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MATTHEW ARNOLD

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SOCIAL CRITIC

BY

ANNETTE HOINES

A thesis submitted
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree Master of Arts, Major in
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1979

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MATTHEW ARNOLD

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SOCIAL CRITIC

This thesis is approved as a creditable and independent investigation by a candidate for the degree, Master of Arts, and is acceptable for meeting the thesis requirements for this degree. Acceptance of this thesis does not imply that the conclusions reached by the candidate are necessarily the conclusions of the major department.

Dr. J. W. Yarbrough
Thesis Adviser

Date

Dr. J. W. Yarbrough
Head, English Dept.

Date

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Victorian England: Birth of a Critic of Culture

Since time began, mankind has learned to cope with change as a consistent element of life. History is partly a record of man's response to changes in people, in physical circumstances, in social conditions, in moral attitudes. Change, therefore, has always been an integral part of living, but in Victorian England, the changes taking place were so tremendous, so numerous, and so widespread in their effect as to have a dominating influence on the work of certain authors of the period.

The Victorian period, during the decades 1850 - 1870, rife with change and turbulence, saw the rise of Matthew Arnold, a social critic. The son of Dr. Thomas Arnold, the famous educator and Rugby headmaster, Matthew Arnold was already widely recognized as a major poet and scholar. Marriage, however, had necessitated a steady income which poetry could not provide, and Arnold undertook the mundane responsibilities of a school inspector. The years of Arnold's inspectorship prior to 1859 represent a spiritual struggle with his poetic calling, a struggle characterized by sadness, unrest and a growing sense of frustration at the incompatibility of his work with his avocation. Oddly enough, the demands of his inspectorship prompted him to the vision of a second calling, one which bore a strong relationship to the changes England was experiencing. Arnold's inspection of Continental schools, especially those in France, heralded the appearance of a

larger vision of his calling as a servant of the State to disseminate reason among his countrymen and to explore the proper attitude toward change in a time when changes in all facets of living were occurring rapidly.¹ His poetry had earlier probed the spiritual deficiencies of modern man; his social criticism now undertook to help English life take on a nobler, more reasonable style.²

Various factors motivated Arnold to relinquish his poetic calling for that of a social critic. He was, foremost, extremely aware of the material changes rampant in England and of the effect such changes were having on English society. The Victorian citizen watched with exhilaration as one invention followed another in quick succession. The steam ship and railroad revolutionized travel, but equally impressive were the telegraph, the telephone, the electric light, the gas burner and the automobile.³

The invention of the railroad marked a new era as the laying of rails offered a viable method of moving raw materials and finished products across the entirety of England. Railroads brought the life blood of commerce to population centers and old country towns were transformed into industrial cities. The country towns of meadowed squares and open spaces gave way to metropolitan cities, each with a slum section crouched near mills and factories. Factory chimneys spiked the skylines of these new urban areas, belching soot and fumes and reminding all of the workers who toiled within the factory walls.⁴

It was not merely the absorption of the Victorian with material progress that called Arnold to speak out. He also saw the effect of

such rapid material changes on the classes of England. Much of Arnold's later writing is directed at the middle and lower classes of England because he viewed the middle-class idolatry of material objects as brutalizing and intellectually stifling, while the exploitation of the masses together with their subsequent reach for power both alarmed and troubled him.

The industrial revolution, which began in the middle of the eighteenth century, brought an unprecedented number of new members to the middle class. People from various backgrounds broadened the previously thin ranks of the middle class; manufacturers were followed by supporting groups such as commodity brokers, bankers, foreign traders and those who provided consumer goods for the home market. Every one of these occupations rewarded the shrewdness and entrepreneurial skill which traditionally characterized the middle class.

The middle class multiplied rapidly during the nineteenth century. At one extreme, wealth and aggressiveness allowed men at the apex of the middle class to move into the echelons of the gentry. At the other extreme, artisans and skilled laborers looked hopefully to the day when they could enjoy the physical comforts that were associated with the middle class. The material objects that middle class wealth could supply, together with the feeling of status such objects brought, provided one of the major forward thrusts of the age.⁵

It was the middle-class code of values, the drive for money and material objects, that marked the Victorian social structure. It was the same code of values that Arnold castigated in his social criticism

of the 1860's. Arnold clearly saw the detrimental effect of a pre-occupation with material objects on the cultural life of England, and it became a major focal point in his verbal battle with English society.

While the middle-class absorption with the comforts of life was a motivating factor in Arnold's new role, the growth and circumstances of the lower class also stimulated his social criticism. The nineteenth century saw a new systematic concern for the lower classes by those classes above them. Social critics, including Arnold, saw fundamental questions of human values in the exploitation of these people as well as dangers inherent in their awakening political movement.

Life for the lower classes, even when tied to the land, was one of misery and poverty.hovels of mud and plaster, in which chickens and cows shared living quarters, had long been a fact of peasant living. However, it was not until the concentrated squalor of a factory slum struck the consciences of English citizens that the lower classes received a modicum of attention. The jamming of thousands of the poor into small, festering slums adjacent to industrial areas was an element new with the mechanization found in Victorian England. Also new was the magnitude of the poverty problem. No guidance was available from the past; the conditions in need of remedy were the result of novel causes.

During the years when factory conditions were unregulated, men, women and children worked alongside one another for as many as sixteen hours a day. Noisy machinery deafened them; dust-laden, over-heated air stifled them and unguarded moving machinery parts threatened their

lives. Diseases indigenous to industrial workers disabled many; yet sick, crippled employees were simply cast out of the factory system to suffer or die.⁶

With the era of the French Revolution, the lower classes moved into prominence as a political entity. Political theorists like Jeremy Bentham and agitators like Thomas Paine awoke the English nation to the idea of a democracy in which workingmen had a voice. However, the masses were probably indifferent to the idea of political power as most were more vitally concerned with the struggle to simply survive. If the masses were not rising to demand their political rights, many conservatives, as well as moderates, feared the possibility of a revolution in England somewhat akin to that which had shaken France.⁷ Arnold, if not afraid of the growing power of the masses, was concerned about the place of this group in English society and their need for civilizing influences to prepare them for their future role.

It was not only the outward circumstances of English life that caused Arnold to voice his criticism; he was also disturbed by the economic and social philosophies that supported the structure of the new Victorian society. Two of those philosophies were laissez faire economics and Utilitarianism.

Arnold fought the demand for liberty characteristic of Victorian England. Victorians demanded to be left alone, to be allowed to live their lives unhampered by interference in business or religion. In fact, the English developed a theory to justify their desire for unfettered liberty: the theory of laissez faire. Initially developed

to avoid government interference, sophisticated theorists expanded the scope of their theory:

Its central thesis was that there could be only one way to maximize the total product of an economic system: allow each agent as much freedom as is compatible with a like freedom for all other agents to pursue his own economic ends. No legislation would be necessary to assure fair prices or the supply of desirable goods. ...The law of supply and demand, if no hindrances were interposed, would automatically ensure that what was needed by society was produced, that what was not needed was not produced, and that output was as great as resources allowed.⁸

The basic motivation behind the laissez faire theory was the desire of the individual to buy as cheaply as possible and, likewise, to sell as highly as possible. The competition engendered would be of incalculable benefit to society and progress would be a natural corollary.⁹

Arnold's later writing would attack the premises of laissez faire economics from two directions. First, Arnold's writing proposed the very novel idea that liberty in itself is not a virtue to be pursued as an end. Liberty was of value only if it contributed to the development of the individual as a cultured being. If liberty only confined people into lifestyles lacking in intelligence and beauty, liberty was of no value. In addition, Arnold was not totally in agreement with the current Victorian's belief in the unequalled merits of progress.

Jerome Buckley cites Arnold's dissatisfaction with the apostles of progress and finds a basis for that dissatisfaction in Arnold's "...own need of the past, his respect as artist for conventions and traditions that a self-righteous progressive age felt free to ignore."¹⁰

Utilitarianism was a synthesis of the earlier French rationalism and English materialism. Introduced by Jeremy Bentham, it combined social, political and economic thought. The basic premise of Utilitarianism was the phrase "the greatest happiness for the greatest number." It assumed that self-interest is the only motivation behind human action and the achievement of pleasure and the avoidance of pain is the basis of self-interest. According to Bentham and his followers, man seeks the greatest amount of luxury and comfort with the smallest amount of effort and self-denial. As such, Utilitarianism was hedonistic, making no allowance for the humane impulses of conscience, mercy, love of justice or compassion. Bentham developed a mathematical formula to determine the felicity of an action in which categories of possible effects were rated. Bentham's approach was strictly quantitative. Neither the quality of the pleasurable effects nor the varying notions of happiness were considered in Bentham's calculations. It was presumed that everyone on earth treasured only material values and no considerations were given to those who were not part of the greatest number.¹¹

Arnold objected to the materialistic approach advanced by the Utilitarians. He saw life as more than the acquisition of objects or the gratification of the senses. Utilitarian thinkers, as a rule, put small value on the enrichment of the inner man, and Arnold's social criticism continually emphasized the importance of perfecting the inner being, the spiritual core of man.

Arnold quarreled not only with the economic and social philosophies that belied the importance of the mind and its perfectibility; he also

found fault with the religious views held by many of his countrymen. In particular, he later criticized those religions that destroyed the tradition and beauty of worship.

Arnold devoted a major segment of his social criticism to the chastisement of Dissenters. Dissenters, or Nonconformists, were technically all Protestant sects that had broken with the Established Church of England, the Anglican Church. Made up largely of middle class citizens, Dissenters had rejected the formalized religion of the Anglican Church and constructed a church membership composed of what they termed as the elect or the true believers. For Dissenters, the individual conscience was the final judge in interpretation of the Bible; therefore, no traditions could be considered as authoritative. Departing from the cathedrals of the Anglican Church, they worshipped in homes or small white-washed chapels of austere simplicity.¹²

Arnold had acquired a broad acquaintance with the Dissenters and their religious practices during his years as a school inspector and the lack of totality in their approach to human nature became part of his critical commentary on Victorian society. Stressing only the moral side of man and neglecting the need for beauty and intellectual expansion, the Dissenters later played a major role in Culture and Anarchy as embodiments of the Hebraistic side of man.

Arnold had always professed a reluctance to enter the political and social arena as he feared that practical reform or politics would, of necessity, corrupt his honesty and his objectivity. He wrote: "This

treatment of politics, with one's thought, or with one's imagination, or with one's soul, in place of the common treatment of them with one's Philistinism and with one's passions, is the only thing which can reconcile...any serious person to politics, with their inevitable wear, waste, and sore trial to all that is best in one."¹³ Such a reluctance to enter the battleground of social and political strategy was offset by Arnold's desire to impart a message to Victorian England. His purpose became that of the critic, useful to his time and country by preaching to the English the ideas, in his opinion, they most urgently needed in a time of change and social unrest.¹⁴

Arnold sought to shake the complacent Victorian from his satisfaction with the circumstances of his life. His plan of social criticism was to discover and define the dominant tendencies of his time, to distinguish the favorable from the unfavorable and to foster the good while diminishing the bad.¹⁵ In this criticism, he looked for the results to spring from the people, not the government. Arnold said, "It [the center of movement] is in the fermenting mind of the nation; and his is for the next twenty years the real influence who can address himself to this."¹⁶ There is no doubt, Robbins says, that he felt that he was performing a vital function for humanity in his cultural criticism, a function of intelligence which he considered more practical than that of an advocate of action.¹⁷

The purpose of this paper is to trace the development and exposition of Matthew Arnold's social criticism through four of his prose works that

most fully treat of his emerging and developing social views. Chapter II with discuss three of his early socio-political writings: "England and the Italian Question," "Democracy" and Friendship's Garland. These writings will be treated in this paper in the chronological order of their appearance. Aspects of his social views as they appear and take shape will be explored and specific critical remarks by contemporary and modern writers will be noted. Chapter III will deal with his theory as it is most fully explicated in one of his greatest prose works, Culture and Anarchy. Analysis of changes in theory, tone and purpose will be examined as well as contemporary and current critical response. The final chapter will be an overview of critical evaluation of the socio-political views of Matthew Arnold in regard to their validity, their practicality and their value. A final personal assessment of Arnold's views will conclude Chapter IV.

Chapter Two: Early Social Criticism

Arnold's first endeavor in the field of social and political opinion, "England and the Italian Question," was occasioned by a continental war between Austria and Sardinia, in which Napoleon III of France actively supported Sardinia. The early months of 1859 saw five successive battles between the Austrians and the Sardinian-French forces, with Sardinia victorious in all five. An armistice was negotiated and signed on July 8, 1859.¹⁸

The French motivation for the war had been a political scheme to dominate continental affairs and to establish a firm power base. Louis Napoleon's plan had been to drive Austria from Italy and establish a federation of "free" states on the Italian peninsula governed by the Pope and dependent on French protection. Audacious in his aspirations and extremely clever in his political maneuverings, Louis Napoleon had persuaded his French subjects that the reason for the declaration of war was to liberate a fellow European country. Calling upon the democratic and liberal forces born in the French Revolution, he persuaded Frenchmen to fight for the freedom of subject Italians from Austrian domination.¹⁹ The English reaction to the ongoing struggle in Europe was aloof condemnation of the battle initiated by the French. The Derby policy had been one of non-intervention in the Italian freedom struggle.²⁰

Such was the historical setting for Arnold's pamphlet, "England

and the Italian Question." Motivated not by the action of the two warring factions in his decision to publish a commentary, but by the official stance of the English government toward the war, he felt it his obligation to publicly rebuke the opinions that had determined the English policy.

In July, 1859, Arnold wrote to his sister Jane from Geneva: "I really think I shall finish and bring out my pamphlet."²¹ He wrote again a week later from Lausanne, "I am getting on, and think I shall make an interesting pamphlet; but Heaven knows how the thing will look when all together. If it looks not as I mean it, I shall not publish it."²² But publish it, he did, in that same year, and with the publication of "England and the Italian Question," a new career as social commentator had been launched by Arnold.

Two important strands in the fabric of Arnold's social philosophy have their first appearance in this topical pamphlet: first, Arnold introduces his counterpoint comparison of the intelligent, idea-motivated French masses with the inferior, "insensible" masses of England; second, he introduces his belief that the strong but stubborn English aristocracy, void of ideas, was outliving its period of usefulness. The age of action, as typified by the Battle of Waterloo, had been succeeded by an age of ideas born of the French Revolution. Action, not ideas, suited the aggressive talents of the aristocracy.²³ Thus, this pamphlet begins Arnold's class structure analysis, an integral part of his later social criticism.

The structural organization of Arnold's pamphlet is an outline of the reasons for the English policy in the Austrian-Sardinian war, together with a point-by-point repudiation of the validity of the English political stance. Having shattered the official policy to the best of his ability, Arnold devotes the remainder of his pamphlet to an analysis of why such a non-intervention policy had been adopted by England. In this section he introduces two important strands of his social thought, the intellectual potential of the masses and the primitiveness of the aristocracy, and lightly touches on a third very vital area of his conception of society, its aversion to a strong state government.

It is in this early pamphlet that Arnold begins to attack the basic English antipathy to a state government possessing any degree of restraining or coercive power. Arnold contrasts the views of the French and the English populace toward Louis Napoleon:

The English in general regard Louis Napoleon as a skillful despot who has mastered France and who deals with it for his own advantage. The vast majority of the industrious classes in France regard him as a beneficent ruler on whom they have themselves conferred power, and who yields it for the advantage of the French nation.²⁴

Arnold, at this early stage in the development of his social criticism does not deign to instruct his English audience on the correct viewpoint, if either group holds it, but he does offer a reason for the English stance. "We have a natural antipathy to absolute government, and a predisposition to believe that it cannot exist by wish of the

governed."(p.76) M. K. Brown supports Arnold's statement and assesses the Victorian attitude toward the State as anachronistic and inadequate. Victorians conceived of the State as a power external to the individual, external to his class, restricting his freedom in the interest of something alien to him.²⁵ Such was the popular viewpoint when Arnold began his campaign to augment the power of the State. The attitude of the English toward state government and the need for a strong state power are basic to the future writings of Arnold. With "England and the Italian Question," Arnold has only touched a minor chord in what is to become a major unifying idea in his later social criticism.

It is Lionel Trilling's position that Arnold was trying to communicate that France, in its conception of the State, had an agency that imparted a high and noble tone to society. England, with its aversion to a State power, lacked the civilizing, ennobling influence which had once been furnished by the aristocracy.²⁶ If Trilling's assessment is accurate, it coincides with the next step in Arnold's pamphlet, the first discussion of his class analysis. Limited to a brief look at the masses via comparison and a longer look at the aristocracy, "England and the Italian Question" introduces his ideas on the limitations and characteristics of two of England's social classes.

In his comparison in "England and the Italian Question" of the French and English masses, Arnold lays stress on one major distinguishing characteristic -- the accessibility to civilized ideas. He states that the uniqueness of France lies in the fact that her masses recognize and appreciate civilizing ideas that would elsewhere meet only with a

response from more refined and educated people (p.78). This is a major concern of Arnold's later social criticism. An ennobling and civilizing influence is a necessity for the masses as well as the middle class in England. Without a direct comment on the status of the English, his attitude is clear enough in his limitation of enlightened masses to France.

Arnold goes on to further develop his characterization of the English working class, or masses, with a detailing of their inherent qualities in respect to government or political considerations. He describes the English masses as strongly motivated by general ideas of the "abolition of privilege, the right of the people to choose its own government, the claims of nationality," but lacking in their regard for policy, tradition or the status quo and compromise. "They possess the graver fault of having little regard even for justice, except under a poetical and popular form (p. 82)." It is here in his first assessment of the lower class of England that one begins to note what G. W. E. Russell called Arnold's "dread of the working-man, and the apprehension of the bad use which they might make of their new power...."²⁷ In their lack of appreciation of the established life of England, its past history and its cultural traditions, Arnold saw anarchical tendencies which become more fully explicated in his later works.

Having touched on the lack of civilizing influences for the English lower classes and their own lack of appreciation for that which already existed in England, Arnold moved forward to the major focus of his pamphlet, the aristocracy. In this, his first treatment of the aristocracy,

Arnold took a conciliatory and respectful stance, the pose of one who wished to lead another from error into the path of truth. In McCarthy's opinion, Arnold sought to convince and convert the aristocracy in this pamphlet, so he proceeded with extreme caution; "he wanted to speak of the English aristocracy with the most unbounded respect."²⁸

Arnold's desire to conciliate and convert is apparent from his assessment of the English aristocracy:

It is the most popular of aristocracies; it has avoided faults which have ruined other aristocracies...the aristocracy of England was founding English agriculture, and commanding respect by a personal dignity which made even its pride forgiven. Historical and political England, the England of which we are all proud, is of its making. And...it still governs England...(p.82).

Despite his accolade to the popularity and worth of the English aristocracy, Arnold could not fail to note that the English upper classes must inevitably follow the tendencies of all aristocracies. It is with his analysis of the typical qualities of aristocracies that Arnold first attempted to show his audience how he saw society was moving -- from action to ideas. This first hint of a current trend foreshadows much of what is central in Arnold's thought -- the concept of historical cycles with two dominant historical tendencies, Hebraism and Hellenism, dividing past ages between them. However, this was not the first time that Arnold had expressed his views on historical cycles. In "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time," Arnold discussed epochs of expansion and concentration as converse periods in history. These terms become assimilated into his later social criticism of historical periods marked

by the domination of either Hebraistic or Hellenistic impulses.

Arnold goes on to describe aristocracies as caste-like in their situation and removed by virtue of their economic station from the masses of the people. Having little personal experience with classes subservient to them and the ideas which motivate them, they have little opportunity to comprehend how these classes are developing and molding their world. The aristocracy has naturally a great respect for the established fact, for existing institutions, for the "fait accompli." Such an attitude, according to Arnold, is natural because the aristocracy is itself an established fact, a "fait accompli" (p.83).

In general, because of their established position, aristocracies are unsympathetic to ideas because they are independent of existing facts. Ideas, Arnold asserts, are treated by the aristocracy with contempt and apprehension (p.83). Therefore, aristocracies have been most effective in times when firmness and powerful character were of more value than ideas, during the formative stages of society. They have, in general, been ineffective in times of advanced civilization or complicated social structures because such times, of necessity, demand the understanding and application of ideas. Such a position as Arnold takes does hint at his future exposition of the historical forces of Hellenism and Hebraism.

The ascendancy of the aristocracy, Arnold explicitly stated, ended with the victory at Waterloo when the need for the qualities of an aristocracy, "endurance and resistance", also ended. After Waterloo, the time for intelligence and the application of ideas had arrived,

"for the exercise of faculties in which an aristocracy is weak...(p.85)."

The French Revolution had mistakenly been interpreted by the English aristocracy as a triumph for the endurance and resistance of an aristocracy. The aristocracy believed that they had conquered the ideas which bred the French Revolution and that these ideas possessed little value. Arnold believed, however, that those ideas were basically true and that the continued resistance to them signalled the end of the influence of the aristocracy (p.84).

Critics have had much to say of Arnold's treatment of the aristocracy. Patrick McCarthy notes that Arnold was careful not to impute blame to the aristocracy but did point out that it was losing the popular support on which it depended for its rule.²⁹ He further states that Arnold found in the aristocracy a needed principle of stability in a world of change. McCarthy theorizes that Arnold had few illusions about individual aristocrats or about the virtue of aristocracies in general, but his social structure was stratified and his strictures upon the aristocrats of his time were not to be construed as a desire to remove them from their position of power. McCarthy appears to be biased in his interpretation. Arnold's view of the class system in England does not ameliorate the abuse of power; instead, he emphasized the importance of the proper preparation of the classes for the wielding of political power.

The general consensus regarding Arnold's remarks on the aristocracy in "England and the Italian Question" can be summarized by Patrick McCarthy:

Though he came to know these aristocrats when their political effectiveness was waning, their large culture and gentle manners drew him to them and affects his writing about them. He knew that the future was not theirs and that enormous evils flowed from the abuse of privilege. But he was nevertheless eager for their good opinion. He sought always to mitigate the abuses of the class and to soften the charges he made against it.³⁰

Arnold's sympathetic opinion of the aristocracy and his treatment of them, however, can probably best be illustrated in his own words from "England and the Italian Question":

When I consider the governing skill which the English aristocracy have displayed since 1688, and the extraordinary height of grandeur to which they have conducted their country, I almost doubt whether the law of nature, which seems to have given to aristocracies the rule of the old order of things, and to have denied them that of the new, may not be destined to be reversed in their favor. May it be so! (p.96).

Having begun his social criticism in a topical pamphlet attacking governmental policy, Arnold's next venture into the arena of social comment occurred with the introduction to an education report, published in 1861, for a Royal Commission on the state of elementary education on the continent. This introduction, entitled "Democracy," he considered so important that it was republished in 1879 as an independent essay. R. H. Super goes so far as to say that this essay is the keystone of much of Arnold's political thinking.³¹ Alexander agrees with Super's assessment when he states that "Democracy" contains all the major themes contained in Culture and Anarchy, less the rhetoric and personal allusions of the later work.³²

Arnold's mission was to report upon the elementary schools of France, the French cantons of Switzerland, and Holland. He travelled abroad from March to August of 1859 and returned to England to assemble and compose his report. He appears to have been delayed in his writing for he was still working on the report in January of 1860 when he wrote his mother that he had been gathering materials for it at the British Museum. It was completed as a report to the Commission in March of 1860 and was printed for publication in 1861. The report was entitled The Popular Education of France.

"Democracy," the introduction to The Popular Education of France, caused Arnold the most difficulty. He wrote in February of 1860: "It needs so much tact as to how much and how little to say that I am never satisfied with it." However, he did persist in his struggle to say what he believed needed to be said, and he later remarked that, "It is one of the things I have taken most pains with, and it will come in very well."³³

Arnold was sensitive to the fact that the ideas he would be proposing in "Democracy" would strongly offend many of his readers. He took pains to ensure that such liberties as he would take with the accepted verities of English life were done only after a great deal of soul-searching. He wrote:

No sensible man will lightly go counter to an opinion firmly held by a great body of his countrymen....He will venture to impugn such an opinion with real hesitation, and only when he thinks he perceives that the reasons which once supported it exist no longer, or at any rate seem about to disappear very soon.³⁴

The accepted opinion which he held up to his critical examination in "Democracy" was the English conception of the State. In his analysis of this opinion, Arnold developed in greater detail his views of the masses and the aristocracy. He also introduced several other important ideas which are woven together more completely in Culture and Anarchy. First, he introduced his conception of democracy. Second, he continued his class analysis and introduced some of his main assessments of the middle class. Third, he detailed his conception of the State as a governing power as well as the correct attitude toward the State for the English people. Fourth, he introduced his concept of culture as a civilizing agent in society.

Arnold's major concern in "Democracy" was to abolish the long-held English antipathy to the State, a theme which he had already expressed in "England and the Italian Question" by defining the true value of a State power. In order to do this, he must define it in acceptable terms for the English people and also show why the English have been so staunch in their misguided opposition to State-action. He began by explicitly stating the purpose of "Democracy":

I propose to submit to those who have been accustomed to regard all State-action with jealousy, some reasons for thinking that the circumstances which once made that jealousy prudent and natural have undergone an essential change. I desire to lead them to consider with me, whether, in the present altered conjuncture, that State-action, which was once dangerous, may not become, not only without danger in itself, but the means of helping us against dangers from another quarter (p.4).

The changed circumstances to which Arnold alluded were the "encroaching

spirit of democracy." Arnold took a neutral position in his discussion of the development of democracy. To Arnold it was neither good nor bad. It was simply the result of historic process.³⁵ Democracy was an outgrowth of part of the natural order of things. Like life, democracy "was trying to affirm its own essence; to live, to enjoy, to possess the world...(p.7)." In R. H. Super's estimation, Arnold saw that democracy was inevitable in the modern world because it was part of the natural impulse of life and that, in addition, it was the only political condition that afforded the most people human dignity.³⁶ As a concept, democracy was not a goal or an end, but, to Arnold, simply the means to the end of liberty and humanity.³⁷ Arnold defined his concept of democracy as:

...a force in which the concert of a great number of men makes up for the weakness of each man taken by himself; democracy accepts a certain rise in their condition obtainable by this concert for a great number, as something desirable in itself, because though this is undoubtedly far below grandeur, it is yet a good deal above insignificance (p.13).

Arnold seems to be somewhat ambivalent in his discussion of democracy. As a force for equality and liberty, it receives his support, but as an agent of mediocrity, it receives his criticism. Arnold believed in the merits of equality. Just as he viewed democracy as a natural process, he viewed the approach to equality as a natural social impulse. To the extent then that democracy acts as an equalizing social agent, he supported it. Arnold asked:

Can it be denied, that to live in a society of equals tends in general to make a man's spirit expand, and his faculties work easily and actively; while, to live in a society of superiors, although it may occasionally be very good discipline, yet in general tends to tame the spirits and to make the play of the faculties less secure and active (p.8).

Too fearful of the consequences of a great political upheaval, Arnold advocated democracy as an equalizing social force, but his advocacy is tempered by reservations. He almost wistfully noted that prosperity and grandeur can be achieved by nations wherein gross inequalities are present, and that such nations may possess great national merit, and that the masses may even accept the class division as heaven-ordained and be happy with their lot. But Arnold believed that such a society as he wistfully envisioned was only imaginery and "not the force with which modern society has to reckon" (p.10). Again, one sees Arnold's attitude that democracy was inevitable in England because of its place in man's natural striving for equality.

Arnold favored democracy because of its historical inevitability and its liberating force, but he sought to make his readers aware of its shortcoming -- its tendency to promote mediocrity. Arnold saw the difficulty of democracy in a two-fold manner, as a cause and an effect. The effect he saw in the danger of what he called "Americanism." In America democracy had engendered vulgarity, a loss of national import and the view that each man, no matter how trained or gifted is equal to his neighbor.³⁸ Such views, he thought to be detrimental to the well-being of citizens individually and society collectively, and in his discussion

of the state in "Democracy" he seeks to solve the problem of the growth of democracy without "Americanizing" the people. The cause of mediocrity in a democracy was the difficulty of finding high ideals. Without the aristocratic ideals of greatness, noble feelings and culture, Arnold foresaw difficulties in supplying the middle classes and the masses with a proper standard or ideal:

Nations are not truly great solely because the individuals composing them are numerous, free and active; but they are great when these numbers, this freedom, and this activity are employed in the service of an ideal higher than that of an ordinary man by himself (pp.17-18).

Democracy may be beneficial in its equalizing and liberating influences, but its detriment lies in its lack of high ideals, a deficiency which fosters a habit of vulgarity and self-importance in the individual. As Trilling notes, Arnold believed democracy had its revenge on genius by diminishing the opportunities for greatness.³⁹ Therefore, Arnold sought a remedy for these faults of democracy and he found it in the action of the State as the embodiment of high ideals and elevated culture. If democracy is inevitable, then Arnold must ameliorate its detriments and provide a source of ideals and standards for the citizens. Arnold immediately saw difficulties in his promulgation of the State as a powerful formative agent on society because the English had long been prone to exalt individualism at the expense of a strong state power. Such a propensity on the part of the English middle class was deeply entrenched and with some justification for the middle class had been persecuted by

the State as an instrument of the Anglican Church. The middle-class distrust of State-action had been born of its religious convictions and had spread to an abhorrence of State-action as a general principle.⁴⁰ The English middle class had only to point across the Channel to France to demonstrate the danger of allying a strong State-power with democracy.⁴¹

Arnold had anticipated the example of France as a State-power which usurped the democratic powers of the people. To counter this argument, Arnold introduced his concept of national characters. This concept receives wider treatment elsewhere in his writing, but in "Democracy" he uses it to counter the middle-class charge of the dangers of State-action as exemplified by France. He stated, "It seems to me, then, that one may save one's self from much idle terror at names and shadows if one will be at the pains to remember what different conditions the different character of two nations must necessarily impose on the operation of any principle (p.16)" What may be dangerous in one nation may be valuable in another. Thus, any two nations with unlike characters may benefit from observation of each other. In the case of State-action in England, as a Frenchman, Arnold would admire the independence of English spirits because France would never suffer from the admittance of too much individualism. But, as an Englishman, Arnold knew one could not go wrong to recognize the rationality and coherence which characterize the strong state-power, for the English individual would not be in danger of overvaluing State-action or allowing it to run rampant; such was the national character of England (pp.16-17).

By advocating a State power to replace the old ideals offered by the defunct aristocracy, Arnold offered his English audience a brief vision of the State and its role. To define his State, he borrowed a phrase from Burke -- "the nation in its collective and corporate character." The State is the representative action of the national will (p.26), and because collective action is generally more efficacious than individual efforts, England would benefit from employing such State-action. The citizens of a State are entitled to expect a worthy standard and rational action from the State (p.28).

To whom would Arnold delegate the responsibilities for this efficient State? He was aware that no class would wholeheartedly support a State with another class as its executive officials. In fact, Arnold would offer his argument that no class then existing in English society was the fit administrator of the State as he conceived it. His experiences as a school inspector had made him aware of the growing power of the middle class. His early work with Lord Landsdowne had acquainted him with the aristocracy. Neither were qualified in his estimation to hold power. The lower class was also unfit for power and the fear of the brutality of this group fed his desire for a rational and democratic State.⁴²

In order to offer his view of the fit administrators for his ideal State, Arnold had to eliminate the three English classes from contention because none were prepared or capable, but the individualistic nature of the English people would not accept a class distinct from its own in power. To accomplish this task, Arnold offered an analysis of English

social strata and the defects which disqualified them for such high power. In this manner, he continued his class analysis begun in "England and the Italian Question."

Arnold had in his earlier work begun his characterization of the aristocracy as a group void of ideas and excelling in eras of action. He continued in this vein to illustrate how the aristocracy failed to appreciate democracy as a motivating social factor. He believed that aristocracies would inevitably, because of their inaccessibility to ideas, fail to apprehend the instinct which pushed English society forward at that moment — the instinct for equality, for democracy. In their failure to apprehend the instinct for democratic expansion in the masses, they lost their ability to govern them effectively and, in Arnold's view, they lost their right to govern as well. "It is the old story of the incapacity of the aristocracies for ideas (p.11)." They have little faith in the power of ideas, and ideas were now the power in the world. The aristocracy, resting on solid, visible and material standards, was slow to attach any importance to things of the mind, things invisible (p.11). In its resting on values not then in the modern movement, in its attaching importance to material objects rather than ideas, the aristocracy disqualified itself for rule. The ruler must understand the movement of the era.

Arnold made no direct mention of the lower classes as a possible ruling force in "Democracy." In fact, he referred to them as still in a stage preparatory to taking a more active part in controlling their destinies (p.15). He spoke of them more fully in their relationship to

the aristocracy, as a class flagging in spirit and despondent when contemplating a spectacle such as the aristocracy offered. In their attempts to rise above the poverty and misery of their lot, the impossibility of attainment of the status of the aristocrat made any possible improvement seem cheap and small (p. 9).

In "Democracy," one of Arnold's first commentaries on the middle class, attention was focused on two aspects of this class: its antipathy to the State and its need for education. Trilling notes that Arnold believed that the immediate future lay with the middle class. In fact, he writes that Arnold's fundamental idea, by which his political writing was governed, was his awareness of the cultural deficiency, or materialism, of the English middle class.⁴³

Arnold needed to explore the middle-class antipathy to the State in some depth because the stated purpose of his introduction, "Democracy," was to promote just such a concept. He found two reasons for this middle class opposition. The first reason grew from the core of the class, the Protestant dissenters. In earlier times, Arnold admitted, the aristocratic state government had used its power basely in many instances. They had been ready to help their friends and hurt their enemies especially in domestic concerns such as religious matters. Such an aristocratic government had frequently given its support to the Anglican Church, the church of its class. Because of this intervention, the Puritan middle class had conceived a strong suspicion of the State. The State meant support of a church not their own, a religious practice they had abandoned. Small wonder, Arnold says, that such dislike developed.

The wonder lay in the extension of its suspicion of the State in church matters to suspicion of the State in any capacity (p.20).

Arnold could not understand this extended opposition to State-action in all concerns. The cry of "Leave us to ourselves!" as expressed by the Puritans seemed the rejection of assistance by those most in need of it. In this light Arnold expressed the benefits he foresaw for a middle class under a State as he envisioned it:

For it is evident that the action of a diligent, an impartial and a national government, while it can do little to better the condition, already fortunate enough, of the highest and richest class of its people, can really do much by institution and regulation, to better that of the middle and lower classes (p.21).

"So it is not State-action in itself which the middle and lower classes of a nation ought to deprecate; it is State-action exercised by a hostile class, and for their oppression (p.23)."

Arnold explored the perimeters of a second explanation for middle-class opposition to the State. In addition to the past grievances of an unjust use of power, the basic individualistic nature of the English Puritan would admit of no restraint to his personal liberty, a liberty he viewed as a sacred right sufferable to no violation. In its own opinion, the English middle class had secured its liberty for itself; the state of freedom and industry in Victorian England was of its making through the practical application of laissez faire economics. While admitting that the middle class had been a champion of liberty of action, Arnold warned that such liberty was not enough. "It is a fine thing to

secure a free stage and no favour; but, after all, the part which you play on that stage will have to be criticized." And Arnold did criticize. It was worthy of the Puritan to champion free enterprise and liberty, which in themselves were valuable as universal principles; however, the opinions which were fought for, the use to which liberty was directed, was of paramount importance to Arnold as well. "It is a very great thing to be able to think as you like; but, after all, an important question remains: what you think (p.24)." And the English middle class did not think as Arnold did; it did not relish a strong State power.

In his examination of English classes, Arnold was continually pointing out deficiencies which deprived that particular class of the right to administer his "collective and corporate State." Aside from the middle class distrust of the State, he saw a second disqualifying deficiency in the lack of education in the middle class. Indeed, the purpose of the remainder of the book "Democracy" introduces was to convince the middle classes that they must reorganize their secondary instruction, to enlarge their perspectives and give the masses an ideal toward which they could practically move.⁴⁴

Arnold tied his argument for an effective State to the deficient middle-class education. He saw that the education of the Protestant Dissenter was narrow, ordered around a severe and restrictive existence and lacking in any national character. He believed that with the assistance of the State, the instruction for the class could be bettered at a moderate cost to the student. Such a gain was considerable, but to Arnold the real boon presented itself in the sense of belonging to a national

seat of learning, of sharing in the best cultural life England had to offer. "It would really augment their self-respect and moral force; it would truly fuse them with the class above, and tend to bring about for them the equality which they are entitled to desire (p.23)." Education was a strong evolutionary force in Arnold's view for it could accomplish by peaceful and enlightened methods what otherwise might be accomplished through revolution — the leveling of social classes in England. The problem of the state of education in the English middle class was, therefore, a vital concern for Arnold because, despite their shortcomings, he expected that the middle class would one day rule a democratic England and he felt they were unfit to do so as long as they remained uneducated.

Of course, the role of education was primary in Arnold's thinking, reflecting his long years as a school inspector. He believed that the contending social classes could be brought together by the power of an education with State affiliations. Such a view was not entirely based on theory either for non-aristocratic professionals, such as lawyers and clergymen, who had been educated at what few national schools there were, had become more closely allied to the thoughts and manners of the aristocratic class. Arnold, himself, could be offered as an example. These avenues were not open to many, however; the costs were prohibitive and Arnold feared that unless the state created institutions with a national character which were available to the many and not the few, such a bond between the classes could never exist.⁴⁵

Arnold has been criticized for his strong support of the State, especially by his middle-class readers. Oliver Elton points out that

"He was apt to have the State on the brain. He saw how well the State might organize, but not how horribly it might meddle."⁴⁶ Walcott,

however, takes an opposing viewpoint when he writes:

Arnold was choosing hopefully between the lesser of two dangers. In urging the reluctant middle class to accept the supremacy of the State, he believed confidently that under the augmenting democratic movements of the day, the cautious beneficiary would discover ample safeguards. The members of the middle class might, in fact, dictate their own conditions and perfect their own creature.⁴⁷

Realizing that no class then composed was able to, or worthy of, taking the reins of State government, Arnold had to find a fit agency for that power and a method of developing that agency. The representative acting power of the State should be vested in the "best self," one "whose action its intelligence and justice can heartily avow and adopt (p.28)." Such a best self is but briefly mentioned in this essay and is left for development in Culture and Anarchy. It seemed to be sufficient here for Arnold to introduce the agency of power and more fully explain how it was to be built.

The "best self" was to be nurtured through culture. "A fine culture is the complement of a high reason, and it is in the conjunction of both with character, with energy, that the ideal for men and nations is to be placed (p.24)." Culture was, to Arnold, the main need of English society. It was the diffusion of "the best that has been thought and said in the world" through the instrument of education.⁴⁸ It was England's great want and her salvation. It could be spread through literature in

its power to create a habit of mind open to ideas. It was the opposite of the pedantry, party spirit and narrowness of the Dissenter.⁴⁹ The Puritans were to be educated, relieved of their insularity through contact with the cultural influences of great cultures such as France and Greece.⁵⁰ It was in Greece that Arnold offered the prospect of the "spectacle of the culture of a people....It was the many who relished those arts, who were not satisfied with less than those monuments (p.25)." Arnold's concept of the best self was the Englishman educated with the best literature in the world, the record of man's achievements, who was to rule England.

In summary, "Democracy" offers Arnold's view of democracy as a concept inevitable in its arrival but needful of a strong State power to furnish it ideals and high standards as well as a restraining force against anarchy. He found the administrators for his State in the cultured "best self" rather than in any one class. This acceptance of democracy and his preparation of the English people for a strong State to combat anarchy as well as his desire for education of the English classes to rise to a best self are all keystones of his future socio-political writings.

The publication of Arnold's "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time," prompted a reply by the reviewer Fitzjames Stephen. This reply, published in the Saturday Review on December 3, 1864, was entitled "Mr. Matthew Arnold and His Countrymen"; it was intended to dispute Arnold's conclusions about the state of England. Stephen's article led Arnold to write four days later to his mother:

From anything like a direct answer, or direct controversy, I shall religiously abstain; but here and there I shall take an opportunity of putting back this and that matter into its true light, if I think he has pulled them out of it; and I have the idea of a paper for the Cornhill, about March, to be called, "My Countrymen," and in which I may be able to say a number of things I want to say, about the course of this Middle Class Education matter amongst others.⁵¹

However, by the time that Arnold actually published his essay "My Countrymen" almost fourteen months after its first inception, his original intent of replying to Stephens and of discussing middle class education had been replaced by a more important purpose: to examine England's place in the modern world. He believed he should develop how England appeared to her foreign and domestic critics in light of the demonstrations and unrest in England preceding the Reform Bill of 1867.⁵²

England's place in the modern world was of paramount importance to Arnold. The value he set on England's preeminent position in world affairs is clearly discernible from a letter he wrote to his sister Frances in 1864:

I have a conviction that there is a real, an almost imminent danger of England losing immeasurably in all ways, declining into a sort of greater Holland, for want of what I must still call ideas, for want of perceiving how the world is going and must go, and preparing herself accordingly. This conviction haunts me, and at times even overwhelms me with depression; I would rather not live to see the change come to pass, for we shall all deteriorate under it. While there is time I will do all I can, and in every way, to prevent its coming to pass. Sometimes, no doubt, turning oneself one way after another one must make unsuccessful and unwise hits, and one may fail after all; but try I

must, and I know that it is only by facing in every direction that one can win the day.⁵³

Arnold's change in focus, based on his fear of England's loss of prestige, was probably the result of a second trip to the European continent to investigate schools and universities. He appeared to have been struck by the inadequacies of England when compared with the countries he visited and feared that both America and Europe would bypass England as voices of authority and value in the modern world.⁵⁴

"My Countrymen" appeared in the Cornhill in 1866 as a separate essay and was republished as a part of Friendship's Garland in 1871. In its first appearance, it placed the blame for England's loss of prestige directly on the middle class. The method that he adopted to distribute the blame was a new device for Arnold. He took on the role of a "mock-humble inquirer," a poor Grub-Street journalist who was willing to listen to what foreign "friends" had to say about England. As McCarthy notes, such a device allowed Arnold much latitude for in less than four pages he had quoted Mr. Miall, a leading Dissenter, in a highly ironic manner, had deprecatingly glanced at education for the middle class and first used the term "Philistinism" in conjunction with the middle class.⁵⁵

The publication of "My Countrymen" in February, 1866, created a small uproar. Arnold felt obliged to follow its publication with a series of letters to the Pall Mall Gazette. It is these letters, written as a defense of his ideas, which were published together with "My Countrymen" as Friendship's Garland in 1871.⁵⁶

As has been mentioned, Arnold criticized England in Friendship's

Garland through the voices of foreign commentators, friends of the humble Arnold, a lowly attic-dwelling journalist. The leading commentator, a Prussian who introduces the concept of "Geist" was referred to as simply "a professor" in "My Countrymen," but as the letters comprising Friendship's Garland appear in the Pall Mall Gazette, the Prussian takes on a wider, more influential role and is introduced as Arminius.⁵⁷ Arminius Von Thunder-ten-Tronckh, the fictitious progeny of a family which had raised and expelled Candide, is the epitome of German intelligence. As a voice in the letters comprising Friendship's Garland, he expresses only short-temperedness and contempt for the English people and their country.⁵⁸ Arnold introduces Arminius in a letter published on July 21, 1866, as a "cultivated and inquiring Prussian who had come to England to study our Politics, Education, Local Government and Social Life." Letters appear irregularly during the years 1866 - 1870 and Arminius' abrupt manners and disrespectful method of arguing and questioning became the vehicles for Arnold's strictures on a broad variety of topics, including foreign policy, compulsory education, the press and the Deceased Wife's Sister Bill.⁵⁹

As a book, McCarthy views Friendship's Garland as a classic of Victorian irony and wit, but suffering from its profusion of topical allusions.⁶⁰ Contemporary criticism also commented on Arnold's use of irony: "...though Englishmen can benefit greatly from the self-criticism Arnold urges on them, he too often descends from his superb mastery of the rapier to breaking heads with cudgels."⁶¹ It is easy to agree with McCarthy's assessment for Arnold's attempt is a masterpiece of irony,

frequently subtle and tongue-in-cheek, but occasionally sharp and biting in its intent. Friendship's Garland is a book which is enjoyable to read for its author's use of irony and wit, but again as McCarthy notes, a true appreciation of its points demands accompanying explanatory material for its historically topical allusions.

Friendship's Garland marks a shift in method and tone from his earlier social criticism. Arnold's earlier criticism, especially that of a literary nature, had been based on a "disinterested" stance of the critic examining works on the basis of ideas, allowing a free play of ideas to arrive at the heart of the matter. It was the position of a questioning neutrality, a voicing of different views without a conscious approval of any one view.⁶² Friendship's Garland marks the advent of personalities and irony. Much of Arnold's energy in this book is devoted to creating a favorable impression of himself and an unfavorable impression of the personalities of his opponents. For this purpose, Friendship's Garland is a series of fictitious anecdotes of invented characters whose words and actions reflect a defective temper, a cultural wasteland in England. Through the arguments recorded in the letters, Arnold develops our notions of himself and his opponents. This is to a great extent a work which discredited popular English opinions, those which thwarted the growth of culture in England; the arguments of his characters are reduced to a level of absurdity in which the personalities and tempers of Arnold's opponents are reflected to their discredit. Arnold becomes more polarized in his discussions here and sharp contrasts are built between himself and those he wishes to criticize. Holloway

views this shift in method and tone as natural because he sees Arnold's purpose to be a recommendation of one temper of mind and a condemnation of another through the indirect method of narrated conversation and incident rather than the direct method of proscription.⁶³

The use of irony to inculcate a favorable impression of himself and to subtly undercut his opponents was of the utmost importance. One cannot read two pages without finding examples of irony used for just such a purpose. The editorial comment which precedes "My Countrymen," the first essay in Friendship's Garland, begins the irony:

Much as I owe to his [Arminius'] intellect, I cannot help but sometimes regretting that the spirit of youthful paradox which led me originally to question the perfections of my countrymen, should have been, as it were prevented from dying out by my meeting, six years ago, with Arminius. The Saturday Review, in an article called "Mr. Matthew Arnold and his Countrymen" had taken my correction in hand, and I was in a fair way of amendment, when the intervention of Arminius stopped the cure, and turned me, as has been often said, into a mere mouthpiece of this dogmatic young Prussian. It was not that I did not often dislike his spirit and boldly stand up to him; but, on the whole, my intellect was (there is no use denying it) overmatched by his.⁶⁴

Phrase after phrase reflects this deprecation of himself, his lack of intellect, and his lack of insight about important matters. But each ironic belittlement truly reflects the opposite and Arnold masterfully builds his image at the expense of his opponents.

Arnold's purpose in "My Countrymen" was to show how England appeared to foreign viewers, whether their opinion of England coincided with England's own opinion. Such a purpose he explicitly stated early in

his essay, and he examined England's stated opinion of itself via its newspapers and leading middle-class Dissenters. He quotes Sir Thomas Bazley: "During the last few months,...there had been a cry that middle-class education ought to receive more attention. He confessed himself very much surprised by the clamour that was raised. He did not think that class need excite the sympathy either of the legislature or the public." From another source, Mr. Miall, he quotes: "...this section of the community, which has done everything so well, -- which has astonished the world by its energy, enterprise, and self-reliance, which is continually striking out new paths of industry and subduing the forces of nature...." Again, from the Daily News, he quotes, "All the world knows that the great middle class of this country supplies the mind, the will and the power for all the great and good things that have to be done....(p.5)." From these newspapers, Arnold quickly develops the current English opinion of itself and it is certainly a high one. In fact, Arnold's own opinion, as an Englishman, was somewhat different. He believed that the average Victorian was too prone to believe in the fineness and superiority of the social and political circumstances of England.⁶⁵ He perceived that the English saw what they wanted to see and ignored that which did not support their high self-concept. They easily praised the splendors of their middle-class existence but lacked the honesty to see "themselves as they really were." Just such a shortcoming was one of the primary deficiencies which Arnold sought to point out.⁶⁶

Arnold could not himself contradict the high opinions expressed in the newspaper quotations without incurring an angry obstinacy on the part

of his readers; therefore, he turned to Europe, to a foreign assessment of the English middle class.⁶⁷ In a few brief quotations, he establishes the gist of foreign opinion. From Prussia, he heard, "It is not so much that we dislike England, as that we think little of her." From a German newspaper, he read, "England will probably make a fuss, but what England thinks is of no importance." From France, an English ally, he read, "Let us speak to these Englishmen the only language they can comprehend. England lives for her trade; Cholera interrupts trade; therefore it is for England's interest to join in precautions against Cholera (p.8)."

Such opinions as Arnold presented to counter current English opinion of their world position would only meet with the imperturbable self-satisfaction of the middle class, but he wanted them to accept what he believed: that the England left by Palmerston's death in 1865 was a third-rate power, eclipsed by France and America. Having stated his view of England's world position, Arnold sought to analyze why such an event occurred before a possible change could be initiated.

In his view, the credit, or discredit, for England's world prestige lay directly with the middle class. Despite the fact that aristocrats occupied the executive offices of Victorian England, Arnold believed that every foreign nation was aware that the emerging middle class actually dictated the policies. Such a reversed state in which a weak aristocracy administered, with constant anxiety about the reactions of a strong middle class, resulted in confusion and inappropriate foreign policy. Having mishandled Germany and the United States during the Civil War, England displayed a number of faults:

And, in general, the faults with which foreigners reproach us in the matters named,--rash engagement, intemperate threatening, undignified retreat, ill-timed cordiality,--are not the faults of an aristocracy, by nature in such concerns prudent, reticent, dignified, sensitive on the point of honour; they are rather the faults of a rich middle class,--testy, absolute, ill-acquainted with foreign matters, a little ignoble, very dull to perceive when it is making itself ridiculous (p.11).

The preceding quotation is indicative of the general trend of an ease in listing the virtues rather than the vices of the aristocracy which Patrick McCarthy sees in Arnold's writing. When listing the merits of various classes, McCarthy says those of the aristocracy came easiest to Arnold's mind: "...their power of manners and power of beauty, their ability and pertinacity as administrators, their generous dealings with subordinates, their goodness despite the falseness of their position."⁶⁸ Criticism was also directed at Arnold during his own time for the same reason. Arnold wrote to his mother about a critic named Lingen: "...he thinks I want to exalt the actual aristocracy at the expense of the middle class, which is a total mistake, though I am obliged to proceed in a way which might lead a hasty and angry reader to think so."⁶⁹ It was not as vital for Arnold to detail the vices of the aristocracy because he felt that they were not the power to contend with in England. The real rulers were the middle class and those people were in need of criticism if they were to handle their new power ably and reasonably.

Having established his premise that the middle class was to blame for England's lowered position because they were in actuality England's

rulers, Arnold sought to educate his readers with an explanation of the errors that caused such a decline. He offered two basic reasons, both of which were major shortcomings in the middle class and in need of correction before England could regain her true role. The first reason was the middle class promotion of insularity; the second, the lack of intelligence, of perception of the movement of the modern world. Of course, the second reason was a continuation of Arnold's earlier social criticism of the lack of education in the middle class.

Arnold, Alexander notes, was acutely aware of England's insularity and saw it as the underlying weakness in many areas of English life, especially English intellect and English politics.⁷⁰ This criticism of England's insularity, as a middle-class political stance, was a major issue because insularity violated Arnold's conception of culture. The belief that culture is cosmopolitan in nature unifies much of his work. The English were too concerned with things English and ignored the thought and experience of other countries. Such a contempt for foreign contributions reflected one-sided concerns and neglected the total man.⁷¹

It is in this respect that Arnold's desire for cosmopolitanism related to his concept of the powers that contribute to the rational modern man. In Culture and Anarchy, Arnold enumerates four such powers: the power of conduct, the power of beauty, the power of intelligence and the power of manners. However, in Friendship's Garland, Arnold limits his discussion to three powers: conduct, intelligence and beauty. Whatever the number of powers that are incorporated in the modern man,

Arnold saw these powers as virtues of particular nations. By practicing a policy of isolation, England was neglecting intercourse with foreign ideas and values that promoted three of man's needed powers. As Arnold said, "Human nature is built up by these powers; we have the need for them all...the several powers...are not isolated, but there is a...perpetual tendency to relate them one to another in divers ways."⁷² Arnold saw Italy as foremost in beauty; Germany was first in intelligence (hence the Prussian Arminius); France reigned in the power of social life and manners while England was pre-eminent in the power of conduct.⁷³ To practice isolation was to cripple the growth of modern man in England as well as continue her lowered world status; therefore, Arnold was forceful in his condemnation of such a practice.

Arnold's second criticism of the middle class in "My Countrymen" was its lack of intelligence, its inability to perceive the way the world was moving. The aristocracy had once had the secret of the era. The secret of 1815, the secret of force, had defeated France's intention to dominate a European Confederacy of its own making, and because England had possessed the secret, the world had followed. But sadly Arnold saw that the world's secret was no longer the force of an aristocracy and England did not know the new secret.⁷⁴ As one of Arnold's foreigners said:

We believed in you for a good while; but gradually, it began to dawn on us that the era for which you had the secret was over, and that a new era, for which you had not the secret was beginning. The work of the old era was...a work of force....You were a great aristocratical power, and did it. But then came an era with another work...the work of making

human life, hampered by a past which it has outgrown, natural and rational. This is a work of intelligence, and...since the world has been steadily moving this way, you seem to have lost your secret, and we are gradually ceasing to believe in you (pp.14-15).

As Arnold's foreigner continues, he professes a belief that the English middle class bears the full weight of responsibility and must use its intelligence to cope with it. But, England's middle class has a definite lack of intelligence; in fact, the foreigner says, "...intelligence, in the true sense of the word, your middle class has absolutely none (pp.14-15)."

The middle-class insularity and lack of intelligence, then, had relegated England to a lowered world position and endangered its ability to follow the modern movement.

England's middle class could counter-argue that it did follow the modern movement, as Arnold saw it, to make life more rational, natural and satisfying. Arnold takes the middle-class position and defends their achievements to the foreign critic; he points to their development of industry and wealth. Such a stance as he takes allows the foreign critic to return with an indictment of English life that again reflects its neglect of the powers, as mentioned earlier, that develop modern man. He cited examples of the misery of the common people, stifling in poor quarters and subject to the degradations of poverty. He moved on to indict the middle class and illustrated how their enjoyments even negate the development of the powers contributing to modern life:

The fineness and capacity of a man's spirit is shown by his enjoyments: your middle class has an enjoyment in its business, we admit, and gets on well in business,

and makes money; but beyond that? Drugged with business, your middle class seems to have its sense blunted for any stimulus besides except religion; it has a religion, narrow, unintelligent, repulsive ...what other enjoyments have they? The newspapers, a sort of eating and drinking which are not to our taste...and in their evenings, for a great treat, a lecture on teetotalism or nunneries. Can any life be imagined more hideous, more dismal, more unenviable (pp.18-19).

It was Arnold's intent to enlighten the middle class for the right performance of its historic role. As Trilling notes, the whole intention of his criticism was to increase the consciousness and imagination of this class, to give it a perception of the movement of the world.⁷⁵ He had hoped in this essay to show that England was losing ground because it did not know the movement of the world and did not choose to participate in, or observe, it.⁷⁶

The second essay in Friendship's Garland was occasioned by a reply to "My Countrymen" published in the Pall Mall Gazette on March 14 and 17, 1866. Signed by "Horace," they expressed the opinion that English liberty was superior to the Napoleonic tyranny of the French government, and that Arnold was overly smitten by France and foreign customs. Arnold felt an obligation to respond to such statements and he wrote his mother: "I was glad to have an opportunity to disclaim that positive admiration of things foreign, and that indifference to English freedom, which have often been imputed to me...." The response, entitled "A Courteous Explanation" was published on March 20, 1866.⁷⁷

As Arnold's letter to his mother indicated, the essay "A Courteous Explanation" had two basic objectives. These objectives were a disclaimer

of partiality to the French nation and an explanation of his thoughts on English liberty. Both of these purposes are correlated with aspects of his social views. In Arnold's attempt to dispute the critics who saw him as unpatriotic⁷⁸ and pro-European, he more fully explicated his theory of national characteristics which was introduced in "My Countrymen" as a method of broadening middle-class views through a cosmopolitan culture. Arnold saw different nations as embodiments of different characteristics. Therefore, different virtues and faults could be discernible in certain nations. Measures that would be of value to one country might be of harm to another. In viewing the virtues of France, then, Arnold believed that he was serving England for French virtues were not those of the English. Arnold said: "But what makes me look at France and the French with such inexhaustible curiosity and indulgence is this, -- their faults are not ours, so we are not likely to catch them; their merits are not ours, so we are not likely to become idle and self-sufficient from studying them (pp.33-34)." Instruction was to had from observation; therefore, a specific purpose was achieved by observing foreign nations such as France.

It has been pointed out by Holloway, and with some justification, that Arnold's view of national characteristics is somewhat simplistic. It allowed Arnold to view nations and people, to his advantage, as a combination of distinct and observable virtues and vices;⁷⁹ however, a view such as Arnold's, if accepted literally, is too limited and it reduces people of varied moralities and motivations within an imaginary boundary line to a lump heading, a collective listing of virtues and

vices. If read as symbols for the powers he wished to cultivate in England, however, they take on an additional degree of clarity when associated with a known group of people.

The topic of English liberty was somewhat connected with national characteristics. Arnold believed that liberty was a virtue of the English from observation of which the French might benefit, but not the English because liberty was an accomplished fact of the English and to dote upon it was "idle and self-sufficient." The boasting of freedom and the ability to do as one pleased were not in themselves a virtue, but the resultant achievements were the source of pride.⁸⁰

It is in "A Courteous Explanation" that Arnold began his metaphorical tail of liberty. He said of this tail: "...I admit the French have lost their tails, and that I pity them for it. I rejoice that the English have kept theirs. I think our 'true political liberty' a beautiful, bushy object, and whoever says I do not think so slanders me (p.35)." But, continued Arnold, is it then England's proper course to speak only of her tail in order to oblige those whose tails were absent or not as bushy. It would be of benefit, he said, if the whole human body was composed of nothing but tails; however, such was not the case. Hearts and heads had to be considered as well. In fact, Arnold saw "there was a danger of our trading too extensively upon our tails, and, in fact, running to tail altogether. I determined to try and preach up the improvement and decoration of our heads (p.35)." Liberty, as a national virtue, was not to be regarded as an end in itself, as claptrap, but as the means to the end of perfection. Arnold feared the English would not see the goal, but only one of the steps.

Friendship's Garland, it seems, was a result of Arnold's need to reply to the social and political policies of the English people. Having written "A Courteous Explanation," Arnold was content to leave such a mode of expression behind until he was prompted to deliver judgment on the English position in the Austro-Prussian War. Each letter which follows "A Courteous Explanation" then is prompted by English policy and is Arnold's social criticism of a particular stance or position. There are twelve letters which make up the remainder of Friendship's Garland. Any letter which makes a specific social criticism or advances a teaching of Arnold's will be discussed.

Letter I, "I Introduce Arminius and 'Geist' to the British Public" was a response to an article by Goldwin Smith on the role England should play in the Austro-Prussian War. Letter I was published July 21, 1866, five days after Smith's article.⁸¹ In his response, Arnold introduced three names, all of which are referred to throughout Friendship's Garland and are of special interest to the English middle class: Mr. Bottles, "Geist," and Arminius.

Mr. Bottles first appeared in Friendship's Garland as a passenger in the same railroad car compartment with Arminius and Arnold. Arnold described him as "...one of our representative industrial men (something in the bottle way), a famous specimen of that great middle class whose energy and self-reliance make England what it is, and who give the tone to our Parliament and our policy (p.38)." Mr. Bottles is of significance for Arnold. In him, Arnold embodies what he saw as the archetypal Philistine Dissenter, whose shortcomings had been confirmed by wealth

and success.⁸² He is the future ruler of England and his devotion to slogans, wealth and trade had to be revealed as meaningless when examined in the light of reason. He was the vehicle which Arnold used to show the middle class what it was, in the hope that he might show them how to change.

Mr. Bottles offended the Prussian intellectual, Arminius, with his inability to grasp the situation surrounding the Austro-Prussian War. In his ignorance, Bottles was functioning as a symbol of his class. Arminius, as Arnold's mouthpiece, provided the harsh indictment of Bottles: "The dolt! the dunderhead! His ignorance of what makes nations great, his ignorance of what makes life worth living, his ignorance of everything except bottles,--those infernal bottles! (pp.38-39)" Such was Arnold's general judgment of the middle class. Devotion to machinery, to external objects and an existence predicated on slogans of liberty, wealth and trade resulted in ignorance. As expressed in his earlier works, the middle class was in need of education and in need of the ability to objectively see themselves for what they were.⁸⁴

It fell to Arminius to explicate the present power in the world, the unifying element between nations. That power was "Geist" and England was markedly deficient in it. "Geist" was intelligence and Arminius saw the victory of "Geist over Ungeist" as the movement in the world. Intelligence of the world movement, a perception of the direction societies were evolving, was "Geist." "Geist" found its focal point in the French Revolution which was destructive of old creeds and social forms that had outlived their purpose. The Revolution was the expression of forces

alive in Europe to new social forms and orders and, as such, was the epitome of "Geist."⁸⁵ Arminius was adamant in his denial of "Geist" to England. It was denied its existence by the class symbolized in Bottles. He was able to allocate it to other nations but rigorously declined to honor it as an English virtue:

We North-Germans have worked for "Geist" in our way, by loving knowledge, by having the best-educated middle and lower class in the world....France has "Geist" in her democracy and Prussia in her education. Where have you got it?...Your common people is barbarous; in your middle class "Ungeist" is rampant; and, as for your aristocracy, you know "Geist" is forbidden by nature to flourish in an aristocracy (p. 41).

"Geist" was Arnold's medication to cure a nation drugged on its own worth, on its liberty, wealth and success. England was moving into the modern world shackled by an outmoded class structure and an uneducated new ruling class. "Geist," a perception of the world movement, was a necessary acquisition for the English. Arminius summed it up: "Great events are happening in the world, and...England will be compelled to speak at last. It would be truly sad if, when she does speak, she should talk nonsense. To prevent such a disaster, I will give you this piece of advice, with which I take my leave: Get 'Geist'! (p.42)"

Letter V, "I Communicate a Valuable Exposition by Arminius, of the System of Tenant-Right in Prussia" reflects Arnold's concern about the Irish land tenure matter, a situation of much importance at the time. Arnold wrote to his sister from Prussia: "Tell William [Forster] that the effect on the people and property of Prussia of the land measures... of Stein, the great Prussian minister, seems to me one of the most important

things for a politician to study, with Irish tenant right a present question in England...."⁸⁶ The second Irish matter, that of the disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Ireland is treated in Culture and Anarchy. This letter was a development of the Prussian reform measure, although it is a matter of debate whether Arnold advocated adoption of the same measures for England or simply wished to expand English thinking on the subject. Direct advocacy was not a common Arnoldian tactic, but viewing matters in several ways, by the light of reason, was a typical approach. Besides illuminating the land question, Arnold described for his readers both Arminius and themselves.

Arminius, whose ill temper is repeatedly provoked by the English betrayal of the fundamentals of democracy and their preference of custom and prejudice to reason and intelligence, was described by Arnold.⁸⁷ Arminius's personal appearance has no direct effect on Arnold's social commentary, but the generally favorable appearance was an indirect method of persuasion. It was another example of Arnold's self-promoting, since Arminius is his voice, while denigrating his opponents. Arminius appeared to be squarely built, with a thatch of unruly blond hair, clean-shaven except for a whitish-brown moustache. His apparel included a rough pilot-coat into whose pockets he habitually stuffs his hands. Arminius was described when astonished at England's analysis of Prussian land reform. Amazed, once again, at the middle-class ignorance, Arminius launched into one of Arnold's first attempts to define and classify the Philistine. "My dear friend," says he, 'of the British species of the great genus

Philistine there are three main varieties. There is the religious Philistine, the well-to-do Philistine, and the rowdy Philistine (p.58)'"

Arnold's meaning of the term "Philistine" seems to be broad enough to allow a great deal of latitude in interpretation. Arnold, himself, offers definitions and characteristics in abundance in Culture and Anarchy, but elsewhere he also sought to correctly single out the Philistine.

From his notebook for 1865, he noted that Philistinism stood askew in several ways. He wrote, "On the side of beauty and taste, vulgarity; on the side of morality and feeling, coarseness; on the side of mind and spirit, unintelligence."⁸⁸ He reiterated his major criticisms in his

notebook for 1879: "The British middle class presents: A defective type of religion, a narrow range of intellect and knowledge, a stunted sense of beauty, a low standard of manners."⁸⁹ McCarthy has classified

Philistinism into two categories -- a non-professional middle-class person, usually a Dissenter or a coarse, narrow, one-sided person regardless of rank.⁹⁰ It is probable that Arnold was crusading against McCarthy's first type of Philistine and that the second is an outgrowth of Arnold's work into later writers.

Arnold's treatment of the Philistine has brought criticism. McCarthy believed that Arnold was scarcely objective about the Philistine middle class. He saw a failure of sympathy in Arnold's entire treatment of the class. The term when used by Arnold became one of opprobrium and lacked the objectivity and reasonableness which Arnold preached.⁹¹ McCarthy, in The Three Classes wrote:

We cannot avoid the impression that though he met and observed them, he did not know them and could not love them. He never speaks to them without condescension. We mark the slightly uplifted eyebrow, the not-quite-suppressed smile. And we note that he is never more maddeningly superior than when he protests that he is a simple, straightforward person.⁹²

John Shepard Eels comments that Philistine is an expressive term that describes a frame of mind, not a class. Eels goes further and states that Philistinism describes Arnold's own frame of mind about the class so labelled.⁹³ Both critics have a valid point if one assesses Arnold's attitude toward the middle class as narrow and lacking in objectivity, and it is not difficult to present evidence of Arnold's lack of understanding for the Dissenter's values.

The Pall Mall Gazette took a position against compulsory education in its November 8, 1866, issue. A contributor to the same paper wrote a few days later: "The evidence is conflicting as to the working of compulsory education abroad, and we want some light on the method of its enforcement. I wish Mr. Arnold would ask his friend 'Arminius' about it." Apparently Arnold did, for two letters on the subject were published on April 20 and 22, 1867, in which Arminius expresses Arnold's views; the letters, numbers VI and VII, were entitled, "I Become Entrusted with the Views of Arminius on Compulsory Education" and "More About Compulsory Education."⁹⁴

In Letter VI, Arnold was able to comment sharply on the inadequacies of the current educational system in England, and in letter VII, Arnold defined compulsory education and how it would operate. The backdrop for

Arnold's social views on education was a fictitious trial in the country. Presided over by Viscount Lumpington, Rev. Essau Hittal and Mr. Bottles, the court was trying a poacher named Zephaniah Diggs. Arnold discussed Digg's circumstances of poverty and the fact that Diggs had a houseful of children who were uneducated. This case alone was enough to merit compulsory education, Arnold said, so that the gap between the lower class and the educated and intelligent upper classes could be lessened.

It was Arminius who quickly noted that England had no such educated and intelligent class, and he set out to prove it in the cases of the three magistrates, each having a different educational background and each proving to be either deficient or too exclusive. In this manner, Arnold was able to lessen opposition to compulsory education by showing that the present system was inadequate. None of the three magistrates were educated, by Arnold's standards, and yet they had the responsibility for passing judgments.

Viscount Lumpington, the first magistrate, was a peer of old family and wealth. Having attended Eton and followed a classical curriculum, he then attended Oxford. Arnold saw Eton as a fine school, but restrictive in its capacity and cost. Only the few, and those few wealthy, could have the advantage of an Eton education. With wealth to gain his education, Lumpington pressed on to Oxford, where hunting and sports were his major interests (pp.69-70). Arnold saw Lumpington's education to be lacking in two ways. First, if the schools were good, they were too few. Second, the love of sports, which Arnold saw as an aristocratic characteristic, occupied most of the college training period. Nurtured on classics and

gymnastics, Lumpington was unprepared to take a responsible, educated position.

The Rev. Essau Hittal was placed on the foundation at Charterhouse by his uncle and from there accompanied Lumpington to Oxford. His education at Oxford drew the same criticism as Lumpington's. Having been asked by Arminius what Hittal and Lumpington had learned at Oxford, Arnold replied:

...during their three years at Oxford they were so much occupied with...hunting that there was no great opportunity to judge. But for my part, I have always thought that their both getting their degree at last with flying colours, after three weeks of a famous coach for fast men, four nights without going to bed, and an incredible consumption of wet towels, strong cigars, and brandy-and-water, was one of the most astonishing feats... (p.70).

Not only was Hittal's Oxford education a source of criticism, but also the method of his education at Charterhouse. Arnold saw that the current means of appointment to foundation schools was unfair and rife with self-interest. The fictitious Mr. Hittal was appointed by his uncle, a trustee of the school, and was the youngest of six nephews all of whom had been appointed by the same uncle. Arnold ironically commented on the prejudiced method of appointment:

...we English have no notion of your bureaucratic tyranny of treating the appointments to these great foundations as public patronage, and vesting them in a responsible minister; we vest them in independent magnates, who relieve the State of all work and responsibility, and never take a shilling of salary for their trouble (pp.69-70).

Arnold would certainly have traded places with the Prussians on the matter of foundation appointments.

The education of Mr. Bottles, previously introduced in Letter I, was of a different strain. Educated at Lycurgus House Academy, Bottles was the student of the modern, but fictitious, Archimedes Silverpump. Of Silverpump's system, the best criticism was Bottle's own praise: "Original man, Silverpump! fine mind! fine system! None of your antiquated rubbish--all practical work--latest discoveries in science--mind constantly kept excited--lots of interesting experiments--lights of all colours--fizz! fizz! bang! bang! That's what I call forming a man." But the man formed by such an education, neglectful of Arnold's prescription of acquaintance with "the best that has been thought and said in the world" was inadequate. He came to be the typical Philistine -- narrow, uneducated and acquainted only with his paper and the preachings of his Baptist minister (pp.70-71).

Letter VII is a direct statement of the principle of compulsory education as advocated by Arnold and its necessity for equal application. Arnold saw compulsory education as a bar or condition which must be satisfied before a person could be fit for his desired position. The principle was applicable to all classes, not only the lower uneducated class. It was as malicious a disservice to have magistrates such as the three at Diggs' trial as it was to have Diggs' children without any education. It was insufficient for the magistrates to have attended school. Their class assured them of that opportunity. It was necessary for them to have studied and trained for the particular function they were filling.

Nothing had qualified them as magistrates and such a lack was as disturbing to Arnold as Diggs' total lack of education for his peasant children (pp.72-73).

For Arnold, education of the English, particularly the middle class, was always a vital concern. Education, of course, was related to his position as inspector and it occupied a great deal of his time. Education and the social and political organization behind it were issues that Arnold constantly returned to in the 1860's and 1870's.⁹⁵

Following the publication of Letter VII, there is a two-year lapse before Letter VIII appears. In this time-span Arnold published the whole of Culture and Anarchy.⁹⁶ The letters which follow Culture and Anarchy dealt with pending legislation, such as the Deceased Wife's Sister Bill and English policy abroad. Taken as a group, they do not offer much that is new for Arnold readers and the latter two to three letters are concerned with a respectable demise for Arminius. Arnold had sent Arminius as a soldier to the Franco-German War. As such, Arminius ill-temperedly continued to comment on the farcical position of England, ruled by her "Ungeist" middle class. However, English reaction to aspects of the War and the possible fall of Paris had given too serious a turn to the events on which Arminius vented his irony. Before the comedy turned sour, Arnold felt necessitated to kill Arminius.⁹⁷ Struck by a random bullet while on sentry duty, Arminius fell victim to the battle, ironically dead before battle, without struggle, glory or reason (p.346). With Arminius' death, Friendship's Garland was finished.

Friendship's Garland had provided Arnold with a somewhat gracious

method of attack on the English middle class for several years. In this time span, several important opinions and concepts were introduced or discussed. Among those of importance were his opinion of England's flagging world position and the placement of blame for such a decline on the middle class attitude of insularity and its lack of intelligence. He also offered Arminius' remedy of "Geist" as a corrective for the middle class and England, in general. Other concepts introduced were those of national characteristics, the powers which contribute to modern man, and compulsory education. Most, if not all, of the opinions expressed had one unifying aim -- the transformation of the Philistine into an enlightened and reasoning being able to take up the reins of government.⁹⁸

Critics vary in their evaluation of Friendship's Garland. Saintsbury saw the book as the work of a convinced reformer and apostle. He believed it was evident that the satirist had a serious side to avow, but that the exact purpose he espoused was not clear. In searching for a philosophy, Saintsbury saw nothing tangible in the book.⁹⁹ Holloway, in The Victorian Sage, comments on the negative approach Arnold took in this work. His main direction was to deprecate the crude, to regret the narrowness or excess of his countrymen. Holloway agrees with Saintsbury that his statements are commonplace, familiar and not directive.¹⁰⁰ However, Holloway maintains that reading Arnold was not just a matter of content or paraphrasable meaning, but it was the whole texture of his writing which constituted an experience for the reader.¹⁰¹ It is in Arnold's ability to arouse a reader to perceptions of a better approach to life and in his ironic wit salted throughout his writing that much of Arnold's attraction lies. If he had advocated direct programs rather than a manner of outlook

Chapter Three: Culture and Anarchy

Late in the spring of 1867, Matthew Arnold delivered his final lecture as Professor of Poetry at Oxford University. The topic chosen for this final address to an Oxford audience was "Culture and Its Enemies."¹⁰² The next year, 1868, Arnold continued the argument concerning the quality of civilization in contemporary England and his suggestions for improving that quality in a series of papers on "Anarchy and Authority." These papers were Arnold's major undertaking for the year and appeared serially in the Cornhill magazine. They related so closely to Arnold's closing lecture at Oxford that in 1869 they were joined to form Culture and Anarchy.¹⁰³

This book published in 1869 is the most complete exposition of Arnold's social and political views.¹⁰⁴ Culture and Anarchy projects the vision of a possible future reconciliation between the impulses that battle within both man and society.¹⁰⁵ It expresses Arnold's main concern with the humanization of man in society¹⁰⁶ by the powers of culture, which are sweetness and light. It was his intention to show how much England had come to undervalue those qualities of culture and also to show the evils in the mind of man and in the life of the society which resulted from this undervaluing.¹⁰⁷

Arnold, himself, very succinctly states that "the whole scope of the essay is to recommend culture as the great help out of our present

difficulties...."¹⁰⁸ Within the supposedly unsystematic way most suitable to his taste and powers, Arnold intended to inquire "what culture really is, what good it can do, what is our own special need of it; and...[what are] some plain grounds on which a faith in culture ...may rest securely (pp.88-89)."¹⁰⁹ John Shepard Eels sees this faith in culture and his quest for it as the summation of the best years of his work. Culture was Arnold's "Holy Grail."

Thematically, this was the intent of Culture and Anarchy. Structurally, Arnold proceeded to accomplish his intent in the following manner: First, he offered a definition of "culture" as a goal, an expanded "Geist," for England to strive for and eventually achieve. He then characterized "culture" as a composite of beauty and intelligence, both of which different segments of English society lacked. It was this absence of the characteristics of culture that leads to what Arnold described as an anarchical society. The remedy was to be sought in a State power which rested as an authority on the rule of right reason. He analyzed the classes of English society for their qualifications as a source of right reason. Upon finding no class suitable as a basis of authority, he theorized that this was because of the predominance of man's moral impulses, or Hebraism, over man's intellectual impulses, or Hellenism. Arnold urged a revival of Hellenism in society as a remedy for the anarchical tendency then found in England. This, in brief, is the structure of the collection of essays, Culture and Anarchy. In this overview, many strands of Arnold's earlier work can be seen tied together in a more comprehensive social outlook.

Arnold began his series of essays with a discussion of culture: its meaning, its aim and its function. It is with the concept of culture, then, that a more detailed look at Culture and Anarchy should begin. An examination of Arnold's theory of culture, moreover, is valuable in the light of critical remarks that the entire book is "an attempt to defend culture against the charge of being 'frivolous and useless'...."¹¹⁰

Arnold briefly defined his idea of culture in the preface to his work as "a pursuit of our total perfection, by means of getting to know, on the all the matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world...(p.233)." Although culture is, above all, an inward operation (p.234), a perfection of self by the acquisition of knowledge and reason, it must be a general perfection developing all parts of society. According to Arnold, perfection could not occur in isolation; it had to be a general growth (p.235). The perfection towards which culture builds is a harmonious perfection, a development of all sides of the common humanity (p.235), of those powers which contribute to modern man which found expression earlier in Friendship's Garland.

Culture had as its aim of perfection the discipline of impartial thinking, or the striving to see things as they really are. It is a disinterested seeking of knowledge. It was not intended as a social program, Robbins says, but was intended as a guard against precipitate and ill-advised action. The emphasis for Arnold at the time, he continues, was on the seeking of knowledge rather than on a program of action.¹¹¹

Culture was a composite concept, according to Arnold. One part of it was the outcome of a wide-ranging curiosity, "a desire after the

things of the mind simply for their own sakes and for the pleasure of seeing them as they are...(p.91)." This side of the composite nature of culture was the scientific passion. The part of culture issued in a desire to translate one's ideas into social realities and by communicating them to a wide audience to make reason and God's will prevail.¹¹² Culture then was distinguished by two motivating forces -- the force of thought and the force of action. Culture realized the futility of action and institution of change unless worthy notions of reason indicated a correct action and institution. This necessity of adequate reasoning before action may have been prompted by Arnold's concern at the time over the Second Reform Act of 1867 which would have extended the franchise.¹¹³ Walter Jackson Bate, in his essay Criticism: The Major Texts summarizes Arnold's concept of culture:

Culture, to begin with, is an activity of mind. It is not, that is, a body of memorized information, but a quality that characterizes an actual way of living, thinking and feeling--a quality that consists "in becoming something rather than in having something, in an inward condition of the mind and spirit, not in an outward set of circumstances." It is the ability, in short, to react in accordance with what is true and valuable.¹¹⁴

Arnold found two characters necessary to the idea of perfection as conceived by culture. A harmonious perfection, a developing of man's totality, united the characteristics of beauty and intelligence, or as they are preferably called by Arnold, "sweetness and light" (p.99). Having borrowed the terms from Swift's Battle of the Books, Arnold made these characters the essential elements of culture. In doing so, culture

became a spiritual mate of poetry in which the "...idea of beauty and of a human nature perfect on all its sides...prevails (p.99)."

Arnold made much use of religion, in general, and various religious groups, in particular, in order to well establish what he meant by culture. Religion, as a force of the human race, was compared to, and then contrasted with, culture in its aims, methods and conclusions.

Arnold first developed the similarities between religion and culture. First, religion's great aim is to perfect the human race. This aim sanctions culture's aim because both religion and culture have identical intentions, that of man's perfection. Second, religion and culture are similar in their placement of perfection in an internal condition. They both identify perfection with the growth of the humanity of man and the suppression of the animality of man. Culture is also similar to religion in its movement. Culture perceived perfection as an endless process, one in which there are continual expansions of power and continual growth in sweetness and light. "Not a having and a resting, but a growing and a becoming, is the character of perfection as culture conceives it; and here, too, it coincides with religion (p.94)."

Culture went beyond religion in that it conceives of perfection as "a harmonious expansion of all the powers which make the beauty and worth of human nature, and is not consistent with the over-development of any one power at the expense of the rest (p.94)." It was here that religion failed and, in particular, it was here that the Dissenters of Arnold's day were failing.

Arnold accused the Non-conformists, or Dissenters, of developing only one side of humanity -- the moral side, while neglecting the sides of beauty, intellect and manners (p.236). In fact, he believed that England, in the form of the Puritans, had probably done more than any other country in the struggle towards moral perfection (p.100). However, this over-emphasis on morality resulted in a tendency to sacrifice other sides of one's being to the religious side, which inevitably would lead to a narrow, twisted growth of the religious side itself, and, ultimately, to a failure to perfection (p.236).

It was for this reason that Arnold was an advocate of the Established Church. For him, being a member of an Established Church meant the possibility of a share in the cultural life of the nation.¹¹⁵ One was kept in contact with the mainstream of national life by virtue of the antiquity and the historical and national ties of the Anglican Church (p.239). The Non-conformist became too involved in defining his own religious forms, in defending those forms, and in asserting their validity. The spiritual side absorbed and tyrannized the Non-conformist and he had no cultural ties within his church to offset this religious over-emphasis (p.239).

In Culture and Anarchy, Arnold summarized his comparison of religion and culture:

Culture, disinterestedly seeking in its aim of perfection to see things as they really are, shows how worthy and divine a thing is the religious side in man, though it is not the whole of man. But while recognizing the grandeur of the religious side in man, culture yet makes us also eschew an inadequate

conception of man's totality. Therefore to the worth and grandeur of the religious side in man, culture is rejoiced and willing to pay any tribute except the tribute of man's totality (p.252).

William Robbins cites T. S. Eliot's statement that the effect of Arnold's philosophy was to set up culture in place of religion and to leave religion to be wasted by feeling.¹¹⁶ This is not quite true. Culture was possibly a higher kind of religion,¹¹⁷ but religion was still an integral part of Arnold's concept of culture. It served as a foundation upon which to proceed toward culture and the development of all of man's powers. David DeLaura, an Arnold critic, sees Arnold's concept of culture as an attitude of spirit which is morally oriented. He says that culture may best be described "as religion with critical intellect super-added."¹¹⁸

Culture, according to Arnold had an important function to perform for mankind. He found this to be true especially in England where the internal condition of man, his passion for knowledge and right reason, was thwarted by mechanical and material society. Arnold saw a danger in the English faith in machinery, a faith beyond the end which machinery serves. England had developed a faith in machinery almost as an end in itself. Freedom of the individual, for example, was worshipped in, and of, itself. This machinery was not subordinated to a rule of right reason which would determine the validity of the ends of the machinery of freedom (p.96).

However, culture was not fanatical in its opposition to machinery. Culture with its single-minded love of perfection, was flexible. It

resolutely avoids anything that resembles fanaticism.¹¹⁹ Arnold stated that "...the flexibility which sweetness and light give...enables a man to see that a tendency [machinery] may be necessary, and even, as a preparation for something in the future, salutary, and yet that the generations or individuals who obey this tendency are sacrificed to it, that they fall short of the hopes of perfection by following it...(pp.104-105)."

Finally, culture was not a creed with which to indoctrinate the inferior classes into a particular sect with ready-made judgments. Instead, it sought to do away with classes; it strived to make the best that has been thought and known in the world known everywhere so that all men could live in an atmosphere of sweetness and light (p.113).

Having established for his readers the basic concepts underlying culture, Arnold was quite unwilling that this criticism of society based on its lack of culture should pass as impractical. He stated his intention to drive as much as possible at practice, at practical improvement.¹²⁰ With this in mind, Arnold compared the Victorian England he knew to his ideal of culture and found it very deficient:¹²¹

Culture is inward; but Victorian England was absorbed with machinery--with railways and wealth, with population and health and sport, with freedom and religious organizations and political institutions pursued as ends in themselves. Culture is general; but Victorian England was irresponsibly individualistic. Culture is harmonious; but Victorian England was inflexibly devoted to the needs of one side of our nature, the honesty, energy and strictness of conduct, and warped even this side of humanity through neglect of the complementary faculties.¹²²

Arnold had been frequently reproached for not taking an active part in correcting these evils in Victorian England; in fact, this lack of action had contributed to the labelling of his criticism as impractical. English reformers felt Arnold should extend a helping hand, that he should actively engage in extirpating evil. However, Arnold quite disagreed with those who urged him on to action. He believed that this was the cause of England's present difficulties. England had been engaged too long in pursuing action without adequate light, just to be doing something. Establishing the intention, then, of the practicality of his cultural concept, Arnold signified his intention to show that England's present course of action without light was the cause of England's misery and, then, to exemplify the correction of this state by practical light (p.116).

England's obsession with personal liberty proved to Arnold to be a very dangerous state. He saw in this continual assertion of personal right a resemblance to machinery. Englishmen worshipped personal liberty as an end in itself without any subordination to a rule of reason; freedom had become mere machinery. Because of this great right of an Englishman to do as far as possible what he chose without restriction, Arnold saw England to be in danger of anarchy (p.117). In particular, he saw the working classes, who were awakening in their perception of political rights, taking more and more liberties in the name of freedom (p.119). "The moment it is plainly put...that a man is asserting his personal liberty, we are half disarmed; because we are believers in

freedom and not in some dream of a right reason to which the assertion of our freedom is to be subordinated (p.120)."

Arnold saw the reason for England's obsession with personal liberty and its consequent drift toward anarchy in the fact that Englishmen did not have the Continental concept of the State; as defined briefly in "Democracy," the State is "the nation in its collective and corporate character, entrusted with stringent powers for the general advantage, and controlling individual wills in the name of an interest wider than that of individuals (p.117)."

Much has been written on Arnold and his choice of the State as a remedy for the danger of anarchy in England. Both Patrick McCarthy and Kenneth Allott, Arnold scholars, theorize that Arnold believed the State to be the only possible source of national unity,¹²³ that the "nation in its collective and corporate character" alone could make men aspire to the grand.¹²⁴ Oliver Elton, another critic, states that Arnold had a strong anti-English bias because he fell in love with the Continental bureaucratic organizations without adequately studying it or the fact that England would not accept a State power. Elton says that "He [Arnold] was apt to have the State on the brain."¹²⁵ It seems difficult to accept Elton's statements. First, Arnold was not anti-English. He saw much goodness and beauty in England, but he also saw evils. It was not out of antipathy to England that he sought to remedy those evils by an application of sweetness and light. Second, Arnold was somewhat familiar with the Continental State power. As noted in Chapter II, Arnold had spent some time on the Continent evaluating

educational systems in the role of an educational ambassador. Third, Elton was narrow-minded in his interpretation of Arnold's State concept. Arnold is a great deal more concerned with the State as an agency which would guide and mold the inner man and provide a worthy standard for emulation. He does not conceive of the State as merely a coercive or restrictive agency to control the actions of its citizens. Fourth, Elton broadly over-generalizes in his criticism which makes it difficult to accept as a correct interpretation; there is slim evidence to support his accusation.

Arnold next set himself the practical problem of how to organize authority, how to get the State to be the summation of right reason. Because of culture's ability to perceive the value of a State as a source of authority to counteract England's drift toward anarchy, Arnold felt that culture would also be the fit judge of the various candidates for authority (p.124).

With this purpose of judging candidates for authority, Arnold attempted an analysis of the three classes of English society: aristocracy, middle class and populace. His analysis is based on the Aristotelian method which consists in the idea that virtue exists in a mean, or average, with each mean having a swing to an excess and a swing to a defect (p.127).

Arnold began his Aristotelian analysis with the upper class of English society, the aristocracy. He found that this class possesses sweetness, or beauty, but that it is in need of light. The aristocracy, as Arnold had consistently noted in his early works, was by its very nature inaccessible to ideas; the static nature of the aristocratic world

limits the ability to see the world as it really is. The aristocracy naturally clings to the established fact, insensible of the flux of the world. The qualities which the aristocracy possessed -- "serenity, high spirit, power of haughty resistance" -- are naturally opposed to Arnold's defense against anarchy, the powers of reason, light and ideas (p.125). The static impenetrability of the aristocrat closed the doors to the influence of light and ideas.

Arnold found the virtuous mean of the aristocracy in the example of an unnamed Lord whose "high spirit is tempered with ease, serenity and politeness." The excess is found in a certain anonymous baronet who has too much high spirit, impenetrability, defiant courage, and proud resistance (p.127). The defect of the aristocrat is easily derived from the excess and the mean; it would lie in a spirit lacking boldness and height, and in an unaptness for resistance (p.137).

Arnold found in the middle class a type of egotism. He believed that the middle class was always claiming more than its actions merited. Therefore, he found the virtuous mean of the middle class to lie in self-satisfaction. "So the middle class is by its essence,...by its incomparable self-satisfaction decisively expressed through its beautiful and virtuous mean, self-excluded from wielding an authority of which light is the very soul (p.130)." The satisfaction with life at a certain stage took the middle class out of the movement and becoming necessary for the growth of culture and right reason. Arnold found the excess of the middle-class mean in a certain Dissenting minister, not named but strongly hinted at, whose excess lay in a too strong and too self-reliant

persuasion of the value of his own mind (p.131). The defect, logically enough, lay in an ineptitude for the allegedly great middle-class works and in a lack of self-satisfaction. Arnold offers himself as a middle-class defect (p.138). McCarthy states that Arnold always had a sense of existing outside or above his middle-class distinction. This sense can, in part, be explained, he says, by his membership in the professional class and by his close connections with the current Establishment.¹²⁶

With such an identification, Arnold could portray himself as an exemplar of the individual progress possible for the middle class member.¹²⁷

Another reason for Arnold's isolation from his class may be seen in the idea that he felt himself to be one of those people who rise above class, of which more will be said later.

The working class for Arnold was clearly not the proper basis for authority. He states that the very condition of the class, its embryonic development, clearly illustrated that the class could not at present have a sufficient amount of light based on culture--that is, by reading, observing and thinking. Arnold found the virtuous working-class man in Mr. Odger, a well-known figure of the times who, despite some good points, lacks light. The excess example is Mr. Bradlaugh, who is characterized as an iconoclast, one who would baptize by blood and fire (p.133). The defect naturally would lie in the individual who fell short in the power of action which was so closely related to the working class (p.138).

For Arnold, the basis for authority did not lie in any of these classes that he so skillfully analyzed. None of the classes possessed

a sufficient quantity of light to arrive at an authority of right reason. The solution Arnold saw was one that had not been tried before. It was to rise above one's class to the idea of a state (p.134). It required rising to a best self, briefly introduced in Friendship's Garland, in which Englishmen would be united, impersonal and at harmony. It was just such a self that culture sought to develop, not the ordinary self in which people habitually lived and which did not carry them beyond the ideas and the wishes of the particular class to which they belonged (pp.134-135). Englishmen were afraid to give too much power to the State, Arnold says, because it was always equated with the class in the executive branch, or with the ordinary self, instead of with the classless best self.

Critics have frequently commented on Arnold's use of the Aristotelian method of analysis in his search for a proper center of authority.

E. K. Brown says that Arnold's application of this method of analysis to the social conditions that were then immediately present wins for him two valuable positions. First, he exemplifies the value of the guide to life he is recommending, the value of culture, for no doubt the man of culture would be familiar with Greek art and poetry as the finest exemplar of sweetness and light; second, the method makes it possible for him to treat of the most controversial issues in "a tone of disinterested observation and a framework of principles external to his thoughts."¹²⁸ Patrick McCarthy, in general, agrees with Brown's statement; McCarthy comments that Arnold planned his analysis of the classes along lines which were calculated to assure his readers that he was an

objective observer.¹²⁹ Yet both agree that despite the valuable position won by this method in its calculated, objective observation of the classes, Arnold loses this position when he tags specific names to the virtuous mean, excess and defect of each class.¹³⁰ McCarthy sees this loss of disinterestedness to be particularly true in the case of the lower class. He believes that the reader can be misled by the seeming conscientious manner with which he treats each class, especially in the matter of defects. The grave sins of the lower class are matched against the mild idiosyncrasies of the aristocracy.¹³¹ It does seem entirely possible that Arnold was less objective about the lower, working class. It was in this class that Arnold saw the greatest threat of anarchy.

Arnold apparently was not satisfied with his analysis of the classes of English society into their virtuous means, excesses and defects. He found it desirable to improve upon both his analysis and his nomenclature in a chapter entitled "Barbarians, Philistines, Populace." In this famous chapter, each class of society previously introduced is denoted with a name-tag and then more deeply analyzed in light of the particular tag applied to it. This chapter is typical of Arnold's desire to attach distinctive epithets to whatever he is discussing.¹³² Holloway, in The Victorian Sage, says these names are frequently "hangdog" names. By employing distinctive names for the classes of English society, he is able to influence the reader's attitude through the nuances of the names as well as more ably articulate his argument. Without affecting the logic of his discussion, Holloway believes they transform the quality.¹³³

Arnold's first concern in this expansion of his social analysis lay with the middle class. This is not difficult to understand, in the light of Chapter II, for Arnold thought that the middle class would certainly take the leading role in the coming events of both politics and culture. Therefore, he was vitally interested in enlightening this class about its deficiencies and reforming it so that it could successfully assume its future role. Trilling says that "the whole intention of Arnold's criticism was to increase the consciousness and imagination of this class, to give it a sense of the way the world goes and should go."¹³⁴ Arnold's experiences as a school inspector, which brought him into close and continual contact with the middle class, had made him peculiarly aware that the future of England was passing to a class which was quite unprepared for power.¹³⁵

The term that Arnold used to identify the middle class was Philistine. Arnold said that "Philistine gives the notion of something particularly stiff-necked and perverse in the resistance to light and its children, and therein it specially suits our middle class, who not only do not pursue sweetness and light, but who even prefer to them...machinery... (p.140)." Generally speaking, the typical Philistine was identified with "the thrifty earnest Dissenter who divided his time between counting-house and chapel, sure of his solvency in this world and salvation in the next."¹³⁶ He was desperately in need of culture in Arnold's view; for culture might persuade him "to re-examine his stock notions and habits, might broaden his religious sympathies [and] might ultimately shame him into dissatisfaction with a 'dismal, illiberal life'...."¹³⁷

Arnold's treatment of the Philistine Dissenter has been one of continued interest to his critics. Most of the critics who have commented on his remarks are in agreement that the sweetness of culture failed Arnold when he spoke of them. Patrick McCarthy saw this less than generous treatment as the result of Arnold's deep concern about religion. Arnold was invariably engaged in formulating and expressing his own religious views and he was disheartened by what he saw of the Dissenter's religion. He could not understand the spiritual satisfaction that Dissenters felt in their little "Bethel" services, their prayer meetings and hymn sings. In many ways, he saw that this religious practice had resulted in high moral standards, but he also saw that the passionate adherence to the Dissenter's particular creed had caused a lifestyle deficient in beauty and sweetness.¹³⁸

Robbins agrees, in essence, with McCarthy's remarks on Dissenters and comments on Dissent in relation to the Established Church. He believes that much of Arnold's irritation with Dissenters arose from the fact that Dissenters separated from the early church for the sake of opinions. In this, Arnold saw them to be wrong, "because the church exists, not for the sake of opinions, but for the sake of moral practice, and a united endeavor after this is stronger than a broken one."¹³⁹

Stronger criticism was levelled at Arnold by contemporary critics who were, of course, personally acquainted with the class Arnold had occasion to describe as "a kind of Philistine whose graver self likes rattening; the relaxed self, deputations, or hearing Mr. Odger speak." Leslie Stephens, a contemporary wrote: "I often wished that I too had a little sweetness and light that I might be able to say such nasty things of my enemies."¹⁴⁰

It is true that Arnold was a harsh critic of the middle class, but he was justified in his method for two reasons. First, this class was the target for his cultural dialectic and, as the primary goal, it had to be jolted the hardest. Second, Arnold was struggling to overcome the self-satisfaction of the average middle-class citizen. Certainly, people who are self-satisfied are less likely to react to criticism than those who are not as confident of their own merits.

The aristocracy, previously treated by Arnold, was reintroduced with the tag "Barbarian." In the Barbarians, Arnold saw sweetness imaged in the politeness of the class. He could find no questing after light, but at least there was no perverse worshipping of machinery as found in the Philistines. The Barbarians had been of some service to society. They had introduced and maintained the concepts of individualism and personal liberty and they had developed a type of culture, although its nature was only external. The Barbarians had, in a sense, been seduced and led away from the power of light by their concern with external qualities, such as worldly splendor, pleasure, power and security. Arnold saw the class as having only one insufficiency, that of light (pp.141-142).

Critics have commented on Arnold's opinions and treatment of the aristocracy; one such critic is Patrick McCarthy in his book Matthew Arnold and the Three Classes. Among McCarthy's comments on Arnold and the aristocracy are the following: McCarthy theorizes that Arnold had become acquainted with the aristocracy during his tenure as Secretary to Lord Lansdowne. The culture and gentle manners of this class drew

him to them and affected his writing about them. Although he knew that they did not hold the future and that many evils flowed from their privileged state, he was nevertheless eager to maintain a friendly relationship with them.¹⁴¹ So, even if Arnold believed that the aristocracy should be a target for reform, he so palliated charges against them that there was no real question about which class Arnold preferred.¹⁴² There may be some justification in McCarthy's remarks, for it must be remembered that the aristocracy had qualities that were culturally valuable far beyond any other class. The aristocracy possessed qualities of sweetness, or beauty; they were preservers of art and poetry. They only needed some light, or intelligence, to reveal to them the real state of the world in order to begin the progress towards perfection which was culture's end. On the other hand, Arnold found it very difficult to see any sweetness or light in the Philistine middle class.

The lower class Arnold identified with the term "Populace." Arnold distinguished this class as "the vast portion, lastly, of the working class which, raw and half-developed, has long lain half-hidden amidst its poverty and squalor, and is now issuing from its hiding place to assert an Englishman's heaven-born privilege of doing as he likes, and is beginning to perplex us by marching where it likes, meeting where it likes, bawling what it likes, breaking what it likes...(p.143)."

Again, Patrick McCarthy comments on Arnold's treatment of the working class. McCarthy believes that Arnold did little justice to this class because he was infected with the age's "panic fear of revolt." He sees the repression of the working class as one of the main functions

of Arnold's best self. He adds that whatever weak praise Arnold did mete out to this class was inundated under a series of very emotional epithets such as "English rough," "Hyde Park rioter," and "the mob... bent on mischief."¹⁴⁴ McCarthy is supported in this thesis by G. W. E. Russell, an early Arnold biographer. Russell believed that Arnold pitied the sorrows of the "dim, common population," but that he did so from above. He did not, or could not, share their experiences or feel their sorrows. Arnold lacked, concludes Russell, a genuine sympathy or acquaintance with the life of the poor.¹⁴⁵ McCarthy and Russell may have a point, but their language is too strong and their conclusions are too narrow. The Populace was a class comparatively new in its existence as a national force. The action that it advocated without a basis in reason would be alarming to Arnold, for whom action must be based on a justifiable logical reason. In addition, the Populace was the most unfamiliar class to Arnold. He had the least acquaintance with the Populace and, therefore, probably the least insight into their problems of all English classes. However, it is too severe an indictment to say that he wished to repress the class; he only wished to perfect them.

Having reviewed and expanded his analysis of the classes in English society, Arnold returned to the concept of the best self. Within each class, Arnold theorized, there were a certain number of people who were curious about their best self, who had a knack for seeing things as they are, for disengaging themselves from machinery, for concerning themselves with reason and doing their best to make it prevail. People with this bent are found in all classes; however, this bent always "tends to take

them out of their class and to make their distinguishing characteristic not their Barbarianism or their Philistinism, but their humanity (pp.145-146)." Arnold also gave this group a name-tag; he called them "aliens." These aliens were not led primarily by their class spirit, but were guided, instead, by a "general humane spirit, by the love of human perfection...(p.146)." It is this group that has subordinated the ordinary self in order to elevate and develop their best self, a self which culture sets up as an ideal for society. The hope for the future lay in this group and its expansion.¹⁴⁶

Lionel Trilling saw Arnold's whole class analysis, including the "alien," as fallacious in its structure. He says that class is a concept whose essence is interest. To take away the idea of special interest in "class" is to render it meaningless. In other words, classes exist because of a common interest.¹⁴⁷ Taken in this context, Trilling's criticism seems to have some validity. Classes would probably not exist if different groups of people did not have different needs or interests. But as a convenient method of classifying broad groups of people with basically similar interests, Arnold's class system is useful and colorful, while it does not necessarily invalidate his points.

In defining the "alien," Arnold makes it very clear that the numbers in this group are not static. They are capable of either increasing or decreasing depending on their meeting, or not meeting, in society with what is designed to elicit the best self (p.146). Arnold believed that society and circumstances in Victorian England were not designed to elicit any best self. In fact, he found it would be difficult to get

beyond the ordinary self because of the style of proceeding then common in England (p.147).

This becomes one of the fundamental problems that Arnold seeks to analyze for it is just such a problem that kept England from recognizing the value of right reason and establishing it as an authority. It was essential, for Arnold, to seek out the causes underlying England's opposition to right reason and the best self; for it was only with this cause in mind that Arnold could hope to set up culture as an ideal. The growth toward perfection could not occur in an anarchical society where class instinct and the ordinary self dominated the humane spirit and the best self.

Arnold saw the reason for English opposition to right reason in the fundamental English preference of "doing" to "thinking." These two concepts, the doing side of man and the thinking side of man, are two rival forces that divide the world between them. Not that they are necessarily rival by nature, but as they have been exhibited by man throughout history, they exist in rivalry (p.163).

These two forces are the subject of two chapters in Culture and Anarchy: "Hebraism and Hellenism," and "Porro Unum Est Necessarium." It is these chapters that Arnold held to be so true for the most part that they would form a center for English thought and speculation on the matters treated in them. ¹⁴⁸

Arnold identified the two forces which divide society as "Hebraism" and "Hellenism," both of which are named for the races who best manifested the rival qualities. Arnold makes the point quite frequently

that the world ought to be, but never has been, balanced between these forces.

The doing side, denoted as Hebraism, is "the energy driving at practice, [the]...paramount sense of the obligation of duty, self-control and work, [the]...earnestness in going manfully with the best light we have...." The thinking side, denoted as Hellenism, is "the intelligence driving at those ideas which are...the basis of right practice, the ardent side for all the new and changing combinations of them which man's development brings with it, the indomitable impulse to know and adjust them perfectly...." The final aim of both these forces is the same: man's perfection or salvation (p.163).

However, this identical aim is pursued by very different courses. Hellenism is primarily concerned with seeing things as they are, while Hebraism is primarily concerned with conduct and obedience. "The Greek quarrel with the body and its desires is, that they hinder right thinking; the Hebrew quarrel with them is, that they hinder right acting (p.165)." Hebraism fastens upon "certain plain, capital intimations of the universal order, and rivets itself...on the study and observance of them...[while] the bent of Hellenism is to follow, with flexible activity, the whole play of the universal order, to be apprehensive of missing any part of it, of sacrificing one part to another, to slip away from resting in this or that intimation of it, however capital (p.165)." The governing idea of Hellenism is spontaneity of consciousness; that of Hebraism, strictness of conscience (p.165).

David DeLaura identifies this distinction between the two forces as

that between the scientific passion-force in culture and the passion for doing good-force. He says that Arnold is arguing, in terms of his concept of culture, for a unification of the two forces.¹⁴⁹

Arnold contrasts the ideals offered by Hellenism and Hebraism. Hellenism holds up as an ideal for humanity the ideas of getting rid of one's ignorance, or seeing things as they are, and of seeing them in their beauty as a result. Hellenism offers a life filled with a certain light ease, a clearness and radiancy, a life filled with sweetness and light (p.167). Hebraism on the other hand has always been very occupied with the difficulties which arrange themselves between man and his pursuit of perfection. This lies in the fact that Hebraism has always allowed sin to fill a much larger space in its philosophy than it does in Hellenism. Sin is the active, hostile force that thwarts man's progress towards perfection (p.168).

David DeLaura suggested that Arnold's assumed equivalence of values in Hebraism and Hellenism is nothing but a rhetorical device. He says that Arnold in his projected vision of human nature is Hellenic; he believes that Arnold absorbs and subordinates the Hebrew impulse into the Hellenic ideal.¹⁵⁰

As a comment upon DeLaura's remark, it is possible to use a statement made by Arnold:

...of [the] two disciplines laying their main stress, the one on clear intelligence, the other on firm obedience; the one, on comprehensively knowing the grounds of one's duty, the other on diligently practising it;...the priority naturally belongs to that discipline which braces all man's moral powers, and founds for him an indispensable basis of character (p.170).

In other words, the Hellenic force must be given highest priority because it provides a basis for the expansion of all man's powers by seeing the world as it is.

It is not that Arnold so much preferred the Hellenic bent as that Victorian England was so desperately in need of it. Sweetness and light were necessary because there was already an exclusive and excessive development in England of the side of human nature known as Hebraism (p.176).

Arnold believed that this over-attention to Hebraism, to obedience rather than intelligence, was the cause underlying the English disbelief in right reason. The Englishman believed that he already had in his religion a sufficient basis for his entire life, fixed and forever certain, "a full law of conduct and a full law of thought" when really all that Arnold saw in this religion was a law of conduct. Man is a composite of moral and intellectual instincts, not of moral instincts alone. So this Hebrew-like attention solely to a fixed religion thwarted perfection in its inflexible attention to only one side of human nature (pp.176-177).

The supreme example, to Arnold, of the Hebrew impulse predominating and thwarting the Hellenic lay in the Puritan. The Puritan dangerously believes, said Arnold, that he is in possession of a rule that tells him the unum necessarium, the one thing needful. Once he believes that he is in possession of the only thing needful, he becomes self-satisfied and believes that he has only to act in the assurance of this knowledge (p.180). Therefore, the Puritan acts out of the ordinary self and moves away from the becoming process so important in the growth toward perfection.

It must be remembered that in Arnold's concept of culture there is no unum necessarium except the obligation for man to come to his best at all points. The movement, the endless progression, must continue for cultural expansion and perfection; Puritanism and the dominating Hebrew impulse thwarts this dialectic (p.180).

The Puritan self-satisfaction with the Hebrew impulse attempts to posit the whole evolution of humanity in one force. For Arnold, the whole evolution lay in neither force. Neither Hebraism nor Hellenism are the law of human development, despite what their admirers are apt to see in them. Both are only contributions, very valuable and very important contributions, each having more value and more importance according to the moment in which they are viewed and in what circumstances they are viewed. The whole of human nature, it must be remembered, is wider than either of the forces which bear it forward (pp.170-171).

So, as contributions to human development, both Hebraism and Hellenism have moved in history in alternation. Christianity was the greatest triumph of Hebraism, while the Renaissance was a reinstatement of Hellenism (p.172). This re-entrance of Hellenism in the sixteenth century met the same fate as Hellenism in Greece. In the Renaissance too much attention had been given to the intellectual side again, and not enough to the moral side. However, there was, according to Arnold, a very important difference between the earlier and the later triumph of Hebraism. Said Arnold: "Eighteen hundred years ago it was altogether the hour of Hebraism (p.175)." Another hour began in the fifteenth century and the road for that hour lay in Hellenism. But Puritanism perverted the main

movement necessary at the time. "They have made the secondary the principal at the wrong moment, and the principal they have at the wrong moment treated as secondary. This contravention of the natural order has produced, as such contravention always must produce, a certain confusion and false movement...(p.175)." It was the static, self-satisfaction of Puritanism that upset the intellectual progress essential to counter-balance the moral growth of England. They brought in confusion and a twisted view of perfection that brought to England an inability to view right reason as an authority out of which culture could grow.

Arnold knew that culture would not win mankind overnight. This is why the State was so important to him. Until right reason could be realized the State and its authority, even if expressed through the ordinary self, must counteract anarchy. The State may be imperfect but it must remain as the framework into which the best self will grow. Eventually, Arnold saw a union of Hebraism and Hellenism in which the best of both forces would be combined. The steadfastness and energy of the Hebraist would support the intellectual vigor of the Hellenist (pp.224-226).

If Arnold saw the State as an integral part of his social scheme, as a framework for the support of the best self, critics do not agree on exactly what that State was or on its relative value. Walcott, in The Origins of Culture and Anarchy, conceives of Arnold's State as mystical in nature, in that it was based not on actuality but on an existence hoped for. Arnold would have substituted the current reality of classes and jealousy with a benevolent state action which is the embodiment of

the best self.¹⁵¹ In this concept, Walcott sees a fallacy of which he believes Arnold was quite aware; namely, that the State action he so strongly advocated must always vest its authority in men, plain ordinary men, and that its residence will always be remote from much of the governed area.¹⁵² Walcott summarizes Arnold's State as a "benevolent rational authoritarianism" designed for the regeneration of the middle class as its future governors.¹⁵³

Alexander in Arnold and Mill sees a danger analogous to the fallacy Walcott notes. He, too, is aware that culture's best self is merely a man and that Arnold's system vested a strong authority in such a man. Best selves, in Arnold's mind, could prove themselves by repressing the ordinary selves. Alexander believes that Arnold became so involved with suppression of the ordinary self that the act of suppression itself became proof of the possession of the best self's right reason.¹⁵⁴ In fact, Alexander notes Arnold's concluding statement that the symptoms of anarchy which may arise in his State would be suppressed with the greatest urgency and severity.¹⁵⁵

Lionel Trilling, a noted Arnoldian scholar, takes a somewhat different position. He is of the opinion that Arnold's state does not hold up as a practical structure because it evades the issue of power. He believes that Arnold's effort can be thought of as "an experiment of light" rather than as "an experiment of fruit." Trilling adds that Arnold's State myth does not depend for its value on its demonstrability, but, instead, the value lies in the attitudes it fosters and motivates. In this respect, Arnold's State, concludes Trilling, is still fertile and valuable.¹⁵⁶

G. W. E. Russell is perhaps the most succinct in his summary of Arnold's State. He wrote: "Perhaps his ideal of a State can best be described as an Educated Democracy, working by Collectivism in Government, Religion and Social Order."¹⁵⁷

One can see from the variety of opinions expressed about Arnold's State that the concept is somewhat nebulous. If so many critics can see different virtues and fallacies, the State concept may lack a definitive form; but, lacking a definitive form, it more closely allies itself to the dialectic of progression and growing wherein a static form would be of little value.

Arnold concludes by stating:

We, indeed, pretend to educate no one, for we are still engaged in trying to clear and educate ourselves. But we are sure that the endeavor to reach through culture the firm intelligible law of things, we are sure that the detaching ourselves from our stock notions and habits, that a more free play of consciousness, an increased desire for sweetness and light, and all the bent which we call Hellenizing, is the master impulse even now of the life of our nation and of humanity—somewhat obscurely perhaps for this actual moment, but decisively and certainly for the immediate future; and that those who work for this are the sovereign educators.
(p.229)

In conclusion, it may be useful to note how Arnoldian scholars have estimated the value of Culture and Anarchy. Walcott, in his study of the origins of the book, has labelled it Arnold's most ambitious essay, the purpose of which was to expose British social degeneracy and to promulgate a general plan of cultural reform.¹⁵⁸ Garrod hails it as Arnold's best work in style and manner,¹⁵⁹ while T. S. Eliot calls it a perfect book

for its purpose: "an invective against the crudities of the industrialism of its time." Eliot says that Culture and Anarchy is the Arnold work in which culture appears to its best advantage because it stands out in such contrast to a contrived background of definite items of ignorance, prejudice and vulgarity.¹⁶⁰ Walter Hipple calls it the work which expresses the ground of all Arnold's special thought,¹⁶¹ and Janet Courtney agrees when she says that Culture and Anarchy most fully expounds Arnold's philosophy of life.¹⁶²

Perhaps, Patrick McCarthy summarizes the quality of Arnold's work best in his outstanding work, Matthew Arnold and the Three Classes. He writes:

Culture and Anarchy...as a defense of culture as an ideal of individual and social perfection is magnificent. As an evocation of the idea of a democratic state, capable of achieving excellence itself and capable of determining correctly what its citizens may read and how its citizens may worship, it is an astonishing testament of faith in man's power of goodness and power of reason. As an analysis of the classes of England, it is broad, pungent, impressive and exasperating.¹⁶³

Chapter Four: Conclusion

In this final chapter, several major Arnold critics will be examined to define the purpose of Arnold's social criticism, to assess the success or failure of his critical effort and to estimate his value and place in English literature. Such an assessment will be relatively general in nature as specific criticisms or evaluations are placed in conjunction with the topics discussed in earlier chapters.

Most critics are in agreement that the basic purpose behind Arnold's social commentary was to inculcate an attitude of reason that fostered a harmonious growth of all of man's powers. David DeLaura, a notable Arnold scholar, believes that the search for an ideal that would harmonize man's powers marks Arnold's entire critical career.¹⁶⁴ This harmonious growth is viewed by William Robbins as a correlative of the Aristotelian golden mean. He saw Arnold's purpose as a rejection of enthusiastic extremism, a rejection of obscure unreason in favor of expansion and progress as well as a conservative check on innovation without acquired wisdom. Robbins saw Arnold's intent to be a check to fanaticism and materialism and a reminder of the spiritual needs of man as exemplified in his four powers of conduct, beauty, intelligence and manners. Robbins concludes, as do many other critics, that Arnold does not offer a full, coherent philosophy but instead he holds forth a set of ideals which rest on balance and reason.¹⁶⁵

In my opinion, Arnold's purpose revolved around his concept of a society in which man would live harmoniously, void of class-interest,

attentive to the expansion of all man's powers. Led by his vision of a classless, progressive society, Arnold sought to acquaint English society, as it was then composed, with the means of achieving such an enlightened condition. The classes of Victorian England had to be made aware of the deficiencies of their existence and of the means of evolution into a better State. England needed intelligence, reason and an appreciation of beauty; it already had an abundance of action and strict moral codes. Arnold knew that the State he proposed would not develop in his lifetime. What he saw as his mission was the preparation of the English people so that such a society could eventually evolve. To teach the value of a lifestyle based on reason, attentive to all the facets of human nature was his immediate purpose.

Related to Arnold's purpose is the personal example of reason offered by Arnold's own life. Arnold is a singular example in his time, Brownell says, of a writer who definitively patterned his nature as well as his work in accordance with his conception of reason. It seems apparent from a perusal of Arnold's writing that he was always disposed to the ideal of a reasoned existence but, Brownell continues, he kept his aim so consistent and so conscious as to mark his life with distinction. "The pursuit of perfection that he preached he practiced with equal inveteracy."¹⁶⁶

If Arnold's purpose was to promote a harmonious progress towards a perfection of man's powers and reason, he also sought to conserve the best of the past to march forward. David DeLaura calls Arnold a "mediator" between the past and the present. Arnold was ever mindful of the need of

tradition in human continuity; he would not welcome the overthrow of English traditions such as the Established Church, nor would he ignore the values derivable from past cultures such as the Greek. Temperamentally and spiritually tied to the past, he sought to make it relevant to the present and valuable for future progress.¹⁶⁷ Lionel Trilling agrees with DeLaura's assessment of Arnold's mediative position; he believes Arnold attempted to make "the past of Europe march with the future." Arnold believed, Trilling says, that he lived in a time when old orders and patterns were dissolving and he sought to conserve the best from those disappearing social forms. Trilling concludes that Arnold "sought to conciliate epochs and that is something that history but no single man can successfully do."¹⁶⁸ Such an attitude of attentiveness towards the values to be secured from a perusal of past great civilizations is the study of the best that has been thought and said in the world; in Arnold's terminology, it is the pursuit of culture. The study of past cultures reveals not only man's previous deeds but it also is a revelation of present circumstances. From the past, Arnold believed, one could discover the forms of the present.¹⁶⁹

Critics seem to agree that Arnold's social commentary revolved around a thesis of a reasoned existence fostering a total rounded being and encompassing a respect for, and knowledge of, past cultures. As a general concept, it is a worthy ideal to follow in the elevation of humanity. Who would not want to be reasonable, knowledgeable of the best ideas and advancing on all sides of one's personality? But, as a practical and workable plan, there are many vague, undefined terms that

are left open to personal interpretation, and thus to argument. What is reason; what is well-rounded and what is the best that has been thought and said in the past? To determine definitions alone would entail extended debate and encourage the divisiveness and provincialism that Arnold deplored.

Criticism directed at Arnold's attempt reflects several major areas. First, many readers have been left with the impression that Arnold has a lack of sympathy with plain, ordinary people. Lionel Trilling wrote that Arnold failed in a perception of life as it really is: "mistaken, silly, but the 'dirt' out of which things grow."¹⁷⁰ DeLaura agrees with this criticism and adds that Arnold removed himself from the people and assumed a cool pose of disinterestedness, almost a kind of snobbishness. With such a position, DeLaura believes Arnold limited his effectiveness because he managed to alienate almost all sections of society.¹⁷¹

J. Hillis Miller summarizes the above point. He wrote: "As a critic of society, he seeks rather to understand than to sympathize. He wants to control society and keep it at arm's length by a discovery of its laws. His attitude toward society is fundamentally defensive."¹⁷²

Patrick McCarthy does not deny the charge that Arnold lacked sympathy with the people he wrote for; instead, he believes that such an attitude made him a more effective writer. Had he been more sympathetic to the middle class, they would not have been as interested in what he had to say. If he did not convert them, he did make them attentive. The wider the audience reached because of his sometimes acidulous comments, the greater the influence, and the middle class has always been the best reader of Arnold.¹⁷³

A second criticism frequently directed at Arnold is his own critical stance. G. W. E. Russell, Arnold's first biographer, points out that in every area he touched, Arnold was critical rather than constructive.¹⁷⁴ E. K. Brown believes that such a critical position, in which Arnold is consciously attempting to rectify an error into which he believes his readers have fallen, leads him into provincialism such as he sought to remedy. The points of stress in his work may not reflect what is most important in a broad sense, but only what is important to a limited audience.¹⁷⁵ This criticism is perhaps a justifiable one. However, it must be remembered that Arnold was not typically advocating a set of reforms or an organized program of action; instead, he was trying to correct what he felt to be the errors of his society. Thus, his criticism was often negative as he wanted to show what was wrong with England and he avoided an explicit program of reform.

Other criticisms are reflective of Arnold's argumentation. Lionel Trilling voices a common opinion when he criticizes the circular structure of Arnold's State concept: "The way in which society is ordered determines the moral life of individuals and classes, but the moral life of individuals and classes determine the way in which society is ordered."¹⁷⁶ In Arnold's State, the basis for authority must always be vested in people whether that person is called to serve in his best self or his ordinary self. The difficulty lies in two areas. The first is the definition of best self and the second lies in a determination of when it is operative. People will always differ in their judgment of what is

best, what constitutes reason and what authority is valid. In the last analysis, Arnold fails to provide a guideline for judgment so that one can develop a "best self" or submit to an authority that represents an aggregate "best self." Arnold's State is still controlled by people, fallible and selfish, and it is only ideally that man will operate selflessly and on Arnold's plane of the best self. Chapman, in The Victorian Debate, calls this idealistic approach of Arnold's Utopian in nature. He saw Arnold's hope in a change of heart in the people rather than in measures that were practically enforceable.¹⁷⁷

A final criticism of Arnold's work is that of his ability to develop and define his ideas. T. S. Eliot discerns a lack of consistency and concrete definitions in his writing: "Nor had he the power of connected reasoning at any length; his flights are either short flights or circular flights. Nothing in his prose work, therefore, will stand very close analysis...Culture and Conduct are the first things, we are told; but what Culture and Conduct are, I feel that I know less well on every reading."¹⁷⁸ John Holloway, in The Victorian Sage, agrees with Eliot's assessment. He sees the ability of Arnold to impart a rare degree of knowledge, but he also sees the difficulty of grasping the meaning of Arnold's ideas.¹⁷⁹ However, not all critics are in agreement with Eliot. Chapman, a Victorian scholar, sees only occasional inconsistencies and failures to reach a logical conclusion. Chapman, in fact, sees Arnold as superior to most of his contemporaries in coherent and consistent thinking.¹⁸⁰ If Arnold is not always consistent, it must be noted that he was one of the few authors of his time who were guided almost exclusively by one overriding concern in his prose writings of the 1860's. The state of

civilization in England and the exemplification of its errors was the foundation upon which his works of the period rest.

The consensus of opinion on Arnold's place in English literature has been generous in its estimation. Critics generally agree that Arnold has a permanent value for readers although the reasons for this value may vary. David DeLaura sees Arnold's permanent value in his consciousness of change in the nineteenth century. More than any other figure of his time, Arnold tried to develop which elements of traditional culture needed to be carried forward into the newly evolving modern world. Arnold persistently tried to sketch a modern society incorporating traditional social and religious values without which the world would have been left to technology and anarchy.¹⁸¹

T. S. Eliot is somewhat more conservative in his estimate of Arnold's value. He sees Arnold, quite unlike DeLaura's view, as a representative of a period of stasis. As such, he is simply an example of a certain age. Arnold is a friend, says Eliot, not a leader because he was an advocate of ideas which Eliot does not take seriously. Eliot wrote: "His culture is powerless to aid or to harm."¹⁸² Eliot's estimation is not really a friendly one. His dismissal of Arnold's culture as an idea of any significant force may seem to be a disinterested criticism but as such it negates entirely the bulk of Arnold's prose writing of a decade. To say that an idea, such as Arnold's culture, is "powerless to aid or to harm" contradicts the very essence of ideas, all of which have some effect on the thinker. If outward changes are not apparent, some inner reaction occurs to incorporate the new idea into a fund of knowledge. This,

however, is not an admission that Arnold's culture has only a small internal effect on the reader. Arnold's culture is a concept which, if not capable of actualization in society, is still a worthy ideal for any individual to emulate.

Other estimations of Arnold's place in literature give him a position as a leader of free thought,¹⁸³ or a position at the center of his age whose influence has been felt long after his own demise and that of his age.¹⁸⁴ Alexander, in Arnold and Mill, compares Arnold's influence in England during the last half of the nineteenth century to that of Aristotle's. He notes the wide range of his influence as well as the mark he made upon criticism.¹⁸⁵ Courtney quotes Disraeli in her estimate of Arnold: "He was the only living Englishman who had become a classic in his own lifetime."¹⁸⁶

Matthew Arnold's place in literature is not questionable in my estimation; he ranks among the foremost of social critics and offers ideas of significant value to the reader. To read Arnold's work and become inspired by his vision of society transformed by culture is an experience which would enhance the lives of most Americans.

However, the state of America (or England) today causes me to question the practicality of Arnold's State vision. It is true that mankind has progressed since Arnold's time. We are more mechanized, more materially oriented and more educated. We can walk on the moon, travel internationally, live in push-button homes and go to state colleges, but we are not really any closer to a reasoned existence. If anything, Philistinism is more firmly entrenched in society than ever. The need for material success and comfort today seems to far outweigh the

need for expansion of the mind, intellectually or spiritually. We still have our hungry lower classes even here in America and we still pursue rash courses of action as firmly as ever while our major cultural influence is the television set in every living room.

What exactly Arnold's philosophy, if any, has been the concern of this paper. From the foregoing material, in which important concepts and major social criticisms were examined, an outline of his social views may be gathered. Arnold was quite aware of the encroachment of democracy in England and he was dismayed by the lack of a responsive, enlightened citizenry for the workings of democracy. He was troubled by the rise of a lower class, uncivilized and dangerous in its actions. To prepare for the inevitable, Arnold proposed a cultural state in which each of the three classes must be educated by acquaintance with "the best that has been thought and said in the world" to a higher level of existence called the "best self." The "best self" would then govern through a classless State to encourage the growth of culture and to negate the ordinary self which is motivated by personal, selfish interests.

As a theorist, Arnold probably does not succeed; a practical social structure is not defined in his work. Perhaps, Arnold's work may be termed a vision of an ideal social entity. The vision of a State void of self-interest passing through the ages in a genteel educational process does not seem capable of realization in life. His State says much for Arnold's faith in mankind but also for his lack of knowledge of people and their motivations. Interest, needs and wants have always driven man and it is hard to envision man cleansed of these selfish

characteristics. Nonetheless, if such a view is proven impractical, Arnold is not a failure. His life and his dreams are an example to follow and as such his work is enduring, a monument to his gentleness, faith in mankind, and integrity.

Notes

- ¹ Fred G. Walcott, The Origins of Culture and Anarchy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), p. 143.
- ² Lionel Trilling, Matthew Arnold (New York: Meridan Books, 1955), p. 145.
- ³ Jerome Hamilton Buckley, The Triumph of Time (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 9.
- ⁴ Richard D. Altick, Victorian People and Ideas (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1973), pp. 75-76.
- ⁵ Altick, pp. 27-28.
- ⁶ Altick, pp. 42-43.
- ⁷ Altick, pp. 82-83.
- ⁸ J. B. Schneewind, Backgrounds of English Victorian Literature (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 26-27.
- ⁹ Schneewind, p. 27.
- ¹⁰ Buckley, p. 62.
- ¹¹ Altick, pp. 116-118.
- ¹² Schneewind, pp. 64-65.
- ¹³ Edward Alexander, Matthew Arnold and John Stuart Mill (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), p. 17.
- ¹⁴ W. C. Brownell, Victorian Prose Masters (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1901), p. 156.
- ¹⁵ Trilling, p. 146.
- ¹⁶ Walcott, p. 37.
- ¹⁷ William Robbins, The Ethical Idealism of Matthew Arnold, A Study of the Nature and Sources of his Moral and Religious Ideas (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), p. 123.
- ¹⁸ R. H. Super, ed., The Complete Prose Works of Matthew Arnold: On the Classical Tradition, I (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1962), p. 234.

- 19 Trilling, p. 148.
- 20 Trilling, p. 148.
- 21 Cited by R. H. Super, ed., The Complete Prose Works, I, pp. 234-
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- 26 Trilling, p. 164.
- 27 G. W. E. Russell, Matthew Arnold (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904), p. 151.
- 28 Patrick J. McCarthy, Matthew Arnold and the Three Classes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 67.
- 29 McCarthy, p. 70.
- 30 Patrick J. McCarthy, "Matthew Arnold and the Three Classes," Dissertation Abstracts, 24 (1963), p. 301.
- 31 R. H. Super, ed., The Complete Prose Works of Matthew Arnold: Democratic Education, II (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1965), p. 330.
- 32 Edward Alexander, Matthew Arnold, John Ruskin and the Modern Temper (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1973), p. 177.
- 33 Cited by R. H. Super, ed., The Complete Prose Works of Matthew Arnold, II, pp. 328-331.
- 34 Matthew Arnold, "Democracy," in The Complete Prose Works of Matthew Arnold: On Democratic Education, ed. R. H. Super, Vol. 2 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1965), p. 3. Subsequent references to this work will be indicated in the text.
- 35 Trilling, p. 170.

- 36 R. H. Super, The Time-Spirit of Matthew Arnold (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1970), p. 36.
- 37 Trilling, p. 170.
- 38 Trilling, p. 157.
- 39 Trilling, p. 160.
- 40 Alexander, The Modern Temper, p. 180.
- 41 Trilling, p. 163.
- 42 Kenneth Allott, "Matthew Arnold," in British Workers and Their Work, ed. Bonamy Dobree, No. 2 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), p. 63.
- 43 Trilling, p. 349.
- 44 McCarthy, p. 82.
- 45 Walcott, pp. 45-46.
- 46 Oliver Elton, Tennyson and Matthew Arnold (London: Edward Arnold & Company, 1924), p. 88.
- 47 Walcott, p. 127.
- 48 Walcott, p. 60.
- 49 H. W. Garrod, Poetry and the Criticism of Life; The Charles Eliot Norton Lectures for 1929-30 (New York: Russell and Russell, 1963), p. 74.
- 50 Raymond Chapman, The Victorian Debate, English Literature and Society 1832-1901 (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 223.
- 51 R. H. Super, ed., The Complete Prose Works of Matthew Arnold: Culture and Anarchy with Friendship's Garland, V (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1965), p. 360.
- 52 R. H. Super, ed., The Complete Prose Works, V, p. 361.
- 53 R. H. Super, ed., The Complete Prose Works, V, p. 361.
- 54 R. H. Super, ed., The Complete Prose Works, V, pp. 360-361.
- 55 McCarthy, p. 124.
- 56 Trilling, p. 211.

- 57 R. H. Super, ed., The Complete Prose Works, V, p. 382.
- 58 Trilling, p. 211.
- 59 Russell, pp. 134-135.
- 60 McCarthy, p. viii.
- 61 Cited by R. H. Super, ed., The Complete Prose Works, V, p. 359.
- 62 David J. DeLaura, ed., Matthew Arnold, A Collection of Critical Essays (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Incorporated, 1973), p. 8.
- 63 John Holloway, The Victorian Sage, Studies in Argument (Hamden: Archon Books, 1962), p. 231.
- 64 Matthew Arnold, "Friendship's Garland," in The Complete Prose Works of Matthew Arnold, ed. R. H. Super, V (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1965), p. 3. Subsequent references to this work will be indicated in the text.
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- 66 Trilling, p. 185.
- 67 E. K. Brown, p. 95.
- 68 McCarthy, p. 77.
- 69 Cited by R. H. Super, ed., The Complete Prose Works, V, p. 362.
- 70 Alexander, Arnold and Mill, pp. 199-200.
- 71 Alexander, Arnold and Mill, p. 195.
- 72 Holloway, p. 206.
- 73 Alexander, Arnold and Mill, pp. 204-205.
- 74 Trilling, p. 209.
- 75 Trilling, p. 8.
- 76 R. H. Super, The Time-Spirit of Matthew Arnold, p. 15.
- 77 Cited by R. H. Super, ed., The Complete Prose Works, V, pp. 372-373.
- 78 Elton, p. 88.

- 79 Holloway, p. 205.
- 80 Walcott, pp. 119-120.
- 81 R. H. Super, ed., The Complete Prose Works, V, p. 378.
- 82 McCarthy, p. 127.
- 83 Super, The Time-Spirit of Matthew Arnold, p. 39.
- 84 McCarthy, p. 131.
- 85 Super, The Time-Spirit of Matthew Arnold, p. 34.
- 86 Cited by R. H. Super, ed., The Complete Prose Works, V, p. 394.
- 87 Trilling, p. 212.
- 88 John Shepard Eels, Jr., The Touchstones of Matthew Arnold (New Haven: College and University Press, 1955), p. 65.
- 89 Eels, p. 65.
- 90 McCarthy, p. 106.
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- 92 McCarthy, p. 137.
- 93 Eels, p. 65.
- 94 R. H. Super, ed., The Complete Prose Works, V, p. 398.
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- 109 Eels, p. 207.
- 110 DeLaura, Hebrew and Hellene, p. 180.
- 111 Robbins, p. 131.
- 112 Brown, p. 130.
- 113 Allott, p. 49.
- 114 Walter Jackson Bates, "Criticism: The Major Texts," in Victorian Literature, Modern Essays in Criticism, ed. Austin Wright (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 64.
- 115 Robbins, p. 50.
- 116 Cited in Robbins, p. 170.
- 117 William A. Madden, Matthew Arnold, A Study of the Aesthetic Temperament in Victorian England (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), p. 173.
- 118 David DeLaura, Hebrew and Hellene, p. 64.
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- 120 Brown, p. 128.
- 121 Robert Shafer, "The Concept of Culture in the Works of Matthew Arnold," Dissertation Abstracts, 21 (1961), p. 2299.

- 122 Hipple, p. 8.
- 123 Allott, p. 64.
- 124 McCarthy, p. 69.
- 125 Elton, p. 88.
- 126 McCarthy, p. 107.
- 127 Alexander, Arnold and Mill, p. 9.
- 128 Brown, p. 126.
- 129 McCarthy, p. 74.
- 130 Brown, p. 126.
- 131 McCarthy, p. 74.
- 132 Brown, p. 225.
- 133 Holloway, pp. 225-226.
- 134 Lionel Trilling, ed., The Portable Matthew Arnold (New York: The Viking Press, 1949), p. 8.
- 135 Allott, p. 63.
- 136 Allott, p. 64.
- 137 Allott, p. 64.
- 138 McCarthy, p. 130.
- 139 Robbins, p. 143.
- 140 McCarthy, pp. 98-99.
- 141 McCarthy, DA, p. 301.
- 142 McCarthy, p. 76.
- 143 McCarthy, DA, p. 301.
- 144 McCarthy, p. 102.
- 145 Russell, p. 130.
- 146 Courtney, p. 84.

- 147 Trilling, p. 231.
- 148 Courtney, p. 80.
- 149 DeLaura, Hebrew and Hellene, p. 72.
- 150 DeLaura, Hebrew and Hellene, p. 73.
- 151 Walcott, p. 123.
- 152 Walcott, p. 124.
- 153 Walcott, p. 128.
- 154 Alexander, Arnold and Mill, p. 260.
- 155 Alexander, Arnold and Mill, p. 259.
- 156 Trilling, p. 233.
- 157 Russell, p. 116.
- 158 Walcott, p. xii.
- 159 Garrod, p. 79.
- 160 T. S. Eliot, "Arnold and Pater," in Matthew Arnold, A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. David DeLaura (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 11.
- 161 Hipple, p. 4.
- 162 Courtney, p. 80.
- 163 McCarthy, p. 128.
- 164 DeLaura, Hebrew and Hellene, p. 37.
- 165 Robbins, p. ix.
- 166 Brownell, p. 152.
- 167 DeLaura, Hebrew and Hellene, p. 3.
- 168 Trilling, p. 13.
- 169 Alexander, The Modern Temper, p. xi.
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- 171 DeLaura, ed., Matthew Arnold, p. 4.
- 172 J. Hillis Miller, "Matthew Arnold," in Matthew Arnold, A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. David DeLaura (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 26.
- 173 McCarthy, pp. 137-138.
- 174 Russell, p. 112.
- 175 Brown, pp. 94-95.
- 176 Trilling, p. 232.
- 177 Chapman, p. 38.
- 178 T. S. Eliot, "Selected Essays," in Victorian Literature, Modern Essays in Criticism, ed. Austin Wright (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 238.
- 179 Holloway, p. 4.
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- 183 Courtney, p. 87.
- 184 Trilling, p. 2.
- 185 Alexander, Arnold and Mill, p. 23.
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