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S. I. HAYAKAWA'S EXPRESSED POSITIONS REGARDING  
CAMPUS GOVERNMENT AND CONTROL  
FROM NOVEMBER 26, 1968  
TO MARCH 20, 1969

BY  
RICHARD E. PLETCHER

A thesis submitted  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree Master of Arts, Major in  
Speech, South Dakota  
State University

1971

S. I. HAYAKAWA'S EXPRESSED POSITIONS REGARDING  
CAMPUS GOVERNMENT AND CONTROL

FROM NOVEMBER 26, 1968

TO MARCH 20, 1969

1. INTRODUCTION

Origin and Statement of the Problem

Procedures Followed

II. EMERGENCY SITUATION AT SAN FRANCISCO  
STATE COLLEGE IMMEDIATELY BEFORE AND DURING  
THE PERIOD OF TIME FROM NOVEMBER 26, 1968,  
TO MARCH 20, 1969

University of San Francisco

This thesis is approved as a creditable and independent investigation by a candidate for the degree, Master of Arts, and is acceptable as meeting the thesis requirements for this degree. Acceptance of this thesis does not imply that the conclusions reached by the candidate are necessarily the conclusions of the major department.

Approved by the Department of History

The

by

Subject

City

Faculty of the University of San Francisco

Page Supervision Committee

Read Before the History Department

Approved by the

Thesis Adviser

Date

Date

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REP

This thesis is approved as a creditable and independent investigation by the candidate for the degree, Master of Arts, and is acceptable in meeting the thesis requirements for this degree. Acceptance of this thesis does not imply that the conclusions reached by the candidate are necessarily the conclusions of the major department.

Wayne E. Hoogestraat 5-20-71  
Chair, Thesis Committee

Helene Whitson 5-20-71  
Interlibrary Loan Librarian



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## CHAPTER I

### STATEMENT OF THE METHODOLOGY USED DURING THIS STUDY

#### Origin and Statement of the Problem

Since the role of many college administrators has been challenged in the past by segments of the college community, it may be valuable to look at possible effects of this challenge. In any college, one of the main figures of established authority is the college president. The purpose of this study has been to ascertain to what extent the position of the chosen administrator regarding campus government and control, as revealed in his public statements, has been altered over the period of time from November 26, 1968, to March 20, 1969.

For purposes of this study campus government and control are defined in the following manner. Campus control is the authority to direct or regulate college functions and processes. Campus government is the method by which the above authority is exercised. The selected functions and processes subject to government and control by the college which were picked for this study are enumerated as follows: (1) The role of the college president in campus government and control. (2) The use of an external police force in campus government and control. (3) The role of an Academic Senate in campus government and control. (4) The role of, and limitations on, the faculty in campus government and control. (5) The role of, and limitations on, students in campus government

and control. (6) The role of a campus judicial system in campus government and control.

It is acknowledged that the above functions and processes are not the only ones applicable to campus government and control. However, from the available data, and due to the nature of the incident with which this study is concerned, the selected functions and processes are considered to be the most important for a study of this type.

Samuel Ichye Hayakawa, President of San Francisco State College, was selected for this study because of his involvement at a college during a unique rhetorical situation. The situation in question was the student strike, and subsequent faculty strike, at San Francisco State College during the period of time from November 6, 1968, to March 20, 1969. This study is concerned with Hayakawa's position(s) regarding the listed functions and processes of campus government and control before his appointment as acting president on November 26, 1968, and any subsequent changes in position(s) up to March 20, 1969. Also, because of his stature in the area of general semantics, Hayakawa was of interest to a student of speech. Prior to his appointment as acting president on November 26, 1968, Hayakawa was a professor of English at San Francisco State College, and author of several books dealing with general semantics.

Another reason for undertaking this study was the author's concern over perceived communication gaps between different segments of society, which is the college community as viewed by the president. Any analytical study which can bring into view possible causes and effects related to problems in communication, as seen through the public

statements of a university president, is potentially valuable to the student of speech.

### Procedures Followed

The following steps were taken to insure the originality of the necessary research and the possibility that the investigation would lead to valid conclusions.

A. The subsequent publications were surveyed to determine if any previous inquiries or studies had been made relating to the individual or subject:

Auer, J. Jeffery, "Doctoral Dissertations in Speech: Work in Progress," Speech Monographs, annual issues, 1966-1969.

Dow, Clyde W., "Abstracts of Theses in the Field of Speech," Speech Monographs, annual issues, 1966-1969.

Index to American Doctoral Dissertations, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan, 1966-1969.

Knower, Franklin H., "In Index to Graduate Work in Speech," Speech Monographs, annual index, 1966-1969.

Nelson, Max, "Abstracts of Dissertations in the Field of Speech," Speech Monographs, annual index, 1966-1969.

In reviewing the literature, the following dissertation was originally noted to be similar in part to the current study.

Venderbush, Kenneth Ray, "Communication in Contemporary Student Controversies," Ohio State University, 1968.

Upon review of the abstract, it was determined that the Venderbush study pertained to student attitudes and concepts of communication during student controversies. The current study pertains to an administrator's expressed position regarding campus government and control.

B. Available texts, or partial texts, of speeches and other public statements by Hayakawa were gathered from sources listed in the Reader's Guide To Periodical Literature, from 1968 to 1970, pertaining to all information listed under "Hayakawa, Samuel Ichye," "San Francisco State College," and "Student demonstrations." Material was also gathered from sources listed in the New York Times Index, from 1967 to 1970, under the headings "Hayakawa, S. I.," and "California State Colleges." Additional data concerning Hayakawa's public statements on campus government and control was gathered from the transcript of the Hearings Before The House Special Subcommittee on Education, Of The Committee On Education And Labor.

Available editorials and journalistic accounts relating to the campus unrest at San Francisco State College were gathered from the same sources in an attempt to determine and establish the environmental situation at San Francisco State College during the stated period of time. This research and material constitutes the second chapter of the study.

A further attempt was made to gather data concerning Hayakawa's public statements on campus government and control through personal correspondence with the three major broadcasting companies, and with specific persons involved in the conflict at San Francisco State College. Letters of inquiry, dated November 20, 1970, were sent to the American Broadcasting Company, the National Broadcasting Company, and the Columbia Broadcasting Company. Replies were received from the American Broadcasting Company and the National Broadcasting Company, but the Columbia Broadcasting Company did not respond to the inquiry. No useable data was gained from the letters received.

On December 7, 1970, a letter of inquiry was sent to Dr. Meyer M. Cahn, a Professor of Higher Education at San Francisco State College. Shortly after December 15, 1970, a letter was received from Mrs. Helene Whitson, Interlibrary Loan Librarian at San Francisco State College. Dr. Cahn had referred the letter to her for action, and as a result additional data pertaining to Hayakawa's public statements on campus government and control was received. A selected bibliography of the turmoil at San Francisco State College, 1968-1969, was also sent.

On January 5, 1971, another letter concerned with clarifying a point of authenticity was sent to Mrs. Whitson. She responded with a letter, dated January 25, 1971, containing the requested information.

A second letter was sent to Dr. Meyer M. Cahn on February 23, 1971, asking for help in determining Hayakawa's position on campus government and control prior to assuming office. A note, dated 3/1/71, was received, but no relevant information was gained from it.

On March 8, 1971, a letter was sent to Dr. Gary Hawkins, a professor at San Francisco State College, concerning the list of grievances issued by the American Federation of Teachers during the faculty strike. Dr. Hawkins responded with a letter dated March 17, 1971, and included the requested information.

C. Personal correspondence with Hayakawa was also used in an effort to define his specific position(s) toward the six enumerated functions and processes of campus government and control. On November 13, 1970, an initial letter was sent to Hayakawa asking for his assistance in providing information for this study. A packet, dated November 20, 1970, was received from Hayakawa's secretary, containing



photostatic copies of administrative papers and public statements made by Hayakawa during the period of time under consideration. Much of the information and quotations used in Chapter III is from the material sent.

On February 6, 1971, another letter was sent to Hayakawa, including a list of questions which had come up as a result of the research already conducted. No answer was received, and on March 25, 1971, a second letter was sent, with the same list of questions. To date, no response has been received.

D. The pertinent data gathered from all attempted research was studied to ascertain which of the enumerated functions or processes it was concerned with. After this had been done, it was decided that in order to determine if any change in position had occurred before or during the student strike and Hayakawa's term as acting president, specific periods of time would have to be set-up, and an attempt would be made to phrase his position concerning each of the enumerated functions or processes during each period of time. The chosen intervals of time are as follows:

1. Position prior to becoming acting president, [inclusive up to November 25, 1968].

2. Position after becoming acting president, [November 26, 1968, to February 3, 1969].

3. Position during the Congressional Hearing, [February 3, 1969].

4. Position after the Congressional Hearing, [February 4, 1969, to March 20, 1969].

Due to the volume of data concerning the use of an external police

force, two additional periods of time were established for the section dealing with Hayakawa's position on the use of an external police force in campus government and control:

Position during Christmas vacation, [December 13, 1968, to January 5, 1969].

Position during post-holiday period, [January 6, 1969, to February 2, 1969].

The intent in Chapter III in this study was to analyze Hayakawa's remarks pertaining to campus government and control, and to determine his position about the enumerated functions and processes at the specified intervals of time. In addition to this, an effort was made to discover any changes in position and note the period of time in which the change occurred.

Chapter IV contains a summary and conclusions arrived at from analysis of the data presented in B., C., and D. Included is a summary of the methodology, chronology, and analysis, plus conclusions based on the analysis in Chapter III.

#### Scope and Limitations

Since this study was limited to the public statements of one specific college administrator concerning his position toward the enumerated functions and processes of campus government and control, conclusions drawn are not necessarily applicable to administrators of other colleges or universities. In addition, these conclusions can not be applied to the same administrator concerning other subject matter. Nevertheless, it was recognized that Hayakawa is a man of considerable stature, and was in a prestigious position during a period of

turmoil, and as such was worthy of study.

It was also recognized that the individual under study may, for professional or personal reasons, hesitate to supply information. In view of this, fact, a variety of sources was used in attempting to gather objective information.

Further, the study, as an item of organized research, should be potentially valuable, since any original research which adds to the total sum of knowledge in the field of speech was considered worthwhile. Only through qualitative research can a total body of knowledge in speech be developed.

#### Characteristics of San Francisco State College

A New York Times editorial described San Francisco State College as a "microcosm of the class."<sup>1</sup> The school is a coeducational college with an enrollment of 12,000 students. San Francisco Chronicle stated that 20% of the student body work while going to school, and the average undergraduate age is 20 years.<sup>2</sup>

Edward G. Hirsch, in an article in the Personnel and Guidance Journal, stated:

San Francisco State has a reputation for one of the most student-oriented faculties, one of the most forward looking groups of administrators, and one of the most alert, socially concerned, and imaginative student bodies in the country.

In 1966, the students initiated an experimental "free" college with faculty support.<sup>3</sup> San Francisco State College was also the site of one

## CHAPTER II

### ENVIRONMENTAL SITUATION AT SAN FRANCISCO STATE COLLEGE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO AND DURING THE PERIOD OF TIME FROM NOVEMBER 26, 1968 TO MARCH 20, 1969

#### Introduction

The intent in this chapter is to determine the environmental situation at San Francisco State College during and immediately prior to the time in which Hayakawa was confronted by campus unrest. The attempt is to recreate the environmental situation for analysis of the public statements and remarks of Hayakawa concerning campus government and control.

#### Characteristics of San Francisco State College

A New York Times editorial described San Francisco State College as a "microcosm of the times."<sup>1</sup> The school is a commuter college with an enrollment of 18,000 students. Newsweek magazine stated that 75% of the student body work while going to school, and the average undergraduate age is 25 years.<sup>2</sup>

Edward O. Hascall, in an article in the Personnel and Guidance Journal, stated:

San Francisco State has a reputation for one of the most student-oriented faculties, one of the most forward looking groups of administrators, and one of the most alert, socially concerned, and imaginative student bodies in the country.

In 1964, the students initiated an experimental "free" college with faculty support.<sup>3</sup> San Francisco State College was also the site of one

of the longest and most violent periods of campus unrest to occur at an American college.<sup>4</sup> The school was subject to a four-month long student strike from November 6, 1968, to March 20, 1969.<sup>5</sup>

Irving Halperin, a professor at San Francisco State, believed the campus unrest had far greater implications than was originally thought. He said, "The confused struggle and violence at S.F.S.C. has become a major political issue in California and the epitome of campus unrest in the United States."<sup>6</sup>

### The Actions of Dr. John Summerskill

In attempting to acquire an objective overview of the series of events during the campus unrest at San Francisco State College, it is necessary to go back to late 1967. At this time, members of the Black Student Union [hereafter referred to as the B.S.U.] invaded the editorial offices of the campus newspaper, [the Daily Gator], and severely beat the editor for alleged racist implications in his articles.<sup>7</sup> Dr. John Summerskill, president of the college, initiated disciplinary action against the involved blacks, and as a result, members of the Students for a Democratic Society [hereafter referred to as the S.D.S.] staged a demonstration in front of the administration building in favor of the suspended blacks. The building was subsequently broken into and partially damaged.<sup>8</sup> Disorders continued, and in the face of further disturbances, Dr. Summerskill closed the campus. According to an article by James McEvoy and Abraham Miller, this course of action did not satisfy the board of trustees, Governor Reagan, or Glenn Dumke, Chancellor of the State College system.<sup>9</sup> They demanded that the college be

reopened and measures be taken to restrict the activities of campus dissidents. The course of action taken by Dr. Summerskill did not satisfy the board of trustees, according to McEvoy and Miller, and on May 24, 1968, Dr. Summerskill was fired for not taking a hard enough line in respect to the demonstrators.<sup>10</sup>

### The Actions of Dr. Robert Smith

Dr. Robert Smith assumed the presidency on May 30, 1968.<sup>11</sup> He had been Dean of the School of Education at San Francisco State College prior to his appointment.<sup>12</sup> According to McEvoy and Miller, Dr. Smith did not fare much better than Dr. Summerskill in reconciling the differences between Governor Reagan and the board of trustees, and the campus demonstrators. McEvoy and Miller went on to say that the level of campus disruptions did decline, but the board of trustees was determined to clamp down on the radicals.<sup>13</sup>

On September 26, 1968, Chancellor Dumke requested that President Smith transfer George Murray, a graduate student and part-time instructor, and "Minister of Education" for the Black Panthers, to a non-teaching position.<sup>14</sup> This action was prompted by the report that Mr. Murray had delivered a black power speech in which he advocated that minority students arm themselves for self-protection.<sup>15</sup> According to an article in the Economist, George Murray "voiced the demands of the minorities when he said 'get yourself a gun'."<sup>16</sup> An article in Time magazine reported that during October, 1968, at a meeting at Fresno State College, Mr. Murray urged students to "kill all the slave masters," among whom he counted President Johnson, Chief Justice Warren and

Governor Reagan. Four days later he told students at San Francisco State to bring guns on the campus for "self-defense" against the "racist administrators."<sup>17</sup>

According to McEvoy and Miller, Governor Reagan, upon hearing about Mr. Murray's remarks, encouraged the trustees to demand the ouster of Mr. Murray. On October 31, 1968, Chancellor Dumke ordered the suspension of Mr. Murray, both as a student and instructor. McEvoy and Miller go on to state that the trustees ignored the college's autonomy and local disciplinary procedures by taking this action. On November 1, 1968, President Smith reluctantly complied.<sup>18</sup> The trustees, anxious to quell further disturbances, took other decisions into their own hands. The article in the Economist stated that this action so angered the academic staff of San Francisco State that they voted to censure Chancellor Dumke, and voiced their disapproval over the trustees' actions.<sup>19</sup>

According to an article in the New York Times, the dismissal prompted action by the B.S.U. and on November 6, 1968, a student strike was called by that group.<sup>20</sup> The B.S.U. declared that a purpose of the strike on November 6 was "to focus national and international attention on our situation at this college." The strike was backed by the S.D.S. and the Third World Liberation Front [hereafter referred to as the T.W.L.F.] plus about 50 professors out of the 1100 member faculty.<sup>21</sup>

According to Edwin C. Duerr, an instructor at San Francisco State, the subsequent disorders, with many reports of intimidations, assaults, small fires, and other damage, caused the closing of the

campus.<sup>22</sup> It was reported in a U.S. News and World Report article that "President Robert Smith ordered the indefinite suspension of all classes on November 13, 1968, after police and militant students--both Negro and white--clashed twice within a half hour on the campus,"<sup>23</sup> According to an article in Time magazine, President Smith reluctantly closed the school after the faculty voted to suspend instruction.<sup>24</sup> The school was not reopened again until December 2, 1968, by order of Dr. Samuel Ichye Hayakawa, the newly appointed acting president.<sup>25</sup> Hayakawa was the seventh man to assume the presidency of San Francisco State in the past ten years.<sup>26</sup>

#### Non-negotiable Demands

Prior to President Smith's resignation, the B.S.U. and the T.W.L.F. drew up a list of fifteen "non-negotiable" demands. The demands were to be met by the school administration before order could be restored and classes resumed.<sup>27</sup> According to an article in Nursing Outlook, the B.S.U. listed 10 demands on November 4, 1968, and the T.W.L.F. augmented these demands with 5 more on November 6, 1968.<sup>28</sup>

The demands included: (1) reinstatement of Mr. Murray, (2) amnesty for all the strikers, and (3) special admission for all minority applicants to the school. But, the major demand was (4) the establishment of an Ethnic Studies Department, with students having full power in hiring and firing of personnel, and determination of course curriculum.<sup>29</sup> Edwin C. Duerr said the following in regard to the demands: "While some of the demands had much merit, others, unfortunately, were legally and/or economically impossible."<sup>30</sup>



On November 18, 1968, the board of trustees met and ordered the school to reopen.<sup>31</sup> The faculty supported Dr. Smith in not opening the school, but having instead a televised "convocation" of student and faculty members to discuss student grievances. The "convocation" was telecast by closed-circuit television for the entire campus area.<sup>32</sup>

According to an article in the New York Times, Dr. Smith was sympathetic toward many of the major stated goals of the campus demonstrators. He sought, through negotiation, to remove causes for violent protest. Governor Reagan had stated explicitly that he wanted no negotiations until the strike was halted.<sup>33</sup> The "convocation" was not supported by the trustees who said there should be no negotiations with students unless through traditional channels. According to an article in the New York Times, Dr. Smith resigned on November 26, 1968, in view of the growing dissatisfaction with his policies. His reason for this action was his:

inability to reconcile effectively the conflict between the trustees and the chancellor, the faculty groups on campus, the militant student groups and the political forces of the state.<sup>34</sup>

#### Various Factions in the Dispute

The dispute plaguing the California state college system was initially between the college administration and minority-group students, according to a New York Times editorial.<sup>35</sup> Thomas B. Carter, in an editorial in the Wall Street Journal, stated that the warring factions could be divided into three: (1) The trustees, the state college system's chancellor, the state legislature and the governor; (2) The president and the faculty, with some of the faculty deserting the ranks

to take "pot shots of their own", and some loyal student groups; and (3) The student militants.<sup>36</sup> Various factions or interest-support groups emerged during the 4 month duration of the strike.

#### Attitudes Concerning the Appointment of Hayakawa

The appointment of Hayakawa to the president's office did not occur without criticism from both faculty and student groups. Dr. Leo G. McClatchy, chairman of the college's Academic Senate, complained that Hayakawa was appointed by the state board of trustees without the knowledge of the presidential selection committee, of which Hayakawa was a member.<sup>37</sup> According to McEvoy and Miller, some students liked Hayakawa and others did not, but almost all stated or implied that he lacked any real authority. McEvoy and Miller go on to state that the students did not view Hayakawa as an effective executive and considered him a "puppet" of Governor Reagan and the board of trustees.<sup>38</sup>

#### The Immediate Actions of Hayakawa

Hayakawa's assessment of the situation at San Francisco State was realistic, according to an article in U.S. News and World Report. Upon taking office, he said, "The problems of this campus are complex and almost beyond solution--but I will try."<sup>39</sup> It was reported in a New York Times article that Hayakawa started immediately on a program that brought the police to the campus to break up student disruptions. This resulted in the use of chemical mace and one incident where the police with drawn guns, confronted the students.<sup>40</sup>

Hayakawa's first attempt at restoring order to the campus was on November 30, 1968. He ordered the college to reopen on Monday, December

2, 1968.<sup>41</sup> Hayakawa said, "We have been warned that dangerous situations may arise. Police will be available to the fullest extent necessary to maintain and restore peace when school opens Monday."<sup>42</sup> According to an article in the New York Times, he declared a "state of emergency" on the campus because of nearly month long turmoil. The turmoil included a student strike and clashes between police and demonstrators. Militant students would march into classrooms and disrupt the teacher, shouting "This subject is irrelevant, class dismissed."<sup>43</sup>

It was reported in a New York Times editorial that on December 2, 1968, Hayakawa was surrounded by demonstrators while enroute to his office. The demonstrators kept shouting, "On strike, shut it down." In response to the illegal demonstration [all on-campus demonstrations had been banned], Hayakawa climbed atop a student sound truck to talk to the students. When he was shouted down, Hayakawa pulled the wires from the truck and began distributing copies of his statements on campus disorders.<sup>44</sup>

Demonstrations continued to occur daily. Police and mace and noon arrests became a routine of life on the campus.<sup>45</sup> According to Edwin C. Duerr, the noise from rallies was heard in the surrounding buildings, disturbing classes and people attempting to study in the library. Typical noon-time rallies originated at the speaker's platform on the Commons. From the speaker's platform, demonstrators marched to surrounding buildings, chanting "On strike, shut it down.", throwing rocks or other objects, or invading the classrooms and disrupting the classes. The demonstrations continued to grow in frequency and swell in number of onlookers and participants.<sup>46</sup> According to a New York Times

editorial, as many as 700 policemen would be on campus confronting several thousand demonstrators. The following illustration was also reported in the article:

After a noon rally supporting the student strike, several thousand persons gathered in the quadrangle. The police then appeared in a show of strength and moved through the crowd. The crowd slowly thinned out.<sup>47</sup>

Hayakawa maintained communication with the campus by using a public address system, with speakers mounted on top of the administration building. He made announcements over this system, attempting to avoid further confrontations between police and demonstrators. During one such incident, he said,

If you want police off the campus, please disperse. This is an unwarranted assembly. You will help your teachers, fellow students, and yourself if you disperse.<sup>48</sup>

Hayakawa urged students, faculty and staff to avoid forming crowds.<sup>49</sup>

#### Closing of the School for Christmas Vacation

The rising level of animosity between the demonstrators and the administration, the increasingly dangerous confrontations between police and demonstrators, and the increase in number of both demonstrators and police prompted Hayakawa, according to a New York Times article, to close the campus on Friday, December 13, 1968, effective the following night.<sup>50</sup> Hayakawa explained that he was starting the Christmas Vacation one week early as a safety measure. He was concerned that high school students, who would get out of school for vacation earlier than the college students, might swell the ranks of the demonstrators still further.<sup>51</sup> At the same time, Hayakawa announced that a black studies

division would be opened for the spring semester. He said,

In addition this allows a period of time for the black studies program to be implemented through its administrators in order that it may be put into effect in the spring semester.<sup>52</sup>

Hayakawa also stated that the school would admit 128 minority group students for the spring semester. He went on to say that the implementation of these concessions was planned prior to his taking office.<sup>53</sup>

During this pronouncement, Hayakawa made no mention of an impending teachers' strike scheduled by the American Federation of Teachers for Monday, December 16, 1968.<sup>54</sup> As reported in an editorial in the New York Times, the aims of the teachers union were supposedly economic and included tenure, teacher class load, and the budget. But the teachers also intended support for the student strike, according to Gary Hawkins, chairman of local 1352 of the American Federation of Teachers.<sup>55</sup>

Student demonstrators, prevented from holding a scheduled rally at San Francisco State College by the early shutdown of the campus for Christmas Vacation, had to find an alternate site for their rally. The front steps of the San Francisco City Hall were used as the alternate site for the rally.<sup>56</sup>

#### Reopening of the School After the Christmas Holidays

The three-week cooling off period over the Christmas Vacation was intended to ease tensions between the administration and the board of trustees, the various faculty groups, and the student groups, but a potentially explosive reopening on January 6, 1969, was expected, according to a New York Times editorial.<sup>57</sup>

A statewide group of students and faculty supporting the student strikers at San Francisco State called for "a mass convergence" on the campus on January 13, 1969. The group also established January 6, 1969, through January 15, 1969, as a "week of solidarity."<sup>58</sup>

Hayakawa prepared for the reopening of the college on January 6, 1969. It was reported in a New York Times editorial that he said: "only people with legitimate business will be allowed on campus when it reopens Monday. All other outsiders will be turned away."<sup>59</sup> He also banned, until the end of the month, "student rallies, marches, parades, shivarees, and other events likely to disturb the people who are here to teach and to study."<sup>60</sup> This ban pertained to the Commons quadrangle on campus. Hayakawa did state that rallies could occur and loudspeaker equipment could be used on the athletic field. The athletic field was close to the Commons quadrangle, but behind the gymnasium and down an incline. Noise from the field was not likely to disturb the rest of the campus.<sup>61</sup>

To show that he meant business, according to a New York Times article, on January 4, 1969, Hayakawa personally posted a sign at the main gate to the campus. The sign read: "Persons who interfere with the peaceful conduct of the activities of San Francisco State College are subject to arrest."<sup>62</sup> According to an article in the Wall Street Journal, Hayakawa stated that any students arrested since November 6, 1968, who are arrested a second time will be suspended from school.<sup>63</sup>

#### Faculty Group Strikes

On January 5, 1969, student strike leaders restated their plan

for a mass demonstration scheduled for the morning of January 6, 1969.<sup>64</sup> According to an article in the New York Times, the mass demonstration "could lead to a violent show down with college officials."<sup>65</sup>

Another New York Times article reported that "clerical workers at San Francisco State College were considering walking off their jobs tomorrow [January 6, 1969] in support of the student strikers."<sup>66</sup> The clerical workers' strike did not materialize. But the American Federation of Teachers [hereafter referred to as A.F.T.] called a strike and put out picket lines on Monday, January 6, 1969. The strike was reluctantly approved by the San Francisco Central Labor Council, according to an article in the New York Times.<sup>67</sup>

The faculty strike jeopardized Hayakawa's "hard-line" position. He had previously stated that a strike by the faculty would not be tolerated.<sup>68</sup> In response to the faculty strike, Hayakawa said striking faculty members would face forfeiture of pay or the possibility of losing their jobs.<sup>69</sup> According to a California State College Law, any faculty member who was absent from his job for 5 consecutive days without authorization was assumed to have resigned.<sup>70</sup>

Teresa Campbell and Sue Parsell reported that the Association of California State College Professors conducted a mail ballot poll of the faculty concerning the teachers strike. The poll, answered by three-fourths of the San Francisco State faculty, showed that a majority opposed the strike.<sup>71</sup> A Wall Street Journal article reported that support for the strike was voiced by 47.7% of the faculty, while 48.1% opposed it.<sup>72</sup>

### Mass Demonstrations Continue

The anticipated violent reopening was more peaceful than expected. Policemen on campus said they were under orders not to interfere with pickets in any way, so long as the picketing was peaceful.<sup>73</sup> It was reported in a New York Times article that some of the leaders of the student strike organizations entered the campus to stop and argue with students headed for classes. This occasionally resulted in minor scuffles, but no major incidents were reported.<sup>74</sup>

On Tuesday, January 7, 1969, approximately two-hundred students marched in front of the administration building. Police ordered the demonstrators to stop and disperse, but the order was refused. According to a New York Times article, about 50 San Francisco policemen and 30 Santa Clara County Sheriffs pushed the "shouting, rock throwing" students back to the side walk in front of the main entrance.<sup>75</sup>

On Wednesday, January 8, 1969, police had to break through a student-teacher picket line in order to make an entrance to the campus. Police chased demonstrators several blocks from campus.<sup>76</sup>

Two hundred striking faculty members picketed the college on Thursday, January 9, 1969, in defiance of a court order ordering them back to work. Students in a separate picket line clashed with police who used clubs to quell the demonstrators.<sup>77</sup>

Rallies, disruptions, and violence continued. On some days, according to Irving Halperin, over 500 policemen would be on campus with several thousand demonstrators. Police helicopters circled over the campus on a daily basis.<sup>78</sup>



Hayakawa, officials, of the Teamsters Union, and a San Francisco Chamber of Commerce member tried an action toward settlement of the strike on Monday, January 13, 1969. According to an article in the New York Times, the meeting was called to bring together members of all parties involved in the dispute. It would be attended by college administrators, faculty groups, including the striking Federation of Teachers, and representatives of the Central Labor Council and Building Trades Council, and the International Longshoreman's and Warehouseman's Union.<sup>79</sup> The attempt failed, according to a New York Times article, when a spokesman for the T.W.L.F. denounced the meeting.<sup>80</sup>

A letter written by Hayakawa was sent to all faculty members on Wednesday, January 15, 1969, stating that all teachers must file signed weekly statements that they had performed their duties in the previous week or face loss of pay. According to a New York Times article, the letter was interpreted by many as a threat and angered most of the faculty.<sup>81</sup>

#### Mass Arrests Weaken Strike Support

Hayakawa decided that, in order for San Francisco State College to function as an educational institution, the rallies and disruptions must be stopped. A New York Times article reported that, on January 23, 1969, during another noisy demonstration, two announcements were made over the loudspeakers atop the administration building. The order prohibiting the rally was noted, plus the fact that an alternate place was available. The crowd was ordered to disperse. Ten minutes after the second reading of the order the crowd had still not dispersed.

Police moved in and arrested 454 persons. Of the persons arrested, 252 were students.<sup>82</sup>

After the mass arrests, leaders of the T.W.L.F. threatened to go back to the college the next day and "close it down until our 15 points are met."<sup>83</sup> Other strike leaders said their spirits were high and they would "return to the campus and be arrested time and time again."<sup>84</sup> Edwin C. Duerr, writing in the Educational Record, stated that the strike leaders were never able to stage another major rally because of lack of support.<sup>85</sup> The large number of arrests on January 23, 1969, raised the price of participation in the rallies. Again according to Edwin C. Duerr, many of the onlookers, who increased the number of participants in the earlier rallies, ceased to be willing to join.<sup>86</sup>

Minor demonstrations and isolated incidents between demonstrators and police continued to occur. On January 30, 1969, policemen on foot and horseback broke up a demonstration, and chased the demonstrators several blocks from campus.<sup>87</sup> By Monday, February 4, 1969, according to Mrs. Helen R. Bedesen, Student Financial Aid Director, 549 students had been arrested since the demonstration started on November 6, 1968.<sup>88</sup>

It was reported in a New York Times article that Hayakawa offered, on February 6, 1969, to rehire striking teachers if they would come back to work by 5 P.M. Monday, February 17, 1969, the first day of the spring semester.<sup>89</sup> The striking teachers spurned Hayakawa's offer,<sup>90</sup> but on February 24, 1969, they ended the strike and promised to return to work as soon "as a peaceful and free academic atmosphere prevails on the campus."<sup>91</sup> Governor Reagan and Hayakawa challenged the

teachers union reservation that its members would return only if the campus was orderly. Hayakawa said that, in effect, the union was insisting that student demands be met.<sup>92</sup>

### Hayakawa Heckled

Following tradition, Hayakawa addressed the faculty on February 14, 1969, prior to the start of the spring semester. According to Meyer M. Cahn, the faculty convocation was poorly attended, with only 250 of the 1100 faculty members present.<sup>93</sup> During the course of the speech, about 20 hecklers, made up of Negro teachers and students, climbed up on the stage and interrupted Hayakawa. After repeated efforts to quiet the dissenters, police were called in to remove them. As reported in a New York Times article, 4 of the protesters were arrested.<sup>94</sup>

Dr. Nathan Hare, a Negro sociologist, appointed head of the Black Studies Department, was one of the demonstrators. It was reported in a New York Times article that after the address, Hayakawa said: "Dr. Hare no longer has my backing to head the Black Studies Program." Subsequently, Dr. Hare was dismissed from his position, effective June 30, 1969.<sup>95</sup>

### Strike Comes to an End

Unable to maintain support for the strike, the dedicated strike leaders changed their non-negotiable demands to negotiable objectives, according to Edwin C. Duerr.<sup>96</sup> The B.S.U. and the T.W.L.F. ended their strike on March 20, 1969, and by Monday, March 24, 1969, it appeared that peace had returned to the campus, ending 4 1/2 months of almost daily confrontations between police and demonstrators.<sup>97</sup>

When the strike was declared officially over, Hayakawa refused to withdraw the police, pending developments. When asked whether he looked upon the campus as still in a state of emergency, he replied, "I certainly do."<sup>98</sup> Hayakawa went on to say that he would keep police on campus and "withhold final decision on disciplinary penalties beyond reprimand and probation until April 11, 1969."<sup>99</sup> According to Time, March 28, 1969, a force of more than 150 riot-equipped San Francisco policemen would continue to patrol the campus.<sup>100</sup>

#### SUMMARY

According to selected newspaper and periodical articles, San Francisco State College was characterized as "a microcosm of the times," with an enrollment of 18,000 students, an average undergraduate age of 25 years, and with 75% of the student body working while going to school. The school administration had been considered progressive in its outlook toward education and in the relationship between the faculty and student body.

The first major occurrence [and an indication of what was to come] of disruption came in late 1967, when members of the B.S.U. [Black Students Union] invaded the offices of the campus newspaper and beat the editor. Dr. John Summerskill, then president of the college, initiated disciplinary action against the involved blacks. The S.D.S. [Students for a Democratic Society] organized a student demonstration in support of the indicated blacks, which resulted in disorder and the eventual closing of the school.

The board of trustees, Governor Reagan, and the Chancellor of the State College system did not condone the closing of the campus and eventually fired Dr. Summerskill for not taking a hard enough line in respect to the demonstrators. Dr. Robert Smith was appointed as the new president on May 30, 1968. He did not fare much better than his predecessor in bringing together the various factions involved in the dispute.

State College Chancellor Dumke eventually requested the transfer of George Murray, a graduate student and part-time instructor, to a non-teaching position. This request was based on the report that Mr. Murray encouraged the minority students to arm themselves for self-protection. The request was eventually changed to an order for dismissal, and on November 1, 1968, President Smith reluctantly complied.

The B.S.U., in response to the dismissal, started a student strike on November 6, 1968. The strike was supported by the S.D.S. and the T.W.L.F. [Third World Liberation Front], plus a small number of faculty members. The strike resulted in numerous disturbances and so on November 13, 1968, President Smith suspended all classes.

The B.S.U. and the T.W.L.F. drew up a list of fifteen "non-negotiable" demands, to be met before the strike would be cancelled. The major demand of the striking students was to establish a completely autonomous Black Studies Department. Governor Reagan and the board of trustees demanded no negotiations until the strike was called off. Dr. Smith, unable to resolve the conflict, resigned on November 25, 1968.

On the same day that Dr. Smith resigned, the trustees named S. I. Hayakawa as the acting president. Hayakawa immediately started on what was called by many as a "hard-line policy" toward the demonstrators. He ordered the reopening of school on December 2, 1968, and said police would be used if necessary. Hayakawa's first confrontation with the demonstrators came on December 2, 1968, while enroute to his office. In an attempt to talk to the students, Hayakawa climbed on top of a sound truck: when he was shouted down, he ripped the wires from the truck and continued to his office. Demonstrations continued to occur daily, swelling both in number of onlookers and participants. Reportedly, in response to a fear that the demonstrations might get out of hand and that high school students, released for Christmas Vacation, might increase the number of demonstrators, Hayakawa closed the campus, effective December 14, 1968.

The three-week cooling off period over the Christmas Vacation did not ease tensions, and a potentially explosive reopening was expected on January 6, 1969. The various factions involved in the dispute marshaled their forces for the expected violent reopening, but it was more peaceful than expected.

The A.F.T. [American Federation of Teachers] called a strike, and put out picket lines on January 6, 1969. The action jeopardized Hayakawa's position and complicated subsequent negotiation procedures. Hayakawa threatened to enforce a California State College rule that all teachers absent from their jobs for 5 consecutive days without authorization were considered to have resigned, but enforcement of the rule was never carried out.

Mass demonstrations continued on the campus, and attempted peace negotiations failed. Hayakawa decided the rallies must be stopped if San Francisco State was to function as an educational institution. On January 23, 1969, police moved in and arrested 454 persons. This was the last large scale demonstration to occur during the student strike. Supposedly, the large number of arrests increased the cost of participation in the rallies.

On February 6, 1969, Hayakawa offered to rehire the striking teachers if they would come back to work by the first day of the spring semester. The teachers did not accept Hayakawa's offer, but did end their strike on February 24, 1969.

Hayakawa addressed the faculty on February 14, 1969, prior to the start of the spring semester. His address was interrupted by about 20 hecklers, including Dr. Nathan Hare, appointed head of the Black Studies Department. Dr. Hare was subsequently dismissed from his position, effective June 30, 1969.

After the mass arrests of January 23, 1969, the strike leaders changed their "non-negotiable" demands to "negotiable" objectives, and the strike ended on March 20, 1969. Hayakawa withheld final decision on disciplinary penalties until April 11, 1969, and refused to withdraw police pending further developments.

# FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Lawrence Davies, "Coast College Unrest", The New York Times, January 11, 1969, p. 17.

<sup>2</sup>"Guerrillas on Campus", Newsweek, December 18, 1967, p. 68.

<sup>3</sup>"Campus Unrest", Personnel and Guidance Journal, April 1970, p. 621.

<sup>4</sup>Wallace Turner, "Teachers Strike At Coast College", The New York Times, January 7, 1969, p. 24.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Irving Halperin, "San Francisco State College Diary", Educational Record, Spring, 1969, p. 14.

<sup>7</sup>James McEvoy and Abraham Miller, "On Strike, Shut It Down", Trans-action, VI (March, 1969), p. 18.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid. p. 19. [It was reported in a New York Times article that two trustees said that Dr. Summerskill was dismissed by the Chancellor, Glenn Dumke, but the chancellor said that Dr. Summerskill had "elected to resign."]

<sup>11</sup>Robert Smith, "San Francisco State Experience," in Agony & Promise: Current Issues In Higher Education 1969, ed. by G. Kerry Smith (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., 1969) p. 91.

<sup>12</sup>Nancy J. Adler, "Head of San Francisco State Resigns", The New York Times, November 27, 1968, p. 25.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid. p. 19.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>"San Francisco State", Economist, December 28, 1968, p. 24.

<sup>17</sup>"Shutdown at San Francisco State; Black Student Union Member Riot," Time, November 22, 1968, p. 55.



- <sup>18</sup>James McEvoy and Abraham Miller, p. 19.
- <sup>19</sup>"San Francisco State," Economist, December 28, 1968, p. 24.
- <sup>20</sup>Wallace Turner, "Campus On Coast Remains Closed," The New York Times, November 28, 1968, p. 37.
- <sup>21</sup>Lawrence Davies, "Coast College Unrest," The New York Times, January 11, 1969, p. 17.
- <sup>22</sup>Edwin C. Duerr, "Police On The Campus: Crises at S.F.S.C.," Educational Record, Spring, 1969, p. 127.
- <sup>23</sup>"Where Disorders Closed a Campus," U. S. News and World Report, November 25, 1968, p. 12.
- <sup>24</sup>Wallace Turner, "Campus On Coast Remains Closed," The New York Times, November 28, 1968, p. 37.
- <sup>25</sup>Nancy J. Adler, "Head of San Francisco State Resigns, Th," The New York Times, November 27, 1968, p. 25.
- <sup>26</sup>"Showdown at San Francisco State," U. S. News and World Report, December 9, 1968, p. 56.
- <sup>27</sup>R. L. Moellering, "Impasse on California Academic Scene," Christian Century, February 26, 1969, p. 296.
- <sup>28</sup>Teresa Campbell and Sue Passell, "Campus in Turmoil," Nursing Outlook, June, 1969, p. 78.
- <sup>29</sup>Earl Caldwell, "Coast Students Expect New Clash," The New York Times, January 4, 1969, p. 24.
- <sup>30</sup>Duerr, Educational Record, p. 127.
- <sup>31</sup>"California Board Meets," The New York Times, November 26, 1968, p. 23.
- <sup>32</sup>Nancy J. Adler, "Head of San Francisco State Resigns," The New York Times, November 27, 1968, p. 25.
- <sup>33</sup>Lawrence Davies, "Coast College Unrest," The New York Times, January 11, 1969, p. 17.
- <sup>34</sup>Nancy J. Adler, "Head of San Francisco State Resigns," The New York Times, November 27, 1968, p. 25.
- <sup>35</sup>Earl Caldwell, "College Disorders Called Inevitable," The New York Times, December 18, 1968, p. 38.

<sup>36</sup>Thomas B. Carter, "Can College Survive a Militant Attack?", Wall Street Journal, November 27, 1968, p. 18.

<sup>37</sup>Wallace Turner, "Campus On Coast Remains Closed," The New York Times, November 28, 1968, p. 37.

<sup>38</sup>McEvoy and Miller, Trans-action, p. 19.

<sup>39</sup>"Showdown at San Francisco State," U. S. News and World Report, December 9, 1968, p. 56.

<sup>40</sup>Wallace Turner, "Hayakawa Shuts Coast College To Delay Strike After Holiday," The New York Times, December 15, 1968, p. 51.

<sup>41</sup>College On Coast Ordered Reopened, The New York Times, December 1, 1968, p. 76.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>Wallace Turner, "Classes Resume After Protest at College on Coast," The New York Times, December 3, 1968, p. 29.

<sup>45</sup>Joan Didion, "The Revolution Game," Saturday Evening Post, January 25, 1969, p. 20.

<sup>46</sup>Edwin C. Duerr, Educational Record, p. 128.

<sup>47</sup>Wallace Turner, "Police Dispense A Campus Crowd," The New York Times, December 5, 1968, p. 36.

<sup>48</sup>Wallace Turner, "Police Repel Students at College in San Francisco," The New York Times, December 4, 1968, p. 26.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid.

<sup>50</sup>Wallace Turner, "San Francisco State Begins Holiday Recess Early," The New York Times, December 14, 1968, p. 40.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid.

<sup>53</sup>"Escalating Troubles," Newsweek, December 16, 1968, p. 62.

<sup>54</sup>Wallace Turner, "San Francisco State Begins Holiday Recess Early," The New York Times, December 14, 1968, p. 40.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid.

56"Students at City Hall," The New York Times, December 17, 1968, p. 23.

57Earl Caldwell, "Coast Students Expect New Clash," The New York Times, January 4, 1969, p. 24.

58"College Strikers Backed On Coast," The New York Times, December 31, 1968, p. 24.

59"San Francisco State Bans Outsiders," The New York Times, January 5, 1969, p. 57.

60Ibid.

61Edwin C. Duerr, Educational Record, p. 128. [The athletic field was never used by the demonstrators.]

62"San Francisco State Bans Outsiders," The New York Times, January 5, 1969, p. 57.

63"Reagan Reaps Political Profit From Student Revolts on Coast," The New York Times, February 10, 1969, p. 20.

64Earl Caldwell, "Coast Students Defy Protest Ban," The New York Times, January 6, 1969, p. 31.

65Ibid.

66Ibid.

67Wallace Turner, "Teacher Strike At Coast College," The New York Times, January 7, 1969, p. 24, 28.

68Ibid.

69Campbell and Passell, Nursing Outlook, p. 79.

70Ibid.

71Ibid.

72Editorial, Wall Street Journal, February 10, 1969, p. 1.

73Wallace Turner, "Teacher Strike At Coast College," The New York Times, January 7, 1969, p. 24, 28.

74Ibid.

75"Student Pickets And Police Clash," The New York Times, January 8, 1969, p. 36.

76"Police Break Picket Line in Coast College Strike," The New York Times, January 9, 1969, p. 17.

77Lawrence Davies, "Teachers On Coast Defy Court Order," The New York Times, January 10, 1969, p. 33.

78Irving Halperin, College English, p. 633.

79Lawrence Davies, "Hayakawa Joined by Union and Chamber in Bid to End Coast College Dispute," The New York Times, January 14, 1969, p. 18.

80Lawrence Davies, "Hayakawa Joined by Union and Chamber in Bid to End Coast College Dispute," The New York Times, January 14, 1969, p. 18. [One purpose of the meeting was to review the approval given the teacher strike by the Central Labor Council. The Council represents members of the American Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations. The teamsters are independent.]

81"Police Curb Pickets At College On Coast," The New York Times, January 16, 1969, p. 41.

82Lawrence Davies, "300 Arrested at San Francisco As Students Clash With Police," The New York Times, January 24, 1969, p. 73.

83"Cyanide Gas Scare At Coast College," The New York Times, January 29, 1969, p. 17.

84Ibid.

85Edwin C. Duerr, Educational Record, p. 129.

86Ibid.

87Lawrence Davies, "Police Disperse Student Pickets At San Francisco and Berkeley," The New York Times, January 31, 1969, p. 18.

88"Hayakawa Critical of Student Aid Law," The New York Times, February 4, 1969, p. 26.

89Wallace Turner, "Hayakawa Offers to Rehire Teachers," The New York Times, February 7, 1969, p. 20. [Throughout the strike, Hayakawa verbally enforced the California State College ruling that teachers absent from their classes for 5 consecutive days without authorization were assumed to have resigned, but the ruling was never enforced by action.]

90"20 in Berkeley Are Held In Clash," The New York Times, February 5, 1969, p. 26.

<sup>91</sup>"Coast Teachers End Strike," The New York Times, February 25, 1969, p. 29.

<sup>92</sup>"Reagan Assails Settlement," The New York Times, February 26, 1969, p. 29.

<sup>93</sup>Meyer M. Cahn, "The 1968-69 San Francisco State College Crisis: A Minority Report," Phi Delta Kappan, 51 (September 1969), p. 24.

<sup>94</sup>"Four Held on Coast," The New York Times, February 15, 1969, p. 16.

<sup>95</sup>"Hayakawa Ousts A Negro Teacher," The New York Times, March 1, 1969, p. 21.

<sup>96</sup>Edwin C. Duerr, Educational Record, p. 130.

<sup>97</sup>Lawrence Davies, "Violent Winter-Long Student Strike is Ended at San Francisco State College," The New York Times, March 21, 1969, p. 31.

<sup>98</sup>Lawrence Davies, "Hayakawa Delays Penalties at San Francisco State," The New York Times, March 21, 1969, p. 31.

<sup>99</sup>"Settlement at S.F.S.C.," Newsweek, March 31, 1969, p. 28.

<sup>100</sup>"Armistice at S.F.S.C.," Time, March 28, 1969, p. 42.

### CHAPTER III

#### CHRONOLOGICAL STATEMENT OF POSITIONS ON CAMPUS GOVERNMENT AND CONTROL TO MARCH 20, 1969

##### Introduction

The intent in this chapter is to determine Hayakawa's positions concerning campus government and control before and during a time in which he was confronted by campus unrest. A judgement, based on a comparison of Hayakawa's position at designated time intervals, was also made in an effort to determine if his position was consistent, or subject to change at periodic intervals.

The data in this chapter was compiled by means of a survey of the Readers Guide To Periodical Literature, from 1968 to 1960, pertaining to all information listed under "Hayakawa, Samuel Ichye," "San Francisco State College," and "Student demonstrations." The New York Times Index, from 1967 to 1970, was also surveyed for information concerned with "Hayakawa, S.I.," and "California State Colleges." Additional supplementary data was gained by the writer through the use of the transcript of a Congressional Hearing, by obtaining copies of public statements and memoranda issued by Hayakawa, and by securing statements made by individuals involved in the turmoil at San Francisco State College. Material clarifying specific events and statements was acquired by the writer through personal correspondence with Hayakawa, and through correspondence with specific persons involved in the conflict at San Francisco State College.

The data used in this chapter was judged to be the most representative of Hayakawa's expressed position concerning each particular subject. This determination was made on the basis of analyzing each statement to see if new ideas were expressed, and if so, did the ideas represent a change in position? In certain cases comments directly pertaining to each subject at the specified time interval were not available in a primary data source, so it was necessary, whenever possible, to determine Hayakawa's position by the inference in his declaration, and by the accounts of his position provided by journalistic writers, faculty, and staff of San Francisco State College.

The chapter is organized according to the functions and processes of government and control enumerated in the introductory chapter. These functions have been divided into six subdivisions: (1) The role of the college president in campus government and control; (2) The use of an external police force in campus government and control; (3) The role of an Academic Senate in campus government and control; (4) The role of, and limitations on, the faculty in campus government and control; (5) The role of, and limitations on, students in campus government and control; (6) The role of a campus judicial system in campus government and control.

All primary and supplementary data was studied to determine the subdivision under which it should be placed. The data was then arranged according to date, from the earliest to the present time, and an attempt was made to determine Hayakawa's expressed position at selected intervals of time up to March 20, 1969. This was done to see if Hayakawa was

consistent in his position or whether he changed, and if he changed, in which of the designated periods the change became evident. A judgement was made concerning consistency of positions. The chosen intervals of time are as follows:

1. Position prior to becoming acting president, [inclusive up to November 25, 1968].

2. Position after becoming acting president, [November 26, 1968, to February 3, 1969].

3. Position during the Congressional Hearing, [February 3, 1969].

4. Position after the Congressional Hearing, [February 4, 1969, to March 20, 1969].

The foregoing time intervals are used in all subdivisions, except that division dealing with the use of external police which has been subdivided into two additional intervals, enabling a more complete analysis of position progression:

Position during Christmas vacation, [December 13, 1968, to January 5, 1969].

Position during post-holiday period, [January 6, 1969, to February 2, 1969].

M.B. Freedman reported in an article in Nation, January 13, 1969, that the president of an urban college is not allowed the realm of power past college presidents have had. Freedman declared;

. . . the presidents domestic complexities are not confined to student, faculty or academic administrators. The president must give heed to campus police, secretaries, dorm residents, business officers, and other non-academic staff.<sup>1</sup>

As has been shown in chapter two, the domestic complexities that confronted Hayakawa were many and varied during the period of time from November 26, 1968, to March 20, 1969.



Hayakawa's Position Concerning the Use  
of External Police in Campus  
Government and Control

Position Prior to Becoming  
Acting President

It is evident in the preceding chapter that external police played an integral part in Hayakawa's attempts to end the student strike at San Francisco State College. This section deals with his position concerning the use of police in campus government and control.

Meyer M. Cahn, a professor at San Francisco State College, wrote in the Phi Delta Kappan that Hayakawa had already begun to speak and write about student unrest and the need for clearer guidelines for the younger generation prior to his becoming acting president.<sup>2</sup> Although no exact statements pertaining to a specific use of police could be found, the following statements possibly indicate his position at that time.

In the June, 1966, issue of ETC: Review of General Semantics, Hayakawa published an article titled "On Communication With Children." A statement in the article foreshadows Hayakawa's later position. "Permissiveness means permitting children to do what they want, up to the point of not creating disturbances for others, or hurting others."<sup>3</sup> Though the statement does specifically refer to children, it is assumed that Hayakawa would probably hold the same position regarding any group.

It was reported in Look magazine, by L. Litwak, a novelist and Associate Professor of English at San Francisco State College, that during the period of time of Dr. Robert Smith's administration [May 30, 1968, to November 25, 1968] Hayakawa was not in favor of suspending instruction for the faculty-student convocation, and implied that

measures should be taken to insure that classes were conducted. He is reported as saying, "No student will interfere with the conduct of my classes."<sup>4</sup> During the same period of time, as reported in U.S. News & World Report, Hayakawa made the following statement.

Students are waiting for us to fulfill our obligation to them. We must not let them down. We must permit no one to disrupt or dismiss our classes.<sup>5</sup>

It is possible to see from the foregoing information that Hayakawa, though having made no statements directly supporting the use of police power, advocated the initiation of measures which would prevent disruption. This assumption is based on the condition that Hayakawa gave no indication of other precautions to be taken to prevent disruption.

#### Initial Statements After Becoming Acting President

Hayakawa established his position concerning the use of a police force shortly after taking office as acting president. A public statement issued by Hayakawa on November 30, 1968, directly referred to the matter of security. Hayakawa pointed out that many people were concerned about their own physical safety, and that their demand for "massive police protection is reasonable and understandable." He further contended:

Many people are sufficiently frightened of disruption and disorder to want a large police force here to protect them. This is particularly true of women in our working staff, secretaries and clerks and administrative personnel, who are often alone in their offices and are genuinely afraid of bands of young men who have been known to roam the corridors during demonstrations and disruptions. Our staff does not have the option open to students of staying home when they are afraid. The women who work here can stay home only at the risk of forfeiting pay.<sup>6</sup>

The Acting President recognized the adverse criticism his action of maintaining police on campus was likely to bring, but defended his position as less likely to result in uncontrollable situations. Failure to have police readily available was considered by Hayakawa to be more of a danger than to have them present on the campus. He contended that:

There are many faculty members and students who sincerely believe that the police have absolutely no business on campus and that academic life is impossible with police around. Allied with these are faculty members and students who are determined to bring campus life to a grinding halt. They want to keep the police away in the beginning, so as to be able to disrupt and terrorize the campus until the police have to be called in. They hope that the police acting to an emergency state will over-react, thereby confirming the conviction that police have no place on campus.<sup>7</sup>

During the same comment of November 30, 1968, Hayakawa seemed to take into account the attitude that many people had toward the police. In doing so, he delineated between various purposes for which police are used. The "raison d'etre of American police and of storm troopers is entirely different." This he explained in the following manner:

The function of storm troopers, like Cossacks, is to suppress dissent, and to diminish individual liberties. The function of American police, who operated on an entirely different kind of legal base, is to protect dissent and to secure us from those who would interfere with our liberties or endanger our lives. Therefore, when Cossacks are brutal, it is because they are well trained. But when American police are brutal, it is because they are not trained well enough.<sup>8</sup>

Thus, to Hayakawa the problem of overreacting and "alleged" brutality on the part of the police was not caused by the police themselves but by the quality of their education and training. He seemed to use this as an additional justification for keeping police on campus. He proposed that "we should have police on campus not only in crisis situations but in daily life."<sup>9</sup> He went on to propose, therefore;

That at San Francisco State College a continuing police training program in criminology, race relations, group dynamics, etc., be available for officers to attend as they come off duty.<sup>10</sup>

The preceding arguments, used by Hayakawa on November 30, 1968, were preliminary to the announcement "that police will be available to the fullest extent necessary to maintain and restore peace when school opens next Monday [December 2, 1968]."<sup>11</sup> From the preceding data, it seems apparent that Hayakawa established and justified his position in the first available statement after assuming office. His position was that police were to be used to maintain and restore peace.

Hayakawa ended the pronouncement with an indication of what to expect if the demonstrators continued their disruptive course of action:

If you treat the police as human beings, they are likely to respond in kind. If you treat them as enemies, loudly and persistently, they can be driven to act as enemies. The choice and the responsibility are yours.<sup>12</sup>

He seemed to be indicating that police action would be directly proportional to strike action, and during later statements reiterated the same position.<sup>13</sup>

Hayakawa was quoted in Time magazine as having said the following about the protection of rights on a college campus:

The relation between teacher and student, the freedom to think and study and discuss, will be protected by all means necessary. The people who cannot live with such a system will have to move on.<sup>14</sup>

This quotation clearly points out that Hayakawa was not likely to back down on his position concerning the use of police.

A Look magazine article reported that during one of the demonstrations shortly after the December 2, 1968, reopening, Hayakawa said,

over the public address system,

This is a warning. All innocent bystanders leave this vicinity. Go to your classes. Go to the library. Leave the troublemakers to the police. Those of you who want trouble, stay there; the police will see that you get it.<sup>15</sup>

The declaration seems to indicate a commitment, on the part of Hayakawa, to use police for maintenance of order. It also implies that Hayakawa was aware of and allowed the actions of the police during the crisis.

On Thursday, December 5, 1968, demonstrators marched to the administration building and tried to enter the office of the president. According to Richard B. Gartrell, author of Crisis Events at San Francisco State College, more than 600 policemen maneuvered the demonstrators off campus.<sup>16</sup> At about this time, according to the New York Times, Hayakawa developed the policy of placing policemen inside major buildings on the central campus. This kept them out of sight and yet readily available.<sup>17</sup>

In response to the events of December 5, 1968, the Acting President announced: "We are going to continue to supply whatever police power is necessary to put down violence."<sup>18</sup> It was reported in a New York Times article that Hayakawa gave the following message over the P.A. system in response to the events of December 5, 1968: "Police have been instructed to clear the campus, there are no innocent bystanders anymore."<sup>19</sup> Here again it is evident that Hayakawa was committed to the position of maintaining order, and that he would use whatever police necessary for that position of order.

The December 8, 1968, issue of the New York Times reported that on December 7, 1968, Hayakawa refused demands to close the school, and

again reiterated that police would continue to be present on campus, if needed to maintain order.<sup>20</sup> In a later issue of the paper, it was disclosed that police had been used as undercover agents in student rallies and strike meetings. Hayakawa is recorded as having made no statements concerning the use of undercover agents during the turmoil.<sup>21</sup>

According to a New York Times editorial, Hayakawa read a statement over the campus public address system on December 13, 1968, the night prior to the early Christmas recess. Hayakawa said his position was unchanged:

Police power must be used, if required, to keep the campus open and classes in operation. This decision confirms the policy of my administration to maintain the instructional process.<sup>22</sup>

Hayakawa's position of December 13, 1968, was that police power should and would be used as a direct response to disruption of academic freedom, preservation of personal safety of San Francisco State College personnel, and protection of property. At the same time he warned that police would carry out their mission and act as they were treated. It can be seen then that the Acting President had no reservation about using any number of police for the purposes enumerated.

#### Statements Made During Christmas Vacation

During the Christmas vacation, new ideas were brought out concerning the use of police. According to an article in America, the Acting President made a statement in late December concerning police actions. He seemed to be answering alleged accusations concerning

police brutality. A similar comment on the same subject [footnote 7] was given in his November 30, 1968, press release. The later statement was as follows:

I don't condone the errors and excesses of the police. I mean, look--suppose the people at San Francisco State College are right, that the tac squad behaved that way. But if they did, it's because they received quasi-military training. That's the only thing they know how to do.<sup>23</sup>

Much of Hayakawa's ideological support came from the Board of Trustees, and Governor Reagan; and because of this the Acting President was probably more dogmatic in his position. It was reported in a New York Times article that Governor Reagan commended the hard line stand taken by Hayakawa. The Governor concurred with the Acting President and said that "police will ring campuses if that's what they must do" to keep the schools running. He indicated that this must be done to protect those who really want an education.<sup>24</sup> This same type of position could be attributed to Hayakawa, since, according to Mrs. Helene Whitson, the Interlibrary Loan Librarian at San Francisco State College, "his rhetoric was similar in wording and position."<sup>25</sup>

It was also reported in the New York Times that Hayakawa was optimistic and believed that the violence that occurred during November and December would not return in January when school resumed. Hayakawa would abide by his position, and added that the police would be called if there were any disruptions.<sup>26</sup>

On Saturday, January 4, 1969, Hayakawa announced his position prior to the school's reopening. According to the New York Times, he warned that the coming days "are likely to be difficult and trying," and said that "there may be a real showdown of opposing forces."



Hayakawa announced, however, that only a few policemen would be called in response to any disturbances:

They would be stationed in various buildings. If disturbances develop, or if the rules just laid down are not obeyed, the large number of policemen that patrolled the campus before vacation will be recalled.<sup>27</sup>

The declaration does constitute a change from the position held on November 30, 1968 [footnote 10], and December 5, 1968 [footnote 17]. At those times he stated that any number of police would be used, but this statement seems to indicate an attempt to minimize the number of police on campus at any given time.

It is also evident that Hayakawa would not hesitate to use any number of police, if necessary, to maintain peace. In this respect it is similar to his November 30, 1968, plea for "massive police protection."

In this period Hayakawa was cognizant of the alleged accusations pertaining to police brutality and attempted to mollify the accusers by saying that responsibility for police intervention rested with the demonstrators, and that a minimum of police would be on the campus initially. However, he again reiterated that he would not hesitate in calling more police on campus if necessary. The January 4, 1969, statement to minimize the number of police on campus reveals a change in Hayakawa's position of November 30, 1968, and December 5, 1968.

#### Statements Made During Post-Holiday Period

Events which occurred during the post-holiday period proved that Hayakawa would act in accordance with his expressed position. On January 4, 1969, Hayakawa addressed a letter to the faculty, students, and



staff of San Francisco State College. This letter was superceded by another letter dated January 6, 1969, pertaining to the same subject matter. On page two of the letter dated January 6, 1969, the Acting President explained his position regarding his intended use of police when school reopened on the sixth:

Some people have maintained that the presence of large numbers of police on the campus is incompatible with an academic environment. In deference to these views we will begin the post-holiday period on January 7, 1969, with no police on the central campus. Some uniformed officers will be stationed in classroom buildings, as they were during the two weeks before the holidays. Some police may be stationed on 19th Avenue or Holloway Avenue to control traffic. But police will not be summoned to the central area of the campus unless the regulations on outdoor activities are flaunted or the safety of people is endangered. The decision as to whether or not there shall be police on campus for the purposes of crowd control, therefore, rests upon the college community. If people behave in a manner appropriate to an academic institution, police will not need to be summoned.<sup>28</sup>

This quotation reaffirmed Hayakawa's November 30, 1968, statement [footnote 11], that the responsibility for police intervention rests with the demonstrators.

An article in the New York Times indicated that student strike leaders planned a demonstration for the morning of January 6, 1969. In response to this proposed action, Hayakawa announced that police "would be brought onto the campus in the morning" if students defied his orders and attempted to proceed with the demonstration.<sup>29</sup> Here again, Hayakawa placed the responsibility for police involvement with the demonstrators as he had done on November 30, 1968, and January 6, 1969. An article in Harpers magazine indicated that sometime after the start of the A.F.T. strike and before the mass arrests on January 23, 1969, Hayakawa reportedly said, "This is a tough neighborhood. The more policemen

I see, the more relieved I feel."<sup>30</sup> Thus he gave credence to his position that any number of police necessary would be used to maintain order.

As of the last week in January, Hayakawa seemed willing to give those people opposed to police intervention a chance to prove that police were not necessary. However, it appears he concluded police would be necessary, and if so he would use them; and, also, that people would be more secure if the police were around. From the previous data, it has been concluded that there was a change in Hayakawa's November 30, 1968, position [footnote 11] and December 5, 1968, position [footnote 18] concerning the number of police to be used at a given time. By January 4, 1969, [footnote 26] his position had changed to one of minimum police presence unless necessary.

#### Statements Given During the Congressional Hearing

On February 3, 1969, Hayakawa appeared before the Special Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Education and Labor of the House of Representatives [hereafter referred to as Congressional Hearing]. The issue about using external police on campus was discussed during the Hearing. In his initial response, Hayakawa justified his position on use of police:

The people who deplore the use of police on campus seem to forget that the first days of this strike saw violence introduced by the students themselves as essential to their plan. The college use of police was a response to violence, not the cause.<sup>31</sup>

An evident position emerging from this statement is that police were to be used as a response to violence. In the same utterance, the Acting President revealed his position on the purpose of police in a democratic

society:

The essential purposes of police in a democratic society is not to suppress our freedoms, but to protect them; and I am glad to say our policemen have acted in just that way, to our great comfort and gratification.<sup>32</sup>

The preceding statement brought out another possible position; that police are necessary to protect personal freedom, and thus one acceptable on a college campus.

After the holiday recess, the number of police on campus did increase, according to the testimony given during the Congressional Hearing.<sup>33</sup> Hayakawa justified his position of increased police support on campus during the month of January by holding that the number of confrontations increased, but that the level of violence decreased. He asserted:

The reason there was relative peace on campus after the A.F.T. strike [January 6, 1969] had started and the A.F.T. mounted its picket line is that we increased the number of police on the central campus. If there was increased peace during the month of January, it is due to the skill and the devotion and the discipline of the San Francisco Police Department.<sup>34</sup>

Further questioning during the Hearing revealed that Hayakawa agreed with the following opinions of his questioner: (1) That there was an escalating number of police-student confrontations, and (2) that the increase in the number of police effectively decreased the amount of violence during the confrontations.<sup>35</sup> It can be reasonably concluded that Hayakawa did use police on the campus as a response to violence, and acted in accordance with his expressed position of January 4, 1969, [footnote 26], and that another facet of this position emerged during this time interval--that police acted as a deterrent to further violence.

On February 3, 1969, Hayakawa again pointed out that his use of police was a response to violence and not a cause, and that police were essential for the protection of freedom. Another reason to justify the use of police came to light during the Hearing, and that was that police acted as an effective deterrent to further disruption. In view of this information, it can be concluded that Hayakawa maintained the same position concerning the use of police that he had during the two previous time intervals, but an added justification for his position did develop --that police can act as an effective deterrent to possible violence.

#### Statements Given After the Congressional Hearing

In early February, Hayakawa differed with the positions held by some other college presidents regarding the use of external police on campus. Shortly after the Congressional Hearing, he appeared on the television program, Face the Nation. The following comment, reported in New Republic and given during the program, indicates the differentiation from the other college presidents. It concurs with an article in Time, dated July 18, 1969.

At most institutions the use of police is delayed as long as possible and when assistance is finally requested, the force is usually too small to handle the situation and new troubles develop. I went the other way. I had ample force available and demonstrated a willingness to use it quickly to protect people and property from attack. The opposition has received my message. I think I have communicated successfully.<sup>36</sup>

Here again, as is consistent with earlier statements, Hayakawa implied that he was willing to use any number of police necessary in response to violence and also as a deterrent to expected violence.

As reported in the Bulletin Of Atomic Science, Hayakawa made the following declaration during the faculty convocation on February 14, 1969, in response to various individuals who said they would not settle down until Hayakawa called the police off campus. Hayakawa said: "The police will not be removed from this place as long as you are around. Why are there police? Because of you, Mr. Hare! I order you to sit down."<sup>37</sup> This seems to add further credence to his position that police are used as a response to violence, and their use acts as a deterrent.

A U.S. News & World Report interview with the Acting President on February 24, 1969, provided a possible justification for Hayakawa's position of maintaining police on campus. He said:

We have no defense against inclassroom disruption because it has not happened before. Lacking any other resources, what I have done is rely upon the police ever since I became acting president.<sup>38</sup>

The preceding utterance provides support for the contention that Hayakawa's position concerning the use of police did not change, since it was issued two months after he assumed the office of acting president. In the same interview, Hayakawa also discussed his action of placing policemen inside buildings. He said the move was a defense against in-classroom disruption [footnote 37].

First, I stationed the police in each building, so all the disorder was eliminated from the buildings of the central campus. Then later we drove the hoodlums off the central campus and into the streets. And that is where they were when last seen.<sup>39</sup>

Thus the police force did act as a deterrent to possible violence, and justified Hayakawa's position concerning the use of external police on

campus. It can be reasonably concluded that Hayakawa initiated this procedure shortly after assuming office, since it was reported in a New York Times article dated December 6, 1968 [footnote 16]; and Hayakawa specifically referred to keeping police in buildings [footnote 27] since the beginning of December.

According to an article in Newsweek, it seems evident that Hayakawa was clear in his position concerning the use of force in response to disruption, and the maintenance of order. The following comment was probably given shortly after the A.F.T. strike ended on February 24, 1969:

Whether you protect the liberty of white people or the liberty of black people, you ultimately have to use force. And I, for one, am not going to hesitate to use it.<sup>40</sup>

A similar assertion given at approximately the same time was also reported in Newsweek: "I have not hesitated to use any number of cops necessary to protect the civil rights of the majority."<sup>41</sup> Both of the above positions are consistent with the statement of November 30, 1968 [footnote 11].

As reported in a New York Times editorial, Hayakawa announced on April 13, 1969, that he was withdrawing emergency regulations from San Francisco State College. He expected it to return to normal.<sup>42</sup>

By the end of the student strike, the Acting President indicated that he had at no time hesitated in using police to protect people and property, and that he considered police to act as a deterrent to expected violence. He seemed consistent in his expressed positions that any number of police necessary would be called, and that even though he differed from most of his colleagues in this respect, he was not about

to change his position.

Recapitulation of Hayakawa's Position  
Concerning the Role of External  
Police in Campus Government  
and Control

Hayakawa's position at the end of each time interval can be summarized as follows:

1. Prior to assuming office on November 25, 1968, Hayakawa's position was that measures must be taken to insure the continuation of the instructional process, and the use of police was considered a reasonable measure to insure that end.

2. From November 26, 1968, to February 2, 1969, Hayakawa contended that any number of police necessary would be used to (a) maintain the instructional process, and (b) quell violence. This position was maintained by Hayakawa even in view of the alleged accusations concerning police brutality. He acknowledged the possibility of police brutality and placed some of the blame on demonstrators and the American society.

3. By the time of the Congressional Hearing, Hayakawa still used police to (a) maintain the instructional process, (b) quell violence, and (c) act as a deterrent to expected violence. He maintained that police would still be used in any number necessary. Hayakawa changed his position in one regard during this time interval. He attempted to minimize the number of police on campus at any given moment, but stated that they would be brought back on campus in force, if necessary.

4. During the period of time from February 4, 1969, to March 20, 1969, Hayakawa demonstrated a willingness to use police quickly and in force, and reiterated his idea of placing police in buildings to prevent disruption. He said that use of police was necessary to protect freedom and he would not hesitate in that respect.

Hayakawa's Position Concerning The Role of a  
College President in Campus Government  
and Control

Position Prior to Becoming  
Acting President

A partial indication of Hayakawa's position concerning the role



of a college president in campus government and control is his lack of comment on the subject, which could be construed to mean that he was not aware of the role of a college president, since he had never been one, or that he did not have a definite position on the role of the president. A statement which supports the above contention is from one of the papers of the "Faculty Renaissance," a conservative group of faculty members from San Francisco State College. Dr. Meyer Cahn, a professor of Higher Education at the school stated that Hayakawa wrote the position paper for the organization.<sup>43</sup> Mrs. Helene Whitson, Interlibrary Loan Librarian, confirmed that Hayakawa wrote the article, probably before taking office as acting president. The position paper was published in January of 1969.<sup>44</sup> Even though it was issued after Hayakawa assumed office, because of the earlier composition date, it can be considered a reasonable indication of Hayakawa's position prior to taking office. In the statement from the paper, Hayakawa discussed the relationship between the various segments of the college community, but no mention was made of the college president.

Plans for a strike are being made by only a small minority of students and A.F.T. faculty who wish to gain the powers that duly belong to the Academic Senate, total faculty, and other official groups charged with the responsibilities of guiding the destiny of the educational processes at San Francisco State.<sup>45</sup>

The writer feels that since Hayakawa was only a faculty member at the time, he would generally use the word faculty before the word president in any of his statements; but it is clear that Hayakawa did provide the faculty, and the group that represents the faculty, the Academic Senate, with the power to guide the educational process. It is



also evident that he did not embody the president with the same power. So Hayakawa's position as of this interim in time is concerned with the faculty role more so than the role of the president, probably due to an unfamiliarity with presidential responsibilities. There is also a possibility that he held the faculty role to be superior to the presidential role.

#### Initial Statements After Becoming Acting President

An article in Newsweek magazine, which discussed the incident involving the sound truck at San Francisco State College on Monday, December 2, 1968, credited Hayakawa with the following statement: "I want to make it clear to everyone, that I will break up this reign of terror."<sup>46</sup> When he said this, there was no doubt that he was speaking from the position of acting president. It is evident from the preceding statement that Hayakawa has shifted his position concerning exercising of control from that of the faculty to the president; and it can possibly be attributed to the fact that Hayakawa was looking at it from the president's viewpoint, and no longer that of the faculty.

Evidence to support the idea of a position change can be seen in the following statement issued by Hayakawa on December 6, 1968.

The conclusions arrived at by the Deans and the Academic Senate preserve the power and limitations of the president, Deans, and Department Heads as laid down by the rules under which we operate. . .<sup>47</sup>

Hayakawa has switched his basis of argument from the faculty to the administrative structure [president, deans, and department heads.]. A discussion of this position as it affects the Academic Senate and

faculty will be handled in those respective sections.

One month later, Hayakawa addressed a letter to the faculty, students, and staff of San Francisco State College. A portion of the letter dealt with disciplinary procedures resulting from past demonstrations. It indirectly dealt with the rights and responsibilities of the college president in dealing with disciplinary procedures. He stated:

I am working out with the Academic Senate a procedure to handle the disciplinary cases which resulted from past demonstrations. However, if further violence occurs, I shall be forced to use section 41303 of Title 5 of the California Administrative Code. The code states that at the discretion of the president, a student may be suspended or dismissed. If violence is renewed, I shall be compelled to use this discretion.<sup>48</sup>

This statement seems to indicate another change in his position, to one of more centralized control. What Hayakawa appears to be saying is that the procedures for handling this problem do not work to his satisfaction under the present conditions. Thus, he, as president, has the right to take measures which will insure a more responsive disciplinary system. Discussion of the disciplinary system will be handled in a later section.

It must be noted that Hayakawa was in effect saying that if other procedures failed to work, then he, as acting president with delegated presidential power, had the authority of summary dismissal or suspension of students. The responsibility of summary dismissal and suspension has usually been left to the disciplinary process.

By this time, it is evident Hayakawa had shifted his position from a faculty orientation to a presidential orientation, and finally to a stronger presidential role in control of the university if necessary.

Statements made During the  
Congressional Hearing

While appearing before the Congressional Hearing on February 3, 1969, Hayakawa responded to several questions pertaining to the role and responsibility of a college president. When asked a question concerning the right of the college president to negotiate with students, he replied as follows:

\* \* \* In fact, one of the functions of the presidency is to hear just that kind of demand [Demands pertaining to curricula, student programs, and so on] and that kind of complaint and to try to organize a structure of personnel and so on to meet those legitimate requests.<sup>49</sup>

The essential meaning of Hayakawa's statement is that the president has the responsibility of putting together a group of personnel responsive to the needs of the students. It seems to be implied that Hayakawa would allow the college personnel a certain amount of autonomy in this regard.

The following quotation seems to point out that the role of the president goes beyond the responsibility of organizing the structure, and the president is capable of determining the makeup of the structure. Here again there is a definite change of position, with more power being placed with the president. When asked a question concerning the relationship of the administration and the faculty, and the right of the president to control the hiring of a teacher by an individual department, Hayakawa responded:

This action [the hiring of George Murray by the English department] took place before I became president. I think he [the president] does have control. In a technical sense, he would have, but in the hiring of a part-time English instructor for something like remedial courses, he would not under ordinary circumstances go over each individual case.

In this particular case, since the individual involved was so notorious and well known and so controversial, it would seem to me- [sic] I was horrified that the English Department had hired him.<sup>50</sup>

Hayakawa gives evidence in the preceding comment that if he had been president at the time of the hiring of George Murray, he would not have allowed the English department to hire him.

The Acting President was also questioned about the source of final authority in the college. In response to the question "Where do we get the source of final authority?", Hayakawa responded:

This is a puzzling question, sir. Actually, speaking strictly legalistically, the final authority should be vested in the president who in turn is backed up by the chancellor and board of trustees.<sup>51</sup>

This statement differs from the one issued two months earlier, prior to Hayakawa's becoming acting president. Hayakawa has now switched his position of power vested in the faculty and Academic Senate to the power vested in the president.

Under further questioning on the problem of final authority, Hayakawa seemed to conclude that presidential authority had been delegated to the university community, and because of this it was not easy to control dissident students.<sup>52</sup> He further clarified this position by stating:

There are a number of ways by means of which what should be the proper delegation of the presidential authority to the various bodies becomes ultimately the formation of strong bodies standing in the way of the president doing anything he wants to get done.<sup>53</sup>

This was the earliest available data concerning delegation of power from the president to various college groups. It indicates that Hayakawa did believe the president should have final authority, and that authority

should come from the president and go down. It also points out, as evident in the last two lines, that Hayakawa viewed the president as having nearly unlimited powers over the college.

Hayakawa's answers about the source of authority were not clear to all members on the hearing committee. He was again asked, "To whom do you look for this source of authority? You, yourself? Do you look to the trustees?" Hayakawa responded, "Well, the trustees, by appointing me president gave me authority---", but he did not indicate the amount of authority that he was given. A further question, "have they?", brought the following response:

They have given me an enormous amount of authority. But also my predecessors as president have delegated some of that authority to various bodies around the campus. I can't snatch it back again without upsetting certain routines that are well established. I would prefer to see those bodies such as the Academic Senate more responsive to the president than they are now.

So I would like to reestablish the presidential authority and the presidential delegation of powers in such a way as not to offend people, upset people, [sic] create an internal revolution.

I would like to see a gradual move back to a more acceptable administrative structure.<sup>54</sup>

This is further evidence of Hayakawa's dissatisfaction with the role of the college president at that time, and his desire for a more acceptable administrative structure, which is construed to mean one that would not block the president in attempting to initiate his policies.

By February 3, 1969, Hayakawa's position exhibited two definite changes. The first major change came after becoming acting president. If the estimate of his pre-presidential position is correct, the emphasis had switched from faculty and faculty groups to that of the president. From that point on, his position change was one of degree,

always calling for more power to be vested in the president.

### Statements Given After the Congressional Hearing

U.S. News & World Report conducted an interview with Hayakawa sometime after December 28, 1968, but prior to February 14, 1969. The nature of the comment seems to indicate that it was made after February 3, 1969. It provides an indication of Hayakawa's position, as of that date, regarding the role of the president. He was asked, "What are some of the things that colleges ought to be doing to fend off these attacks on academic freedom?" He stated:

First we need firmer administration and a facing of the fact that universities don't run themselves. There must be a clearly understood network of obligation that relates instructors, professors, department heads and administrators to each other.<sup>55</sup>

Here again, it is evident that a "firmer administration" was really a call for more presidential authority. Note the use of the word "obligation," whereas in the statement issued prior to November 26, 1968, concerning the same matter, it was "responsibility".

In a press statement dated February 14, 1969, issued through On The Record, an official publication of San Francisco State College, Office of Information, Hayakawa further commented on the role of a college president. According to him, the president is the "symbol of the university" to the outside community. The president is also:

. . . a servant responding to policies established by the faculty and to the wishes expressed by staff and students. In a sense somewhat different from that intended by those who first used the term about me, I am the puppet--the creature of your collective aims as a faculty and student-body. I am proud to serve in this capacity. But I realize too that this position is not an easy one, since it involves synthesizing and making a common purpose out of desperate and sometimes conflicting goals.<sup>56</sup>

This position is not consistent with what Hayakawa had been expressing. He had persistently expressed a desire for more presidential authority, and had held that final authority rested with the president. But the preceding comment indicates that the president receives his authority from the faculty and responds to the wishes of the staff and students. Authority resting with the college president and having the president respond to the policies of the faculty do not seem to be mutually compatible. One cannot be a puppet and a puppeteer at the same time.

During the same press release, Hayakawa brought up the problem of lines of communication in the college. He recognized that communication during periods of turmoil is difficult, but held that it is also necessary. It can be concluded that Hayakawa did view the role of the president as functioning to allow the other segments of the college to interact. This idea is contrary to his earlier view of centralized power. In this instance he said:

It is exceedingly difficult to establish all the channels of communication that this college should have. My personal approach will depend on the amount of time I can find to initiate plans for regularly scheduled meetings with faculty members, by schools, by departments, by special interest groups and individually. I plan to meet personally with as many individuals and groups as time and energy will permit. In addition, I will work through the printed medium to establish some kind of forum for a free and equal exchange of ideas among all segments of our campus community.<sup>57</sup>

The preceding quotation indicates that Hayakawa was concerned about the relationship of the communication between the various segments of the college. He attempted to facilitate use of the channels of communication which he discussed in the announcement dated February 14, 1969, between himself, as acting president, and the college



community. He stated:

In order to keep me informed about the many-faceted interests of this faculty, I would be grateful if you would send me copies of department memoranda describing things you are doing. Please invite me to meetings of your department when you have important and exciting things to discuss. Let me repeat what I said before, that San Francisco State College is an education institution, and one of the people it needs to educate most is its president. Please continue my education.<sup>58</sup>

In the same statement, he gave an indication of what he considered to be rightly presidential responsibility:

The president cannot delegate final authority in student disciplinary matters. This happens to be a trustee rule, but I would support the idea even if it was optional.<sup>59</sup>

During this interval of time, it is clear that Hayakawa was not consistent in his position concerning the role of the president. His expressed opinion about needing more presidential authority and the idea that the president is the servant of the faculty and students do not appear to be traits that can co-exist.

#### Recapitulation of Hayakawa's Position Concerning the Role of a College President in Campus Government and Control

Hayakawa's position(s) during each time interval under consideration in this study can be summarized as follows:

1. Hayakawa's apparent emphasis on campus government and control, prior to assuming office, was on the faculty role and not that of the president. It is also possible that he held the faculty role to be superior to the role of the president. Hayakawa's concern with the faculty role, more so than the presidential role, was probably due to an unfamiliarity with presidential responsibilities.

2. During the period of time from November 26, 1968, to February 2, 1969, Hayakawa evidently shifted his position from a faculty orientation to a presidential orientation, and finally



to a stronger presidential role in control of the university if necessary.

3. By the time of the Congressional Hearing, Hayakawa's position had undergone two changes, if the estimate of his pre-presidential position is correct. The emphasis had switched from faculty and faculty groups to that of the president. He considered the president as having the responsibility of putting together a group of personnel responsive to the needs of the students. From that point on, his position change was one of degree, always calling for more power to be vested in the president.

4. During the period of time from February 4, 1969, to March 20, 1969, Hayakawa seemed to be consistent with his earlier position in one regard: the desire for a "firmer administration" or more presidential authority. However, Hayakawa contradicted himself in this position. He had persistently pointed out that final authority rested with the president, but on February 14, 1969, he stated that the president was a servant to the policies of the faculty. This is a position incompatible with the idea of complete presidential authority and a move back to a more centralized administrative structure.

Hayakawa's Position Concerning the Role of an  
Academic Senate in Campus  
Government and Control

Position Prior to Becoming  
Acting President

The only available comment issued by Hayakawa prior to becoming acting president, which specifically refers to the Academic Senate, was part of the position paper of the "Faculty Renaissance" discussed in the section dealing with the role of the president in campus government and control. In the paper, Hayakawa pointed out that the Academic Senate had the responsibility of guiding the educational processes of the university. It seems that Hayakawa, at that time, viewed the Academic Senate as being the major formulator of college policies.

Meyer M. Cahn pointed out that Hayakawa had begun to speak about stricter guidelines for the younger generation prior to his appointment

as acting president.<sup>60</sup> It is assumed then that he was probably concerned about the role the Academic Senate was taking in the development of a new disciplinary system for San Francisco State College. A statement revealing a probable dissatisfaction with the Academic Senate was issued on March 21, 1969. Hayakawa qualified it by saying that the position had been his since prior to becoming acting president: "I hope that the previous reluctance of the Academic Senate is behind us."<sup>61</sup> Hayakawa was referring to the reluctance of the Academic Senate to initiate policies favored by him.

Alan C. Wolstencroft, Academic Senate representative for the San Francisco State College Library, summarized the viewpoint of the Academic Senate about its relationship to the university president; thus he provided additional information on what role, if any, the Academic Senate should play in campus government and control. This statement, taken from a microfilm provided through interlibrary loan, was made by Wolstencroft prior to Hayakawa's appointment as acting president:

Much of the meeting was taken up with the discussion as to whom the senate must follow--the faculty who elected them and whose decisions they must obey, or the president of the college.

Much of the senate felt that we the Academic Senate must obey the faculties wishes, with the strong provision that it still support the president.<sup>62</sup>

Since Hayakawa was a faculty member at the time, and no evidence exists to the contrary, it is possible that his position was similar to the one stated above. If this is the case, then one of the roles of the Academic Senate, as he viewed it, was to represent the faculty, and to advise the president on its policies. If Hayakawa's position was similar to the one expressed by Wolstencroft, then apparently he did consider the

Academic Senate as having responsibility in formulating college policies, and that it should take a more responsive role in the development of an adequate disciplinary system. It is also probable that Hayakawa viewed the Academic Senate as responsible to the faculty, but that it had a dual responsibility in supporting the president.

#### Initial Statements After Becoming Acting President

Hayakawa's position became more clear and concise after November 25, 1968, concerning the role of the Academic Senate in campus government and control. On December 6, 1968, Hayakawa discussed the idea that the administration, along with the Academic Senate, could meet six of the fifteen demands. His inclusion of the Academic Senate in negotiating with the student strikers gives an indication of his position concerning the role of that group in campus government and control. He stated:

I hope the Academic Senate's executive committee agrees that communication has already begun. I shall work closely with the senate and the faculty as well as with my administrative colleagues to elaborate details of implementation which are necessary to fully realize the developments stated today.<sup>63</sup>

Even though Hayakawa did include the Academic Senate in this process, not much was said about the type of role that it was to play. No indication was found as to whether Hayakawa considered it as a body to carry out his wishes.

According to a Master of Arts thesis written by Kris K. McClusky, a graduate student at San Francisco State College, Hayakawa endorsed the position of the Academic Senate on implementation of certain of the 15 demands.<sup>64</sup> In the public statement dated December 6, 1968,

the Acting President said:

The conclusions arrived at by the deans and the Academic Senate, in which I concur, preserve the powers and limitations of the president, deans, and department heads as laid down by the rules under which we operate, and which experience has taught us to respect.<sup>65</sup>

From this information, it seems probable that Hayakawa did consider the Academic Senate as having a self-determinant role in campus government and control. The declaration further reveals that the Academic Senate probably does have jurisdiction over internal campus policy.

An announcement dated December 13, 1968, provided another view of Hayakawa's position concerning the role of an Academic Senate in campus affairs.

I would like to announce that upon the unanimous recommendation of the Council of Academic Deans and the Executive Committee of the Academic Senate, I have today revised the official college calendar as follows.

Let me add, in clarification of the foregoing announcement of the Council of Academic Deans and the Executive Committee of the Academic Senate, that this decision confirms the policy of my administration to maintain the instructional process.<sup>66</sup>

It seems reasonable to conclude, from the foregoing data, that Hayakawa did consider the Council of Academic Deans and the Executive Committee of the Academic Senate to have some kind of power in campus government and control. Hayakawa's position probably was that the Academic Senate was responsible for some part of the decision making process in campus government and control. It also supports the position that the Academic Senate has an advisory function to the president, in addition to its other functions.

Hayakawa's position during the period of time from November 26, 1968, to February 2, 1969, is that the Academic Senate did play a role

in campus government and control. It seems probable from the foregoing data that he still considered the Academic Senate, which had a function of advising the president on its intended policies, as representative of the faculty. However, lacking evidence to the contrary, it is assumed that he wanted the Academic Senate to be more responsive to the president in setting up an acceptable disciplinary process. It is also evident from the preceding information that Hayakawa did consider the Executive committee of the Academic Senate to have some kind of power in campus government and control, but this power was not specified.

#### Statements Made During the Congressional Hearing

By the time of the Congressional Hearing on February 3, 1969, Hayakawa spoke more critically of the Academic Senate and of its responsiveness to the college president than he had two months earlier. This critical evaluation could possibly be due to the fact that as a president he dealt with the Academic Senate more than he did as a faculty member. His position was:

I don't want to bypass the members of the Academic Senate if I can help it, but if they are not going to show an adequate sense of urgency about this problem, the student strike, I may have to execute procedures independent of their advice.<sup>67</sup>

It is clear that Hayakawa was concerned and upset about the actions of the Academic Senate in response to the student demonstrations. He also pointed out that he felt that one of the functions of the Academic Senate was to advise the president, which is similar to his position during the previous time interval. It is also quite clear that he considered the president as being able to overrule the Academic Senate and

indicated that he might do so. This appears to foreshadow a position change. Prior to this date, Hayakawa spoke of the relationship between the senate and the president as one of presidential concurrence of senate action; but now the senate has been placed in an advisory capacity, which does not seem to be the same as an action capacity.

Hayakawa seemed to imply during the Congressional Hearing that the Academic Senate, as it was constituted at the time, acted as a hindrance to the president [footnote 52] in carrying out those procedures he deemed necessary to campus government and control. In the same remark he also pointed out that the authority vested in the Academic Senate was by delegation of presidential authority.<sup>68</sup> This seems to be in direct contradiction to the position probably held by Hayakawa during the two previous time intervals, that the Academic Senate represented, and received its authority from, the university faculty. It can also be viewed as support for Hayakawa's position that the role of the Academic Senate is mainly advisory.

Another response indicative of Hayakawa's position in regard to the Academic Senate is as follows:

The Academic Senate has been fairly busily occupied for the last several years, as far as I can see, in trying to limit as much as possible the powers and prerogatives of the president.<sup>69</sup>

He also stated the following in response to a question concerning relinquishing of authority by the Academic Senate:

In the particular instance I speak of--that is, the Academic Senate--it has been pretty well-well [sic], the majority in the Academic Senate for the past few years has been antipresident. That has been their basic platform.<sup>70</sup>

This data supports the contention that if Hayakawa had not made a change

in position, he was at least not consistent in his position. Hayakawa appears to believe that the Academic Senate had a self-determinant role in campus government and control, but only if it agreed with the position of the president. If it acts contrary to his wishes, then he no longer supports its role in that area. The Acting President implied that he would like to see measures taken to insure an Academic Senate which would act in accordance with the president's position. He believed this could be accomplished by electing pro-president senate members.

The Acting President did discuss the value of a working relationship between himself and the Academic Senate, but he considered this relationship to be valid only if the senate was responsive to his wishes:

I [Hayakawa] myself have not been disposed to fight the Academic Senate. I want to cooperate with them in any way possible. In order to cooperate with them and let them set up an adequate student discipline, I have negotiated and negotiated, and delayed carrying out what I thought were necessary actions. It is only if the Academic Senate proves totally recalcitrant and produces an academic discipline system that is totally unworkable that I shall move <sup>71</sup>in on my own and set up a different one that is more efficient.

This quotation is further evidence that Hayakawa was inconsistent with his earlier position of December 13, 1968. He again pointed out that the senate has a role in campus government and control, but only if it responds to the wishes of the president. If it does not respond and act as he wishes, then he can and will usurp the role of the Academic Senate, thus neutralizing its role in campus government and control.

Two concise comments by Hayakawa reveal his position concerning the role of the Academic Senate, and also the relationship of the

president to that role. The comments are as follows:

They [the Academic Senate] cannot in themselves set the policy of the university, but there are all sorts of details of how to run the college from day to day about which they can make very important decisions.<sup>72</sup>

I have said repeatedly to the Academic Senate, I would like to be the servant of the Academic Senate in the sense that I would like to carry out their wishes; but up to this point many of their wishes are things I couldn't carry out because I felt them to be destructive to the school as a whole.<sup>73</sup>

The first pronouncement reveals a basic change in Hayakawa's position from the one he held prior to becoming acting president. In that statement, he considered the Academic Senate as having the power of internal policy making for the university. The present statement negates that position, and relegates the Academic Senate to making minor decisions.

The second statement seems to support the contention that during the previous two time intervals, Hayakawa considered the Academic Senate to possess the right of authority in determining internal policy, but due to the present senate makeup, he was not capable of maintaining that same position. This lends further credence to the assumption that he changed his position by February 3, 1969.

It seems reasonable to conclude that by the time of the Congressional Hearing, Hayakawa had changed his position by degree, and was inconsistent in defending that position. It was probably a natural response to desire more authority in the position of acting president, but he was inconsistent in accepting only senate actions in harmony with his position, and disregarding their actions contrary to his position. Patrick F. McGillivray, and Worth S. Summer, support this contention in



the book Academia On the Line, but they point out that Hayakawa "began his rule--and continued it--by substantially ignoring the Academic Senate and any resolutions it produced."<sup>74</sup> By February 3, 1969, it is possible to see that Hayakawa was stressing the advisory function of the Academic Senate and not its self-determinant role in campus government and control.

#### Statements Given After the Congressional Hearing

During a press statement issued through On The Record, dated February 14, 1969, Hayakawa provided another glimpse of his position regarding the role of the Academic Senate.

I want very much to work toward accord with the Academic Senate in the establishment of the permanent procedures that meet all of the requirements of our campus and the regulations of the trustees.<sup>75</sup>

This comment reveals that Hayakawa probably considered the role of the Academic Senate in campus government and control to be important, and that his degree of change was probably only an inconsistency in position.

Immediately after the student strike ended, and an agreement had been reached between the student demonstrators and the select committee representing the administration, Hayakawa made a statement concerning the agreement:

I want to thank the many other members of the academic community, especially the Council of Academic Deans, who have done so much of the basic planning for our academic future--planning which has formed the basis for the agreement between students and the select committee.<sup>76</sup>

It is interesting to note that Hayakawa did not include the Academic

Senate in this quotation. It could mean two things: one, that the Council of Academic Deans and the Academic Senate are related, and if so, Hayakawa was again expressing a position consistent with the one he held prior to February 3, 1969. This position did allow the Academic Senate a role in determining college policy for the future; two, that Hayakawa did not consider the Academic Senate to have a self-determinant role, but only one of advising the president. This latter possibility is similar to his position during the Congressional Hearing. From the preceding information it is assumed that Hayakawa probably did consider the Council of Academic Deans and the Academic Senate as being similar; thus the Academic Senate would have a role in campus government and control.

#### Recapitulation of Hayakawa's Position Concerning the Role of an Academic Senate in Campus Government and Control.

1. Prior to assuming office, Hayakawa apparently did consider the Academic Senate to have some responsibility in formulating college policies relating to campus government and control. However, he was probably concerned about the views taken by the Academic Senate, and wished their actions were more in line with his own position. In addition, he wanted the Academic Senate to take a more responsive role in devising an adequate judicial system. He considered the Academic Senate as representative of the faculty, but felt it should also support the president.

2. During the period of time from November 26, 1968, to February 3, 1969, Hayakawa did consider the Academic Senate as representative of the faculty, with an additional function of advising the president. He also considered the Academic Senate as having a major role in campus government and control, but wanted it to take a more responsive role in setting up an adequate disciplinary system.

3. By the time of the Congressional Hearing on February 3, 1969, Hayakawa had changed his position and was inconsistent

in defending it. He now considered the role of the Academic Senate as solely advising the president, whereas in previous periods it seemed to be one of mutual cooperation. Hayakawa seemed willing to allow the Academic Senate to have a role in campus government and control only if its views were in accordance with his position.

4. After the Congressional Hearing, Hayakawa seemed to move back toward his previous position. He considered the Council of Academic Deans and the Academic Senate to be similar in responsibility toward campus government and control. However, he probably only allowed it this right as long as its views were consistent with his position.

Hayakawa's Position Concerning the Role of  
and Limitations on Students in Campus  
Government and Control.

Comments Made Prior to Becoming  
Acting President

It seems apparent, from the nature of the student strike at San Francisco State College, that Hayakawa would be concerned about the role of and limitations on students in campus government and control. Jerry Pederson, author of an article published in Lutheran Quarterly, commented on the characteristics that were involved in the turmoil at San Francisco State College. It is probable that Hayakawa's position toward the student government leadership at the school was quite similar. Pederson stated:

By the beginning of the 1968 academic year, it was evident that the student government had come to represent the aggressive community action groups more than the indifferent general student body.<sup>77</sup>

Mervin B. Freedman contended, in an article in Nation, that:

A president must find a suitable way for students to participate in the operation of the institution. Only then will students assume the responsibility. Given the nature of campus government, which has grown by accretion, this is no easy task.<sup>78</sup>

Hayakawa probably considered the student body leadership at that time to be representative of the activist, left-wing ideology, since it had been active in the student strike from the beginning, [November 6, 1968] and he had been able, as a faculty member, to observe the strike.

Hayakawa made various comments which gave an indication of his position concerning the role of and limitations on students and/or student groups in the functioning of a college. One comment pertaining to students was briefly discussed in the section dealing with the use of an external police force. Sometime during the period of Dr. Robert Smith's administration [May 30, 1968, to November 25, 1968], Hayakawa declared "no students would interfere with the conduct of my classes."<sup>79</sup> This announcement is possibly reflective of his position that student influence on class proceedings was beyond the rights of students. He probably believed that students were in the college to learn from the instructor, not tell the instructor how to teach the subject.

A December, 1968, article in Time revealed Hayakawa's attitude toward dissenters prior to becoming acting president of San Francisco State College. It was reported that he "castigated" Berkeley's promoters of the free speech movement. He is reported to have said, "They [the demonstrators] defy authority, yet when punitive action is threatened they holler for amnesty. They want to be martyrs without martyrdom."<sup>80</sup> In other words they want privilege without responsibility. The aspect of privilege without responsibility was a recurring theme in Hayakawa's later statements.<sup>81</sup>

It was reported in a July 18, 1969, edition of Time that Hayakawa reacted strongly to student strikers even before becoming acting

president. He urged the faculty to fight back and not allow the students to disrupt the normal operation of the university.<sup>82</sup> In other words, he felt that the students had overstepped their bounds by assuming a role which did not rightfully belong to them.

In an article in ETC: Review of General Semantics, December, 1963, Hayakawa foretold of the idea of student activism and explained a consequence. He stated:

It is deeply significant that so many young people are at the heart of the current racial demonstrations. Teenagers by the hundreds have been hustled off to jail by the Southern police--and they are singing and cheering as they go! Some Northern editorialists have asserted angrily that these young people are being exploited and used by unscrupulous Negro leaders to propagandize their demands. It still hasn't occurred to them that Negro leaders are not leading anyone any more. They are merely breathlessly trying to keep up with the revolutionary fervor of the young people.<sup>83</sup>

Hayakawa could be advocating the inclusion of younger people in processes previously open only to the older age groups, and in this way the younger generation could be kept track of, or some level of control could be maintained over their actions. This idea, applied to the university situation, would mean the involvement of students in campus government and control so they could be watched and, if necessary, limited in actions.

ETC: Review of General Semantics, September, 1966, provided another view by Hayakawa in which he again brought up the aspect of responsibility:

New left leaders [It is assumed that Hayakawa is referring to students.] adroitly escape power and therefore responsibility by refusing to enter into alliances or coalitions, which they term as making deals or selling out.

Standing on their ideological purity they prefer the blazing rhetoric of moral denunciation.<sup>84</sup>

It can be seen from the previous comments that the idea of responsibility, and of assuming that responsibility was important to Hayakawa.

As pointed out in chapter two, the evident reason for the student strike at San Francisco State College was to establish a Black Studies Department, which was officially organized on November 4, 1968. As reported in U.S. News & World Report, Hayakawa made the following statement before assuming the position of acting president. "Black students are again disrupting the campus. A significant number of whites, including faculty members, condone and even defend this maneuver."<sup>85</sup> Hayakawa was probably in favor of the establishment of a Black Studies Department, but the quotation indicates that he did not condone disruption, or the support of disruption on the part of anyone, whether they be black or white, student, faculty or staff.

In another article published in ETC: Review of General Semantics, Hayakawa proposed another possible reason for the actions of student activists.

The militancy of young people, both white and black, eager for social change is often accounted for by saying that they have lost faith in the slow processes of democratic discussion and decision making. This argument seems to me highly questionable. It is my impression that militant young people, far from being disillusioned with democratic processes, are totally unacquainted with them.<sup>86</sup>

He continued his argument with the following example.

The unfamiliarity of young people with democratic processes is illustrated by the history of the "teach-in." The original idea was that teachers of every shade of opinion about the war in Vietnam would give their views. The original idea was never given a chance. The proposal of the teach-in as debate was scuttled by the youthful organizers [and the middle aged adolescents who were their faculty advisors] in favor of the teach-in as demonstration.<sup>87</sup>

These comments, plus the one given earlier about racial demonstrations [footnote 83], possibly point out that Hayakawa believed the younger generation [to include students] was incapable, under the present political and academic structure, of constructive discussion. It is highly probable that their tactics at that time were all that could be expected, according to Hayakawa, but that does not mean they had to be allowed.

It is assumed that whenever Hayakawa referred to young people, he meant students, since they made up the group that he was most familiar with. It is acknowledged that students and dissenters are not necessarily the same, but Hayakawa did consider those individuals that represent the students [student government leaders] as supporting the dissenters.

Hayakawa's position before assuming office on November 25, 1968, was probably one of concern that the students, not familiar with the democratic processes and procedures that the college used, would get out of hand. He realized that the expressed reason for the disruption was a racial issue, but still he could not condone the present actions, or even condone the actions of those supporting the strikers. The students had overstepped their role in the college by disrupting classes and they should be stopped.

#### Initial Statements After Becoming Acting President

Hayakawa's comments during this time interval show a determined effort to effectively neutralize student pressure. This must be construed as a de-emphasis on the student role, and an attempt to limit

the student role in campus government and control.

A New York Times editorial, dated December 14, 1968, revealed Hayakawa overruled any student government role in future disciplinary courts. He "flatly refused to approve any plan that included the present leadership of the students," because of "the utterly irresponsible and rebellious body of student officers who now claim to represent the student body."<sup>88</sup>

This was the first decisive move by Hayakawa to limit the student role in campus government and control. By this action, he effectively neutralized any student participation in campus disciplinary procedures under the present student body leadership. It is assumed that here as with the Academic Senate, and since no evidence supports the contrary, Hayakawa would allow student participation in campus government and control if it were more responsive to the president's wishes. This can be considered an inconsistency in his position. The additional intent of this statement seems to be inconsistent with one he made prior to assuming office [footnote 83], advocating the inclusion of young people in the decision making process. If Hayakawa believed in his former statement concerning involvement, then it could be reasonably assumed that his position would be in accordance with that announcement. If this be the case, then the position in the latter statement is contrary to the former and thus is an inconsistency.

It was reported in an article in Newsweek that on December 14, 1968, Hayakawa requested that the Attorney General freeze funds for the student government. His comment in regard to this action was, "that



cripples them," and referred to the student government as "a haven for radicals."<sup>89</sup> This indicates the second move, by Hayakawa, to limit the student role in campus government and control.

According to an article in the New York Times, the California Attorney General had been investigating student government finances at San Francisco State College since July of 1968. On December 24, 1968, it was learned that \$400.00 of student government funds had been given to the leaders of the B.S.U. Hayakawa called the transaction "very suspicious", and accused the student government of using its money to help finance campus turmoil.<sup>90</sup>

During the period of time from November 26, 1968, up to February 3, 1969, Hayakawa developed a position which severely limited the student role in campus government and control. The position was expressed to be in response to certain measures by the student government leaders in giving money to the B.S.U.; but Hayakawa also developed the position that he would not deal with the student body leadership due to its make-up at that time, and dismissed any student participation in the disciplinary process because of this reason. This position was inconsistent with his inferred earlier position prior to assuming office, to include the students in campus government and control.

#### Statements Made During the Congressional Hearing

During the course of the Congressional Hearing, Hayakawa commented on the type of student groups which the administration was dealing with over demonstrator demands.

We have several white radical or ultra-liberal groups. Their numbers total something around 300 when their allies are mobilized. Their central control is probably less than 50 people.<sup>91</sup>

Hayakawa seemed to distinguish between the radical and the non-radical militant.

Some militants are genuine in their desire to improve the educational system. But it is also clear that some militants, especially in the Black Students Union, are more concerned with personal power than with education.<sup>92</sup>

Hayakawa acknowledged the demands of some militants as genuine, but dismissed those of others as only means of gaining personal power. This expression could mean a willingness on Hayakawa's part to deal with the genuine demands of the militants, by means of negotiation. If this assumption is correct, it reveals a change from his previous position [footnote 88] of December 13, 1968.

During the same discussion, he pointed out his ideas concerning the make-up of the B.S.U.

It is my impression, however, that of the 800 or so black students at San Francisco State College now, the Black Students Union represents the point of view of only about 100 of them, if that many. . . . So the idea that there should be a unique black program for meeting black psychological or other needs is a demand on the part not of the entire Negro student body, but only of a part of it.<sup>93</sup>

He went on to state:

From these facts it is clear that the majority of the ethnic minority population is more interested in education as conducted or proposed by the college than in the wild plans for education by mob rule proposed by our dissident students.<sup>94</sup>

Hayakawa did point out during the hearing that even though a small minority of the students wanted the Black Studies Program, he granted and "respected that demand for it and was willing to meet it."<sup>95</sup>

Disciplinary procedures were discussed during the hearing.

Hayakawa was quite clear in his position concerning demonstrators [part of which were students]. It was in response to the 8th demand by the strikers, which stated that:

no disciplinary action will be administered in any way to any students, workers, teachers, or administrators during and after the strike as a consequence of their participation in the strike.<sup>96</sup>

Hayakawa stated:

This recurring demand for amnesty for past misdeeds and deeds contemplated in the future seems to me an example of the complete moral flabbiness of many of the strikers and strike demands.<sup>97</sup>

In essence, this expressed opinion pertained to the recurring theme of responsibility. Hayakawa chastised the dissenters because of their lack of responsibility. He also declared;

If every time you violate a regulation you say, "amnesty, amnesty," in a sense you are trying to get martyrdom cheap, at bargain rates, without having suffered any of the consequences of martyrdom. This is what I call the moral flabbiness of this widespread amnesty which I understand turned up the other day at the University of Chicago. It certainly turned up at Columbia and elsewhere. I must say that I am highly contemptuous of those who demand amnesty for these things.<sup>98</sup>

Hayakawa could be saying that he would not deal with the dissidents until they demonstrated a willingness to accept responsibility.

Hayakawa believed that one reason for the radical element being in control of the student government was because of lack of student participation in student affairs during past years. "The overwhelming majority of faculty and students has not voted in past years on matters of great import to our college."<sup>99</sup> It was because of inaction by the general student body, and the control of student government by

"radicals", that disciplinary procedures were at a standstill, as pointed out by Hayakawa in the following quotation:

Because of the irresponsibility of student government since its take-over by student radicals, the judicial court described in the constitution has not been functional for more than four years, and has not even been appointed for the last two years.<sup>100</sup>

Hayakawa could be attempting to pressure the rest of the student body to demand a new student election. If so, this statement is similar in content to his statement of December 13, 1968. At least no evidence was found to the contrary.

One of the Congressional Hearing members asked Hayakawa what his position was on the right of students in negotiating with the administration.

I have repeatedly invited representatives of various student organizations to come to see me to discuss anything they want to discuss. I like to think that my office is open to all the faculty and all the students. Sometimes it hasn't been for the past 8 weeks because there was so much disturbance going on that you couldn't take care of everything at once.<sup>101</sup>

The comment does indicate a willingness on Hayakawa's part to include students in the process of campus government and control, although no definite procedures are spelled out. It also reveals an inconsistency, since Hayakawa had explicitly refused to deal with the student leadership at that time. This seems to support the contention that he would deal with those students or student groups who acted in accordance with his wishes.

Hayakawa's position at the time of the Congressional Hearing had not changed concerning the role of the student government leadership at that time, and he still maintained his position about curtailing the role of students in campus government and control. He refused

to deal with student leaders, and this seemed inconsistent with the statements he made prior to assuming office and the closing statement in this section. If Hayakawa was willing to allow all students to visit him in his office, then he could not forbid the student leaders.

#### Statements Given After the Congressional Hearing

In a letter to the Faculty, Students, and Staff of San Francisco State College, dated February 10, 1969, Hayakawa delineated between two types of students. He reported:

It is also my hope and expectation that a settlement of the student strike within the bounds of justice and practicality, will be arranged by a redress of the real grievances of students whose goals are fundamentally constructive.<sup>102</sup>

In an article in U.S. News & World Report, dated February 24, 1969, Hayakawa seemed to think there was a role for students in directing university policy. He stated: "We must have more effective student participation in the decision making."<sup>103</sup> This statement is consistent with Hayakawa's probable position prior to assuming office, that the younger generation should be included in the decision process. However, it seems inconsistent with his December 13, 1968, statement regarding his refusal to deal with the present student body leadership.

During the statement issued by Hayakawa on March 21, 1969 [the day after the end of the student strike], he pointed out that the success of the agreement between the students and the administration depended on the actions of the students, saying in fact that the responsibility rested with the students.<sup>104</sup>

The position during this period of time indicates a marked change from the position held earlier. It is the first decisive indication that Hayakawa believed students did have a role in campus government and control, and it can be construed that their role should not be limited, but enlarged, in order to effectively control and govern a campus.

#### Recapitulation of Hayakawa's Position Concerning the Role of and Limitations on Students in Campus Government and Control

Hayakawa's position at the end of each time interval can be summarized in the following manner:

1. The course of action prior to November 26, 1968, being undertaken by students could not be accepted, but Hayakawa gave a partial justification for the actions by saying that the students were not familiar with the democratic process of change. He believed the students had overstepped their assigned roles by disrupting classes, and must be stopped.

2. From November 25, 1968, to February 2, 1969, Hayakawa took steps to severely limit the role of students in campus government and control. All funds were shut off from the student government, pending further investigation, and Hayakawa refused to deal with the student body leaders at that time. It is felt that this position was inconsistent with his inferred earlier position regarding the student role in campus government and control.

3. During the Congressional Hearing, Hayakawa still maintained his position of not dealing with the present student body leadership. It was pointed out that he was willing to meet students in his office at any time, which is contrary to his position concerning the student body leadership, but might indicate that he is willing to negotiate with the students about the strike, thus involving them in campus government and control.

4. After February 3, 1969, Hayakawa's position seems to be more lenient than his previous positions. He did point out that

students have a role in campus government and control, and that it must be enlarged to meet the needs of the future.

Hayakawa's Position Concerning the Role  
of and Limitation on Faculty in  
Campus Government and Control

Position Prior to Becoming  
Acting President

Hayakawa discussed the role of and limitations on the faculty in campus government and control in the position paper of the "Faculty Renaissance", which was written before he assumed office. In the paper, he pointed out that faculty [and students] have the right of dissent through a reasoned process:

Faculty Renaissance supports the rights of students and faculty members to dissent as a means of encouraging changes that better meet the needs of a changing, dynamic college and society, but believes that constructive changes should be brought about only through thorough study, peaceful discussion and debate, the use of reason, and properly established procedures.<sup>105</sup>

Hayakawa attributed the student actions to a total ignorance of democratic processes. In the case of those faculty members who supported the student actions, he called it adolescent behavior. Thus it is possible to see from the foregoing statement that Hayakawa did have a preconceived position on how the faculty was to fulfill a function in campus government and control.

In an extension of the position paper, entitled "A Strike is Not the Answer Why?", Hayakawa discussed the role of faculty power. He aimed his attack at the leaders of the AFT, and stated that by their actions they were contradicting their professed aims:

The AFT faculty wishes to gain the powers that duly belong to the academic senate, total faculty, and other official groups charged with the responsibilities of guiding the destiny of the educational processes at S.F. State.<sup>106</sup>

It's possible to see that, prior to assuming office, Hayakawa considered the guiding of educational processes as a total faculty responsibility. He also contended that those faculty who support the AFT action would be derelict in this responsibility:

Faculty members who strike will merely be indicating that they favor relinquishing faculty power to student groups or to the AFT. Faculty shouldn't strike unless they support that idea.<sup>107</sup>

He supported the above statement by discussing what he felt was appropriate:

Requests for legitimate improvements in conditions at the college are certainly appropriate, but unreasonable demands made under threat of strike action are indications of irresponsibility on the part of faculty members.<sup>108</sup>

Hayakawa felt that the faculty did have power in campus government and control, and that this power should not be given to the students. He also believed it had the right to dissent, but probably not by Labor Union methods.

From the above data, it is evident that prior to assuming office, Hayakawa did support the right of faculty dissent, but only by constructive discussion and debate. He also pointed out that guiding of the educational process was a faculty responsibility, and any actions derelict of their responsibility was unprofessional. Hayakawa's position was mainly one of pointing out faculty responsibility, thus indicating that they did have a role in campus government and control. No material was found to indicate a position of limitations on the faculty



role. In fact, he was concerned that the faculty might be giving up some of its power to the students.

#### Initial Statements After Becoming Acting President

Hayakawa clearly indicated, after assuming office, his position regarding faculty responsibility during the student strike.

All instructional staff are being notified that they must be on hand to meet their scheduled classes from December 2, 1968, onward. Unauthorized absences for 5 working days, according to the laws governing our college, are considered the equivalent of resignation. I intend to accept any such resignations promptly.<sup>109</sup>

This explanation provided the first indication of a limitation to be placed on the faculty during the student strike. Hayakawa said that the measure was necessary to maintain university integrity.

In the public statement issued on November 30, 1968, Hayakawa pointed out the measures taken to insure the faculty does meet its responsibilities.

I am asking the Academic Vice President to have the Deans report to me, all failures of instructional staff to meet their obligations to their students. Attendance sheets recording the performance of teaching duties are required, of course, by the State Controller's office. I mean to examine those records.<sup>110</sup>

Hayakawa justified his actions by saying it was only to protect the college and maintain the educational process. In his view, the measure was not a limitation on the faculty since it did not prevent them from doing what they were hired to do. It could be considered a limitation since Hayakawa said he intended to examine the records and then use the data from those records to justify any actions he took in relation to the faculty.

In the same proclamation, Hayakawa indicated his position concerning faculty behavior and the measures which would be taken if that behavior was not in accordance with best university interest.

Faculty members charged with classroom disruptions or other unprofessional conduct will also be promptly suspended, and after due hearings if found guilty, will be reprimanded, suspended for a stated period of time or discharged, depending on the gravity of the offense.<sup>111</sup>

This quotation possibly indicates a move on Hayakawa's part to enforce measures which would limit faculty autonomy and force faculty actions to be more responsive to the administration. Here again it is evident that Hayakawa wanted the faculty to be more receptive to the administration's position.

According to an article in the New York Times, December 2, 1968, Hayakawa again pointed out that he intended to enforce the rule dealing with faculty absences.<sup>112</sup> By January 22, 1969, as indicated in a New York Times editorial, Hayakawa had softened his stand on the issue of dismissing faculty members who had participated in the walkout on January 6, 1969.

I am concerned with the innocent teachers who are walking the picket line, but who are also meeting their classes. A system of administrative review of each case has been worked out.<sup>113</sup>

The intent of this quotation is contrary to his earlier statement on November 30, 1968 [footnote 109]. It must be pointed out that the earlier statement was made before the faculty strike on January 6, 1969, and so it is possible that Hayakawa thought his position was unrealistic in view of the events that had occurred.

Immediately after assuming the role of acting president, Hayakawa's expressed position did concern the responsibility of faculty members in meeting their classes. He initiated measures which would limit faculty independence and placed the review of faculty actions under his personal care. This can be considered a limitation on the faculty in campus control. He also initiated measures which would attempt to make the faculty more responsive to his position. This too must be construed as a limitation on faculty autonomy and thus a diminution of the faculty role in campus government and control.

By January 22, 1969, it seems evident that Hayakawa considered his position unrealistic in view of the events that had taken place; but the concept of a faculty more responsive to the administration was still evident in his statements.

#### Statements Made During Congressional Hearing

During the Congressional Hearing on February 3, 1969, Hayakawa considered the aspect of "moonlighting" by faculty members. This supported his position that the faculty's main responsibility to the college rests in guiding the educational process.

Moonlighting is not the right word. In a sense, a Professor being asked to be a consultant or lecturer in the world outside is encouraged by the college or university very often, because it simply reflects credit upon the university.

But if he is to do it at the expense of his teaching, I think it is a very serious problem.<sup>114</sup>

No evidence was available to indicate that Hayakawa would consider limiting the right of faculty members to "moonlight". It is assumed that he believed in the right of faculty to "moonlight", and that he

would become concerned, as acting president, only if the responsibility of the faculty in guiding the educational process was impaired.

Hayakawa acknowledged that much of the support for the student strike came from faculty members. He seemed concerned that this was not in accordance with the professional conduct of a university teacher. When asked "Had they not had the support of some teacher or teachers' groups, do you believe the dissidents could not long continue to be any real threat?", Hayakawa replied, "I believe that to be the case, sir."<sup>115</sup> "I believe the faculty has a lot to do--certain elements in the faculty have a lot to do with student dissidence and student activism."<sup>116</sup> Hayakawa also pointed out that some students were striking because of pressure from their instructors.

Some students are striking strictly under instruction from their teachers. In fact, they are threatened with dire consequences, if they don't go on strike, by some of our radical teachers.<sup>117</sup>

By February 3, 1969, it seemed apparent that Hayakawa's comments were generally more concerned about faculty responsibility and a professional attitude. It seems reasonable to conclude that he would eventually take further measures to control faculty actions.

During his initial speech at the Congressional Hearing, Hayakawa discussed the relationship between the faculty and the administration. His position seemed to be that the university is characterized by a variety of relationships between the faculty and administration, but that there is and must be a line of communication between the two.

There are some of our campus--and every campus--who ignore the administration completely as they come and go from home to the classroom, laboratory and library. Our strongest ties between the administration and the faculty stem from the Council

of Academic Deans, which includes all school deans and administrative deans working under the Academic Vice President.<sup>118</sup>

The relationship of the faculty to the administration is one of those strange bureaucratic arrangements. Some teachers are professional politicians within the institution, very close to administrators at all levels.<sup>119</sup>

Could it be that Hayakawa, as acting president, was now concerned about those faculty members not in communication with the administration? In other words, he would probably prefer to have all faculty members develop a closer communication line with the administration to facilitate understanding and thus allow the administration to keep track of faculty motives and actions.

Eventually, he defined the relationship between the faculty and the administration:

Generally, administrative control over the faculty cannot be described as dictatorial in the least, despite the present clamor over the state law which says that anyone who absents himself without leave for five consecutive days is considered to have resigned. The faculty has autonomy in essential matters, such as hiring, retention, tenure, and promotion. The president cannot even fire a faculty member. He can only recommend action to the Chancellor.<sup>120</sup>

It is possible that Hayakawa was trying to justify, in his mind, the position he had taken in regard to the faculty by saying that the position was not one of complete dominance. He supported this by saying that the faculty does have autonomy in certain areas, i.e. retention, but this seems to be inconsistent with his position of November 30, 1968, which held that faculty would be dismissed if necessary. Hayakawa's expressed position could vary from his intent, and he could still justify his position of February 3, 1969. It was reported that he could not fire a faculty member, but only recommend dismissal to the

Chancellor. As discussed in Chapter II [footnote 38], many considered him to be a puppet of the Chancellor and Board of Trustees.

Hayakawa did declare during questioning that the college was still collecting faculty attendance sheets, which it was required to do by law, and still planned on using them with the following understanding:

The implementation of the state college law is automatic except in this respect: It is possible for the administration --and our Council of Deans has been working very hard on this-- to request from the State Personnel Board the reinstatement of all those who report back to work in time for the opening of the second semester. That is, we ourselves in the administration believe that the law is punitive. It does not seem to us ever to have been intended to apply in the case of strikes on the part of an organized labor union. Also, many of the people on strike are valued faculty members whom we would hate to lose. Therefore, the Council of Academic Deans has agreed that we would ask for the rehiring and subsequent reinstatement of all those who showed themselves willing to come back to work.<sup>121</sup>

This could indicate a change in Hayakawa's earlier position concerning a limitation on the faculty. It is assumed that Hayakawa was forced to change his position as a result of the number of faculty subject to the rule, or that he really did not believe in his stated position of November 30, 1968.

Hayakawa's position during the Congressional Hearing was still concerned with limiting the faculty. He still considered it a faculty role to guide the educational process, and justified any limitations or measures taken to insure that end. He also implied that he would like to see a closer line of communication between the faculty and the administration, probably for administrative control.

There does seem to be an expressed inconsistency concerning faculty dismissal, from his previous statement of November 30, 1968,

and the one given during the Congressional Hearing. Hayakawa's position concerning the dismissal of faculty members not conducting class did change from his earlier position. This is probably due to the realization that his position was not tenable in view of the events.

### Statements Made After the Congressional Hearing

Hayakawa clarified his position dealing with the enactment of the Educational Code Section 24311 concerning faculty dismissal for unexcused absence during a public statement dated February 6, 1969.

On January 6, certain members of our chapter of the AFT began the withholding of their services. We were soon made aware of Education Code Section 24311 which provides that five consecutive days of unexcused absence constitutes an automatic resignation from state service. We have felt all along that this provision operates punitively in this situation.<sup>122</sup>

This is the first indication that Hayakawa did not believe in the limitations put on the faculty. It can be pointed out that he did consider limitations necessary, under the circumstances, but not necessarily the ones previously discussed.

On February 14, 1969, Hayakawa expressed his gratitude for those faculty members who continued to fulfill their professional obligations.

What has cheered me so very much in the weeks past is the courage and the devotion to their tasks exhibited by so many of our faculty. Many met their classes despite difficulties because of powerful convictions. Many met them in spite of doubts in their own minds, out of dedication to their students.<sup>123</sup>

During the statement on February 14, 1969, he also seemed to define another faculty responsibility. "I strongly believe in the role of the faculty in setting just policy," but he again reiterated their

main responsibility, "which is creating the academic climate that determines so much of our future."<sup>124</sup> The February 14, 1969, statement was the first to offer evidence that Hayakawa felt the faculty had a role in something other than guiding the educational process. This can be considered an enlargement of the faculty role in campus government and control.

In response to the AFT announcement of the strike settlement on February 24, 1969, Hayakawa again contended that faculty members were being irresponsible by supporting the student strike demands.

The striking teachers have offered to return to work, to use their words, "provided a peaceful and free academic atmosphere prevails on campus." This could mean no more than what it says. However, it could also mean what many striking students mean by these words, namely the settlement of student demands and the removal of police protection from the campus.<sup>125</sup>

This is additional support for his position that faculty members have a certain responsibility, and actions contrary to this responsibility are considered to be unprofessional.

A remark which reveals a possible position held by Hayakawa at the end of the strike was reported in the Congressional Record, April 18, 1969. The statement was in response to the events at Harvard.<sup>126</sup> Hayakawa criticized the Harvard faculty for not supporting the college administration during the turmoil. This could indicate a third role of the faculty in campus government and control, that of faculty support and advice to the president.

Hayakawa also provided an indication of how to limit the faculty if its actions were not in accord with the views of the administration. He advised the Harvard president to avoid all faculty meetings until the



turmoil was over as a means of effectively silencing their dissent.

Hayakawa's position during the last time interval seemed to vary. He acknowledged that the measure to dismiss faculty for not conducting classes was considered punitive and not particularly geared for the present situation.

Two additional roles for the faculty in campus government and control were also brought out during this period: One, that the faculty does have a role in setting university policy, and two, that the faculty has the role of advising the president and supporting his action.

#### Recapitulation of Hayakawa's Position on the Role of and Limitations on Faculty in Campus Government And Control

The summarizations of Hayakawa's position(s) during each time interval in the study are as follows:

1. Hayakawa supported the right of faculty dissent by constructive discussion and debate. He did point out that the faculty did have a role in campus government and control, and that it was to guide the educational process. Any dereliction from this duty was considered to be unprofessional.

2. Hayakawa's position after assuming office was mainly one of limiting faculty independence, and placing review of faculty actions under his office. This was considered to be a limitation on faculty autonomy, and thus a diminution of the faculty role in campus government and control.

3. Hayakawa's position during the Congressional Hearing was still concerned with limitation, but it did show a change. He still considered the faculty role as guiding the educational process, and also implied that a closer communication link between the faculty and the administration would be advantageous. The most noticeable change was in regard to dismissal of faculty members not meeting their classes. His previous position was that they should be dismissed, but now he contended that each case would be reviewed. This was probably due to the number of faculty cases subject to review. Under the existing conditions, the code requiring faculty dismissal was not realistic.

4. During the period of time from February 4, 1969, to March 20, 1969, Hayakawa revealed two additional faculty roles in campus government and control. One was that the faculty does have a role in setting university policy, and the other was that the faculty has the role of advising the president and of supporting his actions. It is possible that Hayakawa reserved the right to limit the role of the faculty if its views and actions were contrary to his position.

Hayakawa's Position Concerning the Role  
of a Judicial System in Campus  
Government and Control

Initial Statements Prior to Becoming  
Acting President

The only comment giving an indication of Hayakawa's position concerning the role of a campus judicial system in campus government and control, prior to his becoming acting president, was made in March of 1969. In the statement he said that the position had been his since before assuming the role of acting president, so it is considered to be an indication of his position prior to assuming office.

It has been clear, since long before I became president, that this college lacks an adequate student judicial system. I will work to assure a fair and equitable process. I hope that the previous reluctance of both the Academic Senate and the student government in providing a system that meets the requirements of Trustee regulations is behind us.<sup>127</sup>

It is assumed that by adequate, he meant comprehensive enough to handle problems which might arise due to a number of difficulties. Since no evidence is available to the contrary, it must be assumed that he considered the judicial system to be inadequate even under normal conditions. It is apparent, anyway, that Hayakawa did not believe the judicial system was adequate to handle the number of problems resulting from the student strike.

It can be reasonably concluded that his position prior to assuming office was that the judicial system needed to be changed. Its procedures under ordinary conditions were questionable, and during times of crisis it was inadequate.

#### Initial Statements After Becoming Acting President

Hayakawa's initial announcement after being selected acting president clearly indicated his position on the functioning of a judicial system.

Students charged with disrupting classrooms or the orderly processes of campus life will be promptly suspended. Due process will be provided any student so suspended within 72 hours of such suspension. Those found to have engaged in such violations of college regulations may be continued on suspension, expelled, or given other discipline.<sup>128</sup>

It seems apparent that Hayakawa supported a judicial system that would function quickly in response to any problem, and that measures should be allowed to expedite the judicial process.

On December 6, 1968, Hayakawa issued a public statement which included a comment about the college judicial system. "The college guarantees due process in any college-initiated disciplinary proceedings against students, faculty, staff and administrators."<sup>129</sup>

During another pronouncement issued on December 9, 1968, the Acting President indicated that he was not satisfied with the existing disciplinary procedures and discussed his reasons:

I have taken steps today to revise the emergency disciplinary procedures previously announced. My action is intended to assure due process and a fair and equitable hearing for all persons accused of violations of college rules.

My action is based on several factors which I will take only a moment to outline-first, we found it impractical to conduct hearings within the 72 hour period indicated in my earlier announcement. Second, we found that the 72 hour period did not permit adequate time for assembling information and for accused individuals to prepare their defense.

Another important humanitarian consideration is involved. A student found not guilty would have his financial aid status jeopardized because of the temporary suspension.

Lastly the executive committee of the Academic Senate has assured me that it would take immediate action to form a panel of faculty members and students from which boards of several persons each would be drawn to act on each case for student discipline.<sup>130</sup>

It seems reasonable to assume that Hayakawa's expressed position on December 9, 1968, dealt with: one, the time necessary to initiate action; two, that under present rules a student would be placed on suspension prior to his hearing; and three, that 72 hours did not allow enough time to develop a defense. If this is correct, then Hayakawa changed his position from the one held previously [footnote 128], stating that 72 hours was sufficient time. The change was probably due to the reasons enumerated above.

Also, on December 9, 1968, Hayakawa pointed out that the previous emergency procedures [footnote 128] consisted of one single officer hearing all disciplinary cases. All cases previously heard were to be rescheduled before the panels which the Academic Senate was to select.<sup>131</sup> No evidence was given to justify the recalling of all previous cases.

On January 29, 1969, Hayakawa made a special announcement pertaining to the campus judicial system:

Henceforth, any student who has been arrested since November 6, 1968, on or near the campus for participation in disruption activities, or any student who has been put on notice of college disciplinary action for disruptive activity since

November 6, 1968, will be temporarily suspended immediately if arrested by the police or cited for college offenses by attempting disruptive acts. The temporary suspension will remain in effect until the case is heard by the appropriate college hearing panel and disciplinary action is determined. Hearings will be conducted as soon as possible after suspension.<sup>132</sup>

This does constitute a change from Hayakawa's previous position of December 9, 1968. At that time he was concerned about the temporary suspension prior to the convening of the hearing board, but this quotation points out that it is no longer of importance to him.

Another evident position concerns the right of the president to usurp the role of the judiciary. The content of the statement is that matters generally decided by those groups that devise the judiciary system can be usurped by the president. The statement does point out that the judicial system has a role in campus government and control, but that role can be nullified by the president.

It can be concluded from the preceding statements that, during the period of time from November 26, 1968, to February 2, 1969, Hayakawa did believe in fully utilizing the campus judicial system, and that, as presently constructed, it was not geared to handle the type and frequency of disruptions with which it was confronted. A change was noted in his position concerning enforcement of judicial procedures. In his initial announcement [footnote 128], the 72 hour time was considered to be necessary, but it was not even considered in statements made later in the time interval.

#### Statements Made During the Congressional Hearing

Hayakawa made the following statement during the February 3,

1969, Congressional Hearing pertaining to the campus judicial system and the entire area of discipline:

Several things must be accomplished if we are to end the present trend toward confrontation and violence. We must look realistically at problems of discipline and devise systems that will work without resorting to outside help. We must eventually put campus discipline in the hands of responsible faculty and student groups who will work cooperatively with administrators for the greater good of the institution. Our faculty and student disciplinary systems are not geared for today's problems.<sup>133</sup>

A new position can be seen in the preceding quotation. Hayakawa still maintained that the present judicial system had to be revised in order to meet the needs of the present time. However, he went one step further and pointed out that the judicial system does have an important part in campus government and control, and that if organized properly by the student leadership and Academic Senate, it can function to alleviate the need for outside control during times of crisis on the campus. This must be considered an important role in campus government and control.

In response to a question during the hearing, Hayakawa gave the following reply:

Of the hundreds arrested since November 6, only one has been tried by civil authorities. He was not an aid recipient. Our college disciplinary system proved inadequate for the situation and is being revised to provide both better and quicker procedures.<sup>134</sup>

When asked if he could expell a student, the Acting President stated:

I think we are able to, although I have not been able to yet. One very important reason is that faculty discipline or student discipline has been left in the hands of an Academic Senate, and the Academic Senate has so organized itself as to

make so cumbersome the techniques and processes of student discipline that it is practically impossible to get him through that process. But we do have the legal power to suspend and expel, yes.<sup>135</sup>

It is again evident that expediency was an important aspect in Hayakawa's position, and that the judicial system at that time did not adequately meet his expectations. The quotation also seemed to reveal a determined effort on the part of Hayakawa to facilitate the judicial process, if necessary, by presidential intervention in the judicial function of suspension. In other words, Hayakawa's position was, that if necessary, the president can usurp the judicial role, thus minimizing it, and suspend a student.

It was also pointed out during the hearing that Hayakawa was not able to initiate a new disciplinary system due to opposition in the Academic Senate, which wanted Associated Student veto power over any make-up of the disciplinary panel, and also insisted that the panel have absolute and final authority in its findings. Hayakawa pointed out that the college president, under law and the Board of Trustees regulation, could not delegate this final authority, and thus could not approve the Academic Senate's proposition. Because of the deadlock between the two, student disciplinary matters were being handled pursuant to the Student Disciplinary Procedures, [revised February 20, 1969].<sup>136</sup>

Hayakawa did report that he was "favorably considering" the recommendations of the Select Committee for Student Disciplinary Procedures. The recommendation allowed any student charged with an offense during a selected period of time to receive a written reprimand

with the knowledge that any subsequent charges would require disciplinary action. This was not a complete system of disciplinary procedures, but a means of expedition under the existing procedures.<sup>137</sup> This seemed to indicate a temporary position in regard to the judicial process. Hayakawa probably did not believe this to be a good procedure under normal conditions, but necessary under the existing conditions.

When asked if any students had been expelled to date, Hayakawa replied:

I am sorry to say we have not expelled anybody yet. I think dozens and dozens need expelling. The technique of student discipline, as I said earlier, is so cumbersome--and I would say it was made deliberately so by a faculty determined to undercut the powers of the president.<sup>138</sup>

Here again it is evident that Hayakawa was concerned about the cumbersome process required under the existing procedures, and wishes to have a more expedient system.

He further contended that the "faculty and student disciplinary systems are not geared for today's problems."<sup>139</sup> He gave the following justification for his position.

A large number of students found guilty of an infraction by our campus panels have been given reprimand, probation, or expulsion, and have been acquitted in downtown courts of the same offenses on the basis of the same evidence presented on campus. We feel that our present procedures are just and fair, that they would work in ordinary times.<sup>140</sup>

It is possible that Hayakawa was inconsistent in his position at this point in time. He had previously stated that the judicial system was inadequate, but now he qualified it to say that it was inadequate under the existing conditions. This seems to be contrary to his position before November 26, 1968, that it was inadequate as written up.



Hayakawa placed some blame for the failure of the existing system on the present student leaders, and contended that it would be adequate under more favorable conditions:

With the restoration of representative governance, we believe that present disciplinary procedures, or any other set of such procedures which are fair and workable, would be adequate.<sup>141</sup>

This supports the preceding contention that the existing judicial process was workable under more favorable conditions.

The most obvious position by Hayakawa during the Congressional Hearing was that the judiciary had a role in campus government and control. From the preceding quotation, it can be reasonably assumed that the judiciary had an important role. By the time of the Hearing, Hayakawa seemed convinced that the existing judicial system would not work under the then present circumstances, but would work under ordinary circumstances with representative student government. At this point he blamed the ineffectiveness of the judicial system on two groups, the faculty and student leadership. The position seemed to be inconsistent in that Hayakawa probably did not mean the judicial process would work under ordinary conditions, but it would work if developed by a more responsive faculty and student leadership. If he did mean that it would work under normal conditions, then there is a shift in position from the one he held prior to assuming office. At that time he contended the present judicial system was not workable, probably under any conditions, but during the Congressional Hearing he maintained that it would be workable under ordinary circumstances. He advocated the use of judicial procedures and supported almost any means by which the

procedures could be expedited. At the same time he argued for revised disciplinary procedures that would adequately meet the crisis at that time and still be within bounds spelled out by the trustees.

#### Statements Made After the Congressional Hearing

Only one comment could be found which described Hayakawa's position concerning the judicial process after the Congressional Hearing. It was reported in the February 24, 1969, issue of U.S. News and World Report that he said, "We seriously need more effective student disciplinary procedures, as well as methods for resolving grievances."<sup>142</sup> The quotation does not indicate whether he would say this under ordinary circumstances, so it is assumed that it is similar in position to his latest comment on the same aspect, which considers the disciplinary procedures to be adequate under normal conditions, but does reveal that Hayakawa considered a judicial system necessary for campus government and control.

It can be concluded that Hayakawa saw the necessity for a more effective means of student discipline, which was not being met under the existing circumstances. This seems to be consistent with his previous contention that the judicial system is adequate under normal circumstances, but not adequate under pressure, thus it should be changed to incorporate the existing deficiencies. It can be reasonably concluded then that Hayakawa did consider the judiciary to be important in campus government and control.

Recapitulations of Hayakawa's Position on  
the Role of a Judiciary in Campus  
Government and Control

Hayakawa's position(s) during each time interval under consideration in this study can be summarized as follows:

1. Prior to assuming office, Hayakawa was of the position that the judicial system did need to be changed, that its procedures under normal conditions were questionable, but during times of crisis it was inadequate.

2. Initially after assuming office, Hayakawa seemed to believe in fully utilizing the judicial system, but he did criticize the inefficiency with which it operated. His position during the November 30, 1968, press statement was that 72 hours was adequate time to initiate the judicial process. By December 9, 1968, he did not consider 72 hours to be long enough. His main position during this time period was that the existing judicial system seemed to be inefficient under its existing make-up.

3. The major position brought out by Hayakawa during the Congressional Hearing was that he did believe the judicial system had an important role in campus government and control. He contended that if it was set up correctly, it could alleviate the necessity of calling in outside help. He did not consider the existing judicial system capable of doing this. There was also a change in his position concerning the workability of the existing system. By this time he contended that the existing system would work under normal conditions, but he was inconsistent since he attributed the inefficiency of the system to the student leadership and the faculty.

4. During the period of time from February 4, 1969, to March 20, 1969, Hayakawa's position was similar to the position he held during the Congressional Hearing. He still contended that the existing system was adequate for normal times, but not workable under the current crisis.

#### SUMMARY

##### Use of Police

Hayakawa's position concerning the use of an external police force during campus demonstrations was constant throughout each period

of time. Throughout, he advocated using those means necessary to maintain the instructional process, and considered the use of an external police force as reasonable means of maintaining that process. Hayakawa also considered the use of police a valid means of quelling violence, and a deterrent to expected violence.

One change was detected in Hayakawa's position. He initially advocated using an unlimited number of police during a campus demonstration, but eventually attempted to minimize the number on campus at a given moment. This position was qualified with the understanding that, if necessary, additional police would be requested.

#### Role of a President

Initially, Hayakawa seemed to favor the faculty role in campus government and control more so than that of the president. It is probable that he was more familiar with the faculty role and thus it was natural for him to consider it before that of the presidential role. It is also possible that he considered the faculty role to be superior to the role of the president.

There was a shift in his position from a faculty orientation, to a presidential orientation after assuming office. The change was toward more centralized power vested in the office of the president. Hayakawa's early position was not consistent with his position after assuming office. After November 26, 1968, he asserted that authority rested with the president in developing the college structure. However, by March 20, 1969, he contended that the president should be responsive to the wishes of the collective faculty. This later position was not

considered compatible with the idea of power centralized in the role of the president.

#### Role of the Academic Senate

The Academic Senate did have a role in campus government and control according to Hayakawa's initial position. He preferred that its actions and views be in line with his own position, and, in addition, he wanted the Academic Senate to devise a more responsive judicial system for the campus. Initially, Hayakawa probably considered the Academic Senate as equal to the president in campus government and control, but eventually changed his position and placed the Academic Senate in an advisory position to the president. As president he held that the Academic Senate could develop policies concerning campus government and control only if those policies were in line with the president's position. After the Congressional Hearing, Hayakawa seemed to move back to his original position of allowing the Academic Senate a stronger role in campus government and control.

#### Role of and Limitations on Students

Hayakawa consistently maintained that students were in college to learn. They had the right to express opinions on campus government and control, but the expression or support of change could only be through peaceful means. Prior to November 26, 1968, he implied that students should be involved in campus government and control.

After assuming office, Hayakawa took measures to limit the role of students in campus government and control by stopping all student government funds and refusing to deal with the student body leadership

at the time. By March 20, 1969, his position was again similar to the one held prior to November 26, 1968, and he pointed out that students must and should assume a larger role in campus government and control.

#### Role of and Limitations on Faculty

Hayakawa maintained the faculty role in campus government and control was to guide the educational process. The faculty, he said, had the right to dissent within specific limits, and any actions outside of the limits were considered unprofessional.

After assuming office, Hayakawa seemed to limit faculty independence and minimize its role in campus government and control. By March 20, 1969, he declared two additional faculty roles in campus government and control. One was that the faculty had a role in setting up university policy, and the other was that the faculty had the role of advising and supporting the president.

#### Role of the Judiciary

Hayakawa contended prior to November 26, 1968, that the judicial system, as constituted at the time, needed changing. However, he eventually maintained that the judicial system would be adequate under normal conditions, but due to the severity of the turmoil at San Francisco State College, it needed to be revised.

Expediency was an important part of the judicial process, but Hayakawa changed his position on this point. Seventy-two hours was initially considered to be sufficient time for gathering facts on each case, but it eventually had to be lengthened.

The judicial system could play an important part in campus government and control, according to Hayakawa. After February 3, 1969, he pointed out that an effective judicial system might alleviate the necessity of outside control. He also declared presidential authority in usurping the judicial process, if necessary, thus minimizing its role in campus government and control.

# FOOTNOTES

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<sup>2</sup>Meyer M. Cahn, "The 1968-69 San Francisco State College Crisis: A Minority Report," Phi Delta Kappan, September, 1969, pp. 21-25.

<sup>3</sup>S. I. Hayakawa, "On Communication With Children," ETC: Review Of General Semantics, XXXIII, No. 2 (June, 1966), p. 183.

<sup>4</sup>Leo Litwak and John H. Bunzel, "Why San Francisco State Blew Up," Look, May 27, 1969, p. 62.

<sup>5</sup>"Can Tough Policy Keep a School Open?" U. S. News and World Report, December 16, 1968, p. 8.

<sup>6</sup>S. I. Hayakawa, Public Statement, November 30, 1968. [Supplied to the author by S. I. Hayakawa.]

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>The amount of police action proportional to strike action is also discussed in the New York Times, December 6, 1968, p. 1; New York Times, December 18, 1968, p. 38; New York Times, December 28, 1968, p. 16; New York Times, January 5, 1969, p. 57; New York Times, January 6, 1969, p. 31; and in a Letter from Hayakawa to Faculty, Students, and Staff, San Francisco State College, January 6, 1969.

<sup>14</sup>"Semantics in San Francisco," Time, December 6, 1968, p. 83.

<sup>15</sup>Litwak and Bunzel, p. 66.

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32 Ibid. pp. 52-53.

33 Ibid. p. 49.

34 Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

<sup>36</sup>"Hayakawa On Stage," New Republic, February 15, 1969, p. 9.

<sup>37</sup>Merry Selk, "Styles Of Handling Student Demonstrations," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June, 1969, p. 36.

<sup>38</sup>"Gangsters Cash In On Student Revolt," U. S. News and World Report, February 24, 1969, p. 41.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid.

<sup>40</sup>"How to Deal With Student Dissent," Newsweek, March 10, 1969, p. 68.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Lawrence Davies, "Booing Marks Coast Democrat Reform Session," The New York Times, April 14, 1969, p. 25.

<sup>43</sup>Cahn, p. 22.

<sup>44</sup>Letter from Mrs. Helene Whitson, January 25, 1971.

<sup>45</sup>"Faculty Renaissance," (San Francisco State College), A Statement of Position, January, 1969.

<sup>46</sup>"Escalating Troubles," Newsweek, December 16, 1968, p. 62.

<sup>47</sup>S. I. Hayakawa, Public Statement, December 6, 1968. [Supplied to the author by S.I. Hayakawa.]

<sup>48</sup>Letter from S.I. Hayakawa to Faculty, Students, and Staff, San Francisco State College, January 6, 1969.

<sup>49</sup>Hearings, p. 85.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid. pp. 53-54.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid. p. 84.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid. p. 85.

<sup>55</sup>"Gangsters Cash In On Student Revolt," U. S. News and World Report, February 24, 1969, p. 41.

<sup>56</sup>Statement, On The Record, SFSC (San Francisco State College) Pamphlet 69-1, February 14, 1969.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid.

<sup>60</sup>Cahn, p. 22.

<sup>61</sup>Statement, On The Record, SFSC (San Francisco State College) Pamphlet 69-5, March 21, 1969.

<sup>62</sup>"Strike Materials, 1968-69," distributed at San Francisco State College, San Francisco: Associated Microfilm Company, 1969.

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<sup>64</sup>Kris K. McClusky, "Student and Faculty Attitudes on Campus Crisis" (unpublished M. A. thesis, San Francisco State College, 1969), p. 8.

<sup>65</sup>S. I. Hayakawa, "Public Statement," December 6, 1968. [Supplied to the author by S. I. Hayakawa.]

<sup>66</sup>S. I. Hayakawa, "Public Statement," December 13, 1968. [Supplied to the author by S. I. Hayakawa.]

<sup>67</sup>Hearings, p. 78.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid. p. 84.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid. p. 78.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid. p. 89.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid. p. 53.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid. p. 89.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid.

<sup>74</sup>Patrick F. McGillivray and Worth S. Summer, "Folly of Academic Resolution," in Academics On The Line, ed. by Arlene Kaplan Daniels, Rachel Kahn-Hut, and Associates (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., 1970), p. 144.

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<sup>76</sup>Statement, On The Record, SFSC (San Francisco State College) Pamphlet, 69-5, March 21, 1969.

<sup>77</sup>"Campus Ministry and Student Dissent," Lutheran Quarterly, August, 1969, p. 221.

<sup>78</sup>Freedman, Nation, p. 41.

<sup>79</sup>Litwak and Bunzel, Look, p. 66.

<sup>80</sup>"Semantics in San Francisco," Time, December 6, 1968, p. 83.

<sup>81</sup>See also: S. I. Hayakawa and Barry A. Goodfield, "Reflections On a Visit To Watts," ETC: Review of General Semantics, XXIII, No. 3 (September, 1966), p. 305.; and Hearings, p. 27.

<sup>82</sup>"Permanence For Hayakawa," Time, July 18, 1969, p. 53.

<sup>83</sup>S. I. Hayakawa, "Communication: Interracial and International," ETC: Review of General Semantics, XX, No. 4. (December, 1963), p. 400.

<sup>84</sup>Hayakawa and Goodfield, "Reflections on a Visit to Watts," ETC: Review of General Semantics, p. 305.

<sup>85</sup>"Can Tough Policy Keep a School Open?" U. S. News and World Report, December 16, 1968, p. 11.

<sup>86</sup>S. I. Hayakawa, "Who's Bringing Up Your Children?" ETC: Review of General Semantics, XXV, No. 3. (September, 1968), p. 304.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid. p. 305.

<sup>88</sup>Wallace Turner, "San Francisco State Begins Holiday Recess Early," The New York Times, December 14, 1968, p. 40.

<sup>89</sup>"Conciliation and Cops," Newsweek, September 22, 1969, p. 68.

<sup>90</sup>"California Checks Finances at State College," The New York Times, December 24, 1968, p. 16.

<sup>91</sup>Hearings, p. 7.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid. p. 8.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid. p. 77.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid. p. 8.

<sup>95</sup>Ibid. p. 77.

<sup>96</sup>Ibid. p. 27.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid.

<sup>99</sup>Ibid. p. 74.

<sup>100</sup>Ibid. p. 29.

<sup>101</sup>Ibid. p. 85.

<sup>102</sup>Letter from S. I. Hayakawa to Faculty, Students, and Staff, San Francisco State College, February 10, 1969.

<sup>103</sup>"Gangsters Cash In On Student Revolt," U. S. News and World Report, February 24, 1969, p. 41.

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<sup>105</sup>"Faculty Renaissance," (San Francisco State College), A Statement of Position, January, 1969.

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<sup>107</sup>Ibid.

<sup>108</sup>Ibid.

<sup>109</sup>S. I. Hayakawa, "Public Statement," November 30, 1968, [Supplied to the author by S. I. Hayakawa.]

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<sup>111</sup>Ibid.

<sup>112</sup>Wallace Turner, "Classes Resume After Protest at College on Coast," The New York Times, December 3, 1968, p. 29.

<sup>113</sup>Lawrence Davies, "Berkeley Seeks to Head Off Student Strike Today," The New York Times, January 22, 1969, p. 23.

<sup>114</sup>Hearings, p. 97.

<sup>115</sup>Ibid. p. 87.

<sup>116</sup>Ibid. p. 78.

<sup>117</sup>Ibid. p. 79.

<sup>118</sup>Ibid. p. 6.

<sup>119</sup>Ibid.

<sup>120</sup>Ibid

<sup>121</sup>Ibid. p. 45.

<sup>122</sup>Statement, On The Record, SFSC (San Francisco State College) Pamphlet, 68-5, February 6, 1969.

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<sup>125</sup>S. I. Hayakawa, Public Statement, February 24, 1969. [Supplied to the author by S. I. Hayakawa.]

<sup>126</sup>"Hayakawa On The Harvard Disorders," Congressional Record, April 18, 1969, s3826.

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<sup>128</sup>S. I. Hayakawa, "Public Statement," November 30, 1968. [Supplied to the author by S. I. Hayakawa.]

<sup>129</sup>Statement, On The Record, SFSC (San Francisco State College) Pamphlet 69-5, December 9, 1969.

<sup>130</sup>S. I. Hayakawa, "Public Statement," December 9, 1968. [Supplied to the author by S. I. Hayakawa.]

<sup>131</sup>Ibid.

<sup>132</sup>S. I. Hayakawa, "Special Announcement," January 29, 1969. [Supplied to the author by S. I. Hayakawa.]

<sup>133</sup>Hearings, pp. 9-10.

<sup>134</sup>Ibid. p. 10.

<sup>135</sup>Ibid. pp. 28-29.

<sup>136</sup>Ibid. p. 29.

<sup>137</sup>Ibid.

<sup>138</sup>Ibid. p. 53.

139 Ibid. pp. 72-73.

140 Ibid. p. 73.

141 Ibid.

142 "Gangsters Cash In On Student Revolt," U. S. News and World Report, February 24, 1969, p. 41.

## CHAPTER IV

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

#### Summary of Methodology

The purpose of this paper was to ascertain the extent to which the position of S. I. Hayakawa regarding the enumerated functions and processes of campus government and control, as revealed in his public statements, was altered over the period of time from November 26, 1968, to March 20, 1969.

The environmental situation for the study was reconstructed and constitutes chapter two. Chapter three is the analysis and attempted determination of Hayakawa's position on the subject at periodic intervals of time.

Procedural steps to insure original research were taken. Selected library sources were used in gathering material for the study. In addition, personal correspondence was used to gain material and information from Hayakawa and other specific individuals.

Selected accounts of the events, divided into specific subtitles, were placed in chronological order to recreate the environmental situation at San Francisco State College. Hayakawa's statements and accounts of his remarks on the enumerated functions and processes of campus government and control were categorized by topic and time interval, and an attempt was made to phrase his position(s) concerning campus government and control, and ascertain if and when his position changed.



### Summary of Environmental Situation

San Francisco State College was considered a progressive educational institution by both faculty and students. In late 1967, Dr. John Summerskill initiated action against persons accused of attacking the editor of the school paper. A demonstration, organized by the Students for a Democratic Society [S.D.S.], ensued, and the school was closed. Dr. Summerskill was eventually fired by his superiors, but the new president, Dr. Robert Smith, did not fare much better in resolving the conflict.

Based on a report that George Murray, a part-time instructor and graduate student, had encouraged minority students to arm themselves for protection, President Smith's superiors requested and eventually ordered him to dismiss Murray. As a result of the eventual dismissal, the Black Student Union, supported by the S.D.S., Third World Liberation Front, and a minority of faculty members, organized a student strike on November 6, 1968. A list of 15 "non-negotiable" demands requesting the establishment of an autonomous Black Studies Department was drawn up by the strikers. Dr. Smith, unable to resolve the conflict, partly because his superiors would not allow negotiation until the strike was called off, resigned on November 25, 1968.

Dr. Hayakawa, acting president as of November 26, 1968, instigated a "hard-line policy" of confronting the demonstrators with force. The school was opened on December 2, 1968, but due to an increase of demonstrations, it was closed on December 14, 1968. The somewhat peaceful reopening of the campus took place on January 6, 1969. On that date, the A.F.T. complicated the negotiations by calling a

strike. A California State College rule prohibited teachers from being absent from classes more than 5 consecutive days, but the rule was never enforced.

Demonstrations increased in occurrence and number of participants, so on January 23, 1969, 454 persons were arrested, and as a result, subsequent demonstrations lacked support. The A.F.T. ended its strike on February 24, 1969. On February 14, 1969, Hayakawa's address to the faculty was interrupted by hecklers. Dr. Nathan Hare, appointed head of the Black Studies Department, was eventually dismissed from his position for taking part in the disruption.

After January 23, 1969, the "non-negotiable" demands became "negotiable" objectives. The strike ended on March 20, 1969, and police stayed on campus pending further developments. The final decision on disciplinary penalties was withheld until April 11, 1969.

### Summary of Findings

#### Use of Police

During all four periods of time [See p.37], Hayakawa advocated using necessary means to insure the continuence of the instructional process. Police were considered as a viable means to insure that end. During the first time interval he made people aware of his position concerning the use of an external police force in campus government and control.

From November 26, 1968, to February 3, 1969, Hayakawa added another justification for the use of police--to quell violence. He maintained this position even when police actions were being condemned

as brutal, and acknowledged that police brutality was a possibility, but placed some of the blame on the demonstrators and society.

By February 3, 1969, another position was evident: police acted as a deterrent to expected violence. A shift in Hayakawa's position concerning the number of police to be used was evident during this time. He consciously attempted to limit the number of police on campus, but stated that additional police would be called back, if necessary. During the time interval February 4, 1969, to March 20, 1969, Hayakawa demonstrated a willingness to use police quickly and in force to protect the campus and personal freedom.

#### Role of a President

Hayakawa was not always consistent in his position concerning the role of a president in campus government and control. Before November 26, 1968, the faculty role was stressed. This was probably due to familiarity with faculty responsibilities, or possibly, he considered the faculty role to be superior to that of the president. A change from the faculty role to a stronger presidential role was evident during the period of time from November 26, 1968, to February 2, 1969. By the time of the Congressional Hearing, Hayakawa's position shifted toward more presidential power. He contended that the president had the responsibility of putting together the campus structure to benefit the students. During the period of time from February 4, 1969, to March 20, 1969, Hayakawa contradicted his earlier position by saying that the president was a servant of the faculty and the collective aims of the students, implying that the president gets his authority from the

faculty and students. Previously Hayakawa declared that responsibility should be delegated down from the president to the various faculty and student groups.

#### Role of the Academic Senate

Prior to November 26, 1968, Hayakawa's position was that the Academic Senate did have a responsibility in campus government and control, and wanted it to take a more responsive role in devising an adequate judicial system. The Academic Senate was to support the president, and represent faculty opinion. From November 26, 1968, to February 3, 1969, Hayakawa's position seemed consistent with the previous one. The Academic Senate represented the faculty and advised the president. It was considered to have a major role in campus government and control, and Hayakawa reiterated his desire for it to take a more responsive role in setting up an adequate judiciary.

A major change had occurred in Hayakawa's position by the time of the Congressional Hearing. He contended that the Academic Senate was holding power which rightly belonged to the president. He placed it in a solely advisory capacity, and denied it any other role. In previous time periods the Academic Senate was granted the role of mutual cooperation with the president. He specifically stated that the Academic Senate had power only in minor day to day business of the campus, that it did not have a major role in campus government and control. Another change in Hayakawa's position was evident during the time period February 4, 1969, to March 20, 1969. Hayakawa seemed to move back to his previous position, but probably only as long as the

views of the Academic Senate were consistent with his position.

#### Role and Limitations on Students

Prior to November 26, 1968, Hayakawa did acknowledge that students do have a role in campus government and control, but that until they were willing to accept the responsibility for their actions, their activities should be limited. Between November 26, 1968, and February 2, 1969, Hayakawa's position was to limit the role of students by refusing to deal with the student body leadership at the time. The position seemed inconsistent with the declaration that he was willing to meet valid student demands. However, it could be construed to mean that students would not be limited in their role as long as their demands were in line with his position.

On February 3, 1969, Hayakawa contradicted his previous position by saying that his door was open at all times, and he was willing to negotiate with students. During the time February 4, 1969, to March 20, 1969, Hayakawa pointed out that students must play a larger role in campus government and control in order to meet the needs of the future. Hayakawa would probably only support the students' role if they were willing to accept responsibility for their actions and their views were in accord with his.

#### Role and Limitations on Faculty

Prior to November 26, 1968, Hayakawa supported the right of faculty dissent and pointed out that the role of the faculty in campus government and control was to guide the educational process. He maintained this position during each period of time, but changed his

position concerning additional roles and limitations of the faculty.

From November 26, 1968, to February 3, 1969, Hayakawa's position was to limit the role of the faculty by placing the review of faculty actions under his office, and indicated that the California State College ruling would be enforced. Disruptions in class or unprofessional conduct on the part of a faculty member could result in immediate dismissal. This seemed to be a limitation on faculty independence and a diminution of its role in campus government and control. Hayakawa's position concerning the dismissal of faculty members for absence from class had changed by February 3, 1969. He pointed out that the measure was considered punitive and not necessarily applicable to the situation, but indicated that each case would still be reviewed for possible dismissal. A closer communication link between the faculty and administration was also encouraged. After February 3, 1969, Hayakawa acknowledged that the faculty does have a role in setting campus policy, and that the faculty should advise the president and support his actions.

#### Role of a Judiciary

Before November 25, 1968, Hayakawa considered the existing judicial system inadequate under any circumstances, and contended that the 72 hour time limit for hearing cases was sufficient. During the interval from November 26, 1968, to February 3, 1969, Hayakawa still maintained that the existing judicial system was inadequate and needed to be changed, that it should be utilized, and that it should be efficient. He changed his position concerning the 72 hour time limit on cases.

By February 3, 1969, Hayakawa considered the judiciary as having an important part in campus government and control. If set up correctly it could alleviate the need for calling in outside help. Until that time, Hayakawa considered the existing judicial set-up as unworkable in any situation, but as of February 3, considered it acceptable under normal circumstances. This seems to give further support to the contention that Hayakawa did consider the judiciary as having a role in campus government and control, but more importantly, that he would allow it to function only if its actions were similar to his wishes. Hayakawa's position from February 4, 1969, to March 20, 1969, was similar to his position during the Congressional Hearing. He still considered the judicial system as having a role in campus government and control, and that the existing set-up would work during normal times.

### Conclusions

Based on the analysis of the data presented, the following conclusions have been drawn:

1. During the selected time interval, Hayakawa was consistent in his expressed positions regarding the role of external police in campus government and control. He did, however, vary his position in regard to the number of police to be used.
2. During the selected time interval, Hayakawa's expressed position concerning the role of the college president in campus government and control followed a pattern toward increasingly more centralized power vested in the president. In this respect, his position represented a gradual change.
3. During the selected time interval, Hayakawa was not consistent in his expressed position pertaining to the role of the Academic Senate in campus government and control. He seemed to change his first position, and at a later date a move was detected back toward the original position.

4. During the selected time interval, Hayakawa consistently expressed that students had a role in campus government and control but varied his position concerning the extent of that role. He did however, consider the student role in campus government and control to be necessary.

5. During the selected time interval, Hayakawa shifted his expressed position concerning certain faculty roles in campus government and control. However, he consistently held that the primary role of the faculty was to guide the educational process of the college.

6. During the selected time interval, Hayakawa was consistent in his expressed position concerning the role of a judicial system in campus government and control. He did, however, vary his position in regard to the effectiveness of the existing judicial system.

#### Implications for Further Study

Combining the results of this study with additional research could result in a broader understanding of rhetoric during times of crisis. If such studies were undertaken they might properly appear in the following forms:

1. An additional study might be undertaken to determine if the changes in Hayakawa's position were due to the campus unrest.
2. A similar study could be compiled on a different college president or other administrator or administrative body, to determine his positions(s) on campus government and control.



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