

The next violation of the fifth danger indicator is in the sentence, "However, no Latin-American country or Third World countries will regard a negative vote by the Senate as final." A simple addition of an authorship clause will take the opinion, perhaps well-educated, but an opinion nonetheless, and state it as it should be, and not a fact. "I believe" written prior to the existing statement would present the "fact" as an opinion.

In the final paragraph, Hayakawa states, "Regardless of the outcome of the vote, there are serious
problems and great risks ahead." This statement is presented as a fact, but may not be accepted by others because of its definite nature. To change the definiteness of the statement, a substitution is needed. The statement would then read, "Regardless of the outcome of the vote, there are possibilities of serious problems and great risks ahead." Although authorship is not given to the statement, it is presented in a manner that is open to discussion, rather than definite. It can be taken as a possibility rather than an absolute statement.

Application of danger indicator number seven

The final violation which S. I. Hayakawa presents in "After the Canal Treaties" is the use of authorities to support the author's views. The statement says, "As former Secretary of State Dean Rusk has pointed out . . ." Dean Rusk is used as an authority to support statements Hayakawa has made. In order to be in agreement with general semantics principles of danger indicators, Hayakawa should write the statement as his own view, rather than Rusk's. Hayakawa's opinions should stand as an educated observer since he is familiar with the information he discusses. The statement should be clearly written as his opinions.
Summary of application of danger indicators to Hayakawa's second discourse

The second discourse of S. I. Hayakawa presents an opportunity to analyze two areas of his interests and careers—general semantics and politics. Hayakawa violates some of the general semantic danger indicators, but they are more difficult to find because of the knowledge Hayakawa has as a senator. As in the first discourse, Hayakawa gives approval or disapproval, presents opinions as facts, and uses an authority to support his viewpoints.

The Application of Danger Indicators to a Speech to the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company

The third discourse of S. I. Hayakawa analyzed is a speech made to the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company. The speech was given in San Francisco on May 7, 1977. The discourse was presented to the Senate by Senator James A. McClure of Idaho for inclusion in the Congressional Record. McClure says the speech is the first senatorial report to the public that elected Hayakawa to the Senate. McClure also says that Hayakawa has put bureaucracy, Federal deficits, and increasing dependence on the Government into the proper perspective. The discourse shows the concern Hayakawa has for the direction the government is going. He explains some
of the bills brought before the Senate and his vote on those bills. He also goes on to explain how the vote will affect the public.

This speech to the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company was selected to be analyzed because it is a discourse of S. I. Hayakawa given to a group of business people. This group may not be familiar with the happenings of the Senate and Hayakawa's speech should reflect this possible unfamiliarity. It is hypothesized, then, that this discourse will be relatively free from frequent use of danger indicators because of the language needed to be used to this selective group.

In the application of the general semantics danger indicators to the discourse, five of the seven danger indicators were found. S. I. Hayakawa did not use danger indicator number two, the use of terms showing approval or disapproval; danger indicator number three, the use of "either-or" arguments, describing things in black and white without consideration of any gray areas in between; and danger indicator number four, the presentation of a present situation as "just like" another one. The topic areas in Hayakawa's discourse seemed to be unrelated and a violation of the sixth danger indicator, which is rambling from one subject to another. Further reading of the discourse shows that Hayakawa related all of the
separate areas into one conclusion, however, so the danger indicator was actually not violated. Hayakawa also did not use danger indicator number seven, the use of authorities to back up his points.

Application of danger indicator number one

S. I. Hayakawa uses generalities in two statements in the discourse. The statements are concerning secondary wage-earners who may receive unemployment payments. The first violation occurs in the statement, "That is, he's more likely to quit—in order to go back to school, to take a course—if he or she is unhappy about work conditions or quarrels with the boss." The statement makes all secondary wage-earners appear to be in a category of irresponsible employees. The fact may be that only a few actually quit jobs because of unhappiness. A better phrasing of the situation is, "That is, he may be more likely to quit . . . if he or she is unhappy about work conditions or quarrels with the boss." The substitution of a less-absolute verb "may" for the absolute verb "is" will eliminate the use of the first danger indicator.

The second statement follows the first in the discourse and also uses an absolute verb, implying that the entire group demonstrates a specific behavior. The statement is, "They're more likely to quit because they
don't have to stick it out." The first problem in the statement is that absolute verbs "are" and "do have" are used. A substitution of "may" for the absolute verb "are" would change the implication of the statement. If the first verb is changed, the second absolute verb would take on a less definite meaning. The second problem in the statement shows a generality by assuming that no family needs a second wage-earner to make ends meet. This is shown by the word "they." A solution to the generalities is "Some may be more likely to quit because they don't have to stick it out." The revision would eliminate the generalities and allness terms that Hayakawa uses.

Application of danger indicator number five

As in the previous discourses, Hayakawa presents opinions as facts. Qualifiers were not used to set the opinions apart from the actual facts. The first violation occurs in a paragraph discussing the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). Hayakawa first presents an opinion as fact when he says, "First of all, CETA has not proved itself to be an effective program for training people and getting them into jobs." Hayakawa does not give the source of the information in the statements, so the audience may be accepting opinions as facts. To make the sentences clearly stated as opinions, "I
believe" or some other qualifier could have been used. The statements would then say, "First of all, I believe CETA has not proved itself to be an effective program for training people and getting them into jobs. I also believe CETA has not . . ." The opinions would then avoid the label of a danger indicator.

The next set of violations occurs in the same paragraph as the first danger indicators. The paragraph is:

In the first place, he hasn't got the intense job attachment that the primary wage-earner has. That is, he's more likely to quit—in order to go back to school, to take a course—if he or she is unhappy about work conditions or quarrels with the boss. They're more likely to quit because they don't have to stick it out. In other words, they don't have the career attachment, job attachment, that the primary worker has.

If the first sentence is indeed a fact, a qualifier such as "According to recent studies . . ." could have eliminated the danger indicators. If the statement is an opinion of S. I. Hayakawa, a qualifier such as "In my opinion," would clearly show authorship by Hayakawa. Either change would take the statement out of the danger indicator zone.

The next two statements in the paragraph are violations of the fifth danger indicator as well as the first. The revised statements given under the application of the first danger indicator also eliminates the fifth
danger indicator. The absoluteness of the language used in facts is replaced by language showing probability. The fact is then less rigid and there is room for discussion of that statement.

The last sentence in the paragraph also falls into the fifth danger indicator. If, in the first sentence of the paragraph, a qualifier showing support for the statement is given, this sentence would be presented correctly as a fact. If not, "I believe" could serve as a qualifier showing that the statement is an opinion of Hayakawa.

The final infraction of the general semantics danger indicators in the speech to the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company is near the end of the discourse. The statement is, "Our welfare clients live far better than the working people of three-quarters of the world." Although this sounds like a fact, no documentation of sources is given on where the information is from. To be free from violation of the danger indicator, either the source of information or the authorship phrase of "in my opinion" is needed at the beginning of the sentence. The qualifier is used to show that the statement is, indeed, an opinion.
Summary of application of danger indicators to Hayakawa's third discourse

In the lengthy speech to the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company Convention, Hayakawa rarely violated danger indicators. He presented a speech to a group who may have been unfamiliar with the terms used in the Senate. His manner was such that the audience could relate the information to the involvement they had in the government--mainly paying taxes. Hayakawa uses personal experiences in this discourse. He explains his role on a major unemployment issue, and his fight to change the minds of his colleagues. He also shares discussion he had with his father and how that relates to the U.S. economy. Because these personal experiences were used, Hayakawa violated very few danger indicators.

Hayakawa did violate two danger indicators when he used general terms showing allness and when he presented "facts" that were possibly not facts but opinions. Some of these were difficult to determine, but clarity was made by the author with the substitution or addition of qualifying phrases.

Application of Danger Indicators to "Bilingual Education Improvement Act"

The final discourse of S. I. Hayakawa to be analyzed is "Bilingual Education Improvement Act." The
discourse was delivered to the Subcommittee on Education, Arts and Humanities, Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources in Washington, D.C. on April 23, 1982.\textsuperscript{37} This discourse was selected to be analyzed because it shows Hayakawa fighting for something he believes in—making English the official language of the United States. Because the speech was given before a Senate Subcommittee, it is a picture of Hayakawa in action in his governmental role.

Since this speech, Hayakawa has co-founded U.S.-English, a national nonprofit organization whose goal is to make English the official language of the United States.\textsuperscript{38} Guy Wright, a columnist for the \textit{San Francisco Examiner} and \textit{Chronicle}, says, "Former Senator S. I. Hayakawa, who fought this battle almost alone while in Congress, is honorary chairman of U.S.-English."\textsuperscript{39}

The discourse analyzed deals with the opinions of Hayakawa. It is, therefore, hypothesized that danger indicator number two, the use of words showing approval or disapproval, will be used frequently. In a persuasive situation, it seems approval of an idea presented would be relatively difficult to avoid.

In the actual analysis of the speech, however, Hayakawa rarely falls into any of the danger indicators. The discourse is highly persuasive, but is given in such
a way that facts--based on past legislation and common knowledge--relate the point Hayakawa is trying to make. The audience may, therefore, be persuaded without the use of Hayakawa's opinions or generalizations but with facts.

Four danger indicators were not found in the discourse. Danger indicator number three, the use of "either-or" statements without leaving any gray area for compromise was not used in the speech. Hayakawa did not violate the fourth danger indicator by speaking of a present situation as "just like" another one; nor did he fall into the sixth danger indicator zone by rambling from subject to subject. The seventh general semantics danger indicator, the use of authorities to support opinions, was not found either. Although Hayakawa did mention a few names of those who also believe in the cause, he did not use those sources to support his statements.

Application of danger indicator number one

The first violation in the discourse is the use of danger indicator number one, the use of generalities or "allness" terms. Hayakawa fell into this danger indicator zone in the statement, "We all grew up with the concept of the American melting pot, that is the merging of a multitude of foreign cultures into one."40
offending term in the statement is "all." It puts the entire population into one group, which could be an incorrect assumption. To be free from the danger, Hayakawa needed to change the term "all" to one that is not absolute. One revision that would eliminate the generality is "Most of us probably grew up with the concept . . ." "Most" replaces the "allness" terms and the addition of "probably" decreases the generality given in the original statement concerning the knowledge of the melting pot.

Application of danger indicator number two

Danger indicator number two deals with the use of statements showing approval or disapproval. As general semanticists explain, an indication of the use of approval or disapproval statements is the term "must." Hayakawa uses this word in the sentence, "We as Americans must reassess our commitment to the preservation of English as our common language." Approval, or judgment, is shown in the statement. Following the general semanticists' suggestions, the term should be replaced with a neutral term. The revision would read, "We as Americans might want to reassess our commitment to the preservation of English as our common language." The statement is then a suggestion to Americans rather than a judgmental order.
The violation of the second danger indicator is resolved with the revised statement.

**Application of danger indicator number five**

In a persuasive discourse such as the speech, "Bilingual Education Improvement Act," it would seem relatively easy to present opinions as facts. Unlike the other discourses analyzed, however, S. I. Hayakawa prefices many comments with the qualifier, "I believe." Because he uses the qualifier, many violations of the fifth danger indicator are avoided. The discourse does contain two violations of this danger indicator, however.

The first violation occurs in the statement, "This amendment would end that contradictory, logically conflicting situation." The statement gives no guarantee that a conflicting situation will be ended with the passage of the amendment declaring that English is the official language of the United States. This statement is an opinion of Hayakawa, but is presented as a fact. A qualifier would clearly show that the statement is an opinion, therefore, out of the danger indicator zone. The statement would then read, "This amendment, I believe, would end that contradictory, logically conflicting situation." The statement reads as it should—an opinion.
The second violation of the fifth danger indicator is closely related to the first. The statement is at the end of the discourse, and is Hayakawa's final persuasive appeal. The statement is, "Passage of my English language amendment, as well as my bilingual education proposal, will insure that we maintain a common basis for communicating the sharing ideas." Again, no guarantee is given that cohesive communication will be achieved through the amendment. The thought is an opinion of Hayakawa's, and should be presented with a qualifier to make it clearly authored. The statement revision could be "Passage of my English language amendment, as well as my bilingual education proposal, will insure, in my opinion, that we maintain a common basis for communicating and sharing ideas." The final concern and beliefs of Hayakawa are still shown, but the statement is written clearly as an opinion, as general semanticists would suggest it be written.

Summary of application of danger indicators to Hayakawa's fourth discourse

In the discourse "Bilingual Education Improvement Act," S. I. Hayakawa very rarely fell into any of the danger indicators. Most of his material was either based on legislation that had occurred in our history, or on Hayakwa's opinions, and presented with that qualifier.
The discourse could have easily fallen into the danger indicator of presenting many approving or disapproving statements, but Hayakawa avoided this well. This discourse does have a few uses of dangers according to principles set by general semanticists, but the amount is small in comparison to the amount of statements that are persuasive without being opinionated. The writer feels that "Bilingual Education Improvement Act" is an example of a well-developed discourse showing the finer aspects of persuasive rhetoric.

Summary of the Analysis of the Four Discourses

Four discourses of S. I. Hayakawa were analyzed in this chapter. These discourses were: "A Search for Relevance, 1968," "After the Canal Treaties," an address to the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company Convention in San Francisco, and "Bilingual Education Improvement Act." These discourses were selected to be analyzed because they represent a variety of concerns Hayakawa has in a number of areas. The audiences for the discourses also vary. The audiences include a group of general semanticists, the general public (through a newspaper article), a group of insurance salespeople, and a senate subcommittee. Language use changed somewhat in the four discourses to appeal to each of the groups.
Seven danger indicators from general semanticist J. Samuel Bois were applied to these four discourses of S. I. Hayakawa. Three of the seven danger indicators were not found in the analysis. Danger indicator number three, the use of "either-or" statements without presenting any area of gray in between, was not found, nor was danger indicator number four, labeling situations as "just like" other situations. Danger indicator number six, rambling from one subject to another, was avoided in this analysis, also.

Of the four remaining danger indicators, one was rarely found in the discourses. Danger indicator number seven, the use of authorities to support opinions, was used in only one of the speeches analyzed. Facts and quotes from other individuals were used in a few cases, but they were contributing to the facts being presented rather than supporting Hayakawa's opinions.

The three most commonly used danger indicators were numbers one, two, and five. The first danger indicator is the use of generalities and words that imply "allness." This violation was found in three of the four analyzed discourses. The infraction could have been corrected by eliminating words that gave the implication that all individuals have the same behavior or that situations are always the same. The substitution of a
less inclusive term for the word "all" would also eliminate the use of the first danger indicator.

The second danger indicator, the use of judgment terms, or terms loaded with approval or disapproval, was also used in three of the four discourses. As general semanticists have explained, judgment terms, such as "should" and "must" would be better stated in unbiased and neutral terms. Hayakawa does violate this danger indicator, but he does not use the judgment terms in excess. The judgment terms, although in three of the discourses, are used minimally.

The fifth danger indicator, the presentation of opinions and interpretations as facts, was the danger indicator found most often in the discourses. General semanticists have stated that this danger indicator occurs frequently in our society, often without our recognition. The opinions presented as facts were at times difficult for the writer to recognize due to the frequencies of occurrence in a multitude of other areas including the media. The violation of the fifth danger indicator would be eliminated by using qualifiers, such as "I believe" to show that the statements presented were clearly Hayakawa's own opinions. Unquestionable facts could also serve as replacements for opinions, but they may be harder to find.
The discourses of S. I. Hayakawa did not contain an extreme amount of danger indicators. Just over half of the seven danger indicators were found in analysis, and one of the danger indicators was found only once. Hayakawa, in these discourses, presents generally danger indicator-free material.
ENDNOTES


2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.


5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., p. 86.

7 Ibid., p. 87.

8 Ibid., p. 86.

9 Ibid., p. 87.

10 Ibid., p. 87.

11 Ibid., p. 87.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid., p. 85.

15 Ibid., p. 86.


17 Ibid.


22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.


29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.


41 Ibid., p. 522.

42 Ibid., p. 521.

43 Ibid., p. 523.
CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary of Methodology

The purpose of this paper was to determine to what extent seven general semantics danger indicators applied to four discourses of S. I. Hayakawa. The discourses were written by Hayakawa in his roles as general semanticist, senator, and leader of a nonprofit organization.

The biography of S. I. Hayakawa was given in chapter two. The explanations of the seven danger indicators, both by general semanticists and this writer, were also given in chapter two.

Library sources were used to insure the originality of the study. Material on S. I. Hayakawa was obtained through library and outside sources. Discourses by Hayakawa were gathered and four were selected for analysis.

Summary of Hayakawa's Biography

S. I. Hayakawa was born in Canada and received his education through a Master's degree in that country. He obtained a Ph.D. at the University of Wisconsin. He taught at various colleges and accepted a position at San Francisco State College in 1955. He later became president at the college. Hayakawa became a California Senator
in 1976 and served on various committees. During this time of being a teacher and a senator, Hayakawa established himself as a general semanticist by his writings and lectures. This career as general semanticist continued after his senatorial career.

**Summary of General Semantics**

**Danger Indicators**

J. Samuel Bois in *The Art of Awareness* lists thirteen danger and safety indicators of general semantics. This analysis used seven of those danger indicators that could apply to written discourse. These seven include using absolute terms or generalities, judgment terms loaded with approval or disapproval, "either-or" terms without leaving room for gray areas in between, describing present situations as being "just like" another one, confusing facts with opinions and judgments, rambling from subject to subject, and quoting authorities to support opinions. General semanticists do give some explanation of these seven danger indicators, but the extent of discussion is limited. Very few studies using any of the danger indicators have been found. An explanation of the seven danger indicators was also given by the writer. These explanations were used as guides for applying the general semantics danger indicators to discourse of Hayakawa.
Summary of Analysis

This paper analyzed four discourses of S. I. Hayakawa. The four discourses were: "A Search for Relevance, 1968," a speech given before a group of general semanticists at a convention; "After the Canal Treaties," an article written in the New York Times explaining the affect the Canal Treaties would have; an address to the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company Convention in San Francisco explaining votes by Hayakawa and their effects on the public; and "Bilingual Education Improvement Act," a speech given to a Senate subcommittee trying to persuade the subcommittee vote for an amendment to make English the official language of the United States. These discourses were selected to be analyzed because they represent Hayakawa in a number of different situations with a variety of audiences. The selected discourses are from peaceful periods in Hayakawa's career, rather than discourses from his time of conflict as president of San Francisco State College.

The seven danger indicators were applied to each of the discourses. Three of the danger indicators were not found in the analysis. Those not found in the analysis include indicator number three, the use of "either-or" statements without presenting any gray area in between. Instead of falling into the danger indicator,
Hayakawa gave consideration to degrees and shades of meaning and avoided talking about opposites. Another danger indicator not found in analysis was danger indicator number four, the labeling of situations as "just like" another one, or of this person "just like" so-and-so. Hayakawa was careful to differentiate between people, situations, and problems. The last danger indicator not found in any of the discourses was number six, rambling from one subject to another. Hayakawa kept to the subject under discussion in all four discourses. He did tend to wander onto other subjects in one of the discourses, but brought all of the subjects together to conclude his speech.

Of the four remaining danger indicators, one was found only rarely in the discourses. Danger indicator number seven, the use of authorities to uphold viewpoints, was used in only one of the discourses analyzed. Some facts and quotes from individuals were used in the other discourses, but they were used to support facts being presented rather than supporting Hayakawa's own opinions. For the majority of the time, Hayakawa evaluated the situation on its own merit, and used his own thoughts instead of someone else's to make his point.

The three most used danger indicators found in the analysis were numbers one, two, and five. The first
danger indicator of general semantics is the use of
generalities and words that imply "allness." This
violation was found in three of the four discourses
analyzed. The problem in most cases was a word that
described "allness" situations, which may have not been
ture. The elimination of this word, usually "all," and
replacement with a less-inclusive term makes the statement
less generalized and out of the range of the first danger
indicator.

The second danger indicator, the use of judgment
terms, or terms loaded with approval or disapproval, was
also used in three of the four discourses. According to
general semanticists, statements with "should" and "must"
phrasing would be better stated by using neutral and
unbiased terms. The general semanticists also say that
presenting judgment terms gives the audience a description
of how the author feels about the situation rather than
just giving facts about the situation. Substituting
neutral terms for the biased terms would eliminate the use
of the second danger indicator.

The fifth general semantics danger indicator was
found in all analyzed discourses of S. I. Hayakawa.
This danger indicator is the confusion of facts for
opinions and interpretations that are exclusively the
author's. This is a relatively difficult danger indicator
to find in material, because the presentation of opinions as facts occurs so frequently in our society. The general semanticists say that an explanation of what is going on is needed to combat the danger indicator. In most of the cases in which Hayakawa falls into the general semantics danger indicator, the solution is to add a qualifier showing distinction between the fact and an opinion. "I believe" or "In my opinion" are two qualifiers that would solve the violation. Although this danger indicator was found in all four discourses, it was used rarely in the fourth speech, "Bilingual Education Improvement Act."

Conclusions of Analysis of Discourses

The discourses selected for analysis were presented to the public or a portion of the public. The language use seemed to be appropriate in each case, and it varied in the different discourses. In the analysis of all four discourses, however, it is obvious that S. I Hayakawa did follow the principles of danger indicators as established by general semanticists. Some danger indicators were found in the discourses, but three were not found at all, and one was found in only one discourse. The three that were most commonly found as danger indicators were used rarely in relation to the length of the discourses and the number of facts presented.
If the selected discourses had been given while S. I. Hayakawa had been president of San Francisco State College, many more violations may have been found. Lawrence B. Rosenfeld, in "The Confrontation Policies of S. I. Hayakawa: A Case Study in Coercive Semantics," found that Hayakawa violated some of the principles of general semantics. He says, "Hayakawa, in speaking about (not to) the rebelling students, tried to force a skewed view of the social reality; tried to force others into a signal reaction; and tried to force his definitions into use so as to gain social control." This conclusion by Rosenfeld would show a violation of the second danger indicator, since judgment is shown and opinions are forced onto the listening public. Rosenfeld also says that examples "illustrate that Hayakawa was using a two-valued system—he saw everything in an either-or perspective. The radicals are wrong; he is right." The use of either-or statements is the third danger indicator, and again would show that Hayakawa did not follow the principles of general semantics. In his conclusion, Rosenfeld says, "General semantics failed, but coercive semantics did not."

studied S. I. Hayakawa during his months in control of the conflict at San Francisco State College. Although not analyzing speeches for danger indicator violations, Pletcher did find some conclusions that would fall into the danger indicator realm. One conclusion that could show that Hayakawa violated the seventh danger indicator, the use of authorities to support one's own viewpoint, is in the statement, "Hayakawa seemed to move back to his previous position, but probably only as long as the views of the Academic Senate were consistent with his position." This statement by Pletcher seems to show that Hayakawa followed the support of the Academic Senate rather than using his own opinions and beliefs on which to base his ideas.

These two studies of Hayakawa's rhetoric and actions during his reign as President of San Francisco State College show more tendencies to fall into danger indicators than do the discourses analyzed in this paper. This writer does not believe that the rhetoric and actions of S. I. Hayakawa during the San Francisco State College presidential years is representative of Hayakawa, since it was a conflict period. The discourses selected in this paper, then, were not chosen from those speeches given during the conflict.
As a general semanticist, S. I. Hayakawa followed the principles of danger indicators fairly well. The use of danger indicators may not have been noticed by any person not looking specifically for those indicators. The writer believes that the discourses of S. I. Hayakawa selected to be analyzed are examples of well-planned strategies of persuasion and information. Hayakawa uses the language effectively to convey his thoughts, not pushing his opinions without pushing facts.

Suggestions for Further Research

Further studies could be made in the area of general semantics danger indicators. Specifically, the studies could properly appear in the following forms:

1. Video-taped speeches of S. I. Hayakawa could be analyzed to determine if the additional six danger indicators concerning spoken discourse also apply.

2. Discourses from individuals not familiar with general semantics could be analyzed to determine to what extent danger indicators are used outside of the general semantics field.

3. Video-taping of individual speeches and/or group deliberations could be analyzed to determine to what extent danger indicators are used.
ENDNOTES


2Ibid., p. 19.

3Ibid., p. 20.

4Ibid., p. 21.

"A Search for Relevance, 1968"

I don't need to tell you that general semantics is relevant in our times. But there is one particular aspect of this relevance that presses on my mind very much. I want to share it with you.

Like Marshall McLuhan, I'm much concerned with television and its impact on the world. And like Marshall McLuhan, I agree that no medium of mass communication is as powerful in its effect on people.

In 1963, at the International Conference on General Semantics, I argued that the Negro revolution was triggered by television. Before the advent of radio and television, to be a non-reader was to be cut off from the world. But today, the illiterate and poorly educated can hear about and see events and people he formerly could know nothing about. Electronic communication has brought the whole big startling world into the lives and imaginations of millions who otherwise would not have been aware of it.

Furthermore, American television is commercially sponsored. It finds its economic support and justification in pushing consumer goods. Therefore, television is always friendly and cajoling and persuasive. It tells everybody, "No matter how miserable your present condition, you too can be attractive. You can be as good as anybody else. You can enjoy all the satisfactions of living in this lush and abundant consumer economy."

As I said in 1963, imagine that you are a young Negro to whom the television set with such messages has been his constant baby-sitter and companion. All your life the friendly television set has been saying to you, "You are an American. You are entitled to eat, drink, and wear what other Americans eat, drink, and wear. You are a member of our national community." Then imagine you are this young Negro, deprived by social custom and by lack of education and lack of training from sharing all these things. Would you not be frustrated and angry?

There are a lot of things about this message which create what Alfred Korzybski called our semantic
environment. Our semantic environment is the whole
environment of messages in which we live. Television is
a powerful contributor to that semantic environment.

The basic message of commercial television is
"Want this product. Want this convenience. Want this
luxury. Buy. Buy. Buy. If you have enough things, all
your problems will be solved. This hairdressing, this
headache remedy, this broiler, this luxurious carpeting,
this new automobile will bring you charm, personality,
sexual fulfillment, domestic bliss, and the envy and
respect of your neighbors." All happiness and all signifi-
cance and all values that human beings might strive for
are transformed by advertising into purchasable commodi-
ties.

Such, then, are the messages of television. For
the culturally unsophisticated, there are few messages
from other sources. In many lower-class homes, white
and Negro, the television set is never turned off from
morning till night. Into these homes, a multi-billion-
dollar industry beams daily and nightly messages—messages
skillfully devised to create demand, to stimulate desire,
to nurture the spirit of envy. "Man, I wish I had one of
them," they say as they stare into that color television.

Can anyone doubt the enormous greed for consumer
goods that has actuated every outbreak of looting and
burning since Watts? This greed is by no means confined
to Negroes. For example, what characterized the disorders
in Detroit, according to all accounts, was the apparent
lack of racist motivation among many of the looters.
Whites helped Negroes, Negroes helped whites load into
their cars and carry off television sets, furniture, tape
recorders, end tables and luggage, all in a spirit of
interracial brotherhood. We read that a gay carnival
spirit attended much of the looting. One Detroit police
sergeant was quoted as saying, "This isn't a race riot.
It's a riot of thieves."

At the heart of all this, the central fact is that
the message of television is: "Don't wait. Buy today.
Don't postpone gratification."

This message comes at a most inopportune time,
right on top of the Civil Rights movement. One of the
real problems of the lower-class Negro, still retaining
one hundred years later some of the horrid and tragic
inheritance of slavery, is the inability to postpone
gratification. Under slavery, postponement of gratification made no sense. If you save your money or improved your land, it all belonged to your master anyway, so slaves had too much sense to work all that hard for somebody else. Many underprivileged Negroes, as we all know, have inherited from slavery days the habits of irresponsibility and living from moment to moment.

The tragedy is that, at the very moment when the postponement of gratification begins to make sense for the American Negro (as for all the other poor, because of the great increase in educational opportunities and openings in trades and professions), lower-class Negroes are bombarded by television with messages NOT to save their money, NOT to practice self-denial, but to hurry, hurry, hurry to the nearest furniture store or automobile showroom and brighten their lives with the latest models now on display, for only a tiny down payment and 36 months to pay.

In other words, television discourses with fantastic skill, with fantastic persuasive talents, on the rewards that our economy can offer to those who prosper. But television says nothing about the long years of self-denial, the long years of study and practice, the patient discipline of daily work (and getting to work on time despite the fact that you don't feel like it) for year after year after year in order to earn seniority and promotion and better salaries.

TV is creating, in many of us, the mentality of certain happy South Sea Islanders who lived for the day and did not worry about tomorrow, because all they had to do was to reach out their hands for an abundance of coconuts, bananas, or fish. At the very moment, then, what becomes worthwhile for the underprivileged Negro to postpone gratification, he is urged not to do so.

So the ordinary frustrations of ignorance and poverty are sharpened for Negroes and for everybody who is poor today. It is by no means limited to the American Negro. The ordinary frustrations of poverty have been sharpened to an unprecedented extent by the impact of television. No wonder there is anger and frustration in the Negro community, and no wonder there are angry manifestations as, for example, the Black Panther movement.
Since that is a good example, I'd like to comment further on the Black Panther movement. As Wendell Johnson said, "Every speaker is his own most interested and affected listener."

The word BLACK has evil connotations in our culture. For a long, long time we avoided saying "black people." We said "Negroes," because the word black had connotations of dark, black, evil, Satanic, sinister, and so on. White had connotations of purity, loveliness, elegance, truth, brightness, clarity, and so on. When people call themselves Black Nationalists, Black Panthers, they, like everybody else, are victims of the English language. So they wear black berets, black sweaters, black trousers, black shoes, and black sunglasses, and they role-play being black, suggesting dark, evil, sinister, Satanic.

The policemen of Oakland, California also speak the English language, and they have a semantic reaction to all this Black Panther business. They act as if there were evil, Satanic, ferocious, predatory black forces at loose in the world. The Oakland Police Department arms itself, and prepares for all kinds of trouble. So the black people and the white policemen are all role-playing around the words BLACK-WHITE, BLACK-WHITE--both of them trapped by the English language.

What would happen if the Black Panthers had called themselves, instead, the Soul Brothers Mutual Assistance Society? It's a beautiful name. Soul Brothers. That's fine. Mutual Assistance. That's fine. And the cops wouldn't have to organize themselves in this ferocious way against the Panthers.

This groping around for improvement of self-concept is tragic, kind of mixed-up. Certainly, the semantic analysis of the factors that go into creating such social situations is a tremendously important one.

So I would call upon students of general semantics to study the mechanisms of semantic reaction, and also to study the content and nature of what Alfred Korzybski called the semantic environment, now made so much richer and more complex by the advent of television.

Knowing more about semantic reactions to semantic environments, educators, government, and the broadcasting industry itself might have better facts and better
knowledge with which to govern future policies in the interests of more wise use of the greatest instrument of time-binding over invented--television.
"After the Canal Treaties"

The Panamanians, in their plebiscite Sunday, voted for the Panama Canal treaties. The decision is now up to our Senate, which presumably will not vote on the issue until 1978. Unfortunately, the treaties have become a highly emotional issue. We know the Canal's history, we have begun to scrutinize the treaties' positive and negative elements, but we haven't given much thought to the effects of an affirmative or negative Senate decision.

The news media, to their credit, have presented both sides of the issue. Nevertheless, public debate reveals two misconceptions.

The first is the widely held view that the Senate has only the choice of rejection or consenting to the treaties. Actually, it can modify a treaty; it can give its consent with reservations; or it can interpret a treaty.

In the first two cases, the treaties would probably have to be renegotiated--for another 14 years? A unilateral interpretation by the Senate will have to be communicated to the Government of Panama. But since this need not interfere with the treaties' ratification, I may have some proposals to make in this regard once the treaties reach the Senate floor.

The second, more serious misconception is that the decision to ratify or to reject the treaties will settle the matter for once and all. Actually, it is safe to predict that regardless of whether the treaties are ratified or not, our problems will have only begun. Assuming ratification, it is necessary to point out that there is a long history of international agreements that only resulted in new disputes.

The detailed and complex provisions of the first treaty, which would govern the gradual transfer of administration to the Republic of Panama, are bound to produce all kinds of controversies. It is also by no means certain that the Government of Brig. Gen. Omar
Torrijos Herrera will consider the treaties final; it may very well come forth with new demands in a few years.

One also can reasonably assume that the Torrijos Government will not be around for another 23 years. Regardless of the nature of successor governments, it is likely that they will ask for changes. As former Secretary of State Dean Rusk has pointed out, a future democratic Government of Panama would probably be most difficult to deal with because of susceptibility to nationalistic Panamanian demands.

Finally, it is all too clear that ramification will be interpreted in many quarters as "America on the run." We, therefore, ought to be prepared for new pressures to abandon Guantánamo, Cuba, and to evacuate Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay in the Philippines.

A refusal by the Senate to consent to ratification is bound to have equally detrimental consequences. The threat of sabotage and to guerrilla warfare in the Canal Zone is frequently mentioned and the example of Vietnam is brought up in this connection. But political and geographic conditions in Panama are so different that guerrilla action is extremely unlikely. However, the possibility of terrorism cannot be ruled out. Consequently, if the Senate should decide for rejection, it would seem wise to authorize simultaneously a substantial increase in security and our military presence in the Canal Zone.

An important byproduct of such action would be the warning to the rest of the world that the United States not only is unwilling to give up the canal, but also is prepared to defend its rights regardless of consequences.

However, no Latin-American country nor third-world countries will regard a negative vote by the Senate as final. Continuous and increasing international pressures must be, therefore, expected—possibly accompanied by terrorist acts within the United States. The recent history of the anti-war movement in this country may serve as a useful reminder.

We have heard plenty from the geriatric set about how we must defend the canal at all costs, but has anyone surveyed young men under 30 to see how they feel about such a fight?
Public debate has focused so far only on the text of the treaties. It is time now to take a close look at the consequences of the Senate's impending decision. Regardless of the outcome of the vote, there are serious problems and great risks ahead. It is our political leaders' task to alert the American people and to make it clear that, contrary to their expectations, the Senate's verdict will not dispose of the issue.
APPENDIX C

Speech to the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company

I'd like to start out by telling you a little about my adventures of having become a United States Senator. It's really quite startling. You know, suddenly people begin to give you so much deference. Suddenly, after November 2, 1976, everything that happens has a different flavor.

Instead of all these people around you who quarrel with you and disagree with you and give you a bad time—suddenly these people are saying? "Yes, sir, Senator!" "Yes, indeed, Senator!" "Right away, Senator!" And on and on like that! You get surrounded by this. For the first time in your life, people begin to treat you as important as you always thought you were. It's a very gratifying feeling. I recommend it very, very much, but you mustn't let it go to your head.

I was put on three committees. You will recall that at the beginning of the Congress this year the Senate reorganized its committee structure.

Fortunately, despite my lack of seniority, I was put on the Human Resources Committee—which makes a lot of sense because Human Resources is what used to be called the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. Having been an educator all my life, it seemed to me that's a reasonable place for me to be; so I was perfectly happy with that.

They also put me on Agriculture Committee. I don't know anything about agriculture, but I was deeply aware of two facts. One is that I got an enormous amount of support from the small farmer up and down the state who felt that he'd been neglected. And so the farming community backed me very strongly. I felt I owed them something. And secondly, California has not been represented on the Agriculture Committee for something like 30 years, so I thought it was really my duty to join that committee if I could and do what I can for the California farmer.
I'm glad I'm there, and I am learning so much. I really went to bat the other day for walnuts, dried prunes, and cauliflower, which we export, I believe. Anyway, you never saw such a heroic fighter for the dried apricot crop!

The third committee I was put on was the Budget Committee. This is really ironical because I have the greatest difficulty balancing my own checkbook, and my wife handles my investments. To be put on the Budget Committee when I don't understand money at all seemed to me appallingly irresponsible on the part of the United States Senate. Well, there was no getting out of it. I wriggled and wriggled, but there was no getting off the hook.

So, I got to work, and started to go to meetings. And really, being on the Budget Committee isn't as hard as it looks, because you don't have any complicated numbers to deal with, because you're dealing not with specific appropriations for the food stamp program or specific appropriations for the National Labor Relations Board and all the different things that the government does.

What you're dealing with is the overall budget.

So, instead of dealing in hundreds of thousands, you're always dealing in hundreds of millions and also you're dealing in billions. And that makes it very, very simple!

When we discuss numbers the most difficult numbers you have are still very, very simple numbers. One decimal zero—that means one billion dollars. And then we have decimal one—that means one hundred million, and that's the smallest number we ever deal with in the Budget Committee. And so it works out very nicely. You don't have great difficulty understanding it.

They say on the Budget Committee: "Here's an appropriation for such-and-such a department—1.7 billion, 1.7 for 1976. So, for the 1978 budget we ought to make it 2.9." So, all we do is add 1.2—and that's not hard. And the next item is 2.5. So, they discuss it back and forth and say, "Let's raise that to 3.3." They look around the committee and say, "Everybody in favor?" "Yes, sir, OK." So, in five minutes we've disposed of three billion bucks—$3 billion, not $3 million. I didn't ever realize it was so easy.
Well, after getting accustomed to this for a few weeks, it began to make me a little bit uneasy. Then they appropriated 2.2 billion because of the serious unemployment problem all over the country (7.4 percent unemployment, they said, in tones of great alarm), and 2.2 is not enough. These are for CETA programs, the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, that is to train the long-time unemployed and get them into jobs. Well, they said, 2.2 is not enough in view of the high level of unemployment, so let's raise that to 4.2--and that went through like that! And I said, "No, no, no. Let's not do that." But anyway, they did it. Four point two for CETA. Well, when the bill got out of committee and went to the floor of the Senate, I decided I'd put up a fight on this. Let me tell you the reason for that fight.

I said, "Let's cut back to 2.2--which itself is too much but let's for goodness sakes, not go up to 4.2." These are the arguments I gave, and I'd like to share these with you.

See, they said unemployment is 7.4 in 1976 and my argument was this: First of all, CETA has not proved itself to be an effective program for training people and getting them into jobs. CETA has not proved itself administratively tidy and competent in doing its job well.

But more seriously, I said, what does 7.4 percent unemployment mean?

When you look at the figures, it means, curiously enough, that while 65 percent of the employable population was working in 1954 when they had 3.2 percent unemployment, with 3.2 percent unemployment they had 65 percent of the working population employed, or the adult population employed. Now we have 7.4 percent unemployment and we still have 65 percent of the adult population employed.

In other words, the percentage of adults working remains the same in '54 as it does in '77, despite the fact that the figure for unemployment has gone up from 3.2 to 7.4. The argument I gave was this: Unemployment in 1954 is not the same as unemployment in 1977. It doesn't mean the same thing. Why? There are many, many reasons, but let me go into just a couple of them.

First of all, in 1954 almost all the unemployed who registered as unemployed were primary wage-earners for their families--whether they were men or women, they
were the primary wage-earner for the family. If they were unemployed, then the whole family was in distress.

In the intervening years, with more and more women entering the job market, what happens is this—-that both the primary wage-earner (let's say the husband) and the wife, who is the secondary wage-earner, are both applying for employment. If the wife is unemployed, the family still has a wage-earner there with principal responsibility for the family's upkeep. The unemployment of the wife has several interesting effects.

The unemployment of any secondary wage-earner in a family--whether it's the wife or in the case of the wife as primary wage-earner, the husband, or in the case of the older teenage son, if he's unemployed--the primary wage-earners are still employed. If the secondary wage-earner in a family is unemployed, notice that the secondary wage-earner has a lot of characteristics.

In the first place, he hasn't got the intense job attachment that the primary wage-earner has. That is, he's more likely to quit--in order to go back to school, to take a course--if he or she is unhappy about work conditions or quarrels with the boss. They're more likely to quit because they don't have to stick it out. In other words, they don't have the career attachment, job attachment, that the primary worker has.

And then, in the intervening years between 1954 and 1977, we did something very drastic. We worked out this whole system of unemployment insurance. And so now, if you get angry with your boss, you can leave the boss and claim that you were fired and go and claim unemployment, and, therefore, you get paid for being unemployed.

Now, the attraction to being unemployed has intensified hugely in the intervening years. A friend of mine works for the Forest Service as a firefighter. He's a professional; he's very good at it. In that particular part of the country they need firefighters only for six or eight months of the year--let's say eight months. Then he's laid off for the other four months. He promptly gets unemployment because he is, by definition, unemployed. Of if he looks for another job and isn't sure if he is going to be able to get it, what would he have done in 1954? Well, he would have made his pay for eight months stretch out over 12. But they don't do that anymore. They get into the unemployed lines.
In one way or another, with low job attachment and so on, there's an enormous increase in what I shall call voluntary unemployment. Supposing you take this unemployed person, this secondary wage-earner, off a job. They can be much more fussy about what jobs they take. The head of the family, or the principal wage-earner of the family, is still earning a salary, so they're not facing eviction or starvation. They're very fussy about what kind of jobs they take and may remain unemployed longer.

Now, we have the phenomenon which our economists are beginning to call structural unemployment. It's built into the structure of the economy, and that kind of unemployment is not diminished by rising levels of prosperity. Indeed, if you have a rising level of prosperity you get more of that kind of unemployment because people can quit their jobs more certain than they can get a job again when they need one, or when they want one.

So, what I'm saying is the meaning of unemployment in 1954 and the meaning in 1977 is entirely different—or if not entirely different, different enough to be wary of analogy. And this is the analogy that I'm worried about. When people say we have a 7.4 percent or 7.1 percent or 8 percent unemployment, you know they really go into a tizzy and say, isn't that a terrible situation? We've got to appropriate lots and lots of money to make work for all these people.

I call that the New Deal orientation. It was a great solution in Roosevelt's day, and I believed in it in 1935—and many of you here, who were born by 1935, also believed in it if you knew about it. But this is 1977, and the solutions and the unemployment situation in 1935 and the solutions of 1935 are not entirely relevant to the economic situation in 1977. This is the point I wanted to make, so I argued against the jump from 2.2 to 4.2. It wasn't such a big deal, except that in my fourth month in the United States Senate, having never been in politics before, to me it was a very, very important thing, because this was the first major piece of legislation I tried to introduce. Not only did I introduce it, I gave a 25-minute speech in support of it. People got up to argue with me, so I argued right back again, acting like an experienced Senator.

The amendment was defeated by a vote of 60-29, and I was very proud of those 29 votes. You don't win 'em all. You don't even win one for awhile. But I tell this
story only because--well, because that point, about unemployment is an important one--but also because in my own life in politics it's my first great adventure. The fact that I was defeated doesn't matter a damn in a way, except it's all going to cost all you guys two billion dollars.

Philosophically, there are a lot of problems that come up, as you contemplate this, shall I say, spend-thrift philosophy which really governs a lot of people still. The New Deal was an important breakthrough in America. Things have never been the same since, and I do not regret the fact that the New Deal existed. I do not quarrel with its necessity at the time.

But I'd like to show you the consequences--a little bit of what's happened since then. Let's ask the question: What's the government for?

For a long time, the function of government has been to maintain national security, to preserve domestic order and tranquility, to regulate trade where necessary, to administer and write the laws. At no time did the people of the United States amend the Constitution to say that another function of government is to redistribute income.

However, redistributing income has become the main function of government today. Roy Ash, former director of the Office of Management and Budget and former Cabinet member in the Nixon and Ford Administrations, pointed out that transfer payments, so-called--that is, say, payments for aid to dependent children, food stamps, Medicaid, housing subsidies, supplemental income programs, social service programs and the like--comprise one-half of Federal expenditures: one-half.

So, if you ask what are the functions of government, well, one-half the function of government is to transfer income from you to you. We're just about crossing now, said, Mr. Ash, that line where there are more people benefiting from Federal government payments than there are taxpayers to carry the load.

Now, how did we get ourselves into this fix? Well, it starts with the New Deal. We sort of got into it almost by inadvertence: certainly, not on purpose. More and more people find themselves entitled to payments. And the rules continue to be rewritten so that even larger numbers become eligible.
You may notice that whenever you work out through
the government a program to help, let us say, certain
types of school children get school lunches, there are
administrators always at work trying to increase the
number of people who are entitled to those school lunches.
And if you say, OK, we need aid to dependent children,
then the definition of dependent children, the definition
of entitlement, grows and grows until eventually, you have
far more than you planned on originally.

The best example of that is the food stamp program,
which program started in 1952 with 400,000 people being
served at a cost of $35 million, and now it costs $5.6
billion and serves 19 million people. No one planned this
exactly, but once you start an entitlement, then more and
more people find themselves entitled—and more and more
bureaucrats expand the rules to see to it that more and
more people are entitled.

All right: The momentum in the direction of
additional services is such that further increases in
benefits and therefore in taxes, are almost inevitable.
The producers of goods and services will have to give up
more than half their earnings to support the beneficiaries
of the system. And, as for the beneficiaries, they will
remain discontented. That's the peculiar thing about these
transfer payments, since many of the benefits they get will
not come in the form of cash but in kind, like medical care,
or day care services or educational grants in aid, and the
like. So, if you take half the earnings of this group to
give them to this group, you would think this group would
at least be happy. But they're not.

So, the result is that everybody becomes unhappy.
These are unhappy because you've taken money away from
them, and these people over here are unhappy because they
aren't getting enough. Now, the complaint, in a sense,
is legitimate. They're getting not cash but they're
getting most of their benefits in non-cashable form like
day care services or educational grants in aid or food
stamps. You don't get money; you get services or goods
and you can't do anything else with them but accept those
services and goods. So they don't feel free to spend the
results of the benefits freely and they're dissatisfied.

Now what's happening? If we get to the point in
our economy when there are more payers of taxes than there
are beneficiaries of taxes, not only will we have changed
the economics of the country, but also by breaking the
relationship between effort and reward we shall have changed the social system.

Now, I believe that an affluent society like our own must do what it can to prevent hunger and misery along with all kinds of aid to provide equality of opportunity to those to whom that equality has been denied. But how far can a society go in the redistribution of wealth without changing the very nature of that society? I think this is a problem that we've got to face. I do not think that the majority of people in Congress are even trying to face it or realize that it is a problem because so many of them are still hard at work on this redistribution of income business.

All this reminds me of something that happened in the universities during the 1960s and into the 1970s that I was witness to—with a ringside seat. Until recently, we had in the universities, a raging fashion of giving A's to every student, there were no failures. I mean you could be lazy or stupid or insolent, or you could be cutting half or three-quarters of your classes, but everybody got an A anyway.

The effect on academic life was devastating. When the illiterate or lazy students could get an A average, it kept them in school all right, but the good students stopped studying. The result was a profound change in academic life.

Formerly, dropouts were those who couldn't make the grade. In the late 1960s and early 1970s you saw a different kind of dropouts. The brightest, the most intelligent students started to drop out because if anybody could get an A, then college becomes meaningless. What happens then in schools is not unlike what happens in society at large when the penalties of improvidence or laziness or ignorance are not just softened, but removed altogether. When there is not such thing as failure, there is no such thing as success, either. Motivation, the desire to excel, the urge to accomplishment—all these disappeared, and what you're going to do is to lose the dynamism of society as a whole. And this, I'm afraid is the way in which our society has been going steadily for many years.

And the biggest losers are the brightest and most capable of our men and women. But there is a way in which the average person is a loser, too. Left with no challenges, assured of a comfortable living and medical
care and old-age pensions whether he works or not, such persons become willing dependents, content with the parasitical relationship to the rest of society.

What is significant in our time is that there is a whole class of people interested in encouraging this parasitism. Many welfare officials and social workers are threatened with the loss of their power and influence over people if there is a marked reduction in the number of their clients, so they are motivated to increase, rather than decrease, welfare dependency.

And politicians, too, have flourished by getting increased Federal grants for this or that or other disadvantaged group of beneficiaries. They get those benefits for them and they go back to their constituents and say: "Look what I've done for you," and they get re-elected. These are the office-holders who are far more interested in being re-elected than in doing what is good for the people, good for the economy, or good for the nation.

So, there's this matter of rewarding everybody for just being alive. It's just the same in its effects as rewarding every student just for being enrolled. You not only destroy education, you can destroy society by giving A's to everyone. This is a philosophical consideration that bothers me very much as I sit in the United States Senate and see these great budget allocations going through.

And here I--a Republican Senator--trying desperately to back up President Carter! He said by 1981 we want a balanced budget. We're planning on a bigger deficit for 1978 than we had for 1976. One Democratic Senator, Senator Byrd of Virginia, got up in passionate defense of President Carter and said: "Look, President Carter said balance the budget by 1981 and we're going in the opposite direction." He addressed his Democratic colleagues and he said: "Why aren't you turning around?" I was all with him on that. If there is a balanced budget for 1981, the Democratic President is going to have to rely upon the Republican members of Congress to help him get it, because apparently the Democrats, except for Senator Byrd, haven't caught on yet.

Now, let me go on and wind up these remarks with some other comments on social change and the function of business in the world. You are all independent operators and businessmen. You are all entrepreneurs; whether you
succeed or fail rests upon your own efforts. You're not depending on the government to pull you through. I feel that I deeply sympathize with you and understand your point of view because that was the kind of guy my father was. He died in early 1976, at the age of 91 in Japan.

I recall a long conversation I had with my father just before the beginning of the Second World War. He was then a prosperous importer and exporter in Osaka, doing business with Africa, Europe, Central America, the Dutch East Indies, and I don't know how many other places. I remember that most of his employees had to know two or more languages to work in his company, which received mail from all parts of the world. I said, "Can your employees read all these letters in different languages?" And he said: "Well, if they're orders they can read them, and if they're complaints they can't."

Well, I visited Japan in 1935 (my father had gone back there earlier) but at that time I was a brand new Ph.D. in English literature from the University of Wisconsin with a cultivated distaste for the materialistic preoccupations of the businessman and his concern for profits.

I asked him what he exported, and to whom. I was aware that in those days, "Made in Japan" was a symbol for junk merchandise; that was before the days of Toyota, Datsun, Sony, Nikon, Panasonic, etc. Well, Father said that among other things, the company was at that time exporting imitation patent leather shoes to Central America. Boy, that's junk!

And at this point my scorn for his trade in junk must have been obvious, because at that moment he gave me a lecture that I've never forgotten.

He said, "Do you know what happens to those imitation patent shoes when they are purchased by a poor man in Central America?" I said I can't imagine. He said, well, in the first place, if they were real leather we'd never be able to sell them to him. When he gets them, he ties the laces together and hangs the shoes around his neck and he walks barefoot or in sandals from his little village to a larger town where there's a big marketplace. And when he gets to the edge of town, he puts on the shoes and walks proudly into the marketplace.

When he reaches the marketplace he sees things his little village does not provide: glassware from Germany,
silk scarfs from Hong Kong, chocolates from Switzerland, canned peas and goose livers from France, tinware from the United States, toys from Japan. And all this gives him an intimation of a larger world than that of his little country village. And as this impacts upon him his outlook changes. He wants to become a part of the larger world that he has finally become acquainted with . . . but he can't read and write. But he dreams of possibly, if his children learn to read and write, maybe they can belong to that larger world.

And the moment that illiterate peasant says to himself, "We don't have to be peons forever," my father said, social change is on its way. And I am contributing to that social change with those imitation patent leather shoes, and, he said, your American businessmen aren't doing that much for the world. And at the time he was right.

You remember, in 1935, it was a period, shall I say, of trade isolation. Most big manufacturers were totally content with the American internal market and they were not pushing for exports at that degree.

All this led me many years later to ask the question when the students at San Francisco State College and elsewhere were saying: "We are revolutionaries. We want to overthrow the world. We want to change the world. We're against anybody who stands in the way of social change, etc. etc." I began to think about my father.

These are the kinds of questions I asked myself. What kind of people are the most subversive? From whom do we have to have the most fear in the way of social change?

If you say the people to really fear are the socialists, Communists, anarchists, I think you're wrong. The most subversive people in the world, I think are businessmen. They're traders--and let me explain why I say this.

In ancient tribal societies, people are bound together by well understood rules of class and caste. The medieval society was a closed society, and the worst danger to closed societies was always commerce, that is, a new class engaged in trade and seafaring.

Sir Karl Popper, who studied a lot of Greek history, says that even in ancient Greece the development
of seafaring and commerce, tradesman going back and forth, had led to the partial dissolution of the old ways of life and even to a series of political revolutions.

Now, how does this work out? Well, from the point of view of those who want to preserve the ancient ways of life, commerce and trade are disturbing influences. Close contact with other tribes, other nations, other cultures, is likely to undermine the sense of necessity with which people view their surrounding institutions. I mean, if you're in ancient Greece and you have no idea of what life is like in Egypt or Turkey or elsewhere, then you're perfectly content that's the way life has got to be.

But once your traders come in and out, telling strange tales of what they do in foreign countries and what their customs are and what they eat and what they manufacture and so on . . . then people begin to wonder: Do we have to live this way forever?

Trade, commercial initiative, appears to be one of the few forms in which individual initiative and independence can assert itself even in a society in which tribalism still prevails. This is what Sir Karl Popper says, writing about ancient Greece.

By the 5th century B.C. seafaring and commerce had become the main characteristics of Athenian progress, arousing enormous antagonism of the wealthy oligarch who aligned themselves with Sparta to overthrow Athens. Athens, then, was the revolutionary element. The oligarchs who held the power understood that Athenian trade with its monetary commercialism, its naval policy, and its democratic tendencies were part of a single movement.

That's an interesting idea, isn't it--naval policy, democratic tendencies and commercialism, they're part of a single movement? And the oligarchs who wanted to hang onto their power understood this and opposed it. The oligarchs did everything possible to hinder the development of these movements. The story is a long and complicated one that Sir Karl Popper traces; a long struggle of an adventurous seafaring, democratic, open ridden, closed tribal society of the past, with Plato speaking eloquently for the Spartans and the ancient tribalism.

Now, when you look at it this way--from the point of view of the historian, the businessman, the trader, the entrepreneur, the peddler if you will--far from being the
stubborn deviltry of the status quo that he is said to be by contemporary radicals, he is a catalyst for social change; just as my father said in the case of his patent leather shoes--excuse me, imitation patent leather shoes.

The businessman who has traveled his imports and innovation in products in marketing is constantly stirring up society, breaking up the provincialism and the inertia of traditional ways of living. And the most effective revolutionary is one who does not know he is one--like Henry Ford, who is politically a conservative, but he revolutionized transportation and in doing so he revolutionized courtship in America.

The best and most lasting revolutions are those that people don't know about until after they've had them. They rest on no angry ideologies about taxation without representation, "arise, ye prisoners of starvation ... power to the people," etc. Revolutions change the relationships of social classes to each other. The mercantile class may wrest power from a hereditary aristocracy, the working class led by disaffected intellectuals may overthrow the bourgeoisie, but the relationship of social classes has got to change in order to have a real revolution.

What we've had in the United States, and where we've led the world, is that we are a profit-oriented industrial society. We're capable of the mass production of consumer goods; and therefore we have mass consumption of consumer goods. As a result, we've changed the relationship of social classes to each other without having had a revolution. And this is why I shall argue that the United States is a revolutionary society and we are all--and you, especially as businessmen--are part of that revolution.

Let me explain. Traditionally, throughout the long centuries of aristocratic privilege and social stratification, the obvious way you could tell the difference between a peasant and a gentleman was the way they dress, by what they eat, by what they consumed. You could tell from blocks away that this guy was an aristocrat, this guy was a peasant.

Under the Tokagawa Shogunate of previous industrial Japan there were strict sumptuary laws governing what the aristocracy may wear and what the mercantile class may wear; what an artisan may wear, what a farmer may wear,
etc. And how much a farmer may spend on his daughter's wedding was even dictated by law, because you had to act according to your social class.

Now, we don't have that anymore, but to recent immigrants the feeling is very intense. In the 1940s in Chicago, I used to walk past displays of sample photographs in front of photographers' studios in the Bohemian district. It seems as if every Bohemian had his picture taken with a cigar in hand to send back to the relatives in Czechoslovakia to say he was getting along fine in America. And why is that? Back in the old country only the wealthy aristocrats smoke cigars and here we are as immigrants in Chicago; we're smoking cigars. We're doing fine, thank you. That was the message. And why were they smoking cigars? Well, what this country needs is a good five cent cigar, said Thomas Riley Marshall, Vice President of the Wilson Administration.

European radical thought which rests upon the assumption of a fixed amount of wealth in the world says the only way the poor can become less poor is to take it away from the rich. And that's why European radicalism has an enormous element of envy in it. Let's take it away from those rich so-and-so's and distribute it among the poor.

But American radical thought is likely to insist instead that the ordinary man is entitled to mass-produced copies indistinguishable from the originals! You know, you look at these Pintos out here with rally stripes painted on them to look like Duesenbergs, and you think about a line like this. The Pintos are painted to look like the sportscar of an adle and affluent jet set. And if you have Pintos looking like jet set automobiles, what do you buy if you really are part of the jet set and can afford expensive sportscars? Then you buy a Lamberghini, which sort of looks like a Pinto!

So, the unintended revolution brought about my mass consumption, mass production by advertising men, come close to bringing about a classless society in America, which is what the Marxists said they wanted. A classless society. We're getting there a damn mite faster than the Soviet Union.

The poor of America are no longer poor by world standards. Our welfare clients live far better than the working people of three-quarters of the world. We are
indeed a people of plenty. Hence, the politics of envy--
distributing the rich of the richest--has no great appeal
in America.

Most of us feel there should be enough for everyone; so let the rich keep their riches while paying their
fair share of the taxes, of course, but give the rest of
them a chance to become rich, too.

Let me close my comments by saying that this is
what the energy crisis is about. If as a result of world
shortages in food and energy we cease to be people of
plenty, heaven help us. One very important thing that
President Carter has done is that he has made the energy
crisis real to all of us. There are a lot of people
standing around who said there isn't a real energy crisis
at all; it's a big plot on the part of the oil companies,
and so on.

I don't believe it is. I believe there is an
energy crisis. I believe President Carter has communicated
that message. And whatever you may quarrel with about the
details of an energy program, there is an energy crisis
and we have to continue to be people of plenty. But in
order to be people of plenty, still we must eliminate
waste. We must use what we have wisely, but we must
continue to have a business-oriented society which con-
tinues as it has in the past to make a richer life
possible for all of us.

We shall continue to hold up a hope to the poor,
the under-privileged, everywhere. And we shall also con-
tinue to hold up a hope of reward for all those who work
hard and dedicate themselves to America and believe in its
promises. I assure you those promises are capable of
being delivered, and will continue to be. That's what is
great about the United States.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am honored to follow the testimony of my good friend Secretary Terrel Bell of the Department of Education. He has described in detail the Bilingual Education Improvement Act. S. 2412, which I introduced in the Senate this past Wednesday. I am pleased to work with Secretary Bell on this issue, as we are both committed to giving school districts more flexibility in their teaching methods while targeting the immigrant population in greatest need of English instruction.

Today I would like to address bilingual education as it relates to a much broader issue: the question of what language will be used in the United States. As most of you know I have proposed a constitutional amendment, Senate Joint Resolution 72, which declares as the law of the land what is already a social and political reality; that English is the official language of the United States. This amendment is needed to clarify the confusing signals we have given in recent years to immigrant groups. For example the requirements for naturalization as a U.S. citizen say you must be able to "read, write and speak words in ordinary usage in the English language." And though you must be a citizen to vote, some recent legislation has required bilingual ballots in certain locations. This amendment would end that contradictory, logically conflicting situation.

Our immigration laws already require English for citizenship. The role of bilingual education is then to equip immigrants with the necessary English language skills to qualify them for this requirement. The problem is that all too often, bilingual education programs have strayed from their original intent of teaching English. A related issue is the full scale of interpretation for the term "bilingual education." Chances are that when one asks five people for a definition, five very different answers will be given. According to one interpretation, it simply means the teaching of English to non-English-speakers. This is the method I prefer and is usually called English-as-a-Second-Language or ESL. On the opposite side of the scale bilingual education is more
or less permanent two track education system involving the maintenance of a second culture and an emphasis on ethnic heritage. This method is called transitional bilingual education and involves teaching academic subjects to immigrants in their own language coupled with English language instruction. This is the definition used to determine eligibility for Title VII funding.

We all grew up with the concept of the American melting pot, that is the merging of a multitude of foreign cultures into one. This melting pot has succeeded in creating a vibrant new culture among peoples of many different cultural backgrounds largely because of the widespread use of a common language, English. In this world of national strife, it is a unique concept. I believe every member of this committee will agree that it had a fundamental impact on our nation's greatness. In light of the growing emphasis on maintaining a second culture and instruction in the native languages, I ask myself what are we trying to do? Where do we want to go? Demographic research tells us that in some of our states, 10 or 20 years from now there will be a majority of individuals with Spanish background. It seems to me that we are preparing the ground for permanently and officially bilingual states. From here to separatist movements a la Quebec would be the final step. Is this the development which we want to promote?

I believe that my constitutional amendment as well as my Title VII amendments will prevent a crisis similar to the separatist movement of French Canadians. That confused state of affairs is a result of controversy about which language shall be the official one used in Canada. I want to avoid a similar situation here in America where use of another language is encouraged to the point that it could become an official language alongside English. This would perpetuate differences between English-speaking and non-English-speaking citizens and isolate one group from the other. There can be no doubt that recent immigrants love this country and want to fully participate in its society. But well-intentioned transitional bilingual education programs have often inhibited their command of English and retarded their full citizenship.

Congress recognized the importance of teaching English to immigrants in 1968 when it passed Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. This Act permitted the development of pilot projects to teach English to underprivileged immigrant children. In 1978 Congress expanded the bilingual education program,
dropped the poverty qualification and required appreciation for the cultural heritage of the students served by federal funds. These amendments also introduced the option of providing academic instruction in the native languages of the students, coupled with English classes. This method of instruction, transitional bilingual education, has been interpreted by Title VII regulations as the only acceptable method of instruction for bilingual education. The unfortunate result of Congress' 1978 action was to deprive local schools of their flexibility to determine the best method of instruction for their particular non-English-speaking students.

I agree wholeheartedly that we need to do all we can to teach the English language to non-English-speaking students. However, I cannot support a rigid mandate prescribing a single method of instruction. I believe that given the flexibility to choose their own program, local schools will emphasize English instruction. Without the expensive requirement of a full academic curriculum in foreign languages, schools will be able to teach more non-English-speaking students for the same cost. I have met with many school boards who are struggling to maintain high quality education in the midst of reduced budgets. Through my personal communication studies, I have observed that the more academic instruction children get in their immigrant parents' language, the less quickly they learn English. I personally believe that ESL and immersion techniques allow non-English-speaking students to master our language so they can join the mainstream of society more quickly than through transitional bilingual education. My legislation broadens the range of instructional approaches for serving children of limited English proficiency. I expect school boards to welcome this opportunity to provide more efficient and cost effective instruction to their immigrant students while maintaining their eligibility for Title VII funds.

What the learning of a new language requires, as is well known in U.S. military language schools, is total immersion in the new language, or as close to total immersion as possible. Though I personally support intensive methods of English instruction, I must point out that even my proposed constitutional amendment does not prohibit the use of minority languages to assist non-English-speaking students. On the contrary, it specifically states that it "shall not prohibit educational instruction in a language other than English as required as a transitional method of making students who use a language other than English proficient in English." My
bilingual education proposal follows the same line of reasoning by allowing local schools the freedom to choose the teaching method that will best serve their immigrant population and maintain their eligibility for federal bilingual education funds.

Some immigrant groups argue that transitional bilingual education is necessary to preserve equal educational rights for non-English-speaking students while they are learning English. I believe that this requirement can actually result in discrimination in the administration of Title VII programs. The cost of providing academic subjects in a language other than English can exclude many of our recent immigrant groups such as the Indochinese who speak a variety of languages. Many local districts educating these students simply cannot afford to provide academic instruction in the many Indochinese languages which are often represented in one school. Imagine the cost of providing academic instruction in Cambodian, Hmong, Laotian, and Vietnamese in several grades. These students are no more fluent in English than the traditional immigrant groups funded under Title VII. However, because local schools often use intensive English instruction for Indochinese students, they will not qualify for Title VII money. Section 2, subsection 2 of the Bilingual Education Improvement Act would correct this by allowing funding for projects which use a variety of methods for teaching children with limited English proficiency including but not limited to transitional bilingual education, ESL, or immersion. Section 2, subsection B insures educational quality for students served by requiring applicant schools to show that they have selected instruction methods that will complement the special needs and characteristics of the Title VII students.

The acquisition of a new language is far easier for children than for adults. Children at the ages of four to six are at the height of their language-learning powers. In families where the father speaks to the children in one language, the mother in another, and the maid in a third, the children grow up trilingual with no difficulty. From the age of six onward, there is a gradual decline in a child's language-learning powers, so that learning a new language as an adolescent is a more difficult and self-conscious process than it is for a child. For anyone over twenty, it is a much more difficult process, involving conceptualization, like learning rules of grammar. A child picks up unfamiliar grammar without conscious effort. Because of these differences in the rates and methods of language learning among
different age groups, school children, especially under the age of ten, should be exposed to English constantly through contact with English-speaking classmates and playmates. They will learn English effortlessly, without the sense of undergoing a difficult experience.

The second provision of the Bilingual Education Improvement Act would give priority funding to Title VII projects which serve children who are both of limited English proficiency and whose usual language is not English. In our current period of limited Federal resources in education, both Secretary Bell and I agree that it is imperative to target Title VII funds to this particular group of immigrant children. It is clear that the proposed Fiscal Year 1983 budget of $94.5 million cannot serve the approximately 3.6 million students who are technically eligible for Title VII aid. This provision of my legislation will target those who are most limited in their ability to speak English without tampering with the current definition of eligibility for Title VII funding. During our discussions, Secretary Bell and I have agreed that this effort to channel Title VII funds to the students who are least proficient in English is not to be interpreted as a Federal mandate which will intrude in the local schools' determinations about their immigrant students. It is an incentive to local school officials to set priorities for using limited federal bilingual education funds. We agree that this new provision will be immensely helpful in clarifying a target population of students who are the most limited in their ability to speak English.

The third provision in this legislation would authorize several programs under Title VII which were previously under the Vocational Education Act. Vocational training for immigrant adults and out-of-school youth, training funds for teachers of immigrant students, and bilingual materials development have all proved to be small but effective programs. This provision would remove the set-aside for each program required under the Vocational Education Act and would allow the Department of Education to set priorities for the use of these funds. The focus of this funding will be for demonstration projects which will identify successful teaching methods rather than service projects which merely maintain the status quo. I am very encouraged by Secretary Bell's interest in using these programs as catalysts of research and development which will encourage state and local education agencies to share in the formulation of new training methods.
Another small, but extremely important provision of my legislation would require English proficiency for instructors in bilingual education programs. I was shocked to learn that Title VII currently places greater importance on its teachers knowing the native language of their students than on knowing English. My legislation will amend Section 721 (B) of the 1978 Act to fund programs "including only those teachers who are proficient in English, and, to the extent possible, in any other language used to provide instruction." The emphasis is reversed from knowledge of the immigrant language to English, which Secretary Bell and I agree reflects the true intent of federally funded bilingual education.

The issue of English as our official language and bilingual education for immigrants is especially timely in light of the Census Bureau figures released this past Tuesday. The 1980 census found that 23 million people in the United States aged 5 or older speak a language other than English at home. We as Americans must reassess our commitment to the preservation of English as our common language. Learning English has been the primary task of every immigrant group for two centuries. Participation in the common language has rapidly made the political and economic benefits of American society available to each new group. Those who have mastered English have overcome the major hurdle to participation in our democracy. Passage of my English language amendment, as well as my bilingual education proposal, will insure that we maintain a common basis for communicating and sharing ideas.
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