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COMMUNICATION BETWEEN U.S. ARMY SENIOR AND JUNIOR
OFFICERS AS A FACTOR IN SEPARATION

BY

JEFFREY H. WETJEN

A thesis submitted
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree Master of Arts, Major in
Speech, South Dakota
State University

1978

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COMMUNICATION BETWEEN U.S. ARMY SENIOR AND JUNIOR

OFFICERS AS A FACTOR IN SEPARATION

This thesis is approved as a creditable and independent investigation by a candidate for the degree, Master of Arts, and is acceptable for meeting the thesis requirements for this degree. Acceptance of this thesis does not imply that the conclusions reached by the candidate are necessarily the conclusions of the major department.

Dr. Wayne E. Hoogestraat,
Thesis Adviser

Date

Dr. Judith Zivanovic, Chairperson
Department of Speech

Date

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JHW

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of Purpose

The purpose of this study is to determine the communication relationship between U.S. Army Senior Officers and those Junior Officers who separated from the service voluntarily from 1966 through 1970, as revealed in selected U.S. Army studies.

Origin of the Problem

During the period between 1966 and 1970, the U.S. Army experienced a high rate of Junior Officer separations. Department of the Army felt that problems within the military system may have been responsible for the high separation rate. During this period approximately 80 percent of the Junior Officers on active duty chose to leave active military service. Of these, approximately 81.36 percent elected to leave after having completed more than two years, but less than four years, of active commissioned service, as determined by a review of U.S. Military Personnel records at St. Louis, Mo., in 1971.¹

A variety of studies have been undertaken, primarily by the U.S. Army, attempting to determine the principal reasons for these voluntary separations. However, no specific studies were discovered which have attempted to assess the communication relationship

between Junior and Senior Officers as a possible factor contributing to the decision to separate.

An examination of the available studies dealing with reasons for Junior Officer separations show a substantial amount of data dealing with the communication relationship between Junior and Senior Officers. Specifically, these studies are the Franklin Institute of Research Study, "Career Motivation of Army Personnel-- Junior Officers' Duties;" U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Study, "Why They Leave: Resignations from the USMA Class of 1966;" and the U.S. Army Ordnance Center and School Study, "Ordnance Corps Officer Losses." However, data from the studies have not been analyzed with the view toward assessing the designated communication relationship as a contributing factor in voluntary separations. It is hoped that completion of the present inquiry will lead to such an assessment.

The author, having been a member of the active Army from 1966 through 1975, was directly involved with the problem of Junior Officer retention. While on active duty, it was the author's observation that communication played an important part in retaining Junior Officers. Upon release from active duty, the author felt that a study should be undertaken to determine the scope of the role communication played in Junior Officer separations.

Procedures

In this study the following steps have been completed in the approximate sequence listed:

1. A review of existing pertinent literature was conducted to determine whether or not any studies had been done on the communication relationship between Junior and Senior U.S. Army Officers as a factor in voluntary separations from 1966 through 1970.

A two step review was conducted. The first encompassed studies completed for or by the U.S. Government from 1967 through the spring of 1976. The second review encompassed studies completed in departments of Communication and/or Speech.

The review of the U.S. Government studies was accomplished in the following manner:

- A. Review of the U.S. Government Reports Announcements from 1966 through March 1976 under Corporate Titles, Department of Army, Department of Defense, Franklin Institute of Research, and the U.S. Military Academy, West Point. (See Table I, page 4.)

- B. Review of the U.S. Government Reports Announcements from 1966 through March 1976 under Subject Titles, Communication, Leadership, Personnel Management, and Speech. (See Table I, page 4.)

In conducting the review of the government sources A and B above, six studies were tentatively identified as possibly dealing with a subject similar to that in the present investigation.

- (1) "Career Motivation of Army Personnel--Junior Officers' Duties," Technical Report 1-212, Volumes I & II, Franklin Institute of Research Project C2081, Sept., 1968.

This study is being used in the present investigation.

TABLE I

GOVERNMENT REPORTS ANNOUNCEMENT REVIEW BY
YEAR, CORPORATE TITLE, AND SUBJECT

| Year | Dept of Army | Dept of Def. | F.I.R. | USMA | COMM | LDRSHP | PERMGT | SPEECH |
|------|--------------------|--------------------|--------|------|------|--------|--------|--------|
| 1966 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| 1967 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| 1968 | NO | NO | YES | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| 1969 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| 1970 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| 1971 | NO | NO | NO | YES | NO | NO | NO | YES |
| 1972 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| 1973 | YES | NO | NO | NO | YES | NO | NO | NO |
| 1974 | YES | NO | NO | NO | YES | NO | NO | NO |
| 1975 | YES | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | YES | NO |
| 1976 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |

(2) "Survey of Careerists and Non-Careerists from the USMA Classes 1963-1967 (A Product Appraisal Report)," Robert P. Butler, Apr '71, 50p, Rpt #1X3.01-71-003, U.S. Military Academy, Office of Institutional Research, Conducted May '70. AP 730-685, 71-22 05. This report deals with the responses of 1250 USMA graduates from classes of 1963-1967. A four part survey that was conducted in May 1970. The major purpose of the study was to gather information about the graduates in six major areas: personal background, perceptions of their wives' feelings toward several aspects of military life, development of skills in various areas, perceptions of minority group problems and drug abuse, attitudes toward the Army, and attitudes toward items of general interest. The respondents were divided into two groups, careerists and non-careerists. Statistical tests of differences between the two groups for the questionnaire items were conducted and it found that responses of the careerists and non-careerists differed significantly in regard to the majority of items. This implies that the two groups can be more clearly defined by the information in the six areas of the report.²

(3) "Closing the Communication Gap," Warren G. Lawson, 26 March 1973, 33p, U.S. Army War College, AD 761-575, 73-15, o5A. Interpersonnel Communications are used within the organization to direct all actions. However, research has confirmed that most organizational communication networks are dreadfully inefficient; that the threads of meaning which instruct and implement are frequently broken resulting in a communication gap. Since communication is so important to organizational effectiveness, the many barriers impacting on the system were studied. Data was collected using literature search concentrating on similar problems in the business world, and using material developed from study, research, and discussion of 25 USAWC students within the Interpersonnel Communication Elective (Class of 1973). From this research the most important barriers and gateways of an engineering, (physical, physiological) psychological and sociological nature are isolated. The paper [sic] designed for publication and provided guidance to the military commander or supervisor a recommended method of improving communications in organizations.³

(4) "The Lines of Communication Program in Vietnam," Nelson P. Convor, 8 March 1973, 60p, AD 762-255, 72-15, 15G. This study deals with the highway construction program in Vietnam.⁴

(5) "Communication and the Military Executive," Edwin D. Heath, Jr., 18 June 1974, 25p, USAWC, AD 787-264/1GA, 74-26, 05I. The purpose of this paper is to identify problems which inhibit effective communication in the large organization and to analyze how these problems impact on the military organization and to recommend methods and techniques to make more effective the military executive.⁵

(6) "Survey of Factors Relating to the Retention of Junior Officers," 26 July 1975, Rpt #DAPC-PMP-4-73-E, AD A010-349-9GA, 5I, U.S. Army Military Personnel Center, Personnel Management Development Directorate. This report is based upon a survey designed to qualify factors significant in the career decisions of Junior Officers leaving the Army. Data were collected at 16 selected transfer points during a 30 day period beginning 1 Feb 1972, approximately 1600 Junior Officers were included in the sample.

After careful review of all identified studies in steps A and B, it has been determined that with the exception of (1) above, which is being utilized in the present investigation, there were no studies completed or in progress dealing with the communication relationship between Junior and Senior U.S. Army Officers as a factor on voluntary separations from 1966 through 1970.

The review of Communication and/or Speech areas was accomplished in the following manner:

A. Review of Speech Monographs from 1966 through 1969 under the following titles:

(1) Auer, J. Jeffery. "Doctoral Dissertations in Speech: Work in Process."

(2) Knower, Franklin H. "Graduate Theses: An Index of Graduate Work in Speech."

(3) Nelson, Max. "Abstracts of Theses in the Field of Speech."

B. Review of Bibliographic Annual in Speech Communication from 1970 through 1973 was accomplished in the following manner:

(1) Auer, J. Jeffery. "Doctoral Dissertations in Speech: Work in Process."

(2) Nelson, Max. "Graduate Theses: An Index of Graduate Work in Speech."

(3) Nelson, Max. "Abstracts of Theses in the Field of Speech."

C. Review of Bibliographic Annual in Speech Communication from 1974 through 1975 was accomplished in the following manner:

(1) Logue, Cal M. "Abstracts of Doctoral Dissertations in the Field of Speech Communication."

(2) Logue, Cal M. "Graduate Theses and Dissertations in Speech Communication."

D. Review of Index to American Doctoral Dissertations from 1966 through 1972.

E. Review of Index to Doctoral Dissertations International from 1973 through April 1976.

After careful review of material in A through E above, it has been determined that there were no recorded studies completed or in process dealing with communication between Junior and Senior U.S. Army Officers as a factor in the voluntary separations from 1966 through 1970.

2. In order that this analysis may be interpreted in terms of the environment out of which the designated separations occurred, an attempt was made to provide the military historic milieu of the period 1966 through 1970. In this effort the following sources were used: U.S. Government documents, news

accounts during the 1966 through 1970 period, and other incidental reports.

3. The study, "Ordnance Corps Officer Losses"⁷ (hereafter referred to as the Ordnance Study), which was conducted on Ordnance Junior Officers who separated from the service between 1966 and 1970, was in the writer's possession from the outset of this inquiry.

4. From the above mentioned study all items with either the body of the question or a response dealing with the communication relationship between Junior and Senior Officers were extracted. This was done first by the author and then reviewed by the author's advisor. Additions and/or deletions to the questions were made at that time. The term "communication relationship" is here (and hereafter) broadly defined to include the written and the oral medium; verbal, non-verbal, and paralinguistic; social and professional; formal and informal; and the various rhetorical elements of communication--invention, style, arrangement, and delivery.

5. After the items dealing with the communication relationship between Junior and Senior Officers had been selected, the responses to the selected questions were tabulated.

6. The study, "Why They Leave: Resignations from the USMA Class of 1966"⁸ (hereafter referred to as the West Point Study), which was conducted on the 1966 West Point Class members who separated from the service between 1968 and 1970, was obtained by

writing the Superintendent, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York.

7. From the above mentioned study all items with either the body of the question or a response dealing with the communication relationship between Junior and Senior Officers were extracted, following the method indicated in Step 4.

8. After the items dealing with the communication relationship between Junior and Senior Officers had been selected, the responses to the selected questions were tabulated.

9. The study, "Career Motivation of Army Personnel--Junior Officers' Duties"⁹ (hereafter referred to as the Franklin Study), which was conducted by the Franklin Institute for the U.S. Army on an Army-wide problem of Junior Officer retention, was procured by writing the Franklin Institute Research Laboratories, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

10. From the above mentioned study all items with either the body of the question or a response dealing with the communication relationship between Junior and Senior Officers were extracted, following the method indicated in Step 4.

11. After the items dealing with the communication relationship between Junior and Senior Officers had been selected, the responses were tabulated.

12. From the data provided through the above steps, an attempt was made to assess the degree, nature, and direction of

communication between the designated Junior and Senior Officers as it related to the decision to separate.

13. Finally, conclusions were drawn concerning the degree, nature, and direction of communication between Junior and Senior Officers as a factor in the Junior Officers' decision to separate from active military service between 1966 and 1970.

FOOTNOTES

¹The review of Official Officer Personnel Files was conducted by a team of officers from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, and the U.S. Army Ordnance Center and School, of which the author was an indirect member.

²U.S. Government Reports Announcements from 1966 through March 1976 under Corporate Titles and Subject Titles.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

⁷U.S. Army Ordnance Center and School. "Ordnance Corps Officer Losses," Aberdeen Proving Ground, May 1971. (Typewritten.)

⁸U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. "Why They Leave: Resignations from the USMA Class of 1966," July, 1970. (Typewritten.)

⁹Franklin Institute of Research. "Career Motivation of Army Personnel-Junior Officers' Duties," Philadelphia, Sept., 1968. (Typewritten.)

CHAPTER II

THE VIETNAM CONFLICT

1957 through 1967

Pre United States Involvement

The purpose of this chapter is to present a brief historical sketch of the Vietnam Conflict in order to determine the environment at the time designated U.S. Army Junior Officers voluntarily chose to leave active duty.

The Vietnam War, also called the Second Indochina War, can be said to have started in 1957 when Communist-led insurgents began mounting terrorists attacks against the government of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). The causes of the conflict can be traced back to the First Indochina War of 1946-1954.¹ After the defeat of Japan in World War II, the French returned to Indochina as the colonial administrators but were challenged for control by the Viet Minh, the Communist-led Vietnamese nationalists who had established a government in northern Vietnam in 1945.² The French, in a move designed to give the impression of granting independence to Indochina while still retaining control, granted sovereignty to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as "associated states" of the French Union in 1949.³ This move allowed the new members a seat in the French Parliament, but still gave the ruling party

in parliament almost total control in the Indochina governments. All this, however, was not enough to stop the surge of Communism in Southeast Asia.⁴ In 1950, the United States began supplying the "associated states" with economic and military aid, although it was channeled through France. By 1954, the United States had furnished \$2 billion of financial aid to the French War effort.⁵ The French in 1954 were besieged at the fortress of Dien Bien Phu, and in June the French National Assembly submitted to a termination of the war.

By the Geneva Agreement of July 21, 1954, North Vietnam was left in the hands of Ho Chi Minh and the South in the control of non-Communist nationalists leaders.⁶ With the division of the two Vietnams, the Communists, who were unable to unify and control Vietnam through political means and elections, then turned to military means to try to unify and control the Vietnams. The objective of the Vietnamese Communists remained constant throughout the war: the over-throw of the non-Communist Saigon government and its replacement with a regime that would agree to ultimate amalgamation with Ho Chi Minh's government at Hanoi, in the North.⁷

When the French were besieged at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, a request by the French for assistance was made to the United States. The administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower gave serious consideration to providing the French with air and ground forces for support.⁸ Marvin Kalb, in his book, Roots of Involvement: The U.S. in Asia 1784-1971, states:

Eisenhower determined early in his administration that he would strive for peace and quiet. He was not always successful. But, on at least one occasion in April 1954, when admirals and generals came pounding at the White House door for permission to attack and assist the French at Dien Bien Phu and other Communist held positions, all supported by the Vice President, Secretary of State, and members of the Senate, Eisenhower did not yield under pressure. He attached conditions to his consent, which, as it turned out, could not be met.⁹

Without the support requested, the French were defeated and the Vietnams were divided.

The U.S. Becomes Involved

In accordance with its obligations as a member of the South East Asia Treaty Organization, the United States supplied military material and equipment at the request of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). A Military Assistance and Advisory Group was established to supervise and coordinate this support program. This commitment for support was made by President Dwight D. Eisenhower on 10 October 1954. In 1955, the Military Assistance and Advisory Group was given the authority by the Department of Defense to organize and train as well as equip the armed forces of South Vietnam as defined in the agreement signed by President Eisenhower in 1954.¹⁰

In 1957, the Communist organization in South Vietnam (the Viet Cong) initiated a campaign of terror to undermine the authority of the central government. This campaign included the assassination and kidnapping of governmental officials and supporters. By 1960, the number of assassinations reached 1400, and over 700 kidnappings

had occurred. President John F. Kennedy approved the request for additional aid in 1961 with the increase of 16,000 U.S. Military advisory personnel.¹¹ As the communist pressure increased and the military requirements increased, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was created in February 1962.¹²

On 30 July 1964, South Vietnamese naval craft raided islands in the Gulf of Tonkin north of the 17th parallel. The 17th parallel was the dividing parallel line between North and South Vietnam as set by the Geneva Agreement of 21 July 1954. Two United States Navy destroyers were patrolling near South Vietnamese naval craft. North Vietnamese naval PT boats (Patrol Torpedo Boat, a small, highly maneuverable vessel, armed with torpedoes for action against enemy shipping), probably pursuing the South Vietnamese naval craft, attacked the two United States Navy destroyers. Two North Vietnamese PT boats were sunk by the U.S. destroyers, and U.S. warplanes bombed the North Vietnamese PT boat base. This was the first reported U.S. attack on North Vietnamese territory.¹³

After the Gulf of Tonkin incident, President Johnson asked Congress for powers "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression."¹⁴ Congress granted these powers by an overwhelming vote, though some Congressmen later stated they misunderstood the full implications of this action. Nevertheless, President Johnson used the resolution as the chief legal basis for the U.S.

support of the South Vietnamese in the war. The Gulf of Tonkin resolution was repealed by the United States Congress in June 1970.¹⁵

As of early March 1965, no decision had been reached by the United States on intervention with ground forces into the war, other than limited Marine Security force deployed to protect Da Nang, South Vietnam. Da Nang is a major port and city in South Vietnam, just below the 17th parallel. However, President Johnson ordered air attacks over North Vietnam on military targets in early May 1965. Due to the grave tactical situation reported to President Johnson by MACV and South Vietnamese government sources, President Johnson directed the deployment of U.S. combat forces, using the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as the basis for legally sending in the forces. At the Hawaiian Conference 9-11 April 1965, the Secretary of Defense approved the plan for sending the first combat troops to Vietnam. The 173rd Airborne Brigade began arriving in South Vietnam on 21 April 1965. This was just the beginning of the accelerated build up.¹⁶ President Johnson, being advised by the Commander of MACV, General William C. Westmorland, that the South Vietnamese could not survive very long without more U.S. combat forces to assist the government of South Vietnam in its fight against the communist forces, decided in mid-July to actively commit the United States combat forces to the aid of South Vietnam.¹⁷

The Vietnam Conflict was quite different from that for which the United States Army had been trained. The Vietnam War

was fought essentially by small units in constant pursuit of an elusive enemy. In stark contrast to World War II and Korea, which had major offensive and defensive battles with large numbers of combat forces facing each other over defined linear front lines, Vietnam was characterized largely by small, isolated actions consisting of ground and air assaults mounted from numerous isolated base camps dotting the countryside. There were no fixed terrain objectives. When some key terrain feature was at issue, it was usually for a limited purpose and a designated time.¹⁸ Lieutenant General John H. Hay, Jr., in his monograph, Tactical and Material Innovations in Vietnam, stated:

For the U.S. Army, the war in Vietnam presented a new type of battle fought with new weapons and new tactics against a very different enemy. The tactics and methods of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong soldiers did not fit the patterns established by enemy forces in World War II and the Korean War. This fact was especially evident during the stages of the insurgency when the enemy's main force units tried to avoid heavy contact in favor of terrorism and ambush. Another difference was that all of South Vietnam was a war arena with shifting scenes of combat in comparison to the rigidity imposed by narrow front lines characteristic of past conflicts.¹⁹

There was no neat, linear division between enemy and friendly forces; no front lines; and no rear boundaries. Consequently, there was neither a communications zone nor a combat zone. In fact, the combat zone and the communications zone were one and the same. The Department of the Army defines communications zone and combat zone as follows:

The communications zone (COMMZ) comprises the area from the rear boundary of the combat zone to the rear boundary of the theater of operations. The COMMZ is regarded as essentially a time and distance void between the combat force and its manpower and material replenishment. The combat zone is that part of the theater of operations²⁰ required by combat troupes for the conduct of operations.

At no time during the duration of the war were there any really "secure" areas within Vietnam. The adaptation of the U.S. forces to the countrywide battlefield evolved through a process of trial and error. Success was not clear-cut; control of the population was often in doubt; victory or defeat lay at the grass-roots level. Thus, there were two wars going on: the purely military battle against the enemy's main force, and the pacification operation. Pacification is the process of establishing or reestablishing effective local self-government within the political framework of the legitimate central government and its constitution.²¹

As the problems of the South Vietnamese government increased in the country, with communist forces taking more and more territory, steps were being taken in the United States to further involve the country in a conflict more than 5,000 miles from its shores.

1965 Through 1970

The Buildup

The Secretary of Defense during the Hawaii Conference on April 9-11, 1965, on the defense of Southeast Asia and the Vietnamese situation, approved the first major troop buildup, with an Army Combat force of over 33,000 troops. The first of these

troops were to arrive in South Vietnam on 21 April 1965. (See Chart I and Table II, pages 20 and 21.)

After the April Conference in Hawaii, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam requested that forces would be required to support the action in South Vietnam. However, the number of troops approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense was always less than the number requested by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.²²

United States Forces were built up in an unbalanced manner. Continued enemy pressure on the beleaguered government of South Vietnam and manpower ceilings combined to cause an inadequate defense base in relation to the total force level. By 1967 the communists were closer to victory than ever. American bases populated the coast of South Vietnam, and the U.S. presence there neared 500,000. At each level of escalation General William Westmoreland, Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, kept talking about "the light at the end of the tunnel" and repeated that his last request would be sufficient, only to argue that only 100,000 more men would be enough. As President Johnson reported these platitudes and examples of wishful thinking to the American people, they began seriously to question the wisdom of going into Vietnam in the first place. America found itself in a position similar to that of France in the early 1950's, stepping up the war effort while the political position of her leadership crumbled under criticism of the war at home.²³ During the period from mid-1966

CHART I
 AUTHORIZED TROOP LEVEL IN SOUTH VIETNAM




Chart I shows the manpower ceilings set by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Source: Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies, Logistic Support, Washington, D.C. 1974, page 13.

TABLE II

U.S. ARMY AND TOTAL U.S. MILITARY
PERSONNEL IN SOUTH VIETNAM

| Date | U.S. Army Personnel | Total Military |
|--------------|---------------------|----------------|
| 31 Dec 1960 | 800 | 900 |
| 31 Dec 1961 | 2,100 | 3,200 |
| 31 Dec 1962 | 7,900 | 11,300 |
| 31 Dec 1963 | 10,100 | 16,300 |
| 31 Dec 1964 | 14,700 | 23,300 |
| 31 Mar 1965 | 15,600 | 29,100 |
| 31 Dec 1965 | 116,800 | 184,300 |
| 31 Mar 1966 | 137,400 | 231,200 |
| 31 Dec 1966 | 239,400 | 485,300 |
| 31 Mar 1967 | 264,600 | 420,900 |
| 31 Dec 1967 | 319,500 | 485,600 |
| 31 Mar 1968 | 337,300 | 515,200 |
| 31 Dec 1968 | 359,800 | 536,100 |
| *31 Jan 1969 | 365,600 | 542,400 |
| 31 Mar 1969 | 361,500 | 538,200 |
| 31 Dec 1969 | 330,300 | 474,400 |
| 31 Mar 1970 | 321,400 | 448,500 |
| 31 Dec 1970 | 250,700 | 335,800 |
| 31 Mar 1971 | 227,600 | 301,900 |
| 3 Jun 1971 | 197,500 | 250,900 |

*Indicates peak strength in South Vietnam

Between 1954-1960 U.S. Military Strength averaged about 650 advisors.

Source: Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies, Logistic Support, Washington, D.C., 1974, page 14.

to mid-1969, the authorized strength of U.S. forces in South Vietnam rose from about 276,000 men to a peak of 549,000.

The Pullout

The United States balance of payments deficit between 1960-1968 was soaring, with the United States spending 16 billion dollars more than it received from abroad, according to the U.S. News and World Report, April 1, 1968. The position of the U.S. dollar in world markets was weakening, thus adding to world inflation, according to the American Bankers Association in U.S. News and World Report, August 14, 1967. This was due in part to the U.S. having the only economy in the Western world that was on anything like a wartime basis. U.S. inflation was being exported to Europe and Japan as the vicious spiral escalated with every increase of the war effort. As government platitudes to the public masked a growing despair in circles surrounding President Johnson, riots and demonstrations spread. Anti-war manifestations were joined by civil rights riots which grew in ferocity and destruction. The United States was losing the Vietnam War at home.²⁴ As the U.S. escalated the war in Vietnam, protest activity also escalated. The year 1965 saw not only the beginning of the U.S.'s bombing of North Vietnam on a round-the-clock basis but also a great number of teach-ins, marches, demonstrations, and other forms of protest against the war.²⁵

The anti-draft movement became a most important branch of the anti-Vietnam War movement. The development seemed logical.

With no draft, the war in Vietnam could not be fought; there would be too few to fight in it. Therefore, anyone who was against the war should be against the draft also. Yet it was not until the anti-draft protest began to concentrate its activities on the college campuses that the anti-war and anti-draft movements came together.²⁶

President Johnson's credibility reached new lows at a time when he planned to launch his re-election campaign. U.S. News and World Report, August 21, 1967 stated:

There is a real and growing concern among Democrats in Congress and the White House as they size up the political outlook for the 1968 election year. The combined irritations of war, riots, and spending programs have driven LBJ's popularity down to 39%, the lowest he has received during his 45 months in office according to the latest Gallup poll.²⁷

The U.S. won a surprising victory over the Communist forces, with the defeat of the NLF (National Liberation Front), and the VC (Viet Cong) at Hue to end the 1968 TET Offensive started in January 1968. Meanwhile, pressure to step down as President mounted in the country as the anti-war demonstrations continued. On March 10, 1968, General Westmoreland informed President Johnson that he would need 206,000 more men in Vietnam, when the American presence already stood at over half a million. President Johnson was then told by the Secretary of the Treasury and his economic advisors that if further escalation was contemplated, America would be forced to devalue the dollar in order to meet the costs of the war.²⁸

On March 31, 1968, President Johnson decided not to seek re-election. He knew he was beaten, not on the battlefield but politically. President Johnson withdrew for a number of reasons but, basically, because "he was fed up," beaten down by attacks from within his own party, unable to persuade a Democratic Congress to cooperate in any field, as reported by U.S. News and World Report, April 15, 1968.²⁹ No candidate could run or hope to win on a promise of four more years of war. The public, disillusioned with Democratic war policies for the past eight years and shattered by the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy, turned to Richard Nixon. For the first time during the war the Communists were on the defensive, their TET offensive in the south a failure. Their best units destroyed, their carefully hoarded supplies near exhaustion, the Viet Cong and NLF were in no position to mount another offensive for years. For the first time the Communists were on the defensive just at the moment when America lost its will to fight.³⁰

In June 1969, President Nixon announced the first U.S. force withdrawals, and graduated reductions continued from then on.³¹ But the war was far from over. President Nixon announced a policy of "Vietnamization" of the war, which was a cover word meaning a slow American withdrawal from Indochina while ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) was trained and equipped to maintain its newly-won positions. Despite continuing American withdrawals, President Nixon gave in to the Pentagon's request to

attack North Vietnamese bases in Cambodia in April, 1970. The public reaction, in the United States, to this raid was violent. Congress opposed this apparent re-escalation of the war, and President Nixon was obligated to withdraw U.S. troops from Cambodia in July, 1970. The attack encouraged the American public and Congress to urge President Nixon to step up the American withdrawal from Indochina.³²

By 1972 the United States still had over 100,000 men in Indochina, it was another election year, and President Nixon was up for reelection. Just before the November elections the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, announced that the end of the war was at hand. President Nixon won an overwhelming victory at the polls, and in 1973 the last American troops left Indochina.³³

War Attitudes at Home

At a time when a note of optimism was beginning to creep into the intelligence reports on the progress of the war in Vietnam, pessimism suddenly took hold in the United States. The war, as far as Americans were concerned, appeared to be running toward a showdown between the administration of President Johnson and the American people.³⁴

Signs showed that the public--with an election drawing closer--was becoming more and more insistent that the war in Vietnam either be won or de-escalated by an American pull back.³⁵

Polls, mail to congress, sentiment--sounding at the grass roots--all showed that the people were becoming increasingly irritated and impatient with a war that kept dragging on and on. Disappointment with the causes of the war was evident everywhere, casualties were reaching new highs, progress that had been promised had not materialized, and the South Vietnamese forces were not perceived as taking or accepting their fair share of the responsibility for the fighting.³⁶

The following list of articles from the New York Times illustrates public attitudes and sentiment about the war:

President Nixon refers to some campus radicals who oppose his Vietnamese policies as "bums," contrasting them with American soldiers whom he calls "the greatest." (May 1, 1970)

A blast of gun fire from the National Guard kills four University Students, two of them young women, at Kent (Ohio) State University. Eight other students are wounded. The shooting came shortly after guardsmen used tear gas to break up a noon rally of 1,000 students protesting the widening of the war in Indochina. (May 4, 1970)

Student demonstrators across the country step up their protests against the Indochina war and demonstrate their bitterness engendered by the Kent State killings. (May 5, 1970)

Colleges across the nation close down in anti-war demonstrations for periods ranging from a day to the remainder of the term. (May 6, 1970)

An anti-war crowd of between 75,000-100,000 drawn mostly from the nation's campuses, demonstrate near the White House. (May 9, 1970)

The Hatfield-McGovern "amendment to end the war" is defeated (55-39) in the Senate by a coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats. The amendment

was designed to withdraw all Americans from Vietnam by the end of 1971. (Sept. 1, 1970)³⁷

"Unrest" on the American campuses and elsewhere in the United States among the American people grew, and even the government itself was divided over the Indochina policies of the various administrations since the start of the Vietnam War in 1965. It was this "unrest" that in the end caused the final and eventual withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam in 1973.³⁸

Military War Attitudes

As the "unrest" grew at home with the American people, so did the "unrest" grow within the military system, especially among those young men serving in the war zone itself, Vietnam. The Pentagon reported a total of 495,689 cases of desertion from August 1964 through December 1972.³⁹

An example of the problem within the service is based on personal experience and personal observations of the author during his tour of duty in Vietnam from May 1969 through May 1970. The major problem observed was that of lack of respect for those in command and the orders they were to carry out in connection with the duties the young soldier was expected to complete. Drugs were everywhere and easy to purchase for small sums of money. They were used as a means of escaping something that was unpleasant. Alcohol was also used excessively as a means of escape.

The problems of the soldier grew as he/she learned of the situation at home. Draft dodgers, deserters, protests, and riots

all played their part in making an already unpleasant job even more unpleasant.

The young officers were also dissatisfied with the way things were. Orders from above were often unreasonable and for the most part unrealistic. So it was no wonder that the young soldier had problems and was dissatisfied with the way things were. His only recourse was to rebel, which he did with great vigor against anything which represented authority.⁴⁰

Increased Junior Officer Separations

During the period between 1966 and 1970, a large number of U.S. Army Junior Officers chose to leave the Army for civilian careers. Retention of Junior Officers during the 15 years preceding 1970, show in Table III (See page 29.) and Table IV (See page 30.), shows that 1970 had the lowest level of retention in more than 10 years.⁴¹ This level of retention was of great concern to military leaders. Their concern over this high incidence of Junior Officer separations led to a number of studies: Franklin Institute of Research, "Career Motivation of Army Personnel--Junior Officers' Duties;"⁴² U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, "Why They Leave: Resignations from the USMA Class of 1966;"⁴³ and the U.S. Army Ordnance Center and School, "Ordnance Corps Officer Losses."⁴⁴ This study, using the data provided in the above studies, represents an attempt to determine

TABLE III
PAST RETENTION EXPERIENCE

| Fiscal Yr. | Number Eligible to Leave | Number Retained | Retention Rate % |
|------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|------------------|
| 1956 | 7,672 | 1,404 | 18.3 |
| 1957 | 13,535 | 2,531 | 18.7 |
| 1958 | 8,094 | 1,716 | 21.2 |
| 1959 | 7,224 | 1,835 | 25.4 |
| 1960 | 5,713 | 1,634 | 28.6 |
| 1961 | 4,547 | 1,687 | 37.1 |
| 1962 | 5,680 | 1,920 | 33.8 |
| 1963 | 6,453 | 2,136 | 33.1 |
| 1964 | 9,216 | 2,092 | 22.7 |
| 1965 | 10,201 | 2,540 | 24.9 |
| 1966 | 11,349 | 2,894 | 25.5 |
| 1967 | 10,486 | 2,307 | 22.0 |
| 1968 | 11,624 | 2,813 | 24.2 |
| 1969 | 27,083 | 7,502 | 27.7 |
| 1970 | 30,258 | 5,628 | 18.6 |

Note: The retention rate is the percent extending on active duty in a Voluntary Category out of those eligible to leave the service. The number eligible to leave are those who have completed their obligated term of service during the fiscal year.

Source: U.S., Department of the Army, Headquarters, Department of the Army Pamphlet Number 601-4, Commanders' Guide to the Retention of Junior Officers (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, November 1970), pp. 1-1-1-3.

TABLE IV

U.S. ARMY STRENGTH BY GRADE

| Rank | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 |
|-------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| 2nd LT | 20,353 (19.1) | 32,981 (25.9) | 35,466 (24.3) | 27,706 (18.6) | 28,230 (19.6) |
| 1st LT | 15,824 (14.9) | 18,685 (14.7) | 29,738 (20.4) | 33,267 (22.4) | 25,938 (18.0) |
| CPT | 32,313 (30.1) | 34,156 (26.8) | 35,180 (24.1) | 38,796 (26.1) | 43,717 (30.4) |
| MAJ | 18,534 (17.4) | 20,470 (16.1) | 22,903 (15.7) | 25,205 (16.9) | 23,447 (16.3) |
| LTC | 13,513 (12.7) | 14,841 (11.6) | 16,336 (11.2) | 16,806 (11.3) | 15,481 (10.8) |
| COL | 5,428 (5.1) | 5,743 (4.5) | 6,024 (4.1) | 6,537 (4.4) | 6,376 (4.4) |
| GEN | 503 (0.5) | 517 (0.4) | 341 (0.2) | 519 (0.3) | 514 (0.5) |
| Total Strength | 106,468 | 127,393 | 145,988 | 148,836 | 143,703 |

Source: Military Personnel Figures from the Military Personnel Center Courtesy of Department of the Army, Public Affairs, Public Information Office Division, Washington, D.C.

how great a factor poor communication and a communication break-down may have been in the decision of the Junior Officer to separate himself from active military service.

FOOTNOTES

¹Ernest Gruening and Herbert Beaser, Vietnam Folly (Washington, D.C.: National Press, 1968), p. 75.

²Ibid., p. 53.

³Ibid., p. 73.

⁴Ibid., pp. 73-74.

⁵Ibid., p. 93.

⁶Ibid., p. 118.

⁷Ibid., pp. 119-120, 127.

⁸David Shermer, Ronald Heiferman, and S. L. Mayer, Wars of the 20th Century (Hong Kong: Mandarin Publishers Limited, 1975), p. 476.

⁹Marvin Kalb, Roots of Involvement: The U.S. in Asia 1784-1971 (New York: Norton and Co., 1971), p. 72.

¹⁰LTG Joseph M. Heiser, Logistic Support, The Department of the Army Vietnam Studies (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 5-6.

¹¹Ibid., p. 6.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Shermer, Heiferman, and Mayer, Wars of the 20th Century, p. 480.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Heiser, Logistic Support, pp. 11-13.

¹⁷Gruening and Beaser, Vietnam Folly, p. 291.

¹⁸Heiser, Logistic Support, p. 7.

¹⁹LTC John H. Hay, Jr., Tactical and Material Innovations, The Department of the Army Vietnam Studies (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 3-4.

²⁰"Logistics," The Department of the Army ROTC Manual 145-80 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 6.

²¹Hay, Tactical and Material Innovations, p. 181.

²²Heiser, Logistic Support, p. 241.

²³MG George S. Eckhardt, Command and Control, The Department of the Army Vietnam Studies (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 84.

²⁴Shermer, Heiferman, and Mayer, Wars of the 20th Century, p. 482.

²⁵Ibid., p. 485.

²⁶James Haskins, The War and the Protest: Vietnam (New York: Doubleday, 1971), p. 64.

²⁷Showdown in U.S. over Vietnam: What New Attitude Means, U.S. News and World Report, August 21, 1967, p. 21.

²⁸Shermer, Heiferman, and Mayer, Wars of the 20th Century, p. 484.

²⁹Ibid., p. 485.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid.

³⁴U.S. News and World Report, August 28, 1967, p. 21.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷New York Times, all dates from May 1, 1970 to Sept. 1, 1970.

³⁸Arlie Schardt, William A. Rusher and Mark O. Hatfield, Amnesty: The Unsettled Question of Vietnam (Lawrence, Massachusetts: Sun River Press, 1973), p. 9.

³⁹Ibid., p. 27.

⁴⁰Edward F. Dolan, Jr., Amnesty: The American Puzzle (New York: Franklin Watts, 1976), p. 36.

⁴¹U.S., Department of the Army, Headquarters, Department of the Army Pamphlet Number 601-4, Commanders' Guide to the Retention of Junior Officers (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, November, 1970), pp. 1-1-1-3.

⁴²Franklin Institute of Research, "Career Motivation of Army Personnel-Junior Officers' Duties," Philadelphia, September 1968. (Typewritten.)

⁴³U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, "Why They Leave: Resignations from the USMA Class of 1966," July 1970. (Typewritten.)

⁴⁴U.S. Army Ordnance Center and School, "Ordnance Corps Officer Losses," Aberdeen Proving Ground, May 1971. (Typewritten.)

CHAPTER III

COMMUNICATION BETWEEN JUNIOR AND

SENIOR U.S. ARMY OFFICERS

The intent in this chapter is to provide the reader with evidence from three U.S. Army Studies concerning Junior Officer Retention. These studies were examined and data on the communication relationship between Junior and Senior U.S. Army Officers have been abstracted.

Between 1966-1970, the U.S. Army became aware of a problem with retention of U.S. Army Junior Officers. Each year there was a large number of Junior Officers leaving the Army for civilian life. Approximately 81.36% of the Junior Officers on active duty elected to leave after having completed more than two years, but less than four years, of active commissioned service, as determined by the review of U.S. Army Military Personnel records at St. Louis, Mo., in April 1971.¹ This was a costly drain of talent. Major General F. W. Gobe, Jr., Chief of Personnel Operation, Headquarters Department of the Army, stated:

It is generally accepted that a decision to choose a particular profession, including the military, as a life time career is not done on a moment's reflection; it is a gradual growth, influenced by the individual's day to day contact with others including the individual's Senior Officer whose influence is significant in career decisions.²

DAPM 601-4 reported retention of Junior Officers was below expectations, in 1966--2,894 (25.5%) retained; in 1967--2,307 (22.0%) retained; in 1968--2,813 (24.2%) retained; in 1969--7,502 (27.7%); and in 1970--5,628 (18.6%) retained,³ the U.S. Army attempted to find out why. The Army's efforts to learn more about the problem of Junior Officer retention were primarily centered on three studies. The first study used is by The Franklin Institute of Research, "Career Motivation of Army Personnel--Junior Officers Duties," hereafter referred to as the "Franklin Study." The second is by the U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, "Why They Leave: Resignations from the United States Military Academy Class of 1966," hereafter referred to as the "West Point Study." The third is by the U.S. Army Ordnance Center and School Study, "Ordnance Corps Officer Losses," hereafter referred to as the "Ordnance Study."

Three Studies

The Franklin Study was completed in 1968, the West Point Study in 1970, and the Ordnance Study in 1971. All dealt with aspects of military life which affect the career decisions of the Junior Officer. However, after a detailed review of each study, it became apparent that in the final results a clear assessment had not been made concerning the communication relationship between the Junior Officer and his Senior Officer in relation to career decisions. Therefore, this current study was undertaken to

evaluate the data given in the light of the specific communication relationship between Junior Officers and Senior Officers as it affected the Junior Officers' decision to separate from the Army.

The Franklin Study

The Franklin Study was directed toward identifying the relationships among the various factors that influence Junior Officer Army career decisions. The objectives of the study were to:

1. Determine the relationship between extrinsic factors such as pay, duty assignments, and fringe benefits, and intrinsic factors such as pride, challenge, satisfaction, and independence.
2. Determine the relationship between extrinsic and intrinsic factors and Junior Officer retention.
3. Specify what changes in the extrinsic factors are most likely to influence the intrinsic factors, and thereby improve Junior Officer retention.

In the study, special emphasis was given to duty assignments, career management, duties and their content and career counseling. The group selected for study was company grade officers with more than six months but less than five years of active federal commissioned service. The study was performed for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, by Systems Science Department of the Franklin Institute Research Laboratories of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, September 1968.⁴

The West Point Study

The West Point study was directed toward learning why 23.1% of the members of the USMA Class of 1966 tendered their resignations from the service.

The study addressed itself to the resignation problem by seeking the reasons and answers to three questions.

1. Why did the members of the USMA Class of 1966 resign?
2. How does the quality of the resignees compare with that of the stay-ins?
3. What can be done to reduce resignations when the USMA classes become eligible to leave the Army?

The study was conducted by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Washington, D.C., July 1970.⁵

The Ordnance Study

The Ordnance Study was directed toward learning why 466 Ordnance Officers chose to leave the military service after having completed more than two years, but less than four years, of active duty, and identifying those factors that influenced the Junior Officers' career decisions.

The study addressed itself to four sources of influence in Junior Officer retention:

1. Civilian vs. military career opportunities.
2. The effect of Republic of Viet Nam tour of duty on the career decision.

3. The effect of a terminal RVN tour of duty on the career decision.
4. Other factors, as indicated by the survey questionnaire responses, which affected the career decision.

The study was conducted by the Personnel Management Division, Office of the Secretary, U.S. Army Ordnance Center and School, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, May 1971.⁶

Method of Analysis

Completion of a search for related research revealed no studies which dealt primarily with communication or the lack of communication or which attempted to discover if poor communication between Junior and Senior Officers was a factor in Junior Officer retention.

In the studies being analyzed for this project, the researcher observed numerous questions which dealt with the communication relationship between Junior and Senior Officers. However, there had been no effort to interpret responses to those communication questions as a whole unit and draw conclusions from them. It is the intent of this study to do so.

The communication questions in each study were selected, based on the researcher's own experience with communication and whether the body of the question or a response dealt with a communication relationship between Junior and Senior Officers. All questions selected, together with the full text of the studies, were submitted to the thesis advisor, and agreement was achieved as to

which questions were to be considered "communication questions."

(See Chapter 1, page 8, paragraph 4.)

Each question in each study was analyzed based on the above criteria. A breakdown by study as to the number of communication questions vs. total questions is as follows:

| | Total Questions | Communications Questions |
|-------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|
| a. The Franklin Study | 424 | 41 (9.7%) |
| b. The West Point Study | 70 | 14 (20%) |
| c. The Ordnance Study | 116 | 28 (24%) |
| | <u>610</u> | <u>83 (13.6%)</u> |

The remainder of this chapter is divided into four parts. Part one contains an analysis of items dealing with communication selected from the Franklin Study. Part two consists of an analysis of items dealing with communication selected from the West Point Study. Part three includes a similar analysis of items selected from the Ordnance Study. Finally, part four is a summary of the chapter.

Franklin Institute of Research Study

The Franklin Study was directed toward identifying the relationships among various factors that influence Junior Officer Army career decisions. The group selected for study was company grade officers with more than six months, but less than five years, of active federal commissioned service.

The Franklin Study questionnaire was distributed to more than 4,500 Junior Officers. Responses were collected from 2,977 Junior Officers.

All questions and answers in the Franklin Study were based on an attitudinal scale. The intensity index was based on the scale from one (1) to seven (7) which the respondents used on the surveys. Checking one (1) meant the reason had little or no influence on the individual. A two (2) or three (3) meant the reason had limited influence on the individual. A four (4) meant the reason had a moderate influence on the individual. A five (5) or six (6) meant the reason had a strong influence on the individual, and a seven (7) meant the reason had a decisive influence on the individual. If all 2,977 respondents had checked the "7" column, the overall intensity index for the question would appear as seven. If, however, 1,500 had checked seven (7) and 1,477 had checked one (1), the intensity index would be the sum of $1,500 \times 7$ and $1,477 \times 1$, with the total divided by 2,977 or 4.02. Since some questions were worded in such a manner that the more desirable response, indicating a positive communication relationship, was at the lower end of the scale, the scale needed to be inverted before the Intensity Index was computed (See H-4, H-12, and H-15.). In computing the Mean Intensity Index for the entire study less the communication questions, the same inversion was followed for "negatively" phrased questions.

Those questions with fewer than, or more than, seven responses were not included in the intensity index. However, they were considered when an analysis of the study was performed.

The questions selected from the Franklin Study, on the basis of dealing with communication, were

- H- 1 Recognized my individual contributions
- H- 2 Give constructive criticism
- H- 3 Listen to my suggestions
- H- 4 Critique me in front of others
- H- 5 Commend me for good work
- H- 6 Give me the opportunity for independent action and initiative
- H- 7 Treat me as a mature person
- H- 8 Are inspiring leaders
- H- 9 Exhibit integrity
- H-10 Expect high quality work from me
- H-11 Give me counsel and guidance when needed
- H-12 Pass the buck
- H-13 Communicate their orders clearly
- H-14 Show concern for welfare of their subordinates
- H-15 Over supervise
- H-16 Consider "inexperience" in their evaluation of Junior Officers
- H-17 Understand the problems of Junior Officers
- H-18 Are objective in their Efficiency Ratings
- H-19 Assume responsibility for their mistakes
- H-20 Do you believe that Senior Officers utilized the Efficiency Reporting System in such a manner as to assume that the most qualified Junior Officers are selected for promotion?
- H-21 What effect do your relationships with Senior Officers have on your Army Career decisions?
- I- 1 Intelligence
- I- 2 Competence
- I- 3 Moral character
- I- 5 Maturity
- I- 6 Thoroughness
- I- 7 Sensitivity to others
- I- 8 Respect for fellow officers
- I-10 Leadership
- I-11 Integrity
- I-13 Skill in communicating verbally and in writing
- I-14 Military bearing
- I-15 Self confidence

- J-16 Ability to communicate
- J-17 Ability to make decisions
- J-18 Sensitivity to others
- J-19 Ability to accept and follow orders
- D-22 Officer Efficiency Reports
- M- 1 How many formal or informal career-counseling interviews have you had with your Senior Officers?
- M- 2 What was the attitude of your career counselor towards you and your career?
- M- 3 What effect have these career-counseling sessions had on your career decision?

In analysis of the Franklin Study, the series of questions and answers are on the basis of the Junior Officers' experience. The Junior Officer was to indicate the extent to which each statement described the Senior Officer under whom the Junior Officer served. Answers were based on an attitudinal scale.

| | | | | |
|---|----------------------|-----------------|---|-----|
| H- 1 Recognized my individual contributions | | | | |
| Intensity Index 4.49 | 1. Highly inaccurate | 119 respondents | | 4% |
| | 2. | 179 | " | 6% |
| | 3. | 298 | " | 10% |
| | 4. Somewhat accurate | 893 | " | 30% |
| | 5. | 714 | " | 24% |
| | 6. | 566 | " | 19% |
| | 7. Highly accurate | 208 | " | 7% |

The majority of respondents felt that their Senior Officers recognized their individual contributions to the unit to which they were assigned. This response was mildly positive in nature toward communication between Junior and Senior Officers.

| | | | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|---|-----|
| H- 2 Give constructive criticism | | | | |
| Intensity Index 4.52 | 1. Highly inaccurate | 179 respondents | | 6% |
| | 2. | 208 | " | 7% |
| | 3. | 387 | " | 13% |
| | 4. Somewhat accurate | 685 | " | 23% |
| | 5. | 714 | " | 24% |

| | | |
|--------------------|-----------------|-----|
| 6. | 566 respondents | 19% |
| 7. Highly accurate | 266 " | 9% |

The majority of respondents felt that they were given constructive criticism. The 4.52 intensity index constituted moderately positive communication response.

H- 3 Listen to my suggestions

| | | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|-----|
| Intensity Index 4.46 | 1. Highly inaccurate | 208 respondents | 7% |
| | 2. | 208 " | 7% |
| | 3. | 327 " | 11% |
| | 4. Somewhat accurate | 655 " | 22% |
| | 5. | 685 " | 23% |
| | 6. | 566 " | 19% |
| | 7. Highly accurate | 298 " | 10% |

The majority of respondents felt their Senior Officers listened to their suggestions. This again constituted a moderately positive communication response.

H- 4 Critique me in front of others

| | | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|-----|
| Intensity Index 4.97 | 7. Highly inaccurate | 774 respondents | 26% |
| | 6. | 506 " | 17% |
| | 5. | 476 " | 16% |
| | 4. Somewhat accurate | 625 " | 21% |
| | 3. | 298 " | 10% |
| | 2. | 149 " | 5% |
| | 1. Highly accurate | 119 " | 4% |

In this instance "critique me in front of others" represents an undesirable (negative) communication practice. Therefore, the rating of 1 is more desirable and the scale was inverted before the intensity index was computed.

H- 5 Commend me for good work

| | | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|-----|
| Intensity Index 4.62 | 1. Highly inaccurate | 179 respondents | 6% |
| | 2. | 208 " | 7% |
| | 3. | 238 " | 8% |
| | 4. Somewhat accurate | 655 " | 22% |
| | 5. | 685 " | 23% |

| | | |
|--------------------|-----------------|-----|
| 6. | 625 respondents | 21% |
| 7. Highly accurate | 357 " | 12% |

The majority of individuals felt that their Senior Officers did commend them for good work, thus a moderately positive communication response.

H- 6 Give me the opportunity for independent action and initiative

| | | | |
|-----------|----------------------|-----------------|-----|
| | 1. Highly inaccurate | 327 respondents | 11% |
| | 2. | 238 " | 8% |
| Intensity | 3. | 298 " | 10% |
| Index | 4. Somewhat accurate | 536 " | 18% |
| 4.42 | 5. | 566 " | 19% |
| | 6. | 595 " | 20% |
| | 7. Highly accurate | 417 " | 14% |

The majority of individuals felt that they were given some opportunity for independent action and initiative. This constitutes a moderately positive communication response.

H- 7 Treat me as a mature person

| | | | |
|-----------|----------------------|-----------------|-----|
| | 1. Highly inaccurate | 179 respondents | 6% |
| | 2. | 119 " | 4% |
| Intensity | 3. | 179 " | 6% |
| Index | 4. Somewhat accurate | 447 " | 15% |
| 5.12 | 5. | 506 " | 17% |
| | 6. | 804 " | 27% |
| | 7. Highly accurate | 714 " | 24% |

The majority of individuals felt that they were treated as mature individuals. The 5.12 intensity index constitutes a more positive communication response.

H- 8 Are inspiring leaders

| | | | |
|-----------|----------------------|-----------------|-----|
| | 1. Highly inaccurate | 327 respondents | 11% |
| | 2. | 298 " | 10% |
| Intensity | 3. | 357 " | 12% |
| Index | 4. Somewhat accurate | 744 " | 25% |
| 4.05 | 5. | 566 " | 19% |

| | | |
|--------------------|-----------------|-----|
| 6. | 447 respondents | 15% |
| 7. Highly accurate | 208 " | 7% |

The majority felt that their leaders were inspiring. A neutral communication response is indicated by the intensity index.

H- 9 Exhibit integrity

| | | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|-----|
| Intensity Index 4.75 | 1. Highly inaccurate | 149 respondents | 5% |
| | 2. | 179 " | 6% |
| | 3. | 268 " | 9% |
| | 4. Somewhat accurate | 655 " | 22% |
| | 5. | 625 " | 21% |
| | 6. | 685 " | 23% |
| | 7. Highly accurate | 447 " | 15% |

The majority of individuals felt that their Senior Officers did exhibit integrity. This constitutes a moderately positive communication response.

H-10 Expect high quality work from me

| | | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------|----------------|-----|
| Intensity Index 5.83 | 1. Highly inaccurate | 30 respondents | 1% |
| | 2. | 30 " | 1% |
| | 3. | 60 " | 2% |
| | 4. Somewhat accurate | 327 " | 11% |
| | 5. | 476 " | 16% |
| | 6. | 982 " | 33% |
| | 7. Highly accurate | 1072 " | 36% |

The majority of respondents felt that their superiors expected high quality work from them. The intensity index indicates a strong positive communication response.

H-11 Give me counsel and guidance when needed

| | | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|-----|
| Intensity Index 4.57 | 1. Highly inaccurate | 238 respondents | 8% |
| | 2. | 208 " | 7% |
| | 3. | 327 " | 11% |
| | 4. Somewhat accurate | 744 " | 25% |
| | 5. | 506 " | 17% |
| | 6. | 566 " | 19% |
| | 7. Highly accurate | 417 " | 14% |

The majority felt that Senior Officers gave them guidance and counseling when it was needed, thus constituting a positive communication response.

H-12 Pass the buck

| | | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|-----|
| Intensity Index 4.36 | 7. Highly inaccurate | 536 respondents | 18% |
| | 6. " | 447 | 15% |
| | 5. " | 445 | 15% |
| | 4. Somewhat accurate | 595 | 20% |
| | 3. " | 357 | 12% |
| | 2. " | 298 | 10% |
| | 1. Highly accurate | 268 | 9% |

"Pass the Buck" represents negative communication practice.

Therefore the rating of 1 is the more desirable and the scale was inverted before the intensity index was computed.

H-13 Communicate their orders clearly

| | | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|-----|
| Intensity Index 4.51 | 1. Highly inaccurate | 149 respondents | 5% |
| | 2. " | 179 | 6% |
| | 3. " | 357 | 12% |
| | 4. Somewhat accurate | 714 | 24% |
| | 5. " | 744 | 25% |
| | 6. " | 566 | 19% |
| | 7. Highly accurate | 268 | 9% |

The majority of the respondents felt that their Senior Officers did communicate their orders clearly. A moderately positive communication response was indicated.

H-14 Show concern for welfare of the subordinates

| | | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|-----|
| Intensity Index 4.63 | 1. Highly inaccurate | 179 respondents | 6% |
| | 2. " | 208 | 7% |
| | 3. " | 298 | 10% |
| | 4. Somewhat accurate | 625 | 21% |
| | 5. " | 595 | 20% |
| | 6. " | 625 | 21% |
| | 7. Highly accurate | 417 | 14% |

The majority felt that their superiors did show concern for those under their supervision. Again a moderately positive communication response was indicated.

H-15 Over supervise

| | | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|-----|
| Intensity Index 4.08 | 7. Highly inaccurate | 357 respondents | 12% |
| | 6. | 387 " | 13% |
| | 5. | 566 " | 19% |
| | 4. Somewhat accurate | 566 " | 19% |
| | 3. | 387 " | 13% |
| | 2. | 357 " | 12% |
| | 1. Highly accurate | 357 " | 12% |

"Over supervise" represents a mean neutral communication response as indicated by the intensity index.

H-16 Consider "inexperience" in their evaluation of Junior Officers

| | | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|-----|
| Intensity Index 4.57 | 1. Highly inaccurate | 129 respondents | 5% |
| | 2. | 179 " | 6% |
| | 3. | 268 " | 9% |
| | 4. Somewhat accurate | 834 " | 28% |
| | 5. | 595 " | 20% |
| | 6. | 595 " | 20% |
| | 7. Highly accurate | 327 " | 11% |

The majority felt that their Senior Officers did consider their inexperience when rating them. The intensity index indicates a mild positive communication response.

H-17 Understand the problems of Junior Officers

| | | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|-----|
| Intensity Index 4.52 | 1. Highly inaccurate | 149 respondents | 5% |
| | 2. | 179 " | 6% |
| | 3. | 298 " | 10% |
| | 4. Somewhat accurate | 834 " | 28% |
| | 5. | 625 " | 21% |
| | 6. | 595 " | 20% |
| | 7. Highly accurate | 268 " | 9% |

The majority of individual respondents felt that their Senior Officers did understand their problems, which, combined with the intensity index, leads to a positive communication response.

H-18 Are objective in their Efficiency Ratings

| | | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|-----|
| Intensity Index 4.63 | 1. Highly inaccurate | 179 respondents | 6% |
| | 2. | 179 " | 6% |
| | 3. | 238 " | 8% |
| | 4. Somewhat accurate | 804 " | 27% |
| | 5. | 625 " | 21% |
| | 6. | 655 " | 22% |
| | 7. Highly accurate | 298 " | 10% |

The majority of individual responses felt that their Senior Officers were objective in their efficiency ratings. The intensity index reveals a moderately positive communication response.

H-19 Assume responsibility for their mistakes

| | | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|-----|
| Intensity Index 4.54 | 1. Highly inaccurate | 208 respondents | 7% |
| | 2. | 208 " | 7% |
| | 3. | 357 " | 12% |
| | 4. Somewhat accurate | 655 " | 22% |
| | 5. | 536 " | 18% |
| | 6. | 625 " | 21% |
| | 7. Highly accurate | 417 " | 14% |

The majority of respondents felt that their Senior Officers did assume responsibility for their mistakes. Again the communication response is positive in terms of the intensity index.

H-20 Do you believe that Senior Officers utilized the Efficiency Reporting System in such a manner as to assume that most qualified Junior Officers are selected for promotion?

| | | |
|---------------|------------------|-----|
| 1. Yes | 1101 respondents | 37% |
| 2. No | 1250 " | 42% |
| 3. No opinion | 625 " | 21% |

The majority of respondents did not feel their Senior Officers utilized the Efficiency Reporting System in a way that would assure the most qualified were selected for promotion. This constitutes one of the small number of negative communication responses.

H-21 What effect do your relationships with Senior Officers have on your Army career decision?

| | | | |
|----------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------|-----|
| Intensity Index 4.01 | 1. Strong influence to stay | 208 respondents | 7% |
| | 2. | 387 " | 13% |
| | 3. | 536 " | 18% |
| | 4. No influence | 774 " | 26% |
| | 5. | 447 " | 15% |
| | 6. | 268 " | 9% |
| | 7. Strong influence to leave | 327 " | 11% |

The majority of respondents felt that their relationships with Senior Officers had no influence on Army career decision. However, the percentage of individuals who responded to "strong influence to leave" was higher than the percentage of individuals who responded to "strong influence to stay." Viewed with the intensity index, a neutral communication effect is found among respondents.

In the next series of questions the Junior Officer was asked to evaluate his fellow Junior Officer.

I- 1 Intelligence

| | | | |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------|-----|
| Intensity Index 5.18 | 7. Exhibit to a High Degree (EHD) | 238 respondents | 8% |
| | 6. | 953 " | 32% |
| | 5. | 1072 " | 36% |
| | 4. Exhibit to a Moderate Degree (EMD) | 566 " | 19% |
| | 3. | 119 " | 4% |
| | 2. | 30 " | 1% |
| | 1. Does not Exhibit (DNE) | 0 " | 0% |

The majority of individuals felt that their fellow Junior Officers exhibited a moderate or strong degree of intelligence. A relatively high positive communication response was found.

I- 2 Competence

| | | | |
|----------------------------|--------|-----------------|-----|
| Intensity Index 5.02 | 7. EHD | 179 respondents | 6% |
| | 6. " | 834 | 28% |
| | 5. " | 1101 | 37% |
| | 4. EMD | 655 | 22% |
| | 3. " | 149 | 5% |
| | 2. " | 60 | 2% |
| | 1. DNE | 0 | 0% |

The majority of individuals felt that their fellow Junior Officers did exhibit to a moderate degree, competence in their work. The results were positive.

I- 3 Moral character

| | | | |
|----------------------------|--------|-----------------|-----|
| Intensity Index 4.92 | 7. EHD | 298 respondents | 10% |
| | 6. " | 744 | 25% |
| | 5. " | 834 | 28% |
| | 4. EMD | 744 | 25% |
| | 3. " | 268 | 9% |
| | 2. " | 89 | 3% |
| | 1. DNE | 30 | 1% |

The majority of respondents felt that their fellow Junior Officers were of moral character and exhibited this to a moderate degree, thus a moderately positive communication response.

I- 5 Maturity

| | | | |
|----------------------------|--------|-----------------|-----|
| Intensity Index 4.68 | 7. EHD | 179 respondents | 6% |
| | 6. " | 625 | 21% |
| | 5. " | 893 | 30% |
| | 4. EMD | 744 | 25% |
| | 3. " | 357 | 12% |
| | 2. " | 119 | 4% |
| | 1. DNE | 30 | 1% |

The majority of individuals credited their fellow Junior Officers with moderate degree of maturity exhibited during the performance of their duties. This can be considered a somewhat positive communication response.

I- 6 Thoroughness

| | | | |
|-----------|--------|----------------|-----|
| | 7. EHD | 89 respondents | 3% |
| | 6. | 476 " | 16% |
| Intensity | 5. | 923 " | 31% |
| Index | 4. EMD | 923 " | 31% |
| 4.48 | 3. | 447 " | 15% |
| | 2. | 89 " | 3% |
| | 1. DNE | 30 " | 1% |

The majority felt that their fellow officers displayed a moderate amount of thoroughness when completing a task. A mild positive communication response was found.

I- 7 Sensitivity to others

| | | | |
|-----------|--------|-----------------|-----|
| | 7. EHD | 119 respondents | 4% |
| | 6. | 447 " | 15% |
| Intensity | 5. | 834 " | 28% |
| Index | 4. EMD | 1012 " | 34% |
| 4.47 | 3. | 387 " | 13% |
| | 2. | 119 " | 4% |
| | 1 DNE | 30 " | 1% |

Thirty-four percent of the respondents felt that their fellow officers exhibited a moderate amount of sensitivity to others when dealing with personnel. The intensity index reveals a mildly positive communication response.

I-8 Respect for fellow officers

| | | | |
|-----------|--------|-----------------|-----|
| | 7. EHD | 298 respondents | 10% |
| | 6. | 804 " | 27% |
| Intensity | 5. | 834 " | 28% |
| Index | 4. EMD | 685 " | 23% |
| 4.97 | 3. | 208 " | 7% |

| | | |
|--------|----------------|----|
| 2. | 89 respondents | 3% |
| 1. DNE | 30 " | 1% |

The majority of respondents felt that their fellow officers displayed this trait to a moderate degree which combined with the intensity index constitutes a positive communication response.

I-10 Leadership

| | | | |
|-----------|--------|-----------------|-----|
| | 7. EHD | 119 respondents | 4% |
| | 6. | 714 " | 24% |
| Intensity | 5. | 1104 " | 37% |
| Index | 4. EMD | 744 " | 25% |
| 4.83 | 3. | 208 " | 7% |
| | 2. | 60 " | 2% |
| | 1. DNE | 30 " | 1% |

Responses to this item constitute a moderately positive communication response.

I-11 Integrity

| | | | |
|-----------|--------|-----------------|-----|
| | 7. EHD | 327 respondents | 11% |
| | 6. | 834 " | 28% |
| Intensity | 5. | 863 " | 29% |
| Index | 4. EMD | 685 " | 23% |
| 5.05 | 3. | 179 " | 6% |
| | 2. | 60 " | 2% |
| | 1. DNE | 30 " | 1% |

Responses reveal the majority felt that their fellow officers displayed integrity to a moderate or greater degree. A positive communication response is revealed by the intensity index.

I-13 Skill in communicating verbally and in writing

| | | | |
|-----------|--------|-----------------|-----|
| | 7. EHD | 149 respondents | 7% |
| | 6. | 566 " | 19% |
| Intensity | 5. | 893 " | 30% |
| Index | 4. EMD | 834 " | 28% |
| 4.55 | 3. | 357 " | 12% |
| | 2. | 149 " | 5% |
| | 1. DNE | 60 " | 2% |

In order to lead others an individual must be able to communicate, verbally and/or in writing. The majority felt that their fellow Junior Officers exhibited this ability. A moderately positive communication response is supported by this intensity index.

I-14 Military bearing

| | | | |
|----------------------------|--------|-----------------|-----|
| Intensity Index 4.83 | 7. EHD | 179 respondents | 6% |
| | 6. | 744 " | 25% |
| | 5. | 953 " | 32% |
| | 4. EMD | 714 " | 24% |
| | 3. | 298 " | 10% |
| | 2. | 60 " | 2% |
| | 1. DNE | 30 " | 1% |

The majority felt that their fellow Junior Officers displayed a moderate degree of military bearing, and an intensity index of 4.83 constitutes a qualified positive communication response.

I-15 Self Confidence

| | | | |
|----------------------------|--------|-----------------|-----|
| Intensity Index 5.12 | 7. EHD | 208 respondents | 7% |
| | 6. | 953 " | 32% |
| | 5. | 1012 " | 34% |
| | 4. EMD | 625 " | 21% |
| | 3. | 149 " | 5% |
| | 2. | 30 " | 1% |
| | 1. DNE | 0 " | 0% |

The majority felt that their fellow officers displayed a moderate degree of self confidence, which, combined with an intensity index of 5.12, constitutes a positive communication response.

The next series of responses deals with how the individual Junior Officer perceived himself.

J-16 Ability to Communicate

| | | |
|--------|---------------|----|
| 1. DNE | 0 respondents | 0% |
| 2. | 0 " | 0% |
| 3. | 60 " | 2% |

| | | | | |
|-----------|----|-----|-----------------|-----|
| Intensity | 4. | EMD | 327 respondents | 11% |
| Index | 5. | | 804 " | 27% |
| 5.65 | 6. | | 1161 " | 39% |
| | 7. | EHD | 595 " | 20% |

The majority of responding individuals felt that they exhibited to a moderately high degree the ability to communicate. The 5.65 intensity index constitutes a positive intra-personal communication response.

J-17 Ability to make decisions

| | | | | |
|-----------|----|-----|---------------|-----|
| | 1. | DNE | 0 respondents | 0% |
| | 2. | | 0 " | 0% |
| Intensity | 3. | | 30 " | 1% |
| Index | 4. | EMD | 208 " | 7% |
| 5.88 | 5. | | 655 " | 22% |
| | 6. | | 1280 " | 43% |
| | 7. | EHD | 804 " | 27% |

The majority felt that they exhibited to a moderately high degree the ability to make decisions. This and the intensity index of 5.88 constitutes a positive intra-personal communication response.

J-18 Sensitivity to others

| | | | | |
|-----------|----|-----|----------------|-----|
| | 1. | DNE | 30 respondents | 1% |
| | 2. | | 30 " | 1% |
| Intensity | 3. | | 89 " | 3% |
| Index | 4. | EMD | 387 " | 13% |
| 5.61 | 5. | | 625 " | 21% |
| | 6. | | 1042 " | 35% |
| | 7. | EHD | 774 " | 26% |

The majority felt that they displayed a moderate to high degree of sensitivity to others. Again the higher intensity index indicates a positive inter-personal communication response.

J-19 Ability to accept and follow orders

| | | | | |
|--|----|-----|---------------|----|
| | 1. | DNE | 0 respondents | 0% |
| | 2. | | 30 " | 1% |

| | | | | |
|-----------|----|-----|----------------|-----|
| Intensity | 3. | | 60 respondents | 2% |
| Index | 4. | EMD | 238 | 8% |
| 5.89 | 5. | | 506 | 17% |
| | 6. | | 1161 | 39% |
| | 7. | EHD | 953 | 32% |

The majority of individuals felt that they displayed a moderately high degree of ability to accept and follow orders. The intensity index supports this conclusion and a positive communication response.

D-22 Officer Efficiency Reports

| | | | | |
|-----------|----|---------------------------|----------------|-----|
| | 7. | Strong influence to stay | 89 respondents | 3% |
| | 6. | | 149 | 5% |
| Intensity | 5. | | 208 | 7% |
| Index | 4. | No influence | 1578 | 53% |
| 3.63 | 3. | | 357 | 12% |
| | 2. | | 268 | 9% |
| | 1. | Strong influence to leave | 327 | 11% |

The Officer Efficiency Report is considered a written form of communication between a Senior Officer and a Junior Officer. As answered by the majority of individuals, this communication document did not influence their decision to leave or stay on active duty, but the above mean intensity index reveals a negative communication response.

M- 1 How many formal or informal career-counseling interviews have you had with your Senior Officer?

| | | | | |
|--|----|--------------|-----------------|-----|
| | 1. | One | 506 respondents | 17% |
| | 2. | Two | 387 | 13% |
| | 3. | Three | 208 | 7% |
| | 4. | Four or more | 476 | 16% |
| | 5. | None | 1369 | 46% |

This question and response shows a definite lack of communication between Junior and Senior Officers, with a plurality stating that

they did not receive any formal or informal career-counseling interviews. This constitutes a negative communication response between Junior and Senior Officers.

M- 2 What was the attitude of your career counselor towards you and your career? (Enter "0" if you have not been counseled.)

| | | | |
|----------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|-----|
| Intensity Index 5.35 | 1. Not interested | 30 respondents | 1% |
| | 2. | 30 " | 1% |
| | 3. | 89 " | 3% |
| | 4. Moderately interested | 298 " | 10% |
| | 5. | 298 " | 10% |
| | 6. | 387 " | 13% |
| | 7. Very interested | 417 " | 14% |


Of those individuals who did have career-counseling interviews, the majority felt that their counselors were interested in the individual. The high intensity index indicates a positive inter-personal communication response.

M- 3 What effect have these career-counseling sessions had on your Army career decision?

| | | | |
|----------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------|-----|
| Intensity Index 4.21 | 7. Strong influence to stay | 119 respondents | 4% |
| | 6. | 179 " | 6% |
| | 5. | 357 " | 12% |
| | 4. No influence | 1369 " | 46% |
| | 3. | 119 " | 4% |
| | 2. | 60 " | 2% |
| | 1. Strong influence to leave | 89 " | 3% |

In relation to M-2 the communication relationship established between the counselor and the Junior Officer had only a mild positive influence or none on the career decision of the Junior Officer. This constitutes a neutral to positive inter-personal communication response.

The total number of questions in the Franklin Study was 424 (less questions with fewer/more than seven responses and less communication questions) with a mean average intensity index of 3.94 as indicated on the graph. The mean average response to communication questions intensity index of 4.77 is placed above



the moderate influence toward the strong influence, indicating that the communication series of questions played a greater part in influencing the Junior Officers relationship with his Senior Officer than did the composite of remaining items. However, the relationship that communications played in the Franklin Study had little or no effect on the Junior Officers' Career decisions. If anything could be assumed, communication between Junior and Senior Officers was not a negative factor in causing the Junior Officer to separate but was a positive factor causing the Junior Officer to remain on active duty.

At the time the Franklin Study was completed, Army retention of Junior Officers was high, 24.2%, indicating that the problems surfacing from Vietnam, as outlined in Chapter II, may not have influenced the Junior Officer to any great extent as of 1968, when the study was completed.

The West Point Study

The second part of this chapter deals with the questions and answers of the West Point Study, completed on 6 July 1970.

In June 1970, the U.S. Army became extremely concerned because a high percentage rate (23.1%) of the United States Military Academy Class of 1966 who were commissioned in the Army had tendered their resignations from active duty. The average resignation rate of the past 12 classes had been 15.5%, a 7.6% increase.⁸ The West Point Study addressed itself to the resignation problem by seeking the answers to three questions:

- A. Why did members of the USMA Class of 1966 resign?
- B. How does the quality of the resignees compare with that of the stay ins?
- C. What can be done to reduce resignations from the USMA classes?

This study includes one phase of the West Point Study-- the communication relationship between the Junior Officer resignees and their Senior Officers. There were 81 individuals who responded to the questionnaire.

All questions and answers in the West Point Study were based on an attitudinal scale. The intensity index was based on the scale from one (1) to six (6) which the respondents used on the surveys. Checking one (1) meant the reason had no influence and was not applicable to the individual. A six (6) meant the reason was decisive. If all 81 respondents had checked the "6" column, the over-all intensity index would appear as six. If, however, 40 had checked six (6) and 41 the one (1) the intensity

index would be the sum of 40×6 and 41×1 , with the total divided by 81 or 3.46.

The West Point Study consisted of 70 questions dealing with those aspects of military life which directly affected the Junior Officer. The questions dealing with communication are listed by question number and the intensity index.

Question 25: Lack of authority commensurate with your responsibilities.

The category of decisive (6) was selected by 43% of the individuals. The total response intensity index was 3.15.

Question 27: Your suggestions not listened to.

The category of decisive (6) was selected by 32.43% of the individuals. The total response intensity index was 2.74.

Question 28: Lack of opportunity for independent action and initiative.

The category of decisive (6) was selected by 53.58% of the individuals. The total response intensity index was 3.56.

Question 29: Officer efficiency reports.

The category of decisive (6) was selected by 43% of the individuals. The total response intensity index was 3.15.

Question 43: Your leaders were not inspiring.

The category of decisive (6) was selected by 51.25% of the individuals. The total response intensity index was 3.47.

Question 44: Lack of integrity of superiors.

The category of decisive (6) was selected by 51% of the individuals. The total response intensity index was 3.46.

Question 45: Superiors over supervised.

The category of decisive (6) was selected by 50.74% of the individuals. The total response intensity index was 3.45.

Question 46: Superiors did not understand your problem.

The category of decisive (6) was selected by 24.17% of the individuals. The total response intensity index was 2.42.

Question 47: Superiors did not assume responsibility for their mistakes.

The category of decisive (6) was selected by 14.97% of the individuals. The total response intensity index was 3.11.

Question 48: Superiors were not competent.

The category of decisive (6) was selected by 47.9% of the individuals. The total response intensity index was 3.34.

Question 49: Superiors were not dedicated.

The category of decisive (6) was selected by 16.69% of the individuals. The total response intensity was 2.13.

Question 50: Superiors were not courageous.

The category of decisive (6) was selected by 24.42% of the individuals. The total response intensity index was 2.43.

Question 51: Lack of accessibility of Senior Officer for advice and counseling.

The category of decisive (6) was selected by 11.79% of the individuals. The total response intensity index was 1.94.

Question 52: Criticized inappropriately or for invalid reasons.


The category of decisive (6) was selected by 21.85% of the individuals. The total response intensity index was 2.33.

In analyzing the decisive reasons why individuals left active service, those questions which dealt with communication were further examined as to the percentage of respondents who answered each question in relation to the intensity index selected.

The following order of most decisive to least decisive questions is listed by question number and the percentage of responses to each question.

| | | |
|--------------|--|-------|
| Question 28: | Lack of opportunity for independent action and initiative | 53.6% |
| Question 43: | Your leaders were not inspiring | 53.6% |
| Question 44: | Lack of integrity of superiors | 51.0% |
| Question 45: | Superiors over supervised | 50.7% |
| Question 48: | Superiors were not competent | 47.9% |
| Question 29: | Officer efficiency reports | 43.0% |
| Question 25: | Lack of authority commensurate with your responsibilities | 43.0% |
| Question 47: | Superiors did not assume responsibility for their mistakes | 41.9% |
| Question 27: | Your suggestions not listened to | 32.4% |
| Question 50: | Superiors were not courageous | 24.4% |
| Question 46: | Superiors did not understand your problem | 24.1% |
| Question 52: | Criticized inappropriately or for invalid reasons | 21.9% |
| Question 49: | Superiors were not dedicated | 16.7% |
| Question 51: | Lack of accessibility of Senior Officers for advice and counseling | 11.8% |

The West Point Study with 70 questions had a mean remaining question average intensity index of 2.54 as indicated on the graph. The mean average communication question intensity index of 2.91 as shown on the graph indicates that poor communication in a composite



form appears to have had a greater influence on the West Pointer in his Army Career decision than did the composite non-communication factors covered in the West Point Study.

Further analysis shows the majority of respondents had accessibility to their Senior Officers. However, a majority felt their Senior Officers were not inspiring, lacked integrity, and over supervised them.

The Ordnance Study

In the present analysis of the Ordnance Study, which consisted of 116 questions, only those questions which dealt primarily with the communication relationship between the Junior and Senior Officers were selected. A total of twenty-eight (28) questions was identified as dealing with communication factors.

The analysis of the Ordnance Study differs somewhat from the Franklin Study and the West Point Study in that intensity indexes could not be computed, due to the study format which does not allow for a valid numerical difference between answer

discriminations. The study, however, allows question analysis by the use of percentages. An answer discrimination was selected for each question, based on the total number of responses. Each question will be discussed in detail in chronological order as it appears in the questionnaire.

Question 3. With which one of the following aspects of military life were you most dissatisfied?

| | |
|---|----------------|
| a. Separation from family | 83 respondents |
| b. Pay | 16 " |
| c. Frequent PCS (permanent change of station) moves | 27 " |
| d. Leadership of superiors | 107 " |
| e. Housing | 11 " |

Within the scope of this question and the various discriminations which the respondent could select a clear plurality were dissatisfied with leadership of their supervisors. It must be understood that the question makes no demand on the respondent to reach a decision--that is to say, which were you most dissatisfied with, not which caused you to leave the service?

Question 9. Were your commanders receptive to your recommendations and suggestions?

| | |
|---|----------------|
| a. All of my commanders were receptive to my recommendations and suggestions | 38 respondents |
| b. Most of my commanders were receptive to my recommendations and suggestions | 156 " |
| c. Few of my commanders were receptive to my recommendations and suggestions | 46 " |
| d. None of my commanders were receptive to my recommendations and suggestions | 4 " |

The response in this question indicates that there was relatively effective communication between Junior and Senior

Officers as to the Officers' receptiveness to Junior Officers' recommendations and suggestions.

Question 10. Did you consider your superior officers well qualified for their job?

- | | |
|-----------------|---------------|
| a. All of them | 22 responses |
| b. Most of them | 153 responses |
| c. Few of them | 66 responses |
| d. None of them | 3 responses |

The majority of respondents felt that most of their Senior Officers were well qualified for their jobs. However, a sizable number of respondents indicated that their Senior Officers were less than qualified for their jobs.

Question 11. Do you feel that your commanders were sincerely interested in your remaining in the Army and choosing the Army as a career?

- | | | |
|-----------------|---------------|-------|
| a. All of them | 40 responses | 16.3% |
| b. Most of them | 88 responses | 31.6% |
| c. Few of them | 106 responses | 43.4% |
| d. None of them | 10 responses | 4.1% |

Of the Junior Officers responding, 43.4% held that few of their Commanders (Senior Officers) were sincerely interested in the Junior Officers' remaining in and choosing the Army as a career. These responses certainly do not indicate any strong positive Senior Officer influence on an affirmative decision.

Question 12. Did any of your superior officers counsel you concerning an Army Career?

- | | | |
|--------|---------------|-----|
| a. yes | 176 responses | 72% |
| b. no | 68 responses | 28% |

This question is related directly to question 11. Basic U.S. Army policy recommends that all Senior Officers counsel Junior Officers about remaining in the service and about making the Army a career.⁹ This is shown by the 72% of the respondents answering yes to question 12. The relationship of question 11 and question 12 shows that even though 176 of the respondents stated that they were counseled by their superiors, 106 respondents in question 11 stated that few were interested in their remaining in or choosing the Army as a career. Apparently the intended message was not communicated positively to the Junior Officer.

Question 13. Do you feel that your personal desires concerning assignments, branch and other considerations were taken into account by the Army?

| | | |
|--|---------------|-------|
| a. Yes | 153 responses | 63.0% |
| b. No, but I received a satisfactory explanation as to why they were not. | 31 responses | 11.5% |
| c. No, and I did not receive a satisfactory explanation as to why they were not. | 60 responses | 24.6% |

An explanation of Army policy must be given here before one can fully understand the question and its answers. Department of the Army made and still makes it well known that personal desires concerning assignments, branch and other considerations will be taken into full account once the need of the Army has been filled.¹⁰ This can be best illustrated by showing the relationship between an individual and DA (Department of the Army).

An individual wishes to be assigned to Germany; the Army has X number of spaces available at the time in Germany and $X + Y$ individuals requesting Germany. With more personnel requesting Germany than there are spaces, some desires are not met; however, they were taken into account.

The majority of respondents (153) felt their desires were taken into account. The next 31 respondents felt their desires were not taken into account (i.e., the example stated above), and finally, c, 60 respondents felt their desires were not taken into account nor did they receive satisfactory answers as to why they were not considered.

A breakdown in communication affected at least 60 respondents. Communication breakdowns do occur in both directions, up and down. This failure may have been in either direction.

Question 14. To what extent were your education, training and experience (both civilian and military) utilized in your duty assignments?

| | | |
|-------------------|---------------|-----|
| a . Well utilized | 66 responses | 27% |
| b. Utilized | 103 responses | 42% |
| c. Not utilized | 75 responses | 31% |

The majority of respondents felt that their education and training were being utilized, but not to the fullest extent possible, as seen in c. Not having one's education and training fully utilized can have detrimental effects on the individual, causing discontent and dissatisfaction on the job and a breakdown in the upward and downward flow of communication.

Question 16. Did you receive an orientation or counseling period on how to apply for a Regular Army Commission, indefinite category or short term extension, prior to your release from Active Duty?

- | | | |
|--|--------------|-----|
| a. Yes, and it did influence me to remain on active duty beyond my obligation. | 66 responses | 27% |
| b. Yes, but it did not influence my plans to leave active duty. | 58 responses | 24% |
| c. No, and it might have influenced me to remain longer on active duty. | 22 responses | 9% |
| d. No, but it would not have influenced my plans to leave active duty. | 93 responses | 38% |
| e. I do not remember. | 5 responses | 2% |

To understand the communication relationship between those officers who received an orientation or counseling period and those who did not receive an orientation or counseling period, and their decisions to remain on active duty or get out, a comparison between a and b, c and d, a and c, and b and d must be undertaken. a represents 27% of the total 244, b represents 24%, c represents 9%, d represents 35% and e represents 2%, which is of little value to the overall data revealed by the question.

In comparing a and b, both answers show that there was a two-way communication between Junior Officers and those higher up.

Comparing c and d, shows there was no communication in both directions, upward and downward. However, had there been communication in c, more individuals may have been influenced to stay.

In comparing a and c, one sees that in one case communication was effective in keeping Junior Officers, and in the other case, had there been communication between higher and lower ranks, more individuals might have stayed on active duty.

Answers to b and d, indicate that regardless of communication or the lack of it, there was no intent on the part of the individuals to remain on active duty.

Question 18. Did the Ordnance Corp satisfactorily manage your career?

| | |
|---------------|---------------|
| a. Yes | 105 responses |
| b. No | 70 responses |
| c. No opinion | 69 responses |

Responses show that a plurality of individuals (not the total asked) who answered the question were satisfied with the two-way communication between themselves and those who managed their careers.

Question 26. Leadership of superiors.

| | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------|-------|
| a. Strong influence to stay | 9 responses | 3.7% |
| b. Moderate influence to stay | 39 responses | 15.9% |
| c. No influence | 49 responses | 20.1% |
| d. Moderate influence to leave | 76 responses | 31.2% |
| e. Strong influence to leave | 71 responses | 29.1% |

The number of individuals dissatisfied with their Senior Officers' ability to lead their subordinates is clearly shown by the responses to d and e vs. the responses to a and b in the above question.

Question 28. Efficiency Reports.

| | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------|-------|
| a. Strong influence to stay | 22 responses | 9% |
| b. Moderate influence to stay | 32 responses | 13.2% |
| c. No influence | 102 responses | 41.8% |
| d. Moderate influence to leave | 44 responses | 18% |
| e. Strong influence to leave | 44 responses | 18% |

Efficiency reports are written by Superior or Senior Officers. During the time frame of this study there was no requirement of the Senior Officers to show the completed report to the individual he rated. Therefore, it is felt that this may have been the cause of the high frequency of "no influence," as those officers did not know what their Senior Officers wrote about them.

Question 58. Provide Junior Officers with more opportunity for command experience.

| | | |
|--|---------------|-------|
| a. I would definitely make the Army a career. | 13 responses | 5.4% |
| b. I would possibly make the Army a career. | 71 responses | 29.1% |
| c. This would have no influence on my career decision. | 147 responses | 60.2% |
| d. I would possibly leave active duty. | 9 responses | 3.7% |
| e. I would definitely leave active duty. | 3 responses | 1.2% |

This communication relationship question affected the individual's decision to remain on active duty vs. leaving active duty. Although the majority of individuals who responded to the question stated it had no influence on their career decision, the 84 who responded positively that had there been more communication with their Senior Officers, more would have remained on active duty.

Question 80. I hoped to receive responsibility and challenges; to lead others.

- | | | |
|-----------------------|---------------|-----|
| a. Strong influence | 166 responses | 68% |
| b. Moderate influence | 68 responses | 28% |
| c. No influence | 10 responses | 4% |

This question deals with "Why the Individual Chose a Commission in the Army." Sixty-eight percent indicated that, hoping to receive responsibility and challenge; to lead others, was an extremely strong influence to choose a Commission in the Army. The majority of individuals felt that they could communicate with those higher and lower and be able to be leaders of others.

The next six questions dealt with the individual respondents' describing their Senior Officers.

Question 88. Give constructive criticism.

- | | |
|--|---------------|
| a. This is a highly accurate description of my Senior Officer. | 38 responses |
| b. This is a somewhat accurate description of my Senior Officer. | 144 responses |
| c. This is a highly inaccurate description of my Senior Officer. | 56 responses |

The majority of individuals felt that their Senior Officers did give them constructive criticism when it was given. What is not known is how many times each individual received constructive criticism from his superiors.

Question 89. Critique me in front of others.

- | | |
|--|---------------|
| a. This is a highly accurate description of my Senior Officer. | 24 responses |
| b. This is a somewhat accurate description of my Senior Officer. | 66 responses |
| c. This is a highly inaccurate description of my Senior Officer. | 154 responses |

This question does show a relatively high degree of positive communication between Junior and Senior Officers. However, A and B show that 37% of the Junior Officers may have been critiqued by their Senior Officers in front of others, which is a fairly high degree of negative communication.

Question 90. Commend me for good work.

- | | |
|--|---------------|
| a. This is a highly accurate description of my Senior Officer. | 46 responses |
| b. This is a somewhat accurate description of my Senior Officer. | 139 responses |
| c. This is a highly inaccurate description of my Senior Officer. | 59 responses |

This question does show a high percentage of individuals felt that they received little commendatory communication concerning their effective efforts.

Question 92. Give me counsel and guidance.

- | | |
|--|---------------|
| a. This is a highly accurate description of my Senior Officer. | 37 responses |
| b. This is a somewhat accurate description of my Senior Officer. | 137 responses |
| c. This is a highly inaccurate description of my Senior Officer. | 70 responses |

In dealing with Junior Officers, many Senior Officers were perceived as failing in their efforts to give guidance and counsel to the Junior Officer.

Question 93. Consider "inexperience" in their evaluation of Junior Officers.

- | | |
|--|---------------|
| a. This is a highly accurate description of my Senior Officer. | 49 responses |
| b. This is a somewhat accurate description of my Senior Officer. | 142 responses |

- c. This is a highly inaccurate description of my Senior Officer. 56 responses

Question 94. Are objective in their Efficiency Ratings

- a. This is a highly accurate description of my Senior Officer. 49 responses
 b. This is a somewhat accurate description of my Senior Officer. 124 responses
 c. This is a highly inaccurate description of my Senior Officer. 71 responses

The prime method of evaluating an officer's worth in the Army is with Efficiency Reports done by the rated officers Senior. Inexperience and objectivity are both considered indicators within the efficiency evaluation system. Therefore, Questions 93 and 94 must be analyzed together because of their relationship to each other within the efficiency evaluation system. Inexperience on the part of Junior Officers is something Senior Officers were perceived as failing to understand, many Junior Officers may have never been placed in positions of responsibility before and they had to respond correctly or face the inevitable bad efficiency rating.

Objectivity on the part of Senior Officers is something Senior Officers were perceived as lacking when considering an efficiency evaluation of the Junior Officer's job performance.

Question 97. What effect did your relationship with Senior Officers have on your Army career decision?

- | | | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------|-------|-------|
| a. Strong influence to leave | 63 responses | 27.9% | 55.8% |
| b. Moderate influence to leave | 68 responses | 27.9% | |
| c. No influence | 51 responses | 20.9% | 23.3% |
| d. Moderate influence to stay | 32 responses | 13.1% | |
| e. Strong influence to stay | 25 responses | 10.2% | |

With 55.8% of the respondents answering that their relationship with their Senior Officers had a moderate to strong influence on their leaving active duty, a communication gap between Seniors and Juniors appears to have been shown.

The next four questions deal with the individual and how he or she perceived him/herself.

Question 98. Leadership

| | | |
|-------------------------------|---------------|-------|
| a. Exhibit to high degree | 99 responses | 40.6% |
| b. Exhibit to moderate degree | 139 responses | 56.9% |
| c. Do not exhibit | 6 responses | 2.5% |

Question 108. Ability to communicate.

| | | |
|-------------------------------|---------------|-------|
| a. Exhibit to high degree | 120 responses | 49.2% |
| b. Exhibit to moderate degree | 115 responses | 47.1% |
| c. Do not exhibit | 9 responses | 3.7% |

Question 109. Ability to make decisions.

| | | |
|-------------------------------|---------------|-------|
| a. Exhibit to high degree | 161 responses | 65.9% |
| b. Exhibit to moderate degree | 76 responses | 31.1% |
| c. Do not exhibit | 7 responses | 3.0% |

Question 110. Ability to accept and follow orders.

| | | |
|-------------------------------|---------------|-------|
| a. Exhibit to high degree | 132 responses | 54.1% |
| b. Exhibit to moderate degree | 107 responses | 43.9% |
| c. Do not exhibit | 5 responses | 2.0% |

In analyzing all four of the above questions the majority of the respondents felt that they displayed a moderate to strong ability to communicate with each other, with the men they lead and with their superiors, such self-evaluation must be considered highly inconclusive.

Question 113. How many formal or informal career-counseling interviews did you have with your Senior Officers?

| | | |
|--------------|--------------|-------|
| a. 1 | 67 responses | 27.4% |
| b. 2 | 43 responses | 17.5% |
| c. 3 | 26 responses | 10.5% |
| d. 4 or more | 61 responses | 19.3% |

A plurality of Junior Officers responding received only one formal or informal career-counseling interview during their stay on active duty.

Question 114. What was the attitude of your career counselor towards you and your career?

| | | |
|--------------------------|--------------|-------|
| a. Very interested | 67 responses | 27.5% |
| b. Moderately interested | 86 responses | 35.2% |
| c. Not interested | 41 responses | 16.8% |
| d. Was not counseled | 50 responses | 20.5% |

The majority of individuals who were counseled were moderately happy with the interest their career counselors took in them. It must be understood that an individual's career counselor for the most part was not the individual's Senior Officer, but an individual who dealt with career counseling as his primary job.

Question 115. What effect did these career-counseling sessions have on your Army Career decision?

| | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------|-------|
| a. Strong influence to stay | 11 responses | 4.5% |
| b. Moderate influence to stay | 53 responses | 21.7% |
| c. No influence | 143 responses | 58.6% |
| d. Moderate influence to leave | 16 responses | 6.6% |
| e. Strong influence to leave | 21 responses | 8.6% |

Here the majority of individual respondents stated that the career counseling sessions had no influence on their decisions, though more than one-fourth did perceive a positive effect from the communication.

Analysis of the study tends to indicate that those Ordnance Junior Officers who chose to separate from active duty were very much concerned with "leadership of superiors" as an aspect of military life with which they were most dissatisfied. This coupled with other relationship perceptions by the Junior Officer may have been instrumental in creating an atmosphere of dissatisfaction which over a period of time led to a career decision to separate.

SUMMARY

The communication questions included in each study were presented in parts 1, 2, and 3. Each study was conducted by a different organization and at different times.

The Franklin Study was completed in September, 1968, which makes it the oldest study used in the research. Many of the Army's problems with Junior Officers began after 1968 and continued on through 1972. As indicated by the mean intensity index, the poor communication was not likely to have been a strong decisive influence on the Junior Officer and his Army career decision to separate when compared with the composite mean intensity index of the non-communication questions.


The West Point Study was completed in July 1970 and dealt with problems encountered by West Point Graduates of the Class of 1966 during the Army's personnel turmoil from 1968. The mean intensity index differences between the total non-communication questions and the communication questions shows that the communication factors might have had more decisive effect on the Junior Officer to separate.

The Ordnance Study was completed in May 1971 and dealt with Junior Officer retention in the Ordnance Corp. The study consisted of 116 questions dealing with aspects of the Junior Officer's attitudes toward the military and his/her Senior Officers.

A clear cut analysis of the Ordnance Study was not accomplished due to the format of the study. The study itself was not set up using numerical answer discriminations or an attitudinal scale for the respondents to select. However, responses to questions were analyzed as separate units. Analysis of the responses indicate seven general factors which may have influenced the 244 respondents to leave military service. These are ranked, in order of purported influence, in Table V, page 78.

Any attempt to draw statistical conclusions from extensive comparison of all three studies combined would be impractical due to the variety of questions and formats utilized in all studies. However, there is little reason to conclude that the studies

TABLE V
INFLUENCING FACTORS TO LEAVE THE ARMY*



*Ordnance Corps Officers Loses

This table was derived from the complete Ordnance Corps Study. Each influencing factor was made up from a question group in the study dealing with the specific influence. The complete list of factors consisted of nineteen major significant areas of influence. The seven shown in the chart are the major influencing factors causing the Junior Officer to separate from active duty.

indicate communication problems between Junior and Senior Officers were of any overriding influence in the Junior Officers' decisions to separate.

FOOTNOTES

¹The review of Official Officer Personnel Files was conducted by a team of officers from the United States Military Academy and the U.S. Army Ordnance Center and School of which the author was an indirect member.

²U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, Department of the Army Pamphlet Number 601-4, Commander's Guide to the Retention of Junior Officers (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., Nov. 1970), p. ii.

³Ibid., p. 1-1.

⁴Franklin Institute of Research. Career Motivation of Army Personnel-Junior Officers' Duties, Philadelphia, Sept. 1968. (Typewritten.)

⁵U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. Why They Leave: Resignations from the USMA Class of 1966, July 1970. (Typewritten.)

⁶U.S. Army Ordnance Center and School. Ordnance Corps Officer Losses, May 1971. (Typewritten.)

⁷U.S. Department of the Army, Why They Leave: Resignations from the USMA Class of 1966.

⁸Department of Army Pamphlet 601-4, p. 2-1.

⁹Researchers own personal experience as a Commissioned U.S. Army Officer in the U.S. Army from 1966 to 1975.

CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

The purpose of this study has been to determine the communication relationship between Senior Army Officers and Junior Officers who separated from the service voluntarily from 1966 through 1970 as revealed in selected U.S. Army Studies.

A survey of appropriate publications was conducted to find any previous studies similar to this research subject. Those studies which appeared similar were analyzed further and found to be different from this current study. Thus, the uniqueness of this study was established.

Three U.S. Army studies were utilized as the basis of data from which an analysis of the communication relationship between Junior and Senior U.S. Army Officers could be made. The studies were analyzed in an attempt to determine the degree, nature, and direction of communication between Junior and Senior Officers as a factor in the Junior Officers' decision to separate from active military service between 1966 and 1970.

A Summary of Events

The Vietnam War

In July 1964, the United States became involved, with the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, with the South Vietnamese in their war with North Vietnam. As the United States sank deeper and deeper into the war, protest activity escalated at home. Discontent at home bred discontent within the military. In 1970, retention of Junior Officers reached its lowest level in more than 10 years, causing military leaders great concern. It was this concern that led to a number of studies on retention. However, the studies on retention did not fully address the problem of poor communication and a communication breakdown as factors in Junior Officer retention.

The retention problem

It was during the final years of the Vietnam War that the U.S. Army began to realize that it had a problem with insufficient retention of Junior Officers. Because of this retention problem the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel conducted several retention studies, using Army and outside agencies to conduct the studies to learn why Junior Officers on active military service, who at one time favored an Army career, voluntarily separated from active duty. The recommendations and findings of these studies were to be used to implement new programs to improve Junior Officer retention.

Summary of the Studies

The Franklin Study

The Franklin Study was directed toward identifying the relationships among various factors that influenced Junior Officers' Army career decisions. Special emphasis of the study was given to duty assignments, career management, leadership of superiors, duties and career counseling. The group selected for study was company grade officers with more than six months but less than five years active federal commissioned service.

The questionnaire was distributed to more than 4500 individuals by the Franklin Institute Research Laboratories, 2977 individuals responded to the 424 questions. All questions and answers were based on attitudinal scale.

The Franklin Study results only highlighted communication questions and responses. This researcher took communication questions from the Franklin Study and analyzed those questions in an attempt to determine the effect that poor communication played in the Junior Officer's decision to separate.

The West Point Study

The West Point Study was undertaken to determine why the 1966 West Point Class had an abnormally high number of resignations from active duty and the factors which influenced the individual's career decision, with emphasis being placed on leadership of

superiors, duty assignments, career management, efficiency reports, family separations and career counseling.

The questionnaire, consisting of 70 objective questions based on attitudinal scale, was administered to the 100 resignees by mail with eighty-one resignees responding. This research extracted the communication questions and did an analysis intended to determine the role poor communication played in the graduates' decision to leave active duty.

The Ordnance Study

The Ordnance Study was directed toward identifying the various factors that influenced Ordnance Corps, Junior Officers' decisions to separate. During the study, special emphasis was given to factors of possible influence, such as duty assignments, leadership of superiors, family separation, career management, and career counseling.

The survey was directed to the 446 Ordnance Corps Junior Officers who separated from active duty between 1966 and 1970, by mail with 244 individuals responding to the questionnaire. The questionnaire consisted of 116 questions, either multiple choice or attitude scale. Because of the two different types of questions utilized, an exact analysis of the extracted communication-type questions was not possible. However, each question was evaluated based on a percentage of respondents who selected a specific answer discriminator.

Conclusions

Based on the findings of this study, the following conclusions have been drawn:

1. During the final years of the Vietnamese War the United States Army experienced a serious problem in retention of Junior Officers.
2. Three specific studies were undertaken by the United States Army which were intended to identify the causes of the high level of separations of Junior Officers.
3. While these studies did not categorize questions as dealing with communication, a number of communication-related questions were identified in each study.
4. While communication problems between Junior and Senior Officers during the period covered by this study may have been influential in the Junior Officers' decisions to separate, the findings in this present inquiry do not support a conclusion that communication problems were more influential than the composite of other factors.

Recommendations for Further Study

With what has been learned from this study about communication and Junior Officer retention, it is recommended that another study be undertaken to determine the communication relationships between Junior and Senior Officers who are currently serving in the active Army, and how the communication relationship has affected Junior Officer retention.

It is further recommended that such a study be designed to allow for a measure of statistical significance in the findings. Perhaps such a study could utilize some or all of the communication questions identified in this present inquiry. The historic milieu provided in this study may also provide a foundation for further inquiry into the role of communication between Junior and Senior Officers in the Junior Officers' decisions to separate.

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